



The Tribal Dimension in the Division of the Kingdom of Israel:  
A Contextual Study of 1 Kings 12:1-24 from the Perspective of the 


















Submitted in fulfilment of the academic requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Religion and Theology at the 






















I hereby declare that this dissertation is my own unaided work. All citations, references 
and borrowed ideas have been duly acknowledged. It is being submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities, Development and Social Sciences, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. None of the present work 










































Fidèle and Glorioza Karege and your children Ikirezi, Claudine, and Pacifique; 
Daniel and Frieda Rwandanga and your children Grace and David; 
Alphonsine and Gasarabwe;  
And many more sisters and brothers in the faith who, like you, were direct or indirect 
victims of the senseless tragedy of the genocide, 
 


























I owe thanks to many people who contributed in different ways to the completion of this 
study. Although I cannot enumerate all of those who supported me I will mention some 
of them whose assistance was significant in helping me reach my goal. I wish to express 
my gratitude to Pastor Aminadab and Dr. Marie Grace Butorano, who generously hosted 
my family for about a year upon our arrival in South Africa, when we were struggling to 
find accommodation. Without their valuable support I would have had enormous 
difficulties starting this work.  
 
I am thankful to Dr. Gary S. Maxey, founder of West Africa Theological Seminary 
(WATS), for understanding and supporting my plan to pursue this programme.  His 
financial support to me was significant. He worked together with Friends of WATS to 
raise funds towards the maintenance of my family in South Africa. To Friends of WATS 
and to Dr. Maxey, in particular, I say thank you so much.  I am equally indebted to 
Christian International Scholarship foundation (CISF). They provided the funds 
necessary to cover my tuition and other academic-related expenses. 
 
I want to thank Prof. Elelwani B. Farisani. He was my initial supervisor and I worked 
with him until the time he moved from the University of KwaZulu-Natal to go to the 
University of South Africa (UNISA). Beside his constructive supervision, Prof. Farisani 
helped me get extra funding that this research required. 
 
For the successful completion of this study I am thankful to Prof. Gerald West, who came 
to my rescue when Prof. Farisani was no longer able to continue with me. Taking over 
the supervision of this work, Prof. West brought to it his sound knowledge and wide 
experience. His stimulating critique sharpened my approach to the study and his constant 
encouragement reassured me that it would be successfully completed. 
 
My thanks go to the many friends I met in Nigeria, who responded so generously to my 
appeal for financial support when I was about to make the trip to South Africa. These 
 
  
include Pastor Andrew and Mrs. Gbolu Bondo, Pastor Cosmas Ilechukwu, Pastor Ezekiel 
Odeyemi, Rev. Dr. Obed Uzodimma, Engr. J. Anisiofor, Rev. D. Ongunlowo, Rev. E. 
Oguntokun, Ven. and Mrs. Ogunleye, Rev. and Mrs Aishida and Dr. C. Clansy. 
 
Last but not least, my deep gratitude goes to my beloved wife, Rose, and to our children, 
Nadia, Béni, Benjamin, Fidele, Wesley, Josias and Esdras. I thank you all for your 
prayers, patience, understanding and unreserved support. 
 

































This study aims to undertake a contextual analysis of the event of the division of the 
kingdom of Israel narrated in1 Kings 12:1-24. This text and its context are analysed in the 
light of the context of tribal conflicts in Rwanda, using the inculturation hermeneutical 
approach that makes the contemporary context of the reader the subject of interpretation.  
The interactive engagement between the two contexts is conducted in a way that allows 
insights from each context to enrich the understanding of the other. 
 
The socio-historical analysis of the Rwandan context showed that the 1994 genocide 
resulted from a long period of social conflict opposing the main social groups in Rwanda 
namely the Hutu and the Tutsi. Conflicts arose from the determination of elites from each 
social group to monopolize political power and to control resources, to the exclusion of 
members of the other social group. It was noted that the failure of the church to discharge 
its prophetic responsibility reinforced the perception that God was absent during the 
genocide. 
 
The literary analysis of the text narrating the division of the kingdom of Israel noted the 
theological interpretation that explained that event as a result of Yahweh‟s punitive 
intervention against an apostate king, Solomon. However, literary analysis showed that 
the conflict involved socio-economic aspects and had much to do with the struggle for 
access and for the sharing of resources. Socio-historical analysis of the context of the 
division then revealed that, from the rise of the monarchy in Israel, the issue of the 
control and distribution of resources had been a challenge to unity among the tribes of 
Israel, generating conflicts that culminated in the division of the kingdom.  
 
Interaction between the two contexts of conflict, in Rwanda and in Israel, allowed for the 
identification of categories of players who had a share of responsibility in the conflicts. 
First, political leaders instituted patrimonial regimes that practised inequitable 
distribution of resources and privileges and antagonised social groups in both contexts. 
Second, the people, faced with the discriminative policies of their leaders, grouped 
themselves according to their shared interests or common challenges. Diverging or 
 
  
opposing interests among different groups exacerbated divisions, alienation and conflicts. 
Third, neighbouring countries and external powers had strategic or economic interests 
that led them to intervene in support of the warring social groups, thus aggravating the 
situation. Lastly, God‟s servants, who were supposed to play a unifying role, failed in 
their prophetic responsibility, not only by doing nothing to denounce social injustices, but 
by openly supporting them and actively taking part in them.  
 
This study has reasoned that social conflicts result from diverging interests. They are a 
human responsibility, not imposed by God. Diverse social identities are not intrinsic 
obstacles to social unity. They jeopardize unity when they give expression to conflicting 
interests. Change for lasting peace and unity in Rwanda requires a change of attitude 

































Ce travail a entrepris de faire une analyse contextuelle de l‟événement de la division du 
royaume d‟Israël raconté dans 2 Rois 12 :1-24. Ce passage, ainsi que son contexte, a été 
analysé  dans la lumière du contexte de conflit tribal au Rwanda suivant l‟approche de 
l‟inculturation herméneutique qui se sert du contexte du lecteur comme sujet 
d‟interprétation. L‟engagement interactif entre les deux contextes est conçu de manière à 
permettre une compréhension et un enrichissement mutuels des deux contextes. 
 
L‟analyse socio-historique du contexte du Rwanda a montré que le Génocide de 1994 
était le produit d‟une longue période de conflits sociaux opposant les principaux groupes 
sociaux de la société Rwandaise, à savoir, les Hutu et les Tutsi. Ces conflits provinrent de 
la détermination des élites de chacun de ces groupes   de s‟arroger le monopole du 
pouvoir politique et le contrôle des ressources en excluant les membres de l‟autre groupe. 
On a aussi observé que l‟église du Rwanda a failli d‟assumer ses responsabilités 
prophétiques ce qui a renforcé l‟impression que Dieu était absent pendant le Génocide.   
 
L‟analyse littéraire du passage qui raconte  l‟événement de la division du royaume 
d‟Israël a permis de noter l‟interprétation théologique expliquant l‟événement comme un 
fait de l‟intervention punitive de Yahweh contre le roi Salomon qui s‟était adonné a 
l‟apostasie. Cette analyse a montré que, en fait,   ce conflit comprenait un aspect socio-
économique ayant beaucoup à faire  avec la lutte pour l‟accès et le partage des ressources.   
L‟analyse socio-historique du contexte de la division du royaume a révélé que depuis 
l‟avènement de la monarchie en Israël, le problème du contrôle et de la distribution des 
ressources a toujours été  un défi pour l‟unité entre les tribus d‟Israël. Ce problème a été 
la source des conflits qui ont abouti à la division du royaume.   
 
L‟interaction entre les deux contextes de conflits au Rwanda et en Israël a permis 
l‟identification des catégories des gens qui, par leurs rôles respectifs, partagent la 
responsabilité dans chacun des conflits. Premièrement,  les dirigeants politiques 
instituèrent des régimes patrimoniaux pratiquant une distribution  inéquitable  des 
 
  
ressources et des privilèges créant ainsi un climat d‟antagonisme  entre les groupes 
sociaux dans les deux contextes. Ensuite, les peuples soumis aux mesures 
discriminatoires de leurs dirigeants se divisèrent en groupes sociaux ayant des intérêts ou 
des défis communs.   Le conflit d‟intérêts entre différents groupes aggrava les divisions, 
la rupture et les conflits.  Puis, les pays voisins ainsi que les puissances étrangères ayant 
des intérêts économiques et stratégiques intervinrent  en faveur de l‟un ou de l‟autre 
groupe en conflit. Ces interventions aggravèrent les situations de conflits. Enfin, les 
serviteurs de Dieu qui étaient supposés jouer un rôle unificateur on failli dans leurs 
responsabilités prophétiques, soit par leur silence devant les injustices sociales de leur 
temps, soit par leur rôle actif  dans la perpétration de ces injustices. 
 
Ce travail a soutenu que les conflits sociaux sont le résultat des conflits d‟intérêts. Ces 
conflits ne sont pas imposés par Dieu, les humains en sont totalement responsables. La 
diversité des identités sociales n‟est pas un intrinsèque obstacle à l‟unité sociale. La 
diversité sociale devient néfaste lorsqu‟elle devient l‟expression des intérêts 
incompatibles. Le changement qui apportera une paix durable au Rwanda requiert un 
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to and motivation for the research 
Among the events that marked the history of Rwanda at the dawn of the twentieth century 
was the advent of Christianity in the early 1900s. The impact of the Christian gospel 
promised to be positive when, under the influence of what was called the “East African 
Revival”, lives of people were positively affected, resulting in the restoration of broken 
relationships and the building of unity among neighbours.  Nobody would guess that the 
same century would close in darkness.  
 
The year 1994 was indeed a dark year in Rwanda, the year of the Genocide, a tragedy 
resulting from the ethnic conflict that affected every Rwandan, within and outside the 
country.  This was a time during which the spirit of death seemed to have taken over the 
control of the affairs of the whole nation. Many of those who still believed in God felt 
that God was “absent” during the Genocide.
1
 The Genocide in Rwanda was a sad case, 
illustrating the worst that can result from ethnic conflicts. 
 
The problem of ethnic conflicts is not peculiar to Rwanda. Newspaper headlines and 
television screens bring to our attention many of the places around the world where 
hatreds and conflicting claims by different ethnic groups have led to overt conflict or to 
actual civil war.
2
 The African Great Lakes Region and the Asian Middle East are among 
the most notorious places where ethnic-related conflicts carried over from last century 
into this one, still claiming many lives. Currently, the people of Cote d‟Ivoire, Burundi, 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Sudanese Darfour are among many who are still 
mourning the victims of ethnic-related conflicts. 
 
While the issue of ethnic differences is a worldwide phenomenon, ethnic-related 
problems have been approached in different places in different ways. Some societies were 
                                                 
1
 Guillebaud, M. Rwanda: The Land God Forgot? Grand Rapids, Michigan: Monarch Books. 2002, p 308. 
(The question “Where were you God?” became a recurring theme in the songs of Rwandan artists after the 
Genocide). 
2
 Patchen, M. Diversity and Unity: Relation Between Racial and Ethnic Groups. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. 
1999, p 1. 
 
 2 
able to deal with their ethnic diversity and reach relative harmony. Unfortunately, as the 
case of Rwanda proves, there are still too many places where ethnic conflicts result in 
tragedy. The question is, why should Rwanda be on the side of failure?  
 
The question is made even more pertinent by the claim that Rwanda is a country where 
the majority of the population is believed to be Christian.  According to the 1991 national 
census, 90% of the Rwandan population called themselves Christians. These included 
63% Roman Catholics, 19% Protestants and 8% Seventh Day Adventists.
3
 Since 
Christian ethics and teachings are clearly against such things as the pogrom perpetrated in 
Rwanda, the presence of Christians was expected to be a factor contributing to the 
prevention of the Genocide. Therefore, since the predominance of Christians in Rwanda 
did not make any difference in preventing or stopping the Genocide, it is often concluded 
that the church in Rwanda has failed in its work.
4
  Most of the time, this conclusion 
reflects the opinions of people speaking from their personal observations and 
understanding and not necessarily basing their claims on findings from any serious 
research.  
 
In an attempt to understand the cause of the tragic events in Rwanda, another question 
that arises concerns God‟s attitude to the Rwandan conflict. If God is all-powerful, why 
did he
5
 allow the Genocide to happen? In an essay titled “The divided kingdom, a 
culmination of tribal jealousies: what the church can learn”,
6
 I used the passage reporting 
the division of the kingdom in Israel (1 Kings 12:1-24) to address the problem of 
divisions and conflicts arising in the church, sometimes giving birth to new 
                                                 
3
 Guillebaud, M. Rwanda: The land God forgot? p 284. 
4
  McCullum hints at this conclusion and he attributes the failure of the church to the ethnic tensions 
existing within the church, on one hand, and the deliberate strategy by the extremists to destroy any 
alternatives to their ideology by wiping out those who were advocates of moderation, on the other hand. 
See McCullum, H. The Angels Have Left Us. Geneva, Switzerland: Risk Books Series. 1995. While we 
may agree with McCullum that these reasons contributed to weakening the position of the leaders of the 
church in Rwanda, the inability to prevent or stop the Genocide resulted from more complex factors which 
will be discussed in this study.  
5
 The biblical texts and a number of quotations in this work use masculine pronouns with reference to God. 
For the sake of consistency and in order to avoid confusion, we shall maintain the masculine pronouns 
throughout the thesis, without in any way implying that we are talking about a male God.   
6
 Nyirimana, E. The Divided Kingdom, A Culmination of Tribal Jealousies: What the Church Can Learn. 




denominations accepted as new ministries fitting into God‟s plan and blessed by him. The 
point of the essay was that God may be very present in human-generated conflicts; he 
may even use conflicts to accomplish his plans, but his involvement does not exonerate 
selfish ambitions of the instigators and perpetrators of divisive conflicts. In my reading of 
books on the Rwandan Genocide, I once again came across a number of reactions from 
people implicating God in an attempt to understand or explain the cause of conflict 
among people.
7
   
 
The Bible does not rule out the possibility of God‟s involvement in conflicts of this kind.  
The division of the kingdom of Israel is presented in the first book of Kings as an event 
that was ordained by God when he resolved to punish King Solomon for his apostasy. A 
closer reading of the history of Israel reveals that the nation of Israel underwent a series 
of tribal conflicts that resulted in the secession that produced two separate kingdoms: the 
kingdom of Judah and the kingdom of Israel.  
 
The present research intends to pursue the discussion of the issue of the divine and the 
human share of responsibility in conflicts that divide people. The research uses the 
situation of conflict that opposed the tribe of Judah and the northern tribes. This is viewed 
as a case of human conflict that resulted in the division of the Kingdom of Israel, yet an 
event said to have occurred with God‟s direct intervention.  This case is now approached 
from the perspective of the Rwandan context in a bid to understand God‟s attitude to the 
Rwandan tragedy and human responsibility in the conflict. The human side includes the 





                                                 
7
 In a number of books the authors report expressions of confusion from people who, having witnessed the 
massacre, are now asking questions about God‟s attitude. The statement “I shall no longer come to this 
church… the angels have left us” (MacCullum, The Angels Have Left Us), the question: Where was God 
when the machetes rose and fell? (Guillebaud, Rwanda: The Land God Forgot?) or “Where was God when 
a million innocent people were being butchered?” Rucyahana, J. The Bishop of Rwanda. Nashville, 
Tennessee: Thomas Nelson. 2007, p xv., are expressions of complaints from those who were affected by 
the Rwandan Genocide who did not see the providential help of God the way they expected. 
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1.2 Research problem  
The question “Where was God…?” raised by many frustrated and disappointed 
Rwandans may seem to question the omnipresence of God. The question seems to imply 
that God was absent and unaware of, or indifferent to, what was happening in Rwanda 
during the Genocide. The question “Where was God…?” is a question expecting an 
answer with reasons not with location.
8
 The meaning of the question is “Why didn‟t God 
do anything to prevent or stop the tragedy?” This question reveals the people‟s 
expectation to see the good, merciful and powerful God use his great power to contain the 
folly of human belligerents and prevent them from pouring their wrath on one another 
and on innocent people. An aspect of the question was fairly answered by Rucyahana 
who suggested that God was alongside the victims lying on the cold stone floor of the 
cathedral. He was comforting a dying child. He was crying at the altar. But he was also 
saving lives. Many were saved by miracles. God does not flee when evil takes over a 
nation.
9
 However, Rucyahana‟s answer may not satisfy many of those who still find it 
hard to understand how the good God could allow such an unjust tragedy to befall 
innocent and helpless people. 
 
Coupled with the issue concerning God‟s attitude there is another question asked about 
the church of Rwanda. If the majority of the Rwandan people are Christians known to 
preach love, how could they kill one another the way they did? This question reveals the 
dissatisfaction with the impact of the church on the social life in Rwanda and with the 
role and attitude of religious leaders during the conflict. 
 
                                                 
8
 In fact, the popular saying: “Imana yirirwa ahandi igataha i Rwanda” (God may spend the day in any 
other place but he has his home in Rwanda where he always returns) could be wrongly understood as 
suggesting a belief in a God that is busy during the day, moving from one place to the other, remembering 
to come to Rwanda only for the night. In this case Rwanda would be a home of a wayward God always 
absent and only present in the night when he is weary and exhausted. But the saying means the opposite. 
The emphasis is on the privilege Rwanda has to enjoy God‟s special attention.  Whatever blessing God may 
give to any other people that will be just occasional, his attention is permanently on Rwanda. Among other 
corollaries of God‟s chosen domicile in Rwanda were expected to be peace and prosperity in the country. 
The absence of these privileges meant that God was no longer caring. At the heat of the massacre, the 
saying was revisited so that you could hear people lament in a bitter joke: “God has forgotten his way 
home!” 
9
 Rucyahana, J. The Bishop of Rwanda, p xv. 
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In the midst of their suffering the Rwandan people affected by ethnic conflicts have asked 
questions about God‟s attitude toward their suffering and have lamented the inability of 
the church to prevent the tragedy. The question is, what kind of help were the people 
entitled to expect from the church and from God and what were the perils of their 
expectation?  
 
The questions raised above that relate to the theological aspect of the conflict in Rwanda 
can fit into the larger debate on God‟s sovereignty and human free will. However, the 
present study does not focus on such theological discussions. It attempts to find answers 
to the questions by the use of a dialogue between two concrete cases, an interaction 
between the case of Rwanda and a biblical case that involves the intervention of God in a 
human ethnic conflict. The conflict between the tribes in Israel that resulted in the 
division of the monarchy in Israel, as recorded in 1 Kings 12:1-24, is a case of a tribal 
conflict that can shed some light on God‟s attitude and role in human conflict. 
Conversely, biblical data concerning this conflict approached from the perspective of a 
contemporary social crisis, such as the case of Rwanda, provide useful information about 
the human origin of this conflict as well as the rationale behind God‟s intervention in the 
conflict. 
 
The main questions raised are divided into sub-questions designed to guide the discussion 
of the two conflicts in their respective contexts and to establish the responsibilities 
involved, both divine and human. The sub-questions are formulated as follows: 
 
 What are the root-causes of the conflict that led to the Genocide in Rwanda 
and how do they compare to the causes of the conflict that led to the division 
of the monarchy in Israel? 
 How does the attitude of the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda compare to that of the 
competing tribes in Israel? 
 How do we evaluate the role and attitude of religious leaders in the two 
conflicts in the light of their responsibility to the people and their prophetic 
role toward the political leaders? 
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 What was the external contribution to conflicts that led to the division of the 
kingdom in Israel and to the conflicts that culminated in the Genocide in 
Rwanda? 
 God is said to have not only allowed the division of the Kingdom but even to 
have ordained it as a reaction against the failure of political leaders to keep his 
statutes and judgments ( ). What is the possible socio-political 
element involved in the sin attributed to the leaders of the people? 
 How does God‟s involvement in the conflict affect the human character of the 
conflict, which had an obvious tribal element? How does this apply to the 
tribal conflict in Rwanda?  
 
1.3 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis that this work seeks to substantiate is that a dialogue between two 
contexts, namely the context of conflict in a theocratic society described in the biblical 
text, on one hand, and the contemporary context of conflict in Rwanda, on the other hand, 
can shed necessary light on the understanding of both. Through this dialogue, the 
affirmation of God‟s sovereignty, over-emphasized in the theological interpretation of the 
events narrated in the biblical text, is mitigated by the human responsibility emphasized 
in the case of the Rwandan conflict. The dialogue leads to the understanding that in 
neither of the contexts is God perceived as imposing tragedies on people. Tragedies result 
from conflicts initiated by people who are free and responsible. God is not responsible for 
conflicts among humans, people are! Any conflict can be avoided or resolved; even God-
given social diversity is not necessarily an irremediable obstacle to social harmony. 
 
1.4 Research methodology 
This study is designed as an interaction between two contexts, the contemporary context 
of social conflicts in Rwanda and the ancient context of conflicts in Israel that occurs in 
the biblical passage of 1 Kings 12:1-24. The interactive engagement between the two 
contexts is conducted in a way that allows insights from each context to enrich the 
understanding of the other. The contextual approach adopted for this study is inspired by 
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inculturation hermeneutics, as promoted by Ukpong.
10
 This approach emphasizes the use 
of the contemporary context of the reader as the subject of interpretation of the biblical 
text. Accordingly, the issue of ethnicity and tribal conflict that remain the focus of this 
study is provided by the contemporary context of Rwanda, which also guided the 
selection of the biblical text relevant to the issue at stake. The assumption is that the 
conflict that produced the Genocide in Rwanda has some dynamic correspondences with 
the conflict that resulted in the division of the kingdom of Israel and that each of these 
conflicts has a contribution to elucidate a particular aspect of ethnic conflict. For 
example, God‟s involvement is made explicit in the case of Israel, while the ethnic 
character of this conflict is less emphasized. The Rwandan conflict is obviously ethnic, 
while the extent of God‟s involvement in this conflict is not straightforward. More details 
concerning the inculturation hermeneutic approach are provided in the second chapter of 
this study. 
 
The present study starts with an analysis of the Rwandan context, with special attention 
on the issue of ethnicity and tribal conflicts, identified as the meeting point for the 
analysis of the two contexts. The first part of the work concentrates on a historical review 
of ethnic conflicts in Rwanda. This is a socio-historical analysis of Rwandan ethnicity 
which aims at identifying the possible root causes of the tribal conflicts that culminated in 
the Genocide in 1994 in Rwanda. This analysis pays attention to the worldview of the 
Rwandan people and the way they perceive the issue of ethnicity. It seeks to investigate 
the issues in relation to history, in order to understand how the Rwandan people have 
experienced ethnic conflicts throughout history. This analysis looks at ethnic conflicts in 
Rwanda with respect to the cultural, economic, political and religious implications to the 
lives of the people. The data used for this part of the research came from a variety of 
secondary sources produced by historians, anthropologists, missionaries, human rights 
activists and a variety of works produced after, and about, the Rwandan Genocide. 
 
                                                 
10
 Ukpong, J.S. “Developments in Biblical Interpretation in Modern Africa”. In Missionalia 27(3) 
(November 1999) 313-329. 
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The next stage of the research focuses on the analysis of the biblical text. It involves a 
twofold approach. The first task is that of analysing the biblical passage of 1 Kings 12: 1-
24, reporting the event of the division of the kingdom of Israel. This ancient event is 
perceived to have some commonalities with the Rwandan Genocide, both events 
appearing to be the results of tribal conflict. The selected text is subjected to a literary 
analysis inspired by the distantiation phase of the tri-polar exegetical model developed by 
Draper who describes the distantiation phase as follows: 
 
This stage of exegesis requires that the readers or reading community allow the 
text to speak for itself by creating space or critical distance between themselves 
and the text. It must be allowed to be other, different, over against ourselves and 




The literary analysis of the text selected for the present work is in the form of narrative 
criticism. It pays attention to elements characteristic of a narrative such as setting, plot, 
characters, time and place. This literary approach aims at pointing out issues involved in 
the narrative concerning the division of the kingdom of Israel, around which a dialogue 
with the Rwandan context can be carried out. It is this exegetical part that reveals the 
tribal aspect involved in the division of the kingdom. 
 
The crisis recorded in 1 Kings 12:1-24 resulted from a socio-political situation of a 
nation, the people of Israel, in a particular period of history. This event cannot be fully 
understood, therefore, without considering the socio-political environment surrounding 
its immediate causes. The relevant biblical text under study needs first to be located in its 
historical context before it can be interpreted against the concrete situation of Rwanda. 
To this end, the literary analysis of the text is followed by a socio-historical discussion of 
the events that prepared and culminated in the division. The socio-historical discussion 
starts from the time of the emergence of Israel in Canaan. The focus is on the impact of 
different leadership styles and different political regimes on social relations among the 
tribes of Israel, from the tribal period, through the period of the united monarchy, to the 
                                                 
11
 Draper, J.A. “Old Score and New Notes: Where and What Is Contextual Exegesis in the New South 
Africa?” in Speckman, M.T. and Larry T. Kaufman. eds. Toward an Agenda for Contextual Theology. 
Pietermaritzburg, South Africa: Cluster Publication. 2001, pp 153, 154 (emphasis in the original). Draper 
was describing the stage he calls „distantiation‟ in his Tri-Polar Exegetical Model. 
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event of the division. This overview aims at pointing out the possible link between the 
event of the division of the kingdom reported in 1Kings 12:1-24 and the recurrent 
conflicts that opposed the tribes of Israel from the early history of Israel, in order to 
establish the ethnic aspects of this conflict. 
 
In the last part of this research the two contexts are brought together in dialogue. At this 
stage the work takes inspiration from the appropriation phase of the tri-polar exegetical 
model. The horizon of the text and its community, and the horizon of the interpreter and 
his community, are brought together to mediate a new consciousness, leading to a new 
praxis.
12
 The dialogue revolves around the possible causes of conflict in both contexts 
and the role and responsibility of each of the protagonists. Beside the discussion of the 
responsibility of each of the conflicting tribes, God‟s position on the issue of ethnicity, 
his attitude towards human tribal conflicts and his involvement in human government are 
examined. Insights gathered at this stage help to find answers to some theological 
questions about the Rwandan conflict, such as God‟s role in the conflict.  
 
1.6 Limitations 
The issue of ethnicity is a very sensitive one, especially in a country like Rwanda, which 
is still dressing the wounds of the past atrocities and is yet to heal totally from the 
psychological trauma subsequent to the Genocide. Acknowledgement of the objectivity 
of any Rwandan who undertakes to discuss issues related to ethnicity risks too often, to 
be marred by his/her own ethnic identity.  
 
In the discussion of the causes and the nature of the conflict in Rwanda, an attempt to 
avoid as much as possible judgmental comments on any particular tribe may result in the 
exclusion of some information that would otherwise be relevant to the clarity of the 
matter under discussion. To overcome these limitations, this study endeavours to consider 
different views on controversial issues and to point out their strengths and their 
weaknesses, without taking sides. 
                                                 
12
 Draper, J.A. “Old Score and New Notes” in Speckman, M.T. and Larry T. Kaufman. eds. Toward an 




As a result of the war, the massacre of some, and the subsequent exile of others, has 
removed, or rendered inaccessible, some resourceful persons who were knowledgeable 
concerning the contours of ethnic issues in Rwanda and who could have provided 
important information relevant to this work.  
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
The present thesis is divided into eight chapters. The first chapter provides a general 
introduction to the research. It explains its background and motivation, the issues 
researched and the methodological approach followed. The structure of the thesis is 
briefly described, as well as the limitations of this study. 
 
The second chapter describes the contextual approach used by the study. It presents a 
survey of the historical development of inculturation theology and inculturation 
hermeneutics. The focus is on inculturation hermeneutics as developed by Ukpong, 
especially his emphasis on the context of the interpreter, used as the subject of 
interpretation.
13
  An attempt is made to locate the inculturation approach in African 
interpretation and then follows a brief evaluation of the potential and the limits of this 
interpretive approach. The chapter ends with an examination of the applicability of the 
approach to the text of 1 Kings 12:1-24, selected for the present study. It explains some 
aspects of the tri-polar interpretive model which are useful for this study. 
 
The inculturation hermeneutic approach followed by this study advocates the use of the 
context of the interpretor as the subject of interpretation. In this study the context of 
ethnic conflicts in Rwanda is the subject of interpretation. Chapters Three and Four 
describe this context. These chapters describe the peculiar characteristics of ethnicity in 
Rwanda and present a historical survey of ethnic relations, from the pre-colonial period to 
the time of the Genocide. Chapter Three provides a multidimensional analysis of the 
tribal conflicts in Rwanda, including the cultural, economic, political and religious 
                                                 
13
  See Ukpong, J. S. “Re-reading the Bible with African Eyes”. in Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 
91 (1995), p 3-14.  
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implications of these conflicts to the lives of Rwandan people. Chapter Four discusses the 
relations of the Rwandan churches with political authorities in different regimes that 
governed the country. The focus is on the evaluation of the prophetic ministry of the 
Rwandan churches throughout Rwandan history, especially in the context of social 
conflicts.  
 
After the analysis of the Rwandan context, the study moves to the analysis of the biblical 
text.  Chapter Five focuses on the text in its immediate literary context, while Chapter Six 
analyses the larger socio-historical context of the event of the division narrated in the 
selected text. The study of the text begins with a literary analysis of 1 Kings 12:1-24 in 
Chapter Five. The exegetical study of this narrative examines the way the event of the 
division of the kingdom is described, in order to discover its potential dynamic 
correspondence within the Rwandan context of social conflicts. While the analysis of the 
text involves some historical-critical aspects, the focus remains on its literary 
examination, which considers its narrative form. The exegesis of the text pays attention to 
elements characteristic of a narrative such as setting, plot, characters, time and place. This 
literary approach aims at pointing out issues involved in the narrative about the division 
of the kingdom of Israel, concerning which a dialogue with the context of ethnic conflict 
in Rwanda can be carried out. These issues become even clearer with the examination, in 
Chapter Six, of the larger socio-historical context of the event of the division. Chapter Six 
presents a socio-historical background of the events recorded in 1 Kings 12:1-24. The 
focus is on the conflict among Israel‟s tribes, from the early history of the tribes of Israel 
through to the monarchical period. 
 
The analysis of the contexts of conflicts in Israel and in Rwanda in the previous chapters 
allows for a dialogue between the two in Chapter Seven. In an interactive discussion of 
the two contexts, Chapter Seven attempts to sum up some major socio-economic and 
political issues involved in both conflicts, as discussed in the previous chapters, and to 
examine the extent to which tribal diversity contributed to the conflicts.  Issues covered 
include the leaders‟ resolve to monopolize the privileges of power in dynastic Israel, as in 
Rwandan tribal politics, and the people‟s reaction to such tendencies.  The chapter 
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examines the contribution of external powers to internal conflicts in both contexts, as 
well as the attitude of God‟s servants in times of social conflicts in Israel and in Rwanda. 
This discussion is oriented towards the examination of the prospects of reconciliation and 
reconstruction of the Rwandan nation.  
 
The last chapter concludes the thesis. Chapter Eight is a general conclusion reviewing the 
objectives of the study and indicating the extent to which they have been reached. This 
chapter recapitulates various issues pertaining to tribal conflicts covered in the study. It 
summarizes the findings of the study, assessing to what extent the research has answered 
the questions asked at the beginning of the study. The chapter ends with 
recommendations that some areas not sufficiently covered by this study could be the 




















CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.0 Introduction 
The present study involves an interactive engagement between a biblical text, the passage 
of 1 Kings 12:1-24, which belongs to the ancient world, and a contemporary socio-
political issue, the issue of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts in Rwanda. The contemporary 
Rwandan case will enrich the understanding of this ancient text and the message of the 
text will contribute toward the understanding of the contemporary Rwandan problem. In 
an attempt to bridge the gap between the two worlds - the ancient world that shapes the 
biblical text and the contemporary world that conditions the way I understand it - the 
contextual approach adopted in this study will follow the Inculturation Hermeneutic 
Framework.  
 
Chapter Two presents an overview of the historical development of inculturation 
theology, with special focus on inculturation hermeneutics, as developed by Ukpong.
14
 
An attempt is made to locate the inculturation approach in African interpretation, 
followed by a brief evaluation of the potential and the limits of this approach. The chapter 
ends with an examination of the applicability of the approach to the text of 1 Kings 12:1-
24. However, before all this, there is a need to understand the concept of inculturation. 
 
2.1 Definition 
Inculturation is a term now used in biblical hermeneutics and closely related to – and 
often associated with - “acculturation” and “enculturation”, two well-known concepts in 
sociology and anthropology. The three terms are sometimes confused as if they are 
equivalent in meaning. However, although each concept connotes a kind of cultural 
change, they remain different in meaning.  
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“Acculturation” refers to the contact between different cultures, resulting in unavoidable 
cultural changes
15
. The phenomenon of acculturation may refer to a situation whereby 
one culture overwhelms and dominates another. This domination implies the unwelcome 
transference of foreign cultural traits: symbols, meanings, values and beheaviour, from 
one culture to the other.
16
 But “acculturation” may also refer to a communication between 
cultures on a footing of mutual respect and tolerance.  This contact implies an encounter 
between two different sets of symbols and conceptions, two different interpretations of 
experience, and two different social identities. The consequences of this encounter can be 
discerned post factum at the conscious level, but many of the conflicts it engenders are 
worked out at the subconscious level.
17
   
 
Although “inculturation” is about an encounter between cultures and presupposes 
“acculturation”, the two concepts are not identical. Inculturation has been defined as a 
deliberate and conscious effort of a society, touched by the phenomenon of cultural 
encounter, to develop a satisfactory and appropriate culture which takes into account the 
contingent event of the cultural encounter and considers this event as a fundamental to, 
and the foundation of, its future history.
18
 From the perspective of Christianity, 
inculturation is the on-going dialogue between faith and culture or cultures.
19
 
Inculturation goes beyond a simple contact between cultures to involve the insertion of 
the Christian faith and practices into a given culture.
20
   
 
Inculturation is also different from enculturation. The term “enculturation” refers to the 
process of cultural learning. This is a process by which a person progressively learns and 
grows into a new culture. This process may include formal teachings and learning, but it 
is mainly an informal and even an unconscious experience by which a person teaches 
himself, through a process of adaptive learning, the rules which are given by the 
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 Shorter, A. Toward a Theology of Inculturation, p 7. 
18
 Nkeramihigo, T. “Inculturation and the Specificity of Christian Faith” in Walligo, J.M. et al. 
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 While acculturation presupposes an encounter between cultures with elements 
of the new cultures modifying and enriching the initial culture, enculturation focuses on 
the new culture into which socialization takes place. Both acculturation and enculturation 
refer to a one-way process by which elements of a new culture modify the initial culture 
of a person. Inculturation refers to a two-ways process through which Christian faith 
embodied in one culture encounters another culture with which it fuses and becomes part 
of. With inculturation, the faith fuses with the new culture and simultaneously transforms 
it into a new religious-cultural reality in a process that involves the interaction of mutual 
critique and affirmation.
22
 The new reality results from mutual influence between faith 
and local culture. 
 
Inculturation is an approach that cuts across different theological disciplines. In 
ecclesiological terms, the inculturation of the church has been defined as  
 
…the integration of the Christian experience of a local Church into the culture of 
its people, in such a way that this experience not only expresses itself in elements 
of this culture, but becomes the force that animates, orients and motivates this 
culture so as to create a new unity and communion, not only within the culture in 




Applied to mission/evangelism, inculturation involves evangelising a culture from within, 
that is to say, proclaiming the good news to people from within the perspective of their 
culture.
24
 Inculturation is not about the superimposition of Christian faith and way of life 
on a culture, it is rather about the integration of Christian teachings and practices into the 
given culture, while at the same time the local culture and practices are also integrated 
into the Christian message. The process of incultuation is therefore a two-way process by 
which mutual dialogue, influence and integration between the Christian message and the 
culture of the people occur. The influence of the Christian life and message concerning 
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the cultural context of a particular people is sometimes referred to as inculturation ad 
extra, as opposed to what is called inculturation ad intra, referring to the influence of a 





Inculturation is a programmatic endeavour, necessitated by the meeting of (cultural) 
realities in time and space. Applied to Africa, it refers to the encounter between 
missionary Christianity and African culture. This encounter must be an ongoing process 
of correlating and integrating the two sources.
26
 Inculturation implies integrating 
Christian doctrines with “useful” African traditional cultural values and modern way of 
life.
27
 Grounded on the conviction that Christ and his good news are dynamic and 
challenging to all times and cultures as they become better understood and lived by each 
people, inculturation aims at making Christianity permanent in Africa by making it a 
people‟s religion and a way of life.
28
 The process should lead to a point where African 
Christians can – as is now common to say – live their faith as “truly African and truly 




In the domain of biblical interpretation, the concern to correlate and integrate Christianity 
and African culture is expressed through a contextual interpretive approach called 
inculturation hermeneutics. This is a theological hermeneutics that lays much emphasis 
on African culture and worldview.
30
 This approach seeks to make any community of 
ordinary people and their social-cultural context the subject of interpretation of the Bible 
through the use of the conceptual frame of reference of the people and the involvement of 
ordinary people in the interpretation process.
31
 As an expression of African theological 
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concerns, inculturation hermeneutics is a by-product of African Theology, as the 
historical development of this approach shows.  
 
2.2 Brief overview of the development of inculturation hermeneutics   
Inculturation hermeneutics is an approach to biblical interpretation inspired by the 
concerns of African theologians to promote an African interpretation of the Christian 
faith. The roots of the inculturation approach in theology are to be traced back to the early 
stages of African theology, a current which arose from the need to resist the domination 
and the oppression of colonialism. African theology went through different stages of 
development that resulted in subsequent development in biblical interpretation. 
 
2.2.1 Development of African theology 
From its inception, African theology was a theological counterpart of the political 
movement of liberation and it focused on the cultural-religious dimension of African 
revolution. African theology intended to take account of its African location, its culture, 
its religion and its problems of civilization.
32
 Initially, African theology aimed at the 
Africanisation of the church, understood as the transfer of leadership and management of 
the church from European hands to the hands of Africans. Later the concept of 
Africanisation was expanded to include a reassessment of the traditional systems of 




The Africanisation process was expressed through different idioms such as adaptation, 
accommodation, indigenisation, translation, incarnation, localisation, inculturation, 
interculturation contextualisation and so forth. These terms do not necessarily refer to 
different approaches of Africanisation, rather, sometimes one term was preferred in 
Francophone Africa, while Anglophone Africa was using a different term to refer to the 
same theory, or Roman Catholic theologians were using a term different from the one 
used by their Protestant colleagues, to express the same process. However, new terms 
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were usually adopted at different stages of the process to express a shift in emphasis with 
respect to what should be the object or the extent of the church‟s Africanisation policy. 
 
In its early stages, the Africanisation trend promoted the transfer of church leadership and 
management to Africans and the identification of conceptual tools within the African 
culture, referred to as “stepping stones”, which could be useful in communicating the 
Gospel message to Africans effectively.
34
 African theologians noted that:  
 
An uncritical acceptance of the theology developed in the West, and an equally 
uncritical rejection of anything different from it, are both signs of theological 
immaturity and intellectual irresponsibility in Christian obedience – obedience to 
the Gospel within the context of a given, concrete, social situation. 
35
   
 
In its later development, Africanisation required a critical African theology that would 
operate on the basis of the cultural and religious experience of the African people, a 
theology responding to the questions posed by African society in its contemporary 
evolution;
36
 in a nutshell, a theology that could promote an authentic African 




The term “adaptation” was prevalently used by African Catholic theologians, while 
“indigenisation” was used in Protestant circles. Both terms, originating from Western 
missionaries, shared the weakness of referring to the Africanization of some external and 
superficial aspects of the church such as liturgical adaptation or involvement of black 
priests in the management of the church. These terms were judged inadequate by African 
theologians, who supported a deeper level of Africanisation. They wanted the re-
interpretation programme to include Christian doctrine, cult, pastoral practices and art, 
basing them on African culture and religious tradition.
38
 It was the attempt to express 
better the content and the kind of Africanisation that resulted in the introduction of the 
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term “incarnation”. Incarnation was preferred for its Christological metaphor that 
facilitated its understanding. Incarnation involved “immersing Christianity in African 
Culture [so that] just as Jesus became man, so must Christianity become African”.
39
 The 
purpose of inculturation was compared to the Son of God taking human flesh and 
adopting a human culture as a necessary concomitant of his human nature. In other 
words, the model was one of Christ‟s own enculturation, his cultural education as a first-




Despite the advantages presented by the term incarnation, which had the merit of being 
christologically oriented and deeply rooted in Scripture, the incarnation analogy had 
certain inadequacies that rendered it inappropriate to express the process of 
Africanisation. Shorter has outlined at least three weaknesses of the incarnation analogy. 
Firstly, the analogy of the cultural education of the earthly Jesus could create the 
impression that the focus of Africanisation is on the first insertion of the Gospel into 
culture, with the risk of overlooking the on-going dialogue between Gospel and culture. 
Secondly, the idea of a pre-existent divine being, the Eternal Logos, taking human flesh 
encourages, in practice, a one-way view of inculturation. Lastly, the incarnation model 
may encourage people to succumb to the temptation of culturalism.
41
 This risk is 
described by Shorter,  
 
In concentrating upon the inculturation of Jesus, upon how he accepted and 
identified with a specific culture, we may forget to ask how he himself challenged 
the culture of his adoption. We are so absorbed by the notion of the Son of God 
learning a human way of life that we overlook the fact that he clashed with that 





The above-mentioned inadequacies may explain the fact that the term “incarnation” was 
not retained and the sociological term “inculturation” was preferred instead to express the 
process of Africanisation. However, if the term was abandoned, the economy of its 
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content was preserved and later expressed through the new concept- Inculturation- a term 
which was accepted by most Roman Catholics and Protestants and Francophone and 
Anglophone theologians. 
 
The term “inculturation” was derived from sociology and anthropology, but was given a 
theological definition that borrowed from the metaphor of incarnation. It was understood 
as “the incarnation of Christian life and of the Christian message in a particular cultural 
context, in such a way that this experience not only finds expression through elements 
proper to the culture in question, but becomes a principle that animates, directs and 




Although the inculturation model has been widely accepted among African theologians of 
various backgrounds to express and pursue the process of Africanisation, the term 
inculturation was not found broad enough to cover all aspects of contemporary African 
theology. The need to emphasize some specific African realities has led to different 
trends in African theology. African liberation theology and African feminist theology are 
trends in African theology that focus, respectively, on African political and socio-
economic realities and on gender issues, while Africa‟s religio-cultural matters remain 
the domain of inculturation. 
 
The development of African theology corresponded with a development in the domain of 
biblical interpretation.  The development of African biblical hermeneutics that occurred 
in parallel with that of African theology is surveyed below.  
 
2.2.2 Development of African biblical interpretation 
Ukpong
44
 has identified three main phases in the development of African biblical 
hermeneutics. He summarized the process in the following phases. 
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2.2.2.1 The reactive and apologetic phase (1930s-70s) 
In this first phase, Ukpong states, the African biblical interpretation was characterised by 
its reactive and apologetic tone in response to the condemnation of African culture and 






 This was the inception of the 
comparative paradigm. Ukpong observes a reactive trend expressed through efforts to 
legitimise African religion and culture. The initiative of some Westerners who were 
sympathetic to the African cause was later joined by that of a number of African 
theologians who undertook studies that aimed at pointing out similarities between the 
African religion and culture and the religion and culture of the Old Testament. Ukpong 
mentions Williams‟ work, Hebrewism of West Africa, published in 1930. In this 
publication, Williams endeavours to point out similarities in languages and in worship 
between the Hebrew and the Ashanti of Ghana.  He concludes that there is a possibility 
that the Ashanti of Ghana descended from the Jewish race or that there was a very early 




Improving on Williams‟ methodology, as Ukpong continues to observe, more 
comparative studies were conducted around the 1960s. Going beyond extrinsic 
resemblances, which had been the focus of Williams‟ work, these later studies 
concentrated on religious themes and practices in both cultures. Among studies of this 
kind, Ukpong includes works such as Kibicho‟s article, “The interaction of the traditional 
Kikuyu concept of God with the biblical concepts”
47
, Mbiti‟s “New Testament 
Eschatology in an African background: A study of the encounter between the New 
Testament Theology and Africa traditional concept
48
, Dickson‟s article, “The Old 
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Testament and African Theology”
49
 and Ukpong‟s own work, “Sacrifice, African and 




These comparative studies resulted in the presentation of African Traditional Religion as 
the Africa‟s Old Testament and African culture and religion as a fertile ground for the 
gospel, a praeparatio evangelica.
51
 Ukpong concedes that this was already an important 
step toward the valorisation of African culture and religion, but notes some important 
limitations for which the approach was criticised. According to him, the approach does 
not involve drawing hermeneutical conclusions and does not show concern for secular 
issues which have become important today in theological discussion in Africa. What is 
more, these studies are generally apologetic and sometime polemical. Their value, 
therefore, is mainly heuristic.
52
 African theologians were determined to push further the 
process of Africanisation. 
 
2.2.2.2 The proactive phase (1970s-90s) 
In this second phase, Ukpong notes a more proactive approach that gradually takes over 
from the reactive approach that characterized the first phase. He notes more emphasis put 
on the use of African context as a resource in biblical interpretation; inculturation and 
liberation methods were expressions of this concern.
53
 He observes that the concern of 
inculturation theology to make Christianity relevant to the African religio-cultural context 
was expressed, in biblical studies, through the Africa-in-the-Bible studies and evaluative 
studies. His appraisal of this phase is summarized below. 
 
2.2.2.2.1 Africa-in-the-Bible studies 
A tendency was noted in Western scholarship to read some biblical texts in a way that 
support a negative and offensive portrayal of Africa and African people. It was 
contended, for instance, that Africans were the cursed descendants of Ham, according to 
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the list found in the Noah narrative in Genesis 10:1-14 and in Chronicles. 1:8-16.
54
 
References were made to such readings by those who used them for ideological purpose, 
as was the case in the Apartheid South Africa, or the oppression of aborigines in Latin 
America. Part of the purpose of Africa-in-the-Bible studies was to rectify the negative 
image about Africa embedded in these readings. On this subject, Ukpong includes works 
such as “The Table of Nations Reconsidered in African Perspective,”
55
 “The Bible and 
Colonialism”
 56




In addition to this reaction to the negative portrayal of Africa, Ukpong noted that the 
Africa-in-the-Bible trend was concerned with examining the contribution of Africa and 
its people in biblical history. This contribution was undermined by Western scholarship 
who would even consider Egypt, a cradle of biblical scholarship, as belonging not to 







 who produced works that sought to confirm the presence of 
Africa in the Bible and the contribution of Africans to biblical history.
61
 According to 
Ukpong, the achievements of the Africa-in-the-Bible approach were more in terms of 
awareness created with respect to the contribution of Africa to biblical history.
62
 In the 
phase that followed, studies concentrated on the encounter between the Bible and African 
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2.2.2.2.2 Evaluative studies 
This model refers to studies that went beyond studying similarities and contrasts between 
the Bible and African religion and culture. Using these similarities and differences as a 
basis for interpretation, these studies aim at developing a new understanding of 
Christianity that is both biblical and African.
63
  Ukpong refers to studies analysing 
biblical texts and uses their interpretation to point out values and disvalues of African 
culture, belief and practice against the background of biblical teaching.
64
 He mentions the 
approach adopted in Kalilombe‟s work, “Salvific value of African religion”
65
 and in Mac 
Fall‟s “Approaching the Nuer through the Old Testament”.
66
  Sometimes the contextual 
realities are considered to be disvalues, challenged with the message drawn from the 
biblical text. This is what he finds in the works of Manus, on ethnicity
67
, Abe‟s work on 
the concept of covenant
68




Another way is to interpret biblical themes against the background of African culture and 
practice. The understanding of the text thus reached, informed by the African situation, is 
both African and Christian.
70
 Here Ukpong gives examples from Wambudta‟s Savannah 
theology
71
 and Abijole‟s interpretation of the concept of principalities and powers in 
African context.
72
 There is also an approach that aims at communicating the biblical 
message through the use of concepts, from the Bible or from the culture, that show 
continuity between African culture and Christianity. These concepts, with which Africans 
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can easily identify, are used as bridgeheads.
73
 To illustrate this approach, Ukpong refers 
to Pobee‟s use of the concept of ancestor to describe Christ
74
and Mbiti‟s description of 
Jesus as the conqueror of evil spirits.
75
 In yet another approach, insights from the Bible 
provide a theological foundation for a contemporary practice.
76
 In this category, Ukpong 
fits Buetubela‟s model of relationship between mother churches and mission churches in 
early Christianity to support the autonomy of the young African churches,
77
 Ukpong‟s 
own work pointing out the biblical foundation for the inculturation of Christianity
78
 and 
Osei-Bonsu‟s focus on the biblical foundations for contextualization of Christianity in 
Africa.
79
 While the evaluative studies were concerned with the development of a new 
understanding of Christianity that would be both biblical and African, a growing concern 
to address secular issues was giving rise to African liberation theology.  
 
Liberation theology used the Bible to address the issues of oppression, poverty and 
discrimination. It is a theology used as a weapon in the hands of the oppressed and 
marginalised to reclaim the liberating heritage of the Gospel.
80
  Ukpong described the 
liberation approach and its corollaries, liberation hermeneutics that addressed the issues 
of economic exploitation, black theology that dealt with race discrimination and feminist 
theology, which concentrated on gender oppression.  
 
2.2.2.2.2.1 Liberation hermeneutics 
Liberation hermeneutics developed as the expression of liberation theology in biblical 
interpretation. Liberation hermeneutics were based on biblical witness maintaining that 
God condemns oppression, stands with the oppressed and liberates. For the liberationists, 
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the Bible testifies to the liberation of the oppressed people that began with God‟s 
liberative act in the Hebrew Scriptures and found fulfilment in Jesus the Christ in the 
New Testament.
81
 According to Ukpong, the God of the Bible is a liberating God who 
delivered the Hebrews from socio-political oppression in Egypt.  The Exodus narrative 
provides grounds for the hermeneutics of political liberation. God‟s instructions to Israel 
and Jesus‟ attitude and teaching in favour of the poor provide the basis for the 
hermeneutics of economic liberation. The agenda of liberation theology goes beyond the 
condemnation of political oppression and economic exploitation to include a commitment 





 In the part of the continent where oppression was based on race 
discrimination, social transformation required addressing issues of race relations. This 
was the preoccupation of Black theology. 
 
2.2.2.2.2.2 Black theology 
African Black theology was born out of black anthropological awareness in Southern 
Africa among a people that had experienced a history of racial discrimination, political 
oppression and economic exploitation under the oppressive regime of Apartheid. This 
awareness called for the creation of the Black Consciousness Movement, a movement 
that increased Africans‟ awareness of their political oppression and economic 
exploitation. Black theology was a theological expression of black consciousness. The 
agenda of Black theology was to bring radical transformation of the dehumanising social 
system. Steve Biko, a prominent figure behind the Black Consciousness Movement, 
understood Black theology as a situational interpretation of Christianity, [which] seeks to 
relate present-day black people to God within the context of the blacks‟ suffering and 
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For South African black theologians, biblical theology was to be an “engaged theology”, 
addressing specific situations and this was precisely what the biblical authors were doing 
to the communities which they addressed. Biblical themes containing liberating messages 
are studied and used to support the liberation struggle. According to Ukpong, this is the 






 for whom the Bible remains central 
to Black theology in its struggle for liberation.
88
 A more radical position, however, 
suggests that for Black theology to be an effective tool for liberation, it needs to adopt a 
critical approach to the Bible in order to break with the ideological assumption of the elite 
that, at times, silences the voice of the oppressed.  This is how Ukpong understands 
Mosala,
89
 for instance, who contends that historical materialism is a more effective tool 




In addition to the valorisation of the African culture that remained the preoccupation of 
inculturation theology, African liberation theology went a long way in addressing socio-
political and economic issues. The area of gender oppression still required special 
attention. This was the object of feminist hermeneutics. 
 
2.2.2.2.2.3 Feminist hermeneutics 
Feminist hermeneutics departs from the traditional mode of biblical interpretation that is 
deemed to use the Bible to support the oppression of women. As Ukpong observes, 
feminist approaches include the objection to, and rejection of, the androcentric 
interpretation of biblical texts, whereby God is portrayed in male terms and given only 
male attributes, while feminine attributes are ignored. Other feminist approaches focus on 
women in the Bible. These seek to critique or re-interpret biblical texts that are 
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oppressive to women, or to highlight those texts that portray women positively.
91
 Among 







 who have been prolific in this area. 
 
During this period, extending from the 1970s to the 1990s biblical studies were taken far 
beyond the mere recognition of African culture and religion, as a preparation for the 
Gospel. Biblical hermeneutics became a tool used to address relevant issues in the 
African context. Issues of cultural oppression were addressed through inculturation 
theology, economic exploitation through liberation hermeneutics, racial discrimination 
through black theology and gender oppression through feminist hermeneutics. These 
socio-political and economic issues brought to the attention of scholarship at this stage 
continue to be addressed, in an even more assertive way, in what Ukpong sees as the third 
phase, a phase in which the reader receives more attention. 
 
2.2.2.3 The reader-centred phase (1990s) 
The third phase is still proactive. In addition to the preoccupations of the preceding 
phase, Ukpong identifies new emphases directed at the contribution of ordinary readers. 
Another orientation emphasises the African context, which becomes the subject of 
biblical interpretation.
95
 These emphases are exemplified, respectively, by the contextual 
Bible study promoted by West and by Ukpong's Inculturation Hermeneutics. 
 
2.2.2.3.1 Contextual Bible study 
The features of this approach, as pointed out by Ukpong, include its undeavour to 
empower ordinary African readers of the Bible, those who are not academically trained, 
to read the Bible. These readers are involved in a process of biblical interpretation and are 
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encouraged to critically study the Bible in relation to their situations and for personal and 
societal transformation.
96
 This hermeneutical approach combines the conventional 
exegetical tools with the resources drawn from the people‟s culture, their history and their 
experience. The readers who are not theologically trained are empowered to develop a 
critical awareness and identify and use critical resources in their reading of the Bible. The 
advocates of this approach feel that it provides the best framework for the appropriation 
of the biblical message to the community of believers.
97
  A different way of bridging the 
gap between the academic reading of the Bible and the needs of ordinary African 
Christians was suggested by Ukpong, in his model now known as Inculturation 
Hermeneutics. 
 
2.2.2.3.2 Ukpong’s inculturation interpretive approach  
Ukpong‟s starting point is the concern to make the word of God alive and active in 
contemporary African societies and in the lives of individual Christians within their 
socio-cultural contexts.
98
 He contends that African scholars cannot achieve this goal 
unless they move away from the tradition of Western biblical scholarship and the 
corresponding interpretive grid that hinders their own cultural perspective from having 
the expected impact. To him, inculturation hermeneutics is an approach that helps finding 
adequate answers to relevant questions that Africans are now asking about their life in 
Christ. He describes this approach as one that consciously and explicitly seeks to interpret 
the biblical text from socio-cultural perspectives of different peoples. This includes both 




In his approach, Ukpong encourages a holistic understanding of culture that includes both 
secular and religious aspects and requires reading the Bible within the African religious, 
economic, social and political contexts. This approach makes room for interface between 
the academic and ordinary reading of the Bible, paying attention to the worldview of the 
poor, oppressed and marginalised. It uses the African context as the subject of 
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interpretation of the biblical text.
100
 In short, this approach attempts to combine the 
cultural aspect of inculturation theology with the concerns of Liberation Hermeneutics 
and Contextual Bible Study.  In Ukpong‟s interpretive approach, the reader does not try 
to discover through mere historical analysis the original meaning of the text to be applied 
to the present context, because there is no one and absolute meaning. Rather, the reader 
approaches the text with a critical awareness about his/her contemporary context and 
allows the text to evoke in him/her appropriate responses and commitments about the 
context. The text is read dynamically within the contemporary context.
101
 Ukpong 
outlines five component characteristics of this interpretation process namely, an 
interpreter in a certain context making meaning of a text using a specific conceptual 




2.2.2.3.2.1 The interpreter 
In Ukpong‟s inculturation hermeneutics approach, the focus is on the interpreter and 
his/her context. In reference to Barton‟s classification of biblical criticism,
103
 Ukpong 
locates his approach among theories that focus on the reader. This approach requires that 
the interpreter be acquainted with his/her culture, so as to be able to view it critically. 
He/she needs to consciously take his/her socio-cultural context as a point of departure in 
the reading. Moreover, the interpreter is required to be aware of specific subjective 
factors arising from his/her context that condition him/her giving rise to biases in order to 




2.2.2.3.2.2 The context 
Inculturation hermeneutics is a contextual hermeneutics. For Ukpong, this means a 
hermeneutical approach that is consciously done from the perspective of a particular 
context, namely the perspective of the world-view of the interpreter‟s culture. The 
context here is understood as an existing human community chosen to be the subject of 
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interpretation. This community may be a country, a church denomination, an ethnic group 
or any other social entity united by a shared worldview and life experiences, whether 
historical, social, political, economic or religious. Making such community the subject of 
interpretation implies that the interpreter, who is an insider in that community, draws 




2.2.2.3.2.3 The text 
In the interaction with the text, inculturation hermeneutics emphasises a holistic 
interpretation. Here Ukpong means that different aspects affecting the meaning of the text 
are analysed. These aspects include the inner logic of the text, the immediate, mediate 
and larger literary context, the historical context of the text and the contemporary context 
of the interpreter.
106
 Ukpong has outlined what he called “axes” around which a holistic 
interpretation of a text rotates. These axes are the following:  
 The structure of the argument that helps to grasp the inner logic of the text; 
 The literary context that helps to avoid an overly subjective and skewed 
understanding of the text; 
 The historical context that helps to understand the biblical world that made the 
text meaningful; 
 The analysis of the interpreter‟s context that enables the interpreter to be aware of 
the factors that influence him/her as he/she reads the text so as to exercise control 




Ukpong‟s interpretive process involves an interactive engagement between the biblical 
text and particular socio-cultural issues such that the gospel message serves as a critique 
of the culture and/or the cultural perspective enlarges and enriches the understanding of 
the text.
108
 The interpreter approaches the text, bringing not only interpretive materials 
from his/her context, but also a mental construct. Ukpong calls this a conceptual 
framework that conditions his/her particular hermeneutical orientation.  
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2.2.2.3.2.4 The conceptual framework 
Ukpong believes that people doing exegesis are trained within a mental construct into 
which they grow and within which they operate. This is an orientation in biblical 
interpretation geared toward certain areas of concern about the biblical text.
109
 Any 
exegetical framework is characterised by theoretical assumptions that influence the kind 
of questions asked about the text.
110
 For Ukpong, the inculturation hermeneutics 
framework is characterized by its specific cultural assumptions, on the one hand, and its 
presuppositions about the nature of the Bible, on the other hand.  
 
2.2.2.3.2.4.1 Basic assumptions of the inculturation framework 
Ukpong outlines four basic cultural assumptions that constitute the ground for the 
inculturation framework. The basic assumptions characteristic of African culture include 
first, the unitive view of reality that is exempt from the western dichotomy between 
matter and spirit, sacred and profane; second is the divine origin of the universe and the 
interconnectedness between God, humanity and the cosmos, resulting in the existence of 
a network of relationships between God, humanity and the cosmos; third is the sense of 
community whereby a person‟s identity is defined in terms of belonging to a community 
and last is the emphasis on the concrete rather than the abstract.
111
 These aspects, 
believed to be common to all African world-views make up cultural assumptions guiding 
the methodology followed by inculturation hermeneutics. This approach operates also 
with certain presuppositions concerning the nature of the Bible and the goal of exegesis.  
 
2.2.2.3.2.4.2 Presuppositions of inculturation hermeneutics 
The inculturation framework recognizes two aspects inherent in the nature of the Bible. 
The Bible is viewed, on the one hand, as the word of God containing norms for Christian 
living and, on the other hand, as an ancient literary document “worth attention beyond its 
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 Therefore, exegesis aims at actualising the meaning of the text in a 
contemporary context and, though historical critical tools are used, the focus is not on the 
historical context but on the theological meaning of the text and its relevance for the 
present.
113
 In Ukpong‟s understanding, the inculturation framework does not endorse the 
view that assigns to the text one universal and eternal meaning. Rather, the text is seen as 
capable of yielding different valid meanings, depending on the point of departure of the 
interpreter. However, the possibility of wrong meanings is recognized. The meaning of 
the entire Bible and the basic biblical principles and affirmation, such as love and justice,  
helps to check the soundness of the theology of any text and any meaning derived from it. 
No meaning is acceptable if it contradicts such principles.
114
 The meaning of the text is a 
product of the interaction between the contemporary situation and the text in its historical 
setting. The interpretation of the text aims at producing an actualised meaning of the text 
in the contemporary context of the interpreter.
115
 All these assumptions and 
presuppositions permeate the whole process of interpretation, informing each step of the 
process. The steps followed in this interpretive model are described below. 
 
2.2.2.3.2.5 Steps followed in inculturation hermeneutics 
Ukpong believes that an awareness of, and commitment to, this approach that seeks 
strong interaction of the Christian faith with all aspects of culture life and thought is a 
precondition for doing inculturation hermeneutic. He thinks that the interpreter should not 
only be committed to the Christian faith, but also to the process of actualising the biblical 
message within his/her context. For this, he/she needs to be in a position to control his/her 
cultural biases so as to use them critically.
116
 Ukpong has outlined four steps that the 
interpreter, equipped with the prerequisites mentioned, follows in the process of 
interpretation. The steps are discussed below. 
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Firstly, the interpreter identifies his/her own specific context that corresponds or is 
dynamically equivalent to the context of the text. The historical analysis of the text 
provides information with respect to the socio-cultural, economic, political or religious 
aspects reflected in the text that may have corresponding or dynamically equivalent 
situations in the contemporary context of the interpreter. This is achieved through a 





The second step still focuses on the context of the interpreter, which provides the 
background against which the text is to be studied.
118
 Once identified it is analysed. 
Ukpong suggests five levels in the analysis of the context of the interpreter after its 
identification in step one. 
 
At level one, a phenomenological analysis is done, aiming at the clarification of the 
specific issues in the context of the interpreter against which the text is to be interpreted. 
These are issues that are found in both contexts that make them similar or dynamically 
equivalent. 
 
At level two, a socio-anthropological analysis focuses on the worldview of the people, 
with respect to the issues under discussion. The analysis at this level seeks to understand 
how the people in the interpreter‟s context perceive the issues, pointed out in the text, that 
are also real in their own context. 
 
At the third level, a historical analysis seeks to investigate the issues in relation to the 
history of the concerned community. This is a look into history, to understand how the 
people have experienced the issues identified in the text. 
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At the fourth level, a social analysis looks at the issues with respect to their implication to 
the lives of the people. This includes cultural, economic, political and religious 
implications. 
 
The last level concerns the religious dimension of the issue. The analysis seeks to point 




These are levels through which, according to Ukpong, the context of the interpreter is 
analysed. He does not mean, however, that all these levels will be required in all cases.
120
  
Once the interpreter‟s context is clarified, he/she then moves to the third step, 
concentrating on the biblical text. 
 
The third step in the process of inculturation hermeneutics is the analysis of the text. 
Emphasis is on the historical context of the text that provides insights needed to relate the 
text to the contemporary context. Issues analysed in the historical context of the 
interpreter‟s people are now examined in the historical context of the text. The aim is to 





The fourth step is the analysis of the biblical text in the light of the context of the 
interpreter. At this stage the text is analysed in its immediate and mediate contexts. Due 
attention is paid to the larger context and a critical review of the existing interpretation is 
necessary. The goal of interpretation is always to arrive at the meaning of the text 
dynamically, in the contemporary context. The questions put to the text are those 
provided by insights from the analysis of the interpreter‟s context. The fruits of the whole 
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As an application of inculturation theology to biblical interpretation inculturation 
hermeneutics is committed to producing a kind of Christianity that is truly biblical and 
truly relevant to Africa. In this, the interpretive approach faces the same challenges and 
shares some strengths and limitations with the theological approach, of which it is the 
expression.   
 
2.3 The potential of inculturation hermeneutics 
The major strength of the inculturation hermeneutics approach resides in the attention it 
gives to the context of interpretation and the worldview of the interpreter. It is concerned 
less with the acquisition of theoretical knowledge than with the appropriation of the 
biblical message to the concrete situation, in order to provide answers to questions of 
practical life. Interpretations that focus on the historical context of the text and on the 
meaning intended by the author have too often resulted in the formulation of theories and 
principles than do not necessarily help to address the real issues in the peoples‟ daily life 
in Africa.
123
 Inculturation hermeneutics is an engaged hermeneutics. It does not seek 
merely to understand the meaning of a text but also to actualise the theological meaning 
of the text, utilizing it to address concrete issues in a contemporary context. It goes 
beyond the search for the objective universal and eternal biblical truth contained in the 
text and is more concerned with a pragmatic and existential reading of the text.
124
 The 
outcome of this approach is a Christianity that is integrated in all aspects of daily life, into 




Inculturation hermeneutics acknowledges the classical character of the Bible and the 
validity of secular literary techniques in its investigation without making this the end of 
exegesis. Both the historical and literary contexts of the text are taken into consideration 
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so that the text is understood in its own context before it is reread dynamically against the 
background of the contemporary context. Interpretation done within the canon and in 
comparison with other texts, serves to prevent the risk of assigning to the text a meaning 
and a theology that are not consistent with the large context of the text. Although these 
aspects of the context of the text are considered, the focus of inculturation hermeneutics 
remains more on the context of interpretation than on the text.  
 
The attention reserved to the context, the culture and worldview of interpretation remain 
the major elements that make inculturation hermeneutics an appropriate contextual 
hermeneutics. However, this approach has some limitations that are worth pointing out. 
 
2.4 Limitations of inculturation hermeneutics    
As an application of inculturation theology and a by-product of African Theology, 
inculturation hermeneutics is often described in opposition to Western hermeneutical 
approaches. In their endeavour to promote an authentic African interpretation of the 
Christian faith the champions of inculturation often seem to insinuate that Christian faith 
that is truly African should be stripped off all kinds of Western influences viewed as 
sequels of colonialism or expressions of imperialism. However, though it is easy to point 
out some cultural values and assumptions peculiar to the African worldview that have 
been ignored by Western theologians, the task of differentiating in an exhaustive way 
what is Western from what is authentically African in the Christian faith remains very 
difficult, if not impossible, just as efforts to isolate Christianity in its essence from 
elements of the Western and the Jewish cultures that served as mediums for its expansion 
would be futile.  Inculturation is surely a relevant corrective of the shortcomings of 
traditional interpretive approaches with respect to the consideration of the African 
perspective ignored by those approaches, but it does not render them irrelevant.  
 
Inculturation hermeneutics has the merit of emphasising the role of the African context 
and worldview in the interpretive process and in this it is an appropriate corrective to 
western approaches that do not pay due attention to important realities of the African 
worldview.  However, the strengths of this approach with respect to contextualization 
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should not be the grounds for minimizing the achievements of traditional interpretive 
approaches, coined “Western”, which are still helpful and relevant to Africa.  If African 
culture has its specificity that makes it authentically African, this does not make Africa a 
cultural island. African culture, and any culture for that matter, is not a closed and static 
system; any culture is characterized by its openness to change through encounters with 
other realities.
126
 Stressing elements of the African culture to which non-African 
interpreters have not paid due attention either because they do not understand them or 
they are not comfortable with them, does not mean that their approaches are totally 
irrelevant or useless in the African context.  
 
The endeavour to recover the so-called “original meaning of the text”, as it was “intended 
by the author”, which is the preoccupation of traditional interpretive approaches, may 
lead to an incomplete process of interpretation when it fails to contextualize the message 
of the text to make it relevant to the contemporary situation. Cases exist in which the 
universal and timeless applicability of principles resulting from these interpretive 
approaches remain puzzling for scholars.
127
 However, the attempt to discover the range of 
meanings that the text might have had in its context of production would not be a 
weakness. At this level of the analysis of the text, Ukpong‟s inculturation approach may 
be supplemented by the distantiation phase of the Tri-Polar Exegetical Model, as 
suggested by Draper: 
 
This stage of exegesis requires that the readers or reading community allow the 
text to speak for itself by creating space or critical distance between themselves 
and the text. It must be allowed to be other, different, over against ourselves and 
our concerns and questions. It is rooted in a specific historical, social, cultural and 
economic context. It is addressing its own questions relating to its needs. Its 
language of composition and rhetorical conventions are different to ours and so is 
its worldview. Hence exegesis should consider both the context of the text and 
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how it came into being and the structure of the text, and how it signals meaning 




If the discovery of the range of meanings the text may have had in its context of 
production is a commendable achievement, this is far from being the end of 
hermeneutics. The challenge remains with respect to knowing what to do with those 
possible meanings, as far as they can be recovered. Traditional interpretive approaches 
differentiated exegesis, the process of recovering “what the text meant then” that is, in its 
own time, from hermeneutics, the application of the recovered meaning to the 
contemporary context, “what the text means now”. Such an approach resulted too often in 
forcing universal and timeless application of messages of particular texts to contemporary 
identified contexts. Advocates of inculturation hermeneutics object to this approach that 
assumes that a text has a fixed past meaning. They contend that the classical 
understanding of hermeneutics as a subjective, contextual exercise concerned with the 
application of the meaning of the text to the present context does not apply, since the 
meaning we get of the past is not the meaning of what happened in the past pure and 
simple, but of what happened in the past filtered through the present.
129
 Inculturation 
hermeneutics advocates a shift in the focus from the meaning of the text in the original 
context to its meaning in the contemporary context. This approach is based on the 
assumption that biblical texts are plurivalent and can be understood differently, according 
to different contexts and perspectives. The approach suggests that there are dynamics 
built into biblical texts for guiding interpretation and these dynamics can function in 




The limitations of inculturation hermeneutics are not of the kind that can nullify its 
potentialities as an African interpretive approach. The interpretive approach used in the 
present work draws much from inculturation hermeneutics, especially with respect to the 
attention paid to the contemporary context of the reader. 
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2.5 Inculturation hermeneutics and the present work 
The approach followed in this study is appropriate to the second phase of Ukpong‟s 
classification. This is a phase where African biblical interpretation is described as 
reactive and proactive. In this approach the African context is used as a resource for 
biblical interpretation, while liberation and inculturation hermeneutics are the dominant 
methods.
131
 In the present study the context is narrowed down to that of Rwanda, with 
special focus on situations and events in the history of this country that may have a 
bearing on the Genocide of 1994. The present work has three major points or steps, 
similar to what Grenholm and Patte,
132
 and later Draper,
133
 called “Poles” of contextual 
exegesis in their Tri-Polar Exegetical Model.  
 
The Tri-Polar Exegetical Model is known as an interpretive approach initiated by the 
scholars Cristina Grenholm and Daniel Patte, and later on, developed further by Jonathan 
Draper. The three poles refer to three major phases or moments characteristic of the 
approach, namely the distantiation, contextualizaton and appropriation phases. 
 
The distantiation phase focuses on the text, which is subjected to a critical analysis in an 
attempt to retrieve its most appropriate meaning in its own context, before applying that 
meaning to the reader/interpreter context. Distantiation means that the interpreter takes a 
distance and allows the text to speak to him/her, as the following comment explains: 
 
During the distantiation phase, the reader/interpreter strives to allow the text to 
speak for itself in its own context, and to address its particular problems and 
needs.  This process requires the reader to stay far away from the text in order to 
hear what exactly it meant for its original audience before it can also address the 
reader/interpreter‟s life situation. The distantiation is therefore viewed as a 
moment whereby the reader/hearer seeks to listen rather than to talk. This is a 
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moment wherein various tools are used to allow the text be itself in its origin and 




The disantiation “pole”, as important as it is in this model, is only one step which needs 
to be completed by others in the process of the interpretation.  The approach places 
emphasis on the necessary dialogue between the text and the interpreter, whose context is 
analysed in the contextualization phase. 
 
The contextualizaton “pole” is concerned with the analysis of the context of the 
interpreter and his community. It is this context of the interpreter that determines the kind 
of questions that he/she brings to the text, as well as the kind of answer he/she may 
expect.
135
 It is during this moment that the interpreter speaks back, to the text, 
challenging it with the specific questions and problems from his/her life-situation and 
from his/her context. For this dialogue to bear the expected fruits the interpreter is 
required to have a good knowledge of his context and to be aware of specific needs that 
the text should address.
136
 The conversation between the two contexts reaches its climax 
during the third phase that has been called “appropriation”.  
 
The appropriation “pole” refers to a phase whereby the text and its context are brought to 
an agreement with the interpreter‟s context. The conversation between the text and the 
interpreter‟s context is facilitated by the reader. It is the reader who enables the regular 
back-and-forth movement between text and context, thus making the text and context 
mutually engage.
137
 In his description of the process of appropriation, West has submitted 
that the context of the reader prompts him/her through his/her ideological commitment to 
it and through its ideological formation of him/her. Similarly, the sacred text prompts the 
reader through his/her theological orientation towards it and through its theological 
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 What Draper has designated as “Lived faith”
139
 implied in the 
appropriative moment, West refers to as the reader‟s ideo-theological embodied faith.
140
  
The concept of appropriation implies a process by which the meaning of the text is owned 
by the interpreter.
141
 The interpreter accepts and owns the message that he/she gets from 
the text. He/she accepts the implications of this meaning for his/her situation. The 
interpreter allows the text to stand against him/her, challenge, and even judge him/her by 
its original message so that the meaning acquired from the text challenges his/her life-
style. 
 
The whole process of interpretation is encapsulated in West‟s description of what he calls 
the integrative dynamic between the three poles, as follows: 
 
The contextual pole makes contribution to the ideo-theological orientation of the 
appropriation pole, in terms of the reader‟s social location and the choices readers 
make about their social location. The textual pole makes a contribution to the 
ideo-theological orientation of the appropriation pole, in terms of its own core 




As was mentioned above, the present study comprises three main parts, that correspond to 
the poles of the Tri-Polar Exegetical model described above. The first step concerns the 
analysis of the Rwandan conflict that culminated in the Genocide in 1994. This history of 
the situation of ethnic conflict in Rwanda is the context of interpretation and it will serve 
as the subject of interpretation following the inculturation hermeneutic model suggested 
by Ukpong. The next step concerns the analysis of the passage of 1Kings 12: 1-24. The 
process described as the distantiation phase in the Tri-Polar model will guide the exegesis 
of this passage. The last part is the dialogue between the text and the Rwandan context in 
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2.5.1 Analysis of the Rwandan context 
The goal of this work is not primarily to understand the meaning of a particular biblical 
passage, but to examine a particular situation of ethnic conflict in its socio-political 
context and in the light of scripture. Therefore the starting point is the context of ethnic 
conflict in Rwanda. It is the consideration of the nature of this conflict, its background 
and its effects that guided the selection of the biblical text whose message can be relevant 
to the situation. Thus, the context of conflict in Rwanda is used as a subject of 
interpretation of the selected text; it is not a mere application of the message of the text. 
 
Since the context of conflict in Rwanda is the subject of interpretation, its analysis comes 
first, so that it will provide the background against which the text is to be read. The 
analysis of the context considers different levels or areas of analysis, as the inculturation 
approach requires. At the phenomenological level, the nature of the Rwandan conflict 
needs to be clarified and its ethnic, social and political elements pointed out. The peoples‟ 
worldview and their understanding of the issue of ethnicity in Rwanda constitute the 
socio-anthropological aspect of the analysis. A historical inquiry into how ethnicity 
generated ethnic conflicts throughout the history of the Rwandan nation is an important 
element of this analysis of the context. Finally, the analysis of the Rwandan context seeks 
to point out the religious dimension or aspect of the conflict. The analysis of these 
different aspects of the context of ethnic conflict in Rwanda is expected to provide the 
questions to put to the selected biblical text. This context of conflicts, oppression and 
discrimination constitutes the social location from which the text is read. 
 
2.5.2 Analysis of the biblical text 
The analysis of the selected text (1 Kings 12:1-24) includes its literary study following 
the narrative criticism approach and a socio-historical examination of the larger context 
of the text. The background of this text includes not only the socio-political situation that 
marked the history of the people of Israel, that is what can be reconstructed about 
ethnicity and tribal conflicts in Israel having a bearing in the event of the division of the 
kingdom, it but also the religious aspect of the issue of ethnicity/tribalism, that is, how 
these are represented theologically. 
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My own context and my experience as an African and a Rwandan who lived and 
experienced the effects of ethnic conflicts surely conditions the way I interpret and 
understand this biblical text. My social location shapes the hermeneutical questions 
brought to the text without depriving the text of its fundamental meaning, as Okure has 
explained:  
 
The social location of the interpretation does not deprive the text of its 
fundamental (that is divine) meaning. Rather, it furnishes the hermeneutical 
questions that are brought to the text in order to discover new meanings latent in 
the text as does the wise scribe (Matthew 13:52), meanings that can challenge and 
give fuller life to the reader. The social location cannot ask of the text answers to 




My social location enables me in this study to pay attention to the voice of the frustrated 
mass of the people of Israel in their struggle for political change and for the adoption of a 
system of government based on a social contract and the intransigence that frustrated 
their non-violent request (1 Kings 12:1-15). It is this social location that shapes my ideo-
theological orientation active in the dialogue with the literary and socio-historical 
analysis of the text. This dialogue is the object of the appropriation phase.  
 
2.5.3 Appropriation 
The text of 1 Kings 12:1-24 was chosen as a biblical text describing a conflict whose 
context has similarities with the Rwandan conflict that resulted in the Genocide in 1994. 
The present study is a dialogue between the biblical text in its context and the context 
surrounding the Genocide in Rwanda, so that the context of ethnic conflict in Rwanda 
will enlarge the understanding of the text concerning tribal conflict in Israel. Both 
conflicts are socio-political events resulting from a long history of conflict, with an 
ethnic/tribal element and in which the divine/religious intervention is acknowledged or 
assumed. The two contexts are, of course, not equivalent but, as Ukpong suggests: 
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Just as in translation whereby dynamically equivalent words are used to translate 
the biblical text where there are no exact equivalents, so dynamically equivalent 





Each of the two contexts has a contribution towards the clarification of a particular aspect 
of ethnic conflicts. For example, the way God is represented in the selected text could 
help in the understanding of the theological aspect of the Rwandan conflict. In the same 
manner, the explicit ethnic character of the Rwandan conflict sheds more light on the less 
emphasized ethnic character of the conflict that divided the kingdom of Israel.  
 
The entire the text is be read critically in the light of basic human and biblical values of 
love, justice, peace and inclusiveness, to point out and challenge any part of the text that 
conveys a meaning or a message which should not be adopted as normative or a basis for 
action.
146
 This kind of critical reading, often referred to as “talking back to the text”, 
interrogating it, or reading it against the grain,
147
 is based on the acknowledgment that 





 I would say that my social location influences my ideo-
theological orientation towards opposing social injustice, oppression and discrimination, 
thus reading the text from the perspective of the exploited social groups, excluded from 
political and economic privileges. This approach fits the concern of liberation 
hermeneutics and its attention to the socio-economic and political situation of the 
oppressed. 
 
Through the appropriation stage, the interpretation will bring together the horizon of the 
text and its community and the horizon of the interpreter and his community, to mediate a 
new consciousness leading to a new praxis.
150
 This stage is expected to be the 
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culmination of the interpretive process, where the text is appropriated in the light of the 
context of interpretation, in our case, the context of ethnic conflict in Rwanda, which is 



























CHAPTER THREE: SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN RWANDA 
 
3.0. Introduction 
The present study is designed as a dialogue between the biblical narrative about the 
division of the kingdom of Israel, on one hand, and the event of the Genocide in Rwanda 
on the other. For this dialogue to take place the two events need to be examined in their 
immediate and broader contexts. The 1990 Genocide tragedy in Rwanda was an 
expression and a product of ethnic conflicts that developed throughout Rwandan history, 
just as the division of the kingdom in Israel resulted from social political problems with 
an evident ethnic character.  
 
The present chapter highlights the context of the Rwandan Genocide used as the subject 
of interpretation of the biblical text narrating the event of the division of the kingdom in 
Israel. Historical research will help identify situations, in the Rwandan context of 
ethnic/tribal conflicts that are dynamically equivalent to those that are reflected in the 
biblical text so as to be used to mediate the message of the text. Aspects of the Rwandan 
situation under examination include the socio-cultural, economic, political and religious 
issues around which ethnic conflicts revolved. After a brief review of the background of 
social relations in Rwanda, the present chapter presents a historical analysis that 
considers different periods in Rwandan history that are significant for their specific 
contribution to ethnic conflicts. The focus is on the situation of social relations in the pre-
colonial Rwanda, in the colonial period, from national independence to the Genocide and 
in the post-Genocide period. 
 
3.1 Background to social relations in Rwanda 
Rwandan history is marked by controversies over a number of issues, most of which have 
a bearing in the explanation of the root causes of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. These 
include the issue of the origin of Rwandan social groups, social relations in pre-colonial 
Rwanda, the role of colonialism in ethnic relation in Rwanda, the events of the troubled 
period of 1959-1962, ethnic relations from 1962 to 1990, the 1990 war and its 
culmination in the Genocide in 1994. Of all these issues, the question of the origin of 
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social groups and their relations, requires the examination of the situation in the pre-
colonial period. The remaining issues fall under later epochs. Speculation   about the 
origin of Rwandan social groups, and controversies about how they related throughout 
history, reflect the peculiar character of Rwandan ethnicity that needs to be examined 
first. 
 
3.1.1 The peculiar character of Rwandan ethnicity 
The Genocide that was perpetrated in Rwanda has been recognized as a crime carried out 
by one specific social group, the Hutu, and directed against a precise social category, the 
Tutsi. The existence in Rwanda of distinct social groups designated as Hutu Tutsi and 
Twa has been acknowledged throughout history. It is the criteria of identification, 
categorisation and differentiation of members of these social groups that fluctuated 
through time. While some have identified different races among the Rwandan people
151
, 
others have seen all Rwandans as belonging to one homogeneous ethnic group. While 
ideological preoccupations may have prompted the argument in support of a particular 
view, it remains true that the structure of Rwandan society, the history and the culture of 
this people do not make easy their grouping into categories, especially as they are not 
even grouped in their mode of habitat in their geographical setting.  
 
3.1.1.1 Physical setting of Rwanda 
Located in the Central African Rift Valley, slightly south of the equator, Rwanda is a tiny 
country with an area of only 26,336 km². Bounded in the east by Tanzania, in the west 
by the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the north by Uganda and in the south by 
Burundi, it is squeezed into the heart of the continent. It does not have any access to the 
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The physical topography of the country is mainly mountainous. The whole country lies 
above 1,000 metres, with over half in the 1,500-2,000 m zone.
153
 A volcanic massif 
known as the Congo-Nile Crest
154
 traverses the western region of the country, leaving on 
its western side Lake Kivu in the Rift Valley. These giant peaks include the chain of 
Virunga
155
 on the border with Uganda, where the highest peak, the Kalisimbi volcano, 
reaches 4,507 m in altitude.  From west to east, this volcanic massif, covered with thick 
tropical woodlands, merges into an undulating plateau in the central regions, where hills 
covered with banana groves alternate with marshy valleys. Further east, the landscape 
shades off into a savannah zone, where vegetation ranges from vast stretches of arid and 




Rwanda enjoys a climate that is particularly favourable to human life, with an average 
temperature of 18° C and 900 to 1,600 mm of rainfall per year, according to altitude. 
This temperature remains quite even throughout the year, so that the four seasons of the 
year in Rwanda are not divided according to temperature, but according to rain levels.
157
 
The first Europeans who came into direct contact with Rwanda described it as “a land 
flowing with milk and honey…where the breeding of cattle and bee culture flourish, and 
the cultivated soil bears rich crops of fruits. A hilly country, thickly populated, full of 
beautiful sceneries, and possessing a climate incomparably fresh and healthy; a land of 




The physical and climatic peculiarity of Rwanda provided the country with an ecological 
environment conducive to high population densities. The fertility of the land made 
agriculture and herding of cattle very prosperous, while its highlands provided a natural 
protection against foreign interference. Rwanda is one of the few African countries that 
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were not directly affected by the slave trade. The first explorers who reached the 
Rwandese highlands after the malarial and war-torn expanses of the Tanganyika bush felt 




From among the banana groves and the clumps of eucalyptus trees emerge numerous 
houses scattered all over the many hills of Rwanda where the Hutu and the Tutsi, the 
main social groups, live side by side. Even the Twa, usually marginalised by the other 
two groups, do not have a separate geographical location. This shared geographical 
location coupled with the linguistic and cultural homogeneity of the Rwandan people, 
complicates the understanding of the character of their ethnicity.  
 
3.1.1.2 The confusing homogeneity of the Rwandan society  
The Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa are commonly referred to as three distinct ethnic groups. 
Yet, going by the sociological definition of an ethnic group, as difficult as this definition 
is, it can be argued that the three social categories belong to one and the same ethnic 
group. The complexity of the ethnic phenomenon complicates attempts to capture the 
concept through a simple definition. Maré
160
 understands ethnicity as a term used to refer 
to a character or quality of an ethnic group. Hutchinson
161
 defines an ethnic group as “a 
collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memory of a 
shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as 
symbols of their peoplehood”.
162
 Understood in these terms, the concept of “ethnic 
group” would better be applicable to the Rwandan people as a whole, rather than to any 
one of the social groups.  
 
Hutchinson suggests at least six main feature characteristics of an ethnic group, namely 
(1) a common proper name, to identify and express the “essence” of the community;(2) a 
myth of common ancestry that gives an ethnie a sense of fictive kinship; (3) shared 
historical memories, or better, shared memories of a common past or pasts, including 
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heroes, events and their commemoration; (4) one or more elements of common culture, 
which need not be specified but normally includes religion, custom, language; (5) a link 
with a homeland, not necessarily its physical occupation by the ethnie but at least its 
symbolic attachment to the ancestral land and (6) a sense of solidarity on the part of at 
least some sections of the ethnie‟s population.
163
 Apart from the proper names 
designating each social group in Rwanda, and some sense of solidarity among members 
of each group, all other features suggested by Hutchinson are shared by all the three 
groups. There seems, therefore, to be little, if any, ground for categorizing Rwandans into 
distinct ethnic groups. 
 
The adjective “ethnic” is derived from the Greek word ethnos. The Greeks used the term 
ethnos in a variety of ways and it could refer to a people, a race, a tribe or a caste. In the 
New Testament it referred to non-Jewish people, often translated “nations”. All these 
usages have in common the idea of a number of people who share some cultural or 
biological characteristics and who live and act in concert.
164
 Similarly, in Kinyarwanda, 
the unique mother tongue common to all the three social groups, the word “ubwoko”, 
used to qualify the three groups, can mean a race, a people, an ethnie, a tribe or a clan.  In 
fact, “ubwoko” more generally simply means “a specific kind”. In French, the language 
of the coloniser, the groups have been designated as ethnies a term that suggests that 
these categories were perceived as ethnic groups. As it was stated earlier, however, there 
is no obvious reason to justify the qualification of each of these groups as distinct ethnic 
groups.   
 
The features mentioned above, that are found in varying degrees in different ethnic 
groups, can also be used to identify a tribe. In fact, a tribe can constitute a sub-group 
within a larger ethnic group, so that a tribe can be rightly perceived as a sub-ethnic group. 
The commonalities existing among Hutu, Tutsi and Twa of Rwanda may testify to their 
belonging to one and the same ethnic group, while the peculiarity of each group may 
make it a sub-group within the same ethnic group. Since each sub-group comprises many 
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clans, and is therefore broader than a clan, each of the three groups has been regarded as a 
tribe. But there is no consensus on this ethnic categorisation, as there is none on the 
origin of different social groups that make up the Rwandan people, as will be shown in 
the discussion that follows.  
 
3.1.2 Historical origin of Rwandan people 
Rwandan history is marked by controversies regarding the origin of the people who 
settled in the region now called Rwanda and the quality of socio-political relations among 
the social groups that made up that pre-colonial community.  Although the Rwandan 
people have always been divided into three groups, the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa, there 
is no consensus among historians or anthropologists on the origins of these divisions. 
Divergences in the understanding of the meaning of the ethnic labels “Hutu” and “Tutsi” 
have reached two extreme positions. On the one hand, there are those who contend that 
there is no significant difference between the two groups. Since these people speak the 
same language, share the same territory, the same culture and the same religion; they are 
all Rwandans. On the other hand, there are those who affirm that Hutu and Tutsi are, and 
have always been, two distinct ethnic groups. It has been even suggested that the two are 
different races. Each of these positions has a subsequent corresponding presentation of 
what has been the historical rapport between the two social groups. Each of the positions 
mentioned above appeals to Rwandan history to prove and support its ground.  
 
Of course, Rwanda has and can only have one past and one history. Yet this history has 
been told and written in varying versions. Efforts are still presently being made to rewrite 
and provide a correct and authentic history of Rwanda. However, as Eltringham explains, 
“in writing a historical narrative, even the most disinterested historian, with no ulterior 
motive to distort, does not produce a simple transparent „window on the past‟. His/her 
narrative is the result of interpretation and this differs among historians”.
165
 Most of the 
time, historical narratives attempt to explain how the country‟s past has created its 
present. The content of such narratives is determined by concerns and unanswered 
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questions asked in the present, so that one can argue, like Eltringham, that the present 
creates the past.
166
  A correct and authentic version of Rwandan history, free of all 
ideological preoccupation, and authoritative enough to prevail over the other versions, is 
thus difficult to achieve. 
 
The examination in this section of diverging historical narratives concerning the relations 
of Rwandan social groups does not aim at the discovery of the “true history” of Rwanda; 
rather, the investigation of the relationship between different narratives is expected to 
lead to the understanding of what these narratives reveal about current perceptions of 
conflict in Rwanda.
167
 This is very important, especially as each of the differing positions 
is likely to have far-reaching implications when it is taken as the basis of political 
philosophies that are guiding Rwanda‟s destiny.
168
 Three versions of the origin of the 
people who settled in Rwanda are presented in this section. The Hamitic hypothesis 
stresses the different origin of the Hutu and the Tutsi; the popular view concentrates on 
the order of settlement of the three groups; while the harmonising view denies any 
difference among the groups.  
 
3.1.2.1 Popular view concerning the origin the Rwandan social groups 
The view which has been the most prevalent holds that the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa are three 
different ethnic groups that arrived and settled in Rwanda in different periods of 
history.
169
 According to this view, the first inhabitants of Rwanda were the ancestors of 
the modern-day Twa. These were hunting-gatherer people, who lived by foraging in the 
forest. Not much is said about the location where the Twa may have migrated from and 
they are sometime called Abasangwabutaka, “those found in the land”, to indicate that 
they were the first people to inhabit Rwanda. The Twa are said to belong to the pygmoid 
people. 
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The Hutu are said to have arrived second. This largest group of farmers is believed to be 
descended from Bantu tribes further to the west.
170
 Hypotheses concerning Bantu 
expansion propose different locations supposed to be the origin of the Bantu homeland. 
While Guthrie
171
 suggests the Katanga-Zambia area as the cradle of Bantu culture, 
Greenberg
172
 locates the Bantu homeland in Cameroon.  Greenberg, a linguist, and 
Murdock, an anthropologist, have argued that “the Bantu language originated in the 
Chad-Benue area, expansion was rooted in demographic pressure born from the drying of 
the Sahara, a process that began around the third millennium B.C. and from the resulting 
southward agricultural expansion”.
173
 In the Great Lakes Region, the Hutu cut large tracts 
of forest and confined the Twa to whatever forest remained.
174
 They established a social 
system based on small-scale agriculture and petty kings called Abahinza, “those who 
cause things to grow”
175
.   
 
Tutsi are placed third in the order of migration to Rwanda. These pastoralist people, 
related to the Hima, one-time rulers of the Ugandan Kingdoms of Bunyoro and Buha, 
arrived in successive waves, possibly from about the fifteenth century.
176
 This view 
contends that the Tutsi invaded and conquered territories that were populated by Bantu 
people. This is Lemarchand‟s position, as he says “under the leadership of a royal clan, 
successive waves of nomadic pastoralists spread their domination over the indigenous 
Bantu societies whose customs and traditions they gradually assimilated into their own 
culture”.
177
 Tutsi are also said to have migrated from Ethiopia and to be related to Oromo 
of the Horn in southern Ethiopia.
178
 The hypothesis suggesting that the Tutsi invaded and 
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conquered Rwanda imposing a centralized monarchy was later questioned by historians 
who found it too simplistic. A more complex situation is suggested to explain how the 
alien Tutsi minority managed to extend their hegemony over the indigenous Hutu. 
According to Lemarchand,  
 
At some time in the remote past, wandering bands of Tutsi and Hima pastoralists 
infiltrated among the indigenous tribes with whom they established a symbiotic 
relationship. In some places these intruders set themselves up as minor chiefs 
controlling a few hills; elsewhere, relationship between the two communities were 





The migrating Tutsi adopted the Hutu language and a great deal of their culture, before 
installing their own hegemony through the Nyiginya dynasty.
180
 Hutu agriculturalists may 
have admired the Tutsi cattle so much that they readily aggreed to be part of the well-
organized Tutsi polity. The most speculative identification of the origin of Tutsi was 
expressed through what was called the Hamitic Hypothesis. 
 
3.1.2.2 The Hamitic Hypothesis in Rwandan ethnicity 
The term Hamite has been often used in the Great Lakes Region, in opposition to the term 
Bantu; the two referring to the Tutsi and the Hutu, respectively. The hypothesis that 
advocated for the identification of Tutsi as Hamites made them a different race, whose 
origin was to be traced outside Africa. Taylor
181
 has identified three strands in nineteen 
century Europe that contributed to the fabrication of the Hamitic Hypothesis. The strands 
are theology, biology and anthropology. 
 
The Hamitic Hypothesis has its remote roots in theology. This is a theory whose name is 
derived from the biblical character, Ham, the son of Noah, who attracted his father‟s 
curse upon his family for failing to show respect to his father when he saw him drunk and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Centrale. 1957, pp 22-26. (The Oromo are one of the Cushitic-speaking groups of people living in north-
eastern and eastern Africa. The Oromos are found predominantly in Ethiopia, but also in northern Kenya 
and Somalia. The Oromo were originally a pastoralist/nomadic group).  
179
 Lemarchand, R. Rwanda and Burundi, p 19.  
180
 Pottier, J. Re-imagining Rwanda, p12.  
181
 Taylor, C. Sacrifice as Terror, p 58. 
 
 56 
naked. As part of this curse, Ham‟s descendents through his son Canaan, were                     
condemned to become slaves of Shem and Japhet, the two brothers of Ham. Through an 
interpretation of this biblical story, it was explained how the descendants of Ham found 
themselves in Africa, where they were supposed to endure their fate as an inferior race. 
Yet, the proponents of this theory contended that the Hamites were a superior race 
compared to the Bantu groups around them. To explain this alleged superiority appeal 




 the Great Chain of Being was a theory that ranked human races 
in terms of their moral and intellectual capacities. This ranking could be demonstrated 
quantitatively just by measuring the internal volume of the skull. The white Europeans 
(from whom the theory originated) were said to have a bigger skull and this was an 
indication of them belonging to a superior race. Sub-Saharan Africans were among those 
found with a smaller size and this explained their lower level of civilization.     
 
This theory was challenged when exploration in the parts of the world believed to be 
populated with small-brained people revealed a level of organization and development 
higher than what was expected from inferior races. Hence the presence of complex state 
systems and developed arts in the Great Lakes region in the nineteenth century could not 
be attributed to the work of the indigeneous Bantu. An explanation of this “abnormality” 
was provided first by an English explorer, John Henning Speke. It is said that Speke 
visited the region of Central Africa in 1859 and was amazed at the high level of culture 
that he found there, the administrative structure and the intricate social order with 
aristocrats and vassals. He was convinced that such culture could not have originated 
from “savage Negroes”. He concluded that the Tutsi ruling classes were a superior race. 
Their physical traits, the refinement of their feelings and their intelligence were rare 
among primitive people and they were rather closer to the noble Europeans.
183
 The Great 
Chain of Being theory presented the Tutsi as belonging to a superior race, while the 
Hamitic hypothesis further explained how they arrived in the Great Lakes Region.  
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If Hamites were doomed to inferiority in southern Africa, in interlacustrine Africa 
they became, for Speke, the superior conquering race. Despite their black skins, 
these Hamites were said to be Caucasian. According to Speke, Hamites moving 
out of the Middle East became the Galla and the Oromo in Ethiopia. Ethiopian 





These theories presented the Hutu and the Tutsi as descending from two different races. 
They affirm that the Tutsi are superior to the Hutu and they hold that the Tutsi are aliens 
who came to conquer the land already occupied by the Hutu and the Twa. All these 
claims repeated over and over in the ears of both Hutu and Tutsi were internalised by 
many and they regularly fuelled the conflicts that opposed the two groups throughout the 
history of Rwanda. Before and during the Genocide, these claims were among the 
arguments advanced to justify the treatment which should be reserved for the Tutsi. More 
recently, voices have been raised from those who reject the traditional categorization of 
the Rwandan people, arguing that Rwandans have always been one, undivided people. 
This is the view referred to as the harmonizing view.  
 
3.1.2.3 The harmonizing view 
Those who contend that there were no ethnic groups in pre-colonial Rwanda hold a 
different view of the origin of ethnic groups in Rwanda. This claim is defended through 
what was called historical constructionism, a theory which stands in opposition to 
primordialism. While primordialism claims that ethnic distinctions existed from the 
beginning and the concerned groups have different biological, linguistic and geographical 
origin, constructionism claims that ethnic distinction in the Great Lakes Region was a 
socio-historical construction. Advocates of constructionism contend that if any distinction 
between Tutsi and Hutu existed in pre-colonial Rwanda it was that of class or caste that 
corresponded to a division of tasks and the groups differed in regard to the amount of 
power each could exercise.
185
 The social groups designated by the terms Hutu and Tutsi 
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had no characteristics of tribes, which are micro-nations.
186
 Supporting this position, 
Keane reports that what separated Hutu and Tutsi in the past was primarily a matter of 
occupation and wealth. Thus the Tutsi clan owned large herds of cattle, while their Hutu 
subjects farmed the land and the Twa subsisted on what they could gather in fields and 
forests. As time progressed, many Hutus bought cattle and they were assimilated into the 
Tutsi aristocracy. Some Tutsi became poor and lost their privileged positions.
187
           
 
Eltringham supports a similar position, contending that the terms Hutu and Tutsi did not 
refer to distinct races or ethnic groups in pre-colonial Rwanda. For him, “both over time 
and at any moment in time the terms Hutu and Tutsi were polyvalent there was no single 
meaning for the whole territory at any one time”.
188
   He gives an example of various 
meanings that the term Tutsi may have connoted in pre-colonial and early colonial 
Rwanda. Eltringham states, 
 
My own reading of the diverging historical literature suggests six values of the 
term „Tutsi‟, which implied (at different times and in different contexts) one or 
more of the following: a description of status (wealth in cattle); membership of 
certain „high‟ lineage; the possession of authority derived from the Mwami; social 
recognition as a Tutsi owing to wealth or in order to extend central control (by co-
opting the lineage heads); those who owned cattle; and simply „non Hutu‟. With 
the expansion and the centralization of the kingdom, it appears that the first four 




All these examples of the connotation of the term Tutsi seem to suggest that the term 
referred to an acquired status. This position may lead us to surmise that pre-colonial 
Rwandan people belonged to one ethnic group and were diversified only according to 
their lineages and clans. Those whose social status was higher, through the acquisition of 
power and wealth, became Tutsi and those who did not have access to those privileges 
remained Hutu. This theory does not account for the presence of the Twa group, neither 
does it explain how a great number of Tutsi, the so-called petits Tutsi, who did not enjoy 
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any of the social economic and political privileges reserved for the prominent Tutsi, 
could still be recognized as Tutsi.  
 
Close to Eltringham‟s view is Kamukama‟s position.
190
 His opinion was that both Hutu 
and Tutsi are descendants of Bantu migrants who arrived in the region from West Africa. 
To him the common origin of the two groups explains the similarities in their language 
and culture, while their different economic activities are responsible for their physical 
differentiations. Taylor
191
 has recorded a similar view, suggesting that diet and way of 
life has led to differences in physiognomy; concluding that ethnic categorisation in 
Rwanda is primarily a question of economic specialisation and social class. 
 
More ambiguous is the argument of Rucyahana, who stated that there were no differences 
between the Hutu and the Tutsi that were not manufactured by forces outside of the 
country. Simultaneously, however, he described the distinctive features of pure-blooded 
Tutsi as differentiating them from those of pure-blooded Hutu.
192
 Rucyahana seems to 
admit that long ago there used to be differences between the two social groups, but now 
these differences have disappeared as a result of intermarriage. He feels that a modern 
Rwandan is a blend of both groups, so that any attempt to tell Hutu and Tutsi apart would 
be like going to America and say that you can easily tell an Irish and a Norwegian 
apart.
193
 If Rucyahana is right in the way he views the ethnic mix in Rwanda he does not 
explain how the Genocide was possible, because those who were killed could then not be 
said to belong to a distinct ethnic group. In fact, according to him, both the victims and 
their executioners belonged to the same ethnic mix; this could hardly be called Genocide! 
Prunier would not agree with Rucyahana‟s submission since for him the evidences of 
distinct physical features between Hutu and Tutsi seem plain enough when one has lived 
in the area.
194
Mamdani was referring to claims similar to Rucyahana‟s when, writing 
about his visit to Rwanda in 1995, he said: 
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I was nonplussed to be told over and over again by leading people in the RPF: „we 
speak the same language, have same culture, and live on the same hills; we are the 
same people‟. But in casual conversation and out in the street, some of the same 





Taylor is less categorical in dismissing any possibility for separate biogenetic and 
geographical origins of the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Although he admits the socio-historical 
constructed nature of these categories, he contends that no construction is done ex nihilo. 
He believes that the Hamitic hypothesis divested of its racist claims and ideological 
biases may hold some truth. Evoking evidences from historical linguistics and 
archaeology, Taylor explains that as early as the first millennium B.C.E. interlacustrine 
Africa and the area adjacent to it acted as something of a „melting pot‟ in terms of 





, Taylor affirms that the genetic markers of the 
Tutsi and the Hima show them to be more closely related to the people who live in 
northern Africa and who are Afro-Asiatic speakers. However, he distances himself from 
the aspects of the Hamitic hypothesis that claim that the Tutsi are a superior race; that 
they arrived last in the region; that they conquered Bantu territories or even that they 




 Arguing against the theories of Bantu expansion and Hamitic conquest, Chrétien
199
 
agrees with Taylor‟s position. Referring to archaeological findings, Chrétien contends 
that the Great Lakes region was populated as early as the first millennium B.C.E., dates 
which are much earlier than the period during which Bantu migration, and later Hamitic 
conquest, are said to have occurred. He suggests that an integration of different groups of 
people may have taken place in the region over a long period in history, involving Bantu-
speaking groups from the eastern Congo basin and from Central Sudan; proto-Nilotic 
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groups from what is now Uganda and southern Cushitic groups from south west of Lake 
Victoria.
200
 Considering the length of time that elapsed since the integration took place, 
Chrétien thinks that it is impossible to be categorical in explaining the present 
categorization observed in the region:  
 
When one refers to the distant origins of the internal categorization that marks the 
region‟s societies, notably in the western part, two kinds of answers are possible: 
on the one hand, populations with different geographic origins and from different 
linguistic families encountered one another; on the other hand, a socio-economic 
cleavage developed between largely agricultural groups and largely pastoral ones, 
each of which found an ecological niche for itself. The first episode would have 
occurred more than two thousand years ago, and the second more than one 
thousand years ago. It is therefore impossible to hold fast to explanation tied to 
this distant past, which would mean neglecting everything that happened 





Increasing controversies concerning the pre-colonial history of Rwanda seem to confirm 
that Chrétien is correct about the difficulty of uncovering the total truth concerning this 
period. But even if he was proved wrong, why should the truth about the first settlers in 
Rwanda centuries ago affect the peace, unity and harmony of the country in the present? 
The truth about history is not dangerous in itself, its effect on the present depends on the 
ideological purpose for which it is sought and used. Unfortunately Rwandan history has 
often been seen through biased ideological lenses.  Lemarchand notes:  
 
Hence efforts ultimately made by Hutu and Tutsi intellectuals to reinterpret oral 
traditions so as to create new justifications for political action – the first by 
deliberately calling attention to the role played by monarchy in perpetuating a 
situation of social, economic and political inequality, the second by emphasizing 
the unifying bonds of kingship and imputing most of the responsibilities for social 
injustices to Belgian authorities. The normative ambivalence involved in the 
concept of Mwamiship made it possible for each set of protagonists to extract 
from the traditional arsenal of the monarchy the ideological weapons they needed 
for the realization of their political objectives.
202
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What Lemarchand stated about different evaluation of the monarchy applies to many 
elements of Rwandan history including the issue of the origin of Rwandan social groups. 
It is possible that the present Rwandan social groups may have originated from one same 
ethnic group that underwent socio-economic cleavages. Rwandan people may have been 
formed from an encounter between people of different geographical origins, or both 
phenomena may have occurred, as Chrétien suggests. This should not be a serious 
problem in itself and it is not a situation idiosyncratic to Rwanda.  But the quarrel about 
the origins of different groups that settled in the regions, the modalities, order and process 
of their settlement have gone beyond the limits of mere academic debate. Controversies 
become particularly hot among those who attempt to draw conclusions about the present 
social relations. Most of those arguing for the initial homogeneity of the Rwandan people 
stress that the differences were created by the colonisers who are totally and exclusively 
responsible for the exploitation and oppression that the Hutu suffered under the Tutsi 
monarchical regimes.  Those insisting on the original social differences include those 
who want to trace the roots of the present social conflicts back to the disharmonies 
already existing during the pre-colonial period that embittered the exploited Hutu. The 
question of social relations during the pre-colonial period deserves more attention.  
 
3.2 Social relations in pre-colonial Rwanda 
The controversies that characterize different narratives about the historical origin and 
settlement of the sub-groups that make up the Rwandan people have resulted in different 
descriptions of the relations that existed between the sub-groups in the pre-colonial 
period. Generally, those who think that there were no ethnic groups in pre-colonial 
Rwanda claim that all the social groups were living in harmony. Holders of this view 
contend that it was European demands for resource extraction that bastardised Rwanda‟s 
social system, forced a small group of Tutsi administrators to oppress the Hutu majority 
and, by so doing, polarized and hardened ethnic identities.  A different position is held by 
those who stress that even before the arrival of the Europeans relations among the sub-
groups was characterized by exploitation and oppression of the Hutu by the Tutsi and 
discrimination against the Twa by the two groups. They argue that colonial powers 
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merely formalized and institutionalised a pre-existing racist system by taking steps such 
as issuing identity cards that listed group affiliation.
203
  Besides issues related to access to 
political power and to administration privileges monopolised by one social group, the 
Tutsi, two institutions come to the fore in the debate about social relations in pre-colonial 
Rwanda. These are the cattle clientship, Ubuhake, and the compulsory and non-paid 
labour, Uburetwa. Although both institutions are often perceived as instruments of mass 
exploitation, the Ubuhake had more to do with relations between the social groups. 
 
3.2.1 The cattle clientship “Ubuhake”: expression of social disharmony 
The cattle clientship Ubuhake was the chief institution of pre-colonial Rwanda. This was 
a contract by which a Hutu client entrusted himself to a Tutsi patron, who would grant 
him some privileges in terms of usufruct on cattle and land in exchange for commodities 
and services regularly offered by the Hutu servant. The Ubuhake contract also involved 
an aspect of personal relationship involving reciprocal bonds of loyalty between the Hutu 
client and the Tutsi patron which meant that one became the other‟s man.
204
  This 
institution, considered by some to be mutually advantageous, was seen by others as 
extremely exploitative. 
 
Those who like to see Ubuhake in a positive light feel that this institution was not an 
instrument of ethnic dominance or exploitation. Included among these is Semujanga, who 
states that, in the practice of this institution, a patron or a servant could come from any of 
the three social groups.
205
 Surprisingly, this assertion follows another one of his in which 
he admits that the Hutu belonged to the category of servants as he explains that the term 
“Hutu” referred to the activities of a farmer or umugaragu (servant).
206
 The most 
common positive description of Ubuhake views it rather as a personalised relationship 
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between a client and a patron involving the exchange of certain commodities and 
services. The Hutu (servant) farmers offered the products of their farms while the Tutsi 
(patron) offered cows and milk. This institution had even facilitated social mobility 




It seems, however, that the benefit that the Hutu servant – who was the one in a weaker 
position – could draw from the Ubuhake clientship depended much on the disposition of 
his Tutsi patron. To some lucky servants, this contract was an opportunity for acquisition 
of cows and subsequently a means of upward mobility, while others ended up with too 
many obligations toward their patrons that would not allow them to make any progress.
208
 
Although the Ubuhake contract was generally between a Hutu servant and a Tutsi patron, 
it was not impossible that a commoner Tutsi would offer his services as a servant to a 
more prominent Tutsi. To some extent this attenuated the ethnic aspect of the institution.  
 
The most negative view of Ubuhake perceives it as exploitative and generative of 
hierarchical differences between Tutsi and Hutu. It was an entrenched form of quasi-
slavery, enabling the Tutsi masters to exploit the poor, downtrodden Hutu. The abuses 
that could result were better described by a certain group of Tutsi who opposed it: 
 
The Buhake system is the means par excellence through which the Batutsi have 
managed to maintain and safeguard their ascendancy over the masses. The 
indefinite duration of contractual ties it creates at each echelon of the hierarchy 
implies a constant obligation to obey the dominant caste; through pure and simple 
spoliation an instant remedy is found against the danger of over-rapid social 
mobility or the emergence of competitive centres of power, while intrigues and 
dilation, both of which are encouraged by the system, maintain the omnipotence 




Despite the abuses that could result from Ubuhake, this institution was a contract that 
involved the will of the parties involved, each of whom had benefits and responsibilities, 
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at least in theory. In this, Ubuhake can be said to be better than its sister institution, 
„Uburetwa‟. 
 
3.2.2 The “Uburetwa” forced labour: instrument of oppression 
The compulsory and non-paid work called Uburetwa was introduced in the late 
nineteenth century by King Kigeli IV Rwabugiri.
210
 Initially, the peasants were requested 
to work one day per week, but later this was increased by the chiefs to three days. 
Uburetwa undermined the livelihood security of Hutu commoners and made their 
survival more difficult. In certain regions of the country both men and women would sell 
their labour to survive, even though the common pattern was for only men to do the 
corvée,
211
 while women would work for the family.
212
 This corvée, very much abhorred 
by the population, was the only way given to the agriculturalists to regain access to the 
land that the king had taken from them. It affected only the Hutu, while the labour 
expected from the poor Tutsi consisted of seasonal service at the residence of the chiefly 
residence. The work there would be, for example, maintenance of the fences surrounding 
the houses of the patron. This discrimination emphasised the ethnic character of social 
differences before the arrival of the European colonists. Those who insist on presenting 
the social relationship between Hutu and Tutsi in pre-colonial period as „harmonious‟ 
explain that the Uburetwa was not a form of oppression of the Hutu by the Tutsi, but 
rather an imposition of the Nyiginya-dominated central power upon the people of lower 
class, both Hutu and Tutsi. 
 
Different interpretations of social relations in pre-colonial Rwanda have resulted in 
different evaluation of this period of Rwandan history. To some, the hegemony of the 
Tutsi that characterized this period resulted in the exclusion, oppression and abuse of the 
other two social groups. To them, both Ubuhake and Uburetwa were institutions of 
exploitation by which the Tutsi consolidated their economic superiority. Myths were 
created to justify the social inequalities and the privileges reserved to the Tutsi, so that 
                                                 
210
 Villa-Vicencio,C. Building Nations: Transitional Justice in the African Great Lakes Region. Cape 
Town, Soth Africa: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. 2005, p 73. 
211
 A French term for non paid and compulsory labour. 
212
 Pottier, J. Re-imagining Rwanda, p.13. 
 
 66 
the other groups could not question the status quo.  Before the arrival of the coloniser, 
they argue, the Hutu and the Twa were already browbeaten servants of the Tutsi. People 
from these three social categories were conscious of their social differences. Holders of 
this view think that the root causes of ethnic conflicts in Rwanda are traceable to the pre-
colonial period. This is the view that inspired the propaganda against the Tutsi in Rwanda 
before and during the Genocide. People were „reminded‟ that the Tutsi have always been 
oppressors who disdained the other groups. 
 
A different view is held by those who contend that the pre-colonial Rwanda was marked 
by social harmony. Those who hold this view argue that the social categories existing in 
pre-colonial Rwanda were not ethnic groups. The respective privileges and obligations of 
each social group were socially accepted and mutually profitable. Moreover, it is argued 
that this period never witnessed any ethnic conflict. Never did one social group rise 
against the other in an open and violent conflict. All social groups formed one people 
with one army and under the same political authority of the king. For holders of this 
view, ethnic differences and subsequent conflicts are the consequence of colonialism. 




Although social relations in the pre-colonial era are interpreted differently, it is generally 
agreed that the society was then made up of social categories with unequal rights and 
privileges. Pre-colonial Rwanda was marked by the hegemony of the elite Tutsi over the 
Hutu and Twa peasants.  The transition from statelessness to kingship is often said to 
have been achieved around the fifteenth century, at the expense of Hutu chiefdoms 
conquered by Tutsi kings.
214
 In his book Inganji Karinga
215
, published at the request of 
King Rudahigwa, a well-known Rwandan Catholic priest, Kagame, recounts the history 
of Pre-colonial Rwandan Kingdom as a series of Tutsi victories over Hutu chiefs. The 
account of these conquests is presented in a way that “makes no concession to delicate 
sensibilities in its description of the tortures and humiliation meted out to the vanquished, 
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including a description of the custom of adorning the royal drum, Karinga, with the 




A softer and less ethnic-oriented version of this account of conquest and domination 
attributes them only to one Tutsi clan, the Nyiginya dynasty. Under the leadership of their 
leaders, the Nyiginya, notorious for cattle rustling, embarked on a series of conquests, 
rustling more cows and expanding their territory for more pasture. By the end of the 
fifteen century, the wide territorial structure under the Nyiginya lordship was called 
Rwanda.
217
 The Nyiginya aristocracy constituted a class that thrived on the labour of their 
exploited subjects, the peasant Hutu and the Twa, as well as the Tutsi who were not part 
of the ruling class. However, to ensure the security of their domination, they found it 
more efficient to entrust political and administrative responsibilities to their fellow 
pastoralist Tutsi. This resulted in the differentiation of Rwandan society between ruling 
pastoralists and ruled agriculturalists.
218
 This view seems to be closer to reality in that 
without exaggerating social divisions it acknowledges not only the existence of 
inequalities in the pre-colonial period but also a form of exploitation, of which the Hutu 
were the main victims.   
 
The pre-colonial part of Rwandan history is an integral part of Rwandan heritage, 
certainly rich in very positive things worth remembering. Unfortunately this period has 
been an object of manipulation and misinterpretation from those who were less interested 
in historical truth than the pursuit and defence of particular ideologies. This has often 
been the case, especially when it came to the issue of relations between the Hutu and the 
Tutsi. When the Hamitic superiority was in line with the desire of the elite Tutsi to keep 
the monopoly of power, they accepted it wholeheartedly and found arguments to support 
it.
219
 The Hutu, who felt victimized by this theory, tried to refute it, but met with strong 
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 Later it was the turn of some Hutu extremists to evoke the same theory in 
an attempt to justify their discrimination against the Tutsi. This time the protest came 
from the Tutsi. Hence the same argument from history was used when it fitted the context 
of those holding it, who did not hesitate to refute it when the context was different. The 
biases that characterise the description of social relations in the pre-colonial period 
complicate the understanding of the exact contribution of colonialism to Rwandan 
ethnicity. But whatever may have been the pre-colonial legacy, the responsibility of the 
colonial powers for social conflict in Rwanda remains great.  
 
3.3 Socio-political relations in colonial Rwanda    
Historians and politicians generally agree to the fact that colonialism greatly contributed 
to the sharpening of ethnic distinction in Rwanda. The divergences start when it comes to 
the evaluation of the significance of that contribution. To some, colonialism created 
ethnic groups out of what used to be mere social classes, to others the colonizer inherited 
ethnic categories and stereotypes which it reinforced, consolidated and ultimately 
exacerbated.
221
 The present study focuses on the description of the attitude and behaviour 
of the colonizer toward social categories in Rwanda. This section discusses the 
contribution of the Germans and the Belgians during their respective periods of control 
over Rwanda  
 
3.3.1 German contribution to ethnic conflict in Rwanda  
The Germans were the first colonial power in Rwanda. It was in 1894 that the first 
military-scientific expedition arrived in the country and Germans stayed in the country 
until after their defeat in the First World War. For 10 years Rwanda together with 
Burundi and Tanganyika, constituted what was called “German East Africa”.   But their 
short stay contributed to social conflict in Rwanda through their indirect rule policy and 
their military support to the ruling Tutsi. 
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3.3.1.1 The Indirect Rule strategy 
Having never established a significant presence in the country, the Germans did not have 
sufficient human power to directly control the whole territory.
222
 They decided to 
administer the country through the existing traditional institutions. This was called the 
Indirect Rule policy. This policy consisted of maintaining unchanged the traditional 
administration structure and controlling the country through local officials who became 
the executive instruments of the colonial power.  Apart from supplying the staff that the 
Germans lacked, this approach aimed at avoiding resistance and eventual confrontation 
from the local population that could have resulted from any attempt to displace traditional 
rulers. In his report of November 1905, Captain von Grawert, then Resident of Burundi, 
elucidated the rationale behind the indirect rule:  
 
The deal is: unqualified recognition of the authority of the sultans from us, 
whether through taxes or other means, in a way that will seem to them as little a 
burden as possible; this will link their interest with ours. This ideal will probably 
be realised more easily and earlier in Rwanda, which is more tightly organized, 
than in Urundi where we must first re-establish the old authority of the sultan, 





In a Tutsi-led kingdom, where high-status individuals were from the Tutsi group, these 
early colonizers found it easier subcontracting local control to Tutsi chiefs.  The indirect 
rule policy reinforced the power of members of the Tutsi elite, some of whom, secure in 




3.3.1.2 Military support to Tutsi kings 
In addition to their favouring the Tutsi over the other two groups, Germans provided the 
Tutsi regime with military assistance that enabled them to conquer the remaining 
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 With the military support of the German colonizers, the 
king was able to extend his control to the peripheral regions, especially in the north of the 





Although German control was not for a long period, their influence had long-lasting 
effects. As Prunier has recorded, the colonial policy of indirect rule left considerable 
leeway to the Rwandese monarchy and acted in direct continuation of the pre-colonial 
transformation toward more centralization, annexation of the Hutu principalities and 
increase in the Tutsi chiefly power.
227
 Germans may not be held responsible for creating 
ethnic categories in Rwandan society. However, their support for the Rwandan traditional 
political structure resulted in the reinforcement of Tutsi hegemony. In this regard, 
Germans are criticized for contributing to the oppression of the Hutu, although more 
criticism is directed at the Belgians, who took over from Germans and stayed longer. The 





3.3.2 Belgian contribution to ethnic conflicts in Rwanda  
Favouring the Tutsi over the other groups continued and was reinforced when Belgium 
took over from Germany in 1916. The sympathy of the Belgians shifted, however, and 
they later supported the Hutu in the 1950s. This was after a period of about forty years of 
Tutsi regimes, supported in many ways by the Belgian colonial power.   
 
3.3.2.1 The Belgian support to Tutsi hegemony  
Belgian support to Tutsi regimes was manifested through the systematisation of indirect 
rule, the support of the territorial expansion of their dominion and the substantialisation 
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of Tutsi superiority in many other ways. These included the privileges granted to them in 
education, in leadership positions and in the judiciary.   
 
3.3.2.1.1 Systematisation of Indirect Rule 
During the first years of Belgian administration, there was much uncertainty concerning 
the attitude to adopt toward the Rwandan political structure that the Belgians inherited 
from the Germans. They waited for about 10 years to formulate and implement their 
reforms. A League of Nations Mandate made official in 1919 their occupation of Rwanda 
resulting from the Germans‟ military defeat in 1916. At the time of the Mandate, the 
Belgians were undecided as to how to behave towards the traditional socio-political 
structure. It was not until 1926 that they started to implement a series of measures later 
known as “Reformes Voisin”, named after the then Governor, Charles Voisin.  Although 
they were not impressed with the administrative achievements of the Germans, the 
Belgians‟ policy concerning social relations seemed to stay in line with that of their 
predecessors. Their goal was to ensure peace and public order, while maintaining the 
existing balance between the native groups.
229
 Like the Germans, the Belgians believed 
that Indirect Rule would make easier the implementation of their colonial policies and 
practices. They preferred to maintain the institution of kingship in order to use the king as 
a legitimiser of their policies.
230
 Ryckmans, the first Belgian Resident of Burundi, put it 
in these words: 
 
The presence of the king, the only one capable of conferring a legal, customary 
investiture upon a candidate of our choice, makes it possible for us to go forward 
without running the risk of being faced with a fatal impasse, without having to 
make an impossible choice between a rebellious legitimacy and an impotent 
submission…. It is therefore not because of a pure love for tradition or local 
colour that we keep the native kings. Let their powers be curtailed if necessary but 
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The Belgian strategy consisted of maintaining traditional political institutions in order to 
manipulate them. While the concern to appear legitimate before the people compelled 
them to maintain the traditional institutions, their determination to achieve their own 
goals required suitable personnel fitting into their vision. Not all the existing chiefs met 
these requirements: “There are among the chiefs some who are incapable, imbecile, who 
will never gain authority…. There are some who are irreducibly hostile and who will 
never accept civilization…”.
232
 These were to be replaced by the Belgians‟ candidates 
appointed by the king to achieve what the colonial power called progress. The strategy is 
clearly expressed in these terms: 
 
The agreement between the native king and the European authorities will lead…to 
this final result whereby the country will be left only with chiefs willing, or 
resigned, to march toward progress – and thus acceptable to the occupying power 
– all while maintaining legitimacy and thus being acceptable to the natives. [The 





It was the concern of administrative efficiency that motivated the administrative reforms 
initiated by the Belgians in 1925. For the Belgians, the traditional local administration, 
with its triple hierarchy, whereby three different chiefs had separate and independent 
commands on land, cattle and army, was deemed to be leading to conflict anarchy and 
chaos.
234
 They decided to streamline the structure of local government and to bring the 
three branches of power under the rule of a single Tutsi chief. As a result of this reform, a 
few Hutu who were chiefs of the land lost their positions. This eventually led to a 
situation of almost total dominance of the chiefly functions by the Tutsi. As Taylor notes, 
domination in Rwanda became concentrated in the hands of a relatively small clique of 
Tutsi administrators and a handful of Belgian colonial administrators.
235
 If the more 
rationalized administrative system that resulted from the Belgians‟ reforms was less 
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redundant, it also reduced the ability for weak and poor servants to choose a less 
oppressive chief.  Hutu peasants, who before could cleverly manipulate one level of 
chiefly authority against the other, now found themselves tightly controlled by one chief 
only, whose backing by the white administration was more efficient than the loose 




In the process of these reforms attempts were made by the Belgians to substitute Hutu 
chiefs and sub-chiefs for Tutsi incumbents who were judged either incompetent or 
rebellious. This move met with resistance, not only from the Tutsi elite, but especially 
from the Catholic missionaries concerned about the vacillation of the colonial authorities 
with regard to the traditional hegemony of the well-born Tutsi.
237
 Even Mgr Leon Classe, 
who had initially expressed his views in favour of the promotion of Hutu and Twa, 
reacted strongly against these reforms which, seemed to undermine the prerogative of the 
Tutsi caste. According to Classe, the greatest mistake the colonial administration could 
make would be to suppress the Mututsi caste, by insisting on the equality of social 
groups.  
 
Such a revolution would lead the country directly to anarchy and to hateful anti-
European communism. Far from furthering progress, it would nullify the 
government‟s action by depriving it of auxiliaries who are, by birth, capable of 
understanding and following it. This is the view and the firm belief of all 
superiors of the Rwanda Mission, without exception. Generally speaking, we have 
no chiefs who are better qualified, more intelligent, more active, more capable of 




The colonial administration took note of the warning from the missionaries. Not only did 
they halt the appointment of Hutu into chiefly positions, but also the few to whom 
positions had been given were dismissed. Further efforts were made to preserve and 
strengthen Tutsi hegemony. This strengthening of Tutsi supremacy was achieved in three 
major ways: by facilitating the territorial expansion of the Tutsi political hegemony, by a 
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rigorous control over all education opportunities and by the introduction of judicial 




3.3.2.1.2 Sponsoring territorial expansion of Tutsi hegemony 
The expansion of Tutsi political hegemony, from the centre to the periphery, had started 
but was not completed under the German administration. While the Germans‟ support 
had consisted of helping the central power fight the rebellion, the Belgian policy went 
further in strengthening Tutsi domination. With Belgians‟ help, more Tutsi chiefs were 
appointed in the predominantly Hutu areas of the north and north-west parts of the 
country, a region that for centuries had remained autonomous from the central Tutsi 
regime.  Hutu chiefs “bahinza” were removed from office and replaced with Tutsi 
ones.
240





This political expansion had far-reaching socio-economic implications in the regions that 
came under the control of the central power. The lands in the north were held by lineage 
groups as undivided usufruct in the system called ubukonde.
242
 The Belgian 
administration did not recognize this form of land property. According to the Belgians, 
these lands were not occupied in the legal sense by the native and were considered 
vacant. The state could dispose of such land after due compensation.
243
 The Tutsi chiefs, 
who enjoyed the support of the Belgian administration, did not waste time in modifying 
the traditional land rights in their favour. The Ubukonde system was replaced by ibikingi 
grazing lands, a form of private property recognised to the owners of cattle. Through this 
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system the Tutsi chiefs took control of the land taken from Hutu farmers. Prunier has 





The geographical expansion of the indirect rule was accompanied with the spread of the 
ubuhake contracts to the regions where it had not existed before. This institution in its 
later form was strongly resented by the people who perceived it as a foreign imposition. It 




The Belgians are also credited for having transformed and generalized the institution of 
forced labour „Ubuletwa’. Introduced by King Rwabugiri, the Ubuletwa in its initial form 
was a family obligation so that a lineage had the latitude to delegate only one person to 
do the corvee on behalf of all the members. As a result of the expansion of the authority of 
the king with the help of the colonial power, the forced labour was taken to parts of the 
country where it had never existed before. Moreover, it was made an individual 
obligation, so that at times, when needed, women and children had to go and perform the 
corvee.
246
 The Hutu were considered a working class and their children were not even 
given the opportunity to go to school.  
 
3.3.2.1.3 Exclusion of the Hutu from education 
The indirect rule policy was extended to the sector of education. The assertion that the 
Tutsi were born to lead had its logical corollary that they alone should have access to 
education. By the early 1930s and until well after the Second World War, the consensus 
of opinion among Belgian administrators was that the Tutsi should remain the sole 
recipients of secular and missionary education.
247
 Government schools were created to be 
the training ground for exclusively Tutsi sons. These would later serve as auxiliaries of 
the colonial administration and from among them new chiefs would be appointed. One 
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popular school, the “Ecole des Frères de la Charité,” also known as “Groupe Scolaire d‟ 
Astrida” was especially conceived to provide training for future chiefs. This school 
progressively became “the grace giving institution through which the Tutsi elites 
managed to perpetuate themselves in the seats of power and through which they gained 
the technical skills and training necessary for the preservation of their traditional claims 
to supremacy.”
248
 Lemarchand has recorded the ethnic distribution of student enrolment 




Year  Tutsi pupils Hutu pupils 
 
1932  45   0  
1933  21   0 
1934  26   0 
1935  41   0 
1945  46   0 
1946  44   1 
1947  44   2 
1948  85   2 
1949  85   5 
1953  68   3 
1954  63   3 
 
The ratio of Hutu pupils was not better in other schools, such as the schools of Nyanza, 
Ruhengeri, Gatsibu and Cyangugu, designed to train Tutsi sons. The scarcity of Hutu in 
schools does not mean that they disdained education, as a certain chief Gashugi may have 
insinuated when he asserted that “the Mututsi earns his living through mental work while 
the Muhutu lives by manual work”.
250
 Education was geared to impart skills to those 
destined to rule, so that those who were not eligible for leadership positions were aware 
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that schools were not meant for them. The consciousness of this reality was expressed in 
a popular expression of resignation “ndiga se ngo nzagabane umusozi?” (Why should I 
bother going to school, shall I ever be appointed a chief over any hill?).  
 
The monopoly of education went a long way to consolidating the already recognized pre-
eminence of the Tutsi aristocracy. Lemarchand noted: 
 
No longer was their birth their sole justification for claiming ascendancy over the 
peasant masses; they could also invoke their superior education and technical 
competence to strengthen their supremacist claims. By providing them with 
Western skills and knowledge, with the literary media necessary for the 
elaboration of their own traditional culture, and above all by acknowledging their 
innate superiority, the Christian missionaries gave the Tutsi aristocracy the means 





In addition to preparing young Tutsi for their future position in the administration, the 
missionary-run schools were used to indoctrinate them with the Hamitic ideology. 
Among the missionaries there were ethnographers such as R. Pages and A. de Leacger, 
who were champions of this ideology and undertook to popularise it. Of course, such 
teaching fell on fertile ground, as Taylor has stated:  
 
Many upper-class Tutsi understood that it was to their advantage to reinforce the 
European perception of Hamitic superiority and they obliged with pseudo-
historical fabrication that extolled their intellectual, cultural, and military 
supremacy. Although Tutsi elite were only echoing what colonialists had told 
them, the story of Tutsi natural superiority and predisposition to govern took on 




The indirect rule was not limited to the administration and education but was also applied 
in the judiciary.  
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3.3.2.1.4 Tutsi supremacy in the judiciary 
Another institution through which Indirect Rule was practised was the native tribunals 
initiated in 1936. The system of native courts was instituted to tackle any problem related 
to the native administration. These tribunals were expected to be institutions through 
which the traditions would be preserved, but monitored, in order to progressively achieve 
assimilation. These tribunals, always headed by Tutsi, provided more opportunity for the 
ruling Tutsi oligarchy, not only to retain their privileges but also to abuse them. One 
Belgian official has noted, “The native tribunals never played a moderating role because 
they were intimately linked to the political authorities. In many cases these tribunals were 
organs used by the Tutsi to give a semblance of legality to their exactions….”
253
 Their 
function was not so much to dispense justice as to legitimise abuses and wrongdoings.
254
 
This description may be harsh, but what is obvious is that it was difficult to challenge the 
privileges and eventual abuses of them before the courts controlled by the beneficiaries of 
those privileges.   
 
3.3.2.1.5 Introduction of the identity card 
Throughout the colonial period the privileged Tutsi elite accepted the idea of their 
superiority, while the increasingly marginalized Hutu were becoming more frustrated. 
The emphasis on differences between the different groups convinced them of their 
different identity.  This identity was finally fixed after the census organized by the 
Belgian administration in 1933. Every registered Rwandan was given an identity card 
which indicated and fixed once and for all his/her ethnic group. The introduction of these 
identity documents rigidified further the Hutu-Tutsi distinction. This system of 
identification continued and was still in use during the Genocide. The identity card 
played a significant role during the Genocide, as the bearer could be saved or condemned, 
depending on whether the identity card labelled him/her as a Hutu or a Tutsi.
255
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Despite this division and inequality of privileges that characterized the pre-colonial and 
colonial Rwanda, the different social groups seem to have managed to co-exist free of 
mass violence. The surprising cohesion of the Rwandan traditional social structure has 
been explained through what was called the “premise of inequality”.
256
 According to 
Maquet, people born in different castes are unequal in inborn endowment, physical as 
well as psychological and have, consequently, fundamentally different rights. Maquet 
contends that the acceptance of inequalities was a basic principle influencing the whole 




It was argued that caste structure in Rwanda was based on a shared and culturally 
elaborated image of society, involving a combination of exclusiveness and reciprocity, of 
inequality and solidarity. It was the premise of inequality that allowed this structure to 
retain its stern rigidity, holding the society together over the years.
258
 Moreover, a variety 
of structures are said to have served integrative functions and fostered inter-caste 
cohesion. These include the Mwami (king) as a representative of the deity, a king, father 
and protector of the whole people, not of one particular social group; the Ryangombe cult 
and Kubandwa sect that brought together everybody, irrespective of social group or caste 
hierarchy; the system of clientship that included aspects of solidarity, reciprocity and 
complementarity among the people, irrespective of their category; and also the carrying 
of similar clan names by Tutsi and Hutu.
259
 Such social structures that ignored various 
boundaries were factors of unity and social cohesion. 
 
Elements in traditional Rwandan culture and structure, such as those mentioned above, 
have surely been significant to the cohesion of the society. More importantly, one could 
note that the psychological ties of dependence that resulted from a long period of 
Ubuhake clientship may have created what was called a “dependence complex”
260
 and 
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prevented the Hutu from having a conscience of themselves as a group. This is what 
Lemarchand refers to:  
 
The roles norms and statuses associated with clientage structure tended not only 
to block the emergence of a separate Hutu consciousness but also to positively 
reinforce the attachment of the individual Hutu peasant to his lord. The result has 
been up to a point to hamper the development of any sort of corporate ties other 




The ideology surrounding the Mwami and the institution of the monarchy played a 
central role in the cohesion of Rwandan society. As a representative of Imana (God) the 
Mwami served as the supreme integrative symbol, through which a sense of corporate 
solidarity could be achieved in the midst of inequality.
262
 The prosperity of both the 
exploited masses and the privileged Tutsi elite was is some way associated with the 
institution of the monarchy. Lemarchand‟s analysis of the situation is quite accurate:  
 
Because of the different perceptions of their self-interests held by each caste, the 
masses and the aristocracy tended to “identify” with the monarchy in different 
ways. Monarchical legitimacy for the Tutsi elites was generally identified with the 
attainment and preservation of instrumental, secular goals. The political myths 
fashioned around the Court provided them with ideological justification for 
maintaining their supremacy in all walks of life. For the masses, however, 
monarchical legitimacy conjured up an entirely different vision – that of a 
unifying whole through which a sense of all-embracing solidarity could be 
achieved in spite of inequality. The symbolic roots of monarchical legitimacy, in 
short, made it possible for the masses to endure inequalities – and for the ruling 




The foregoing socio-cultural factors, coupled with the closed and atomised character of 
the Rwandan rural community, did not allow for an environment conducive to an 
organized protest from the subjugated groups. This minimized the risk of ethnic conflict. 
The absence of tribal conflicts, however, should not necessarily mean that the less 
privileged social groups had happily accepted the inequalities. The acquiescence of the 
exploited groups may have simply resulted from the consciousness of their inability to 
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successfully challenge the system. They could probably have behaved differently if they 
were convinced that they could safely question the legitimacy of the regime. This was 
noticed in the attitude of the northern Hutu inhabitants, when Ndungutse aroused them 
against the particularly exploitative Tutsi regime of Bega dynasty: 
 
Undoubtedly the Bahutu did not voluntarily accept the somewhat burdensome 
fiscal regime. The most telling proof of this is the enthusiastic response of the 
local populations to Ndungutse‟s call in 1912, when he threatened to invade the 
[central] kingdom, and the unanimous rallying of the peasantry to his cause at the 




Ndungutse‟s revolt was easily quenched but it revealed the potential for change inherent 
in the traditional society. The traditional base of social prestige and political power was 
seriously challenged later, when the peasantry became bold enough to question and 
repudiate their conventional bonds to the ruling caste. This was a long process that 
culminated in what was called the social revolution in 1959.  At this time the sympathy of 
the Belgians shifted and they supported the Hutu almost the same way they had 
wholeheartedly supported the Tutsi regimes. 
 
3.3.2.2 The Belgians support of the Hutu uprising  
From the early 1950s the socio-political atmosphere in Rwanda underwent progressive 
changes. This was a period when disgruntled masses started to voice their complaints. 
The events that marked this period and culminated in what was called the 1959 revolution 
in Rwanda made this period a turning point in the history of the country. It had long-
lasting implications that have much bearing on the 1994 Genocide. The upheaval that 
began as a protest later transformed itself into a localized rebellion, before it finally 
wound up as a social and political revolution.
265
 The attitude of the people in the events 
that marked this period indicates how shallow was the level at which they had accepted 
the premise of inequality. “The rapidity of the polarization in Rwandan society may 
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suggest that the acceptance of the premise of inequality was not so deeply rooted, or that 
it was coloured with much ambivalence”.
 266
 But for the people to be able to express their 
feelings concerning the regime, many changes needed first to take place. As much as 
these events resulted from dissonance inherent in the traditional structure of Rwandan 
society, which are analysed below, there were more factors of change connected with the 
presence and the attitude of the colonial power which are equally accountable for these 
events. These will be examined next, after a brief look at the disharmonies inherent to the 
traditional society.  
 
3.3.2.2.1 Disharmonies inherent in the traditional texture of Rwandan society 
Despite the noted solidaristic features that were instrumental in holding the traditional 
Rwandan society together, the inequalities that characterized this society constituted a 
fragile aspect of the foundation of its cohesion. The traditional structure often called a 
caste structure and the resulting functional division of labour that often took a character 
of exploitation and oppression provided an atmosphere conducive for potential tensions. 
As Lemarchand observes, “much of the momentum gained by the revolution after the 
initial outbreaks came from the resurgence or reactivation of long-standing inter-group 
tensions which the ruling oligarchy had either failed to dissipate or could no longer 




Social harmony in Rwanda could be maintained as long as the existing socio-political 
structure was not questioned. This required that the downtrodden groups remained 
unaware of any alternative form of social organization, different from the one imposed on 
them. “The evil that one has suffered patiently as inevitable looks unbearable once one 
comes to realize that there is a way of escape from it”.
268
 Abuses in the traditional 
clientship system that made it increasingly exploitative and the labour control policy 
enforced by the Belgian administration caused much frustration among the rural people 
and eventually aroused their political consciousness. It was the rural anger which gave 
                                                 
266
 Kuper, L. The Pity of It All, p 172. 
267
 Lemarchand, R. Rwanda and Burundi, p 97. 
268
 Kamukama D. Pride and Prejudice in Ethnic Relations, p 51quoting Rwanda Embassy Press Release: 
“Background Information to the Problem of Refugees”. 
 
 83 
energy to the emergent national Hutu leadership and party organization. “The (Hutu) 
leaders did not create rural political consciousness, however, they articulated and 
channelled it, even being pushed to make particular demands by their constituencies”.
269
 
If the colonial policies contributed to making the situation unbearable for the rural 
masses, the presence of the colonialists and the missionaries also made available the 
resources that were used for effective protest.
270
 These external powers stimulated and 
encouraged the revolutionary activity. 
  
3.3.2.2.2 External stimuli of revolutionary sentiment 
Although the root causes of revolutionary sentiment stemmed from the disharmonies 
inherent to the Rwandan indigenous social structure, there were foreign forces that 
shaped the growth of the revolutionary activity. The most noted of the external factors 
that contributed to arousing the revolutionary consciousness and activity among the 
masses include the administrative changes introduced by the Belgian colonial power, as 
well as the attitude of the Catholic missionaries.  
 
3.3.2.2.2.1 Changes in the Belgian administration  
Belgians‟ administrative reforms led to the concentration of power in the hand of one 
chief who combined the positions traditionally held by three chiefs. This innovation 
destroyed the old balance of forces between cattle chiefs, army chiefs and land chiefs. It 
reduced the chances for a subject to choose a less oppressive chief, as well as the 
possibilities of appeal in case of abuse. This change conferred on the chiefs unlimited 
powers, which they were later reluctant to relinquish when the legitimacy of their rule 
was questioned.  
 
The Belgian administration did not only rationalize the office of chieftaincy, it also 
bureaucratised it. Although the indirect rule policy required preserving the office, the job 
description of the chiefs was thoroughly reviewed. New sets of obligations were forced 
upon them, with new standards of performance. The chiefs were asked to discharge a host 
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of new functions and these corresponded to new obligations imposed on the peasantry. 
The bureaucratisation of their position was enhanced by the introduction of financial 
incentives and sanctions. This made the chiefs increasingly more accountable to the 
colonial administration than they were to the king.  
 
The bureaucratisation of chieftaincy resulted in the prioritization of administrative 
efficiency at the expense of traditional affective ties that existed between the chiefs and 
the subjects.  The concern to meet the expectations of the system led the chiefs to make 
more demands from the people. Their rule became more harsh and impersonal. 
Administrative efficiency was more often than not synonymous with sheer brutality and 
arbitrariness. Although acting as agents of the colonial administration, the chiefs were 
generally held responsible by the peasantry for all the hardships and sufferings associated 
with colonial rule.
271
 Taxes and corvees increased by the Belgians were implemented by 
the chiefs, who would also administer punishment, including physical beating. Since the 
Tutsi had the monopoly of chiefly position, the abuses of the chiefs were identified with 
the abuse of the Tutsi as a group. This exacerbated racial tensions and may explain the 
tendency for Hutu leadership later to make not only the chiefs but also the Tutsi, as a 
group, the target of their revolution.
272
   
 
The increasing abuses that resulted from the bureaucratization of chieftaincy created a 
kind of rural radicalism that predisposed the people not only to challenge the rule of the 
chiefs, but also to heed a potential call to revolt against the whole regime.  If a 
development of this kind had once been unthinkable, given the inhibiting effect of the 
traditional client-patron relationship, the situation was changing as a new set of 
relationships began to take shape outside the traditional system of authority. 
 
With the introduction of a money economy, the social stratification changed and became 
more fluid and diversified.
273
 New social groupings emerged and a growing number of 
individuals came to be identified on a basis different from patrons and clients. There were 
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clerks, schoolteachers, carpenters, traders, catechists, etc…. Some opportunities for 
higher education and some modest development of industry, commerce and agriculture 
had opened up alternative ways of access to resources outside the system of clientship 
and beyond the control of chiefs.
274
 New occupational categories appeared among the 
Hutu, who were classified among the so-called „evolués‟. This was a serious blow to the 
traditional system. It brought the sundering of vassalage ties resulting from the surge of 
modern economic and social forces which brought about the collapse of the chieftaincy 
and the kind of social order for which it stood.
275
 Such a break in the chain of 
subordination between Hutu and Tutsi was a precondition to the rise of Hutu self-
consciousness and the accompanying revolutionary sentiment.  
 
The Belgian contribution to the revolutionary move was not limited to the consequences 
of their administrative policy. After the Second World War, Rwanda changed from a 
mandated territory to a trusteeship under the United Nations. This implied more 
commitment from Belgium to effecting political change and more accountability to the 
United Nations. A Trusteeship Council set up by the United Nations regularly visited the 
country and is credited to have greatly contributed to the political awakening of the 
population. The visits of the Trusteeship Council provided to nascent Hutu revolutionary 
elites opportunities to articulate their grievances and to make them known to the world.
276
 
In addition, these visits stirred up repeated criticism in the United Nations against Belgian 
policies and their half-hearted commitment to political reforms.  
 
Belgians were initially reluctant to allow any significant changes. One Resident
277
 once 
made it clear, in his answer to the United Nations:  “It would be harsh and unfair to 
render unhappy, or in a state bordering on social anarchy, one or two generation by 
imposing premature reforms by virtue of a political ideology or on the excuse that we are 
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hoping to bring happiness in this fashion to future generations”.
278
 This position was 
reflected in the Belgians‟ half-hearted commitment to constitutional reforms. They 
declared that the election of the chiefs was not necessary but under the pressure of the 
United Nations Belgians introduced in 1952 an elective system that aimed at establishing 
advisory councils at different levels of administrative hierarchy.  The complicated system 
of co-optation they used made the system to be reguarded as “only very moderately 
elective and representative”.
279
 Initially the process did not include a popular vote. Rather 
it allowed the chiefs and sub-chiefs to nominate „suitable‟ candidates, so that even the 
few Hutu who were co-opted were the servants of the chiefs, hardly daring to express an 
opinion contrary to that of their patron. The process was expected to be a move toward 
democracy. It became nothing but “a process of diffusion of power but principally among 




A second election was organized in 1956. This time it allowed a popular vote, where 
adult males were involved in the election of electoral colleges at the level of sub-
chiefdom. Still at higher echelons, “an indirect vote influenced by the ruling authorities – 
a vote responsible for the composition of chiefdoms councils and the High Council of 
Rwanda –was far more favourable to Batutsi”.
281
 This was a situation of frustrated 
expectations for many Hutu, whose optimistic expectations for the future were denied by 




The Belgians‟ opposition to significant socio-political reforms was reflected in their 
attitude in relation to Ubuhake. As early as 1926, the institution of Ubuhake clientship 
was affected by the socio-economic changes that brought about the loosening of 
vassalage ties, so that some patrons and clients had started to terminate their contracts by 
common consent. But still the Belgian administration clung to this old institution (which, 
of course, was the nerve-centre of the indirect rule), even when King Rudahigwa 
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suggested its abolition. It took heavy pressure from the United Nation Trusteeship 
Council to convince the Belgians to allow this abolition in 1954.  
 
The abolition of Ubuhake resulted in the transfer of ownership rights from patrons to 
clients who received full rights of ownership over a portion of cattle. The dissolution of 
the rights and obligations attendant upon Ubuhake contributed to the emancipation of a 
part of the peasantry and to the erosion of legitimacy of the old feudal system.   The 
abolition of Ubuhake, however, was far from terminating the people‟s exploitation by the 
patrons. Clients who acquired cattle were immediately confronted with the problem of 
pasture. The only way for them to be able to graze their cows was through dependence on 
their former patrons, who controlled pasturage.
283
  Thus a number of former patrons, by 
asserting their claims over the grazing area, in effect compelled hundreds of theoretically 




The suppression of Ubuhake, as well as the other attempted reforms, contributed to the 
revolution sentiment, mainly not through their achievements in the social order but 
through their psychological consequences. In-as-much as these reforms increased the 
expectations of the Hutu, who looked forward to freeing themselves from the bonds of 
the old feudal system, they aggravated their disappointment as they noticed their 
continuous dependence on the Tutsi oligarchy. Some of the Tutsi patrons perceived in the 
reforms a threat to their positions and, in a bid to retain their privileges, were becoming 
more oppressive. Many Hutu were then convinced that nothing short of a revolution 
could possibly loosen the Tutsi hold over the peasantry.
285
   
 
In the face of ever-increasing pressure, the Belgians had difficulties in maintaining their 
intransigence with respect to political reforms. Change was sought not only by the Hutu, 
who hoped for a society where justice and equality would replace discrimination and 
exploitation, but also by the Tutsi oligarchy, who wanted first to obtain independence, in 
order to pursue political reforms on their own terms. The setting of a target date for 
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independence fuelled more revolutionary activity. The Hutu counter-elite feared that 
independence granted to Rwanda while still under the rule of the Tutsi oligarchy would 
result in the perpetuation of this regime. Liberation from feudalism was their priority 
even if this meant delaying independence. For the ruling Tutsi, the sooner self-
government was granted, the better.  
 
In the process of their „fight‟ for independence, the Tutsi oligarchy ended up alienating 
themselves from historical Belgian sympathy. The attitude of the Belgians in the 
transitional period that preceded independence revealed the shift of their support in 
favour of the Hutu.
286
 Throughout the events that marked this period, “the Belgians 
played a determining role, gradually destroying or neutralizing all sources of resistance to 
the revolutionary movement, while at the same time creating new institutions through 
which further changes could be generated”.
287
 However, if the Belgians facilitated and 
supported the action of the Hutu revolutionary leaders, it was the Catholic Church 
through its European missionaries, who contributed to training them. 
 
3.3.2.2.2.2 Attitude of the European clergy 
The church that struggled at the beginning to have a firm grounding in Rwandan social 
reality later grew to become an important social institution that had an impact on many 
aspects of Rwandan society.  The Catholic missionaries were among the champions of 
Tutsi supremacy ideology.  They did this through popularising the Hamitic ideology and 
by restricting their schools to Tutsi children and supporting exclusive Tutsi rule.  
 
This attitude of the Catholic missionaries underwent an important reorientation, which 
after the Second World War was translated into a shift from supporting the Tutsi elite to 
helping the revolutionary Hutu. Different reasons have been advanced to explain the 
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Church‟s change of position.  According to Taylor, the shift was reinforced by the fact 
that the Church was recruiting more of its European missionaries from the blue-collar 
strata of Flemish-speaking Belgians, who felt a certain affinity toward the Hutu, whom 
they helped to gain access to higher education.
288
  It was suggested that this was a time 
when a new generation of missionaries, inspired by the ideals of democracy, intimately 
supported Hutu populism.
289
 A good example is the contrast between the conservative 
attitude of the early leaders of the church, such as Mgr Hirth and Mgr Classe, who 
wholeheartedly supported the Hamitic ideology, and the position of Mgr Perraudin, often 




It is worth noting that at this time the native clergy, who were almost exclusively Tutsi, 
formed about half the total number of the clergy in the Rwandan Church.  Confronted 
with ideas of racial equality, democracy and independence, they understood the possible 
implications of these new ideas to their traditional privileges. This awareness led them to 
join their voice with those who advocated the Belgian transfer of power. This stand sent a 
clear signal to the European clergy, who understood that they were not spared by the 
contestation of colonial order. Their perceived risk to lose control of the church to the 
native clergy may have brought an end to their historic sympathy for the Tutsi. The 
question of the control of the Rwandan church may have combined with many other 
reasons to influence the attitude of the European clergy.  This seems to be Prunier‟s 
opinion: 
 
The combination of changes in white clerical sympathies, struggle for the control 
of the Rwandese church and increasing challenge of the colonial order by the 
Tutsi elite, all these combined to bring about a slow but momentous switch in the 
church‟s attitudes, from supporting the Tutsi elite to helping the Hutu rise from 
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The support of the church to those who became the Hutu elite first consisted of offering 
them education opportunities, especially in seminaries when they were denied access to 
government schools. Beside the opportunities they offered for higher education, 
seminaries had become a field for human endeavour, free from racial discrimination. 
Through them, the Hutu elite came into contact with Christian ethics. They were able to 
internalise the universalistic egalitarian values and to gain a new perception of 
themselves as human beings.  This led them to develop a strong sense of disaffection 
towards their rulers.  
 
Of importance to note at this juncture, colonial institutions, ideologies and the entire 
system had given birth to a class that was confident enough to question and challenge the 
order of the day. This was the middle class, born out of the colonial education system or 
the religious one.
292
 Beside the psychological stimulus, the church provided this Hutu 
counter-elite with the political weaponry to bring reality in line with their expectations.
293
 
When these Hutu started to voice their revolutionary claims the European clergy was on 
their side, helping to lobby for moral and financial support from church affiliated 
associations in Europe. Supported by the missionaries and favoured by the colonial 
administration, the Hutu could now openly challenge the Tutsi hegemony. Their 
challenge resulted in socio-political polarization. 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Socio-political polarisation under Belgian supervision 
It was with the support of white missionaries that in various parts of the country Hutu 
started to organize themselves into societies and cultural organizations. The first political 
challenge to the Tutsi oligarchy came in March 1957, when a group of nine Hutu 
intellectuals published what they called „Notes on the Social Aspect of the Racial Native 
Problem in Rwanda,‟ a document better known as the „Bahutu Manifesto‟. By this text 
the Hutu counter-elite aimed at presenting to the United Nations Visiting Mission their 
own appraisal of the prevailing situation. This came as a response to the Mise au Point 
(Statement of Views) expressed earlier in February by the Conseil Superieur du Pays 
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(National Supreme Council), a statement that insisted on a rapid transfer of power to the 
incumbent Tutsi oligarchy. The manifesto denounced the political monopoly of one race, 
the Mututsi, a monopoly which, according to the authors of the document, was turned 
into an economic, social and cultural monopoly, condemning the desperate Bahutu to be 
forever subaltern workers.
294
 This was not yet a call for revolution but a plea for 
democracy. However, by focusing attention on the gap between the democratic-
egalitarian aspirations of its signatories and the oligarchical structure of Rwanda society, 





Despite the apparent conciliatory tone of the manifesto, it contributed much to ideological 
and ethnic polarization. The issues raised in the manifesto became staple news in the 
local press
296
 and a prime subject of discussion in the hills, arousing social consciousness 
among the Hutu masses.
297
 In June 1957 Gregoire Kayibanda, one of the signatories of 
the manifesto, founded the „Muhutu Social Movement (MSM)‟.
298
 This movement was 
committed to the same programme expressed in the manifesto. About five months later, 
in November 1957, another Hutu activist, also a signatory of the manifesto, Joseph 
Gitera, founded the first political party, the APROSOMA (Association for Social 
Promotion of the Mass).
299
 Although this apparently was a class party aimed at the 
mobilisation of common people for social and political reform, APROSOMA attracted 
only Hutu adherents.  
 
The manifesto provoked a highly defensive reaction from members of the Tutsi 
oligarchy, who saw in it a threat to their traditional privileges. Reacting against the 
egalitarian ideology expressed in the manifesto, a group of Tutsi notables, called 
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abagaragu b’umwami bakuru (the senior servants of the king), issued in May 1958 a 
statement rejecting any Hutu pretensions to common ancestry with the Tutsi. Their 
argument ran like this: “Hutu were already in the country when the ancestors of the Tutsi 
arrived. Tutsi kings had conquered the Hutu, killed off their princelings, and reduced 
Hutu to serfs. By what rights then could Hutu claim to be the brothers of the Tutsi, and 





The polarisation grew stronger from the top. Fifteen months after its publication, the Hutu 
manifesto was finally discussed by the Supreme Council of Rwanda in June 1968. The 
outcome was anything but conciliatory.  Playing down the Hutu-Tusti problem, which he 
said to be a fallacy, the king declared his intention to deal with trouble-makers who were 
raising that false problem. To him,  
 
the only problem was one of wicked rumours propagated by a small group of 
enemies of the country, acting under foreign influence; but they would not 
succeed in sowing dissension; the whole nation was united in the search of the 
bad tree producing the fruits of division; the tree would be found, cut down, 




This radical position of the ruling oligarchy on the issue of race relations was obviously 
bound to call for a violent reaction from the Hutu counter-elite. Responding to the re-
asserted historical Tutsi supremacy, the Hutu undertook to challenge the supreme symbol 
of this supremacy, the Kalinga drum, which became the target of criticism in the Hutu 
dominated press. In October 1958, Gitera appealed to Mgr Perraudin to “bring an end to 
the idolatry surrounding the Kalinga”.
302
 For him this was a matter of first importance.  
This sacred royal drum had the peculiarity of being adorned with sexual organs of the 
vanquished Hutu kings. For the Hutu leaders it could not serve as a symbol of national 
unity. The attack on the Kalinga triggered a strong protest from members of the Tutsi 
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oligarchy that were more than ever determined to reassert the legitimacy of their 
traditional institutions.  The whole climate became poisoned, as the two camps engaged 
in disputes marked with racialized and polarized ideologies. 
 
The increased attacks directed against these sensitive aspects of Tutsi political culture 
increased the anxiety of the Tutsi elites and sharpened their sense of solidarity. They were 
already feeling abandoned by the Belgian administration, who now seemed to be biased 
in favour of the Hutu. This impression grew even higher upon the announcement of a 
forthcoming Belgian parliamentary commission appointed to investigate the suitable 
conditions for a safe transfer of authority. The Belgians seemed to support the idea of 
introducing a democratic process that should result in the rule of the majority.  This made 
the ruling class uncomfortable.  
 
The Tutsi‟s qualms about the attitude of the Belgians were brought to a head by the 
mysterious death of King Mutara Rudahigwa. The king was in Bujumbura, when he 
suddenly felt ill and died shortly after receiving an injection of antibiotics. The Tutsi did 
not believe the Belgians‟ explanation of this death and remained suspicious, especially as 
the king died shortly after he had an exchange of views with Belgian officials. His death 





The death of King Rudahigwa exacerbated T utsi acrimony against Belgians and marked 
the rupture of relations and collaboration between the chiefs and the administration.   The 
message of this rupture was sent to the Belgians during the King‟s burial ceremony. On 
this occasion the successor to the throne, unilaterally designated by the chiefs, was 
proclaimed, to the dismay of the Belgians who were totally ignored in this process. The 
enthronement of Kigeri Ndahindurwa at Mwima in Nyanza was so dramatic that it has 
been often referred to as the coup d‟état of Mwima.  
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The new king was only 21 years old when he was brought to the throne. He lacked the 
experience and ability to adequately handle the socio-political problems of the time and 
preserve the image of kingship. Conscious of this weakness, the pro-monarchist chiefs 
realized that the king needed support. On 15 August 1959, the conservative Tutsi created 
the UNAR (Rwandan National Union),
304
 a party whose programme was conceived to 
eulogize the monarchy.  Though ostensibly dedicated to “the union of all Rwandese for 
the purpose of achieving true progress in all spheres”, under the leadership of a Hutu, 
Francois Rukeba, UNAR was perceived as a party clearly intended to serve as an 
instrument of Tutsi supremacy.
305
 Though under the nominal presidency of a Hutu, the 
party was mainly a Tutsi party, its leadership was dominated by Tutsi chiefs.
306
 It was 
described as a party which was strongly monarchist and hostile to the Belgians. It 
defended the idea of immediate independence.
307
   
 
The party‟s radical position was expressed during its meeting on 13 September 1959. In 
his speech, the president of UNAR declared that any person who refused to join UNAR 
would be regarded as the enemy of the king and of Rwanda. The Secretary-General of the 
party supported him, calling for a merciless war against any traitor who would not assist 
in the “conquest” of immediate independence (from Belgium). The threats contained in 
these speeches were not empty words and were followed with concrete actions. In the 
days that followed tracts were published with names of those branded as enemies of the 
king. In almost all the regions, bands of terrorists circulated, intimidating by threats, 
blows and attacks on property, those who had not joined UNAR.
308
 The tension was very 
high and people could sense the imminence of a deadly conflict.  
 
Not all the Tutsi were pro-monarchy, however. In September 1959, just one month after 
the creation of UNAR, some Tutsi reformists formed their own party, the RADER, 
“Rassemblement Democratique Rwandais” (Rwandan Democratic Rally). Unfortunately 
this liberal party had difficulty in attracting adherents. Though it was mainly a Tutsi 
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party, most Tutsi perceived it as too close to the Europeans and they suspected that it was 
formed to challenge the monarchist programme of UNAR. As for the Hutu, they never 
trusted its liberalism and they were more attracted to a party committed to the Hutu 
cause. On 19 October 1959, Kayibanda converted his MSM into a fully fledged Hutu 
political party the PARMEHUTU, “Parti du Mouvement pour l‟Emencipation des Hutu” 
(Party of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Bahutu). The mission given to this 
party was to achieve the social, economic and political democratisation of the country. At 
the beginning, PARMEHUTU did not rule out the possibility of continuing with the 
monarchy, provided that this would be a constitutional monarchy, with strongly 
democraticised institutions, before the granting of independence. The creation of 
PARMEHUTU aroused the protest of UNAR, which denounced the new organisation, 
calling its members the “enemies of Rwanda”, against whom the “children of Rwanda” 
and “subjects of Kigeri” should rise and fight. Some UNAR militants took the message 
literally and started to implement it. It is their attitude that may have set off an explosion, 
causing the Hutu uprising in November 1959. In their violent reaction to provocation 
from UNAR militants, the Hutu enjoyed the support of the Belgian administration. 
 
3.3.2.2.4. Belgian bias in the riots of November 1959 
The igniting spark came on 1 November 1959, when a group of UNAR activists attacked 
Mbonyumutwa, a renowned Hutu subchief. A day after this assault rumours that he had 
died of his wounds were followed by a violent reaction from the Hutu population. Hutu 
troops gathered in protest, which gave rise to violent incidents, first through the central 
province of Gitarama, then spreading to Ruhengeri and Gisenyi in the north. Initially the 
attacks were directed against Tutsi chiefs and known UNAR members. But in the few 
weeks that followed, confused fighting was involving Hutu and Tutsi in general. Bands of 
Hutu were circulating from hill to hill, burning and pillaging Tutsi huts.
309
 Although these 
Hutu raids followed the same pattern in pillaging and burning huts, their lack of 
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organisation and co-ordination indicates that they were not following any master plan. 
Most of the arsonists participated simply because that is what everybody was doing; the 
operation did not involve any risk but it provided the occasion to loot the victims‟ huts.
310
 
Many of the Hutu arsonists joined the violent movement without fully understanding 
what was happening. There were among them those who seemed to have acted with the 




The Tutsi counter-attack was launched from the court. Despite the Belgians refusal to 
grant to the king permission to intervene and restore order, instructions were given from 
the court to arrest Hutu leaders. Some of these Hutu were killed or brought before the 
king, where they were tortured by UNAR militants.
312
 The Tutsi reaction was better 
organized and it seems to have been more brutal than the Hutu initiatives. The main 
targets were well-identified individuals, considered by UNAR to be the instigators of 
subversion. The United Nations Visiting Mission described the conduct of repressive 
military operations as follows: 
 
Each commando party amounted to some hundreds of persons and more, and 
included a majority of Hutu [italics added], but the leaders were generally Tutsi or 
Twa. The group would set off on missions with very definite instructions. In other 
cases emissaries were sent from Nyanza with verbal orders instructing them to 
bring back or kill certain persons, and permitting them to appeal to local 
authorities for armed forces to be assembled on the spot to help them in their 
mission. It seems an established fact, moreover, that in many cases a commando 
group set out with orders to arrest a person, but in effect killed him, either because 




The repression organized by UNAR seems to have motivated the Belgian intervention to 
act generally in favour of the Hutu.
314
 The Belgians believed that the Tutsi regime 
intended to eliminate Hutu leaders in the hope that this would squelch the movement of 
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rural radicalism and agitation in the countryside.
315
 Therefore their preoccupation to 
protect Hutu leaders led them to take sides in their intervention to prevent violence and 
restore order. While the biased intervention of the Belgians pushed the Tutsi to increase 
their efforts to seize the independent control of the state apparatus, it was these efforts 





The joint proclamation issued by the King and the Governor, calling for calm, and the 
State of Emergency declared on 11 November, brought a relative calm.  The UN Visiting 
Mission estimated that 200 people had been killed, while the wounded were estimated at 
317. In addition, thousands of huts were destroyed and an undetermined number of 




The November riots had far-reaching consequences. Although they were not 
revolutionary in nature, they prepared the ground for more revolutionary activity. Hutu 
leaders who had not thus made the abolition of the monarchy a prerequisite for the 
achievement of social justice were losing their illusion about the monarchy and becoming 
republican revolutionaries. After these riots a significant part of the Hutu peasantry was 
becoming permeable for revolutionary ideals and ready to be converted into supporters of 
the republic. The November events constituted a step further in the process of 
polarisation. The chances for peaceful coexistence between Hutu and Tutsi were 
becoming increasingly slim. Views were voiced, suggesting the geographical separation 
of the two groups and the formation of a confederal organization. According to one Hutu 
leader, Hutu and Tutsi constituted “two nations between whom there is no intercourse 
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and no sympathy, who are as ignorant of each other‟s habits, thoughts and feelings as if 




3.3.2.2.5 Belgian supervision of power transfer from Tutsi to Hutu 
In the aftermath of the November riots, passive resistance and open opposition to Tutsi 
rule spread throughout the country. A number of chiefs were forced to resign simply 
because the population refused to obey them. The Belgian administration encouraged this 
phenomenon in many ways, either by doing nothing to restore the authority of a rejected 
chief, or sometimes by encouraging the local population to get rid of an undesirable chief. 
It seems that Colonel Logiest, then military Resident, appointed in November during the 
State of Emergency, had the mission to instal structures of administration staffed by 
Hutu. To ensure that Tutsi supporters of UNAR would not regain control of the state after 
the riots he instructed the local Belgian administration to depose as many Tutsi chiefs as 
possible.
319
   
 
As Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs were forced to resign, their offices were declared vacant 
and taken over by Hutu interim authorities (with the blessing of the Belgian 
administration). At the beginning of March 1960, about 22 out of Rwanda‟s 45 chiefdoms 
and 297 of the 531 sub-chiefdoms were headed by Hutu.
320
 These positions provided 
valuable political resources to Hutu leaders, giving them the opportunity to prove their 
political and administrative abilities and to expand their zone of influence to areas where 
the people were not yet fully sensitised to revolutionary ideals. These interim 
appointments put Hutu leaders in a privileged position to campaign for the communal 




The appointment of Hutu chiefs and sub-chiefs resulted in an increased number of Tutsi 
who left their homes. At the end of November 1959, the number of refugees was 
estimated to about 7,000 people. By April 1960, this number had increased to about 
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22,000 people, who were either internally displaced or had gone into exile in 
neighbouring countries.
322
 The hardships of refugee life endured by this multitude of 
people and their subsequent emotional pain contributed to further corrosion of Hutu-Tutsi 
relations.  The flight of the Tutsi was a blow to the monarchists, who saw their territorial 
support dwindling and the prospects of a UNAR victory at the polls weakened. 
Capitalizing on the misfortune of the Tutsi refugees, UNAR spokesmen found in their 
dissatisfaction an opportunity for carrying out political campaigning. In their efforts to 
keep alive the grievances of the refugees population they kept reminding them that the 
Hutu were responsible for their misery: 
 
…they constantly reminded the refugees of their „brutal uprooting‟, of „the 
devastation of their crops, the killing of their cattle, the destruction of their 
dwellings, the rape of their wives and daughters‟. Likewise, attention was drawn 
to „the enforced promiscuity of the refugee camps, to the criminal expulsion of the 
old and the young from their salubrious native regions and their parking [sic], 




The electoral campaign for the June and July elections was conducted in an atmosphere 
of mutual suspicion, fear, provocation and recurrent violence. Initially, violence could be 
initiated by the Tutsi leadership, exacerbated not only by the intimidation by Hutu local 
authorities but also by the pervasive official (Belgian) propaganda for democracy. 
Sometimes Tutsi extremists reverted to intimidation and violence to keep the people 
away from the polls. Each time the Hutu retaliated violently by burning Tutsi huts. As 
time went by, burning Tutsi huts became a routine duty for the Hutu population, who 




The communal election gave an overwhelming victory to PARMEHUTU which obtained 
2,390 seats out of 3,125.
325
 This victory brought about a radical shift in the distribution of 
power. PARMEHUTU could not only count on the newly elected communal councillors 
to consolidate its electoral gains, it was also favoured by the new structure of power at 
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grass-roots level. Subsequent to the elections, the country was organized in 229 
communes, headed by burgomasters (district mayors), of whom 210 were Hutu.
326
 This 
new structure brought an end to the power traditionally exercised by Tutsi chiefs. The 
electoral victory further encouraged many Hutu to wage a final war against feudalism and 
this attitude perpetuated the cycle of violence. The increasing frustration of the Tutsi 




In a number of communes situated at the border there were recurrent cases of attacks 
instigated by Tutsi refugees from neighbouring countries. Such acts of terrorism would 
then give Hutu a pretext to retaliate against the local Tutsi population. Many of the newly 
elected local authorities exhibited little ability or commitment to restore order. In some 
places, they were involved in instigating disorder to provoke the exodus of Tutsi families 
whose land and property were then seized and distributed among their Hutu supporters.
328
 
Because of this deterioration of relations among the groups, the UN Visiting Mission 
recommended that the legislative election be delayed, to allow for a cooling-off period 
that would pave the way for national reconciliation.  
 
The postponement of the legislative election was not a good idea for the Hutu, whose 
plan was to achieve internal autonomy that would help local administration to consolidate 
the Hutu rule before accession to independence. Realizing that the UN was not on their 
side, but counting on the support from the Belgian administration, the Hutu leaders 
convened a meeting of all the local leaders, held at Gitarama on 28 January 1961. On this 
date the councillors and burgomasters declared the abolition of the monarchy and 
proclaimed the birth of the Republic of Rwanda. This event is sometimes referred to as 




The months that followed were marked by a campaign for legislative elections. This 
period was punctuated with sporadic violence, in which more Tutsi huts were burnt 
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down, a number of Tutsi killed and thousands more displaced, increasing further the 
number of refugees in neighbouring countries. The elections were held in September 
1961. The outcome was an overwhelming victory for PARMEHUTU. At the same time, 
the abolition of the monarchy declared earlier was confirmed by a referendum.
330
 
PARMEHUTU had now a free hand to prepare for the accession to independence, which 
was proclaimed a few months later, on 2 July 1962. To some, this was a happy ending of 
the revolution that started in 1959 and ended with the victory of the Rwandan people. 
This surely was the sentiment of many Hutu, who were happy to put behind an era of 
discrimination, exploitation and oppression.  
 
While some were cerebrating, however, many others were grieving. This was a time of 
sorrow for thousands of Tutsi, many of whom were mourning relatives killed in the 
process, others grieving over their lost positions and property and the appalling refugee 
life they were relegated to. Rwanda had become a democratic republic under an almost 
exclusive Hutu leadership. Unfortunately, the benefits of the socio-political changes that 
ensued were not enjoyed by everybody in the same way. The first republic brought a 
reversal of fortune in favour of the Hutu at the expense of the Tutsi and did not end the 
confrontation between the two social groups.  
 
3.4 Social relations from national independence to the time of the Genocide 
Rwanda regained its independence in July 1962, shortly after the abolition of the 
monarchy. From that time to the time of the Genocide in April 1994 the country that had 
become a republic experienced two regimes, referred to as the First and the Second 
Republics. Both regimes were characterized by the monopoly of political power by the 
Hutu, to the exclusion of the Tutsi. Social conflicts more open and violent in the First 
Republic subsided at the beginning of the Second Republic, but became even more 
explosive at the end of this regime.  
 
                                                 
330
 Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi, p 186. 
 
 102 
3.4.1 Social conflicts under the First Republic 
The First Republic was the regime of the PARMEHUTU party, led by its founder 
president, Gregoire Kayibanda. This regime inherited the tensions and bitterness resulting 
from the political and social conflicts that preceded it and led to national independence. 
Both the abolition of the monarchy and the accession to independence were understood as 
a victory for the Hutu, who from now on would capitalize on their demographic majority 
to claim the right to enjoy exclusive privileges of power from which they themselves had 
been excluded throughout history. The determination to keep and protect these privileges 
resulted in violent conflicts whenever the Tutsi threatened to jeopardize them, whether 
the threat was real, as in the cases of “Inyenzi raids”, or potential, as in the case of the 
Hutu massacre in Burundi. 
 
3.4.1.1 The Inyenzi raids and retaliation on the Tutsi 
The grief and bitterness of the Tutsi population, who had lost everything, rendered many 
of them susceptible to UNAR propaganda. Those in exile enlisted themselves into bands 
of guerrillas that attacked the Kigali republican regime. Between March 1961 and July 
1966, Tutsi bands known as Inyenzi
331
 launched at least ten major attacks on the Kigali 
regime.
332
 Almost each time these attacks resulted in the recrudescence of violence 
against the Tutsi within the country and subsequent waves of people going into exile. The 
bloodiest attack was the invasion of Bugesera in December 1963, when the assailants 
attempted to march on the capital. The violent repression that ensued was not limited to 
the assailants. Most prominent Tutsi politicians who had not fled the country were 
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From 1966 the raids of Inyenzi stopped and violence against the Tutsi inside the country 
abated. They enjoyed a relative calm, even though they were excluded from the 
privileged positions of leadership and their access to secondary schools and to 
employment was controlled. After ten years of democracy, Lemarchand could formulate 
this comment with regard to the achievement of democracy in Rwanda:  
 
Inasmuch as the end result has been the systematic exclusion of the 
representatives of the Tutsi community from participation in the political 
institutions of republican Rwanda, one reaches the conclusion that democracy in 
contemporary Rwanda means, at best, democracy for the Hutu rather than 
democracy per se. By refusing liberty to the enemies of liberty the Hutu elites 
have seriously undermined their claims to democracy; for if one takes democracy 
to mean equal access to opportunities and life chances, irrespective of caste or 





Democracy and freedom for all required first a process of genuine reconciliation that 
could fix the damages of a long history of exploitation, oppression and rivalries that had 
generated violent conflicts. These seem to have never been the preoccupation of those 
whose major concern was to acquire or keep power. Neither of the two antagonistic social 
groups seem to have believed in power sharing. Instead of a sincere commitment to 
reconciliation, mistrust kept the two groups apart, each seeing a threat in the other. Even 
the event happening in the neighbouring Burundi could resuscitate the “demons” of fear 
and mistrust in Rwanda, resulting in acts of violence. 
 
3.4.1.2 Hutu massacre in Burundi and unrest in Rwanda 
The relative calm enjoyed by the Tutsi was again disturbed in the second half of 1972. 
This time their misfortune resulted from the massacre of Hutu by Tutsi in neighbouring 
Burundi in May-June 1972.
335
 The situation in Burundi revived a hostile sentiment 
against the Tutsi in Rwanda. Vigilante groups were organized and toured the country, 
expelling Tutsi students from secondary schools and from university. Though this time 
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the unrest was not as bloody as in the preceding cases,
336
 many Tutsi victims of this hate 
campaign understood that their situation in Rwanda was so precarious that it could not 
give them any hope for a better future. This was another cause for Tutsi emigration. 
 
These disturbances, that lasted from October 1972 to February 1973, provided an 
occasion to the then chief army commander, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, to 
trigger a military coup that ousted the Kayibanda government on the 5 of July 1973. 
Habyarimana‟s main reproach against the toppled regime was its ethnic and regional 
discrimination, to which he had come to put an end. This was good news for the Tutsi, 
who hoped to see their security improved by the new regime. The Second Republic 
seemed to have a more conciliatory tone with regard to social relations between the two 
rival groups. Only time could prove the sincerity of the promises of peace that the Second 
Republic made. 
 
3.4.2 Social relations during the Second Republic 
The overthrown regime of the First Republic was criticised for its ethnic discrimination 
and its sectionalism. To show their commitment to correct these injustices, the junta that 
conducted the coup constituted what they called the Comité pour la Paix et l’Unité 
Nationale (Committee for Peace and National Unity). If peace meant the absence of war, 
there was peace in Rwanda during this regime. The attacks on the Tutsi in the country 
stopped, although discrimination against them increased. This was a time when “national 
unity” was more spoken about than sincerely pursued. The regime was perceived as 
determined to reserve the monopoly of political power and subsequent privileges for a 
small group in the north of the country to the exclusion of the Tutsi and the 
southerners.
337
 It continued to display a stubborn opposition to the request of the exiled 
Tutsi to be allowed to return in the country.  These major weaknesses constituted the 
perils of a regime that had promised unity and peace. The peace provided was a 
conditional peace, without justice. 
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3.4.2.1 Conditional peace for the Tutsi under Habyarimana’s regime 
After he seized power in 1973, Habyarimana banned all political parties. He created the 
“Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement” (MRND), which he 
made a single and totalitarian party. As the founder of the “Mouvement”, Habyarimana 
was not only the never-challenged president of this party, but also the sole presidential 
candidate, always “elected” by an overwhelming majority. Government and 
administrative officials at all levels recruited from the cadres of the Mouvement exercised 
tight control over the population. This regime, though authoritarian, was able to achieve 
significant social and economic stability that gave a favourable image to the country and 
it attracted sympathy from foreign donors.  
 
The good years of this regime lasted until the early 1980s, when the economic 
atmosphere of the country changed due to the collapse of world prices that affected the 
few commodities that Rwanda exported (coffee and tin). From this time on the country 
relied more on foreign aid. Reductions on annual budgets resulted in cutting of social 
services, worsening the life of the population already overburdened with a variety of 
taxes. Overpopulation and subsequent scarcity of land made the country heavily 
dependent on the vagaries of the weather. This resulted in an increasingly marginal food 
supply. 
338
   
 
This economic crisis affected the socio-political stability of the country. The 
Habyarimana regime that resulted from his coup d’etat in 1973 had always been 
perceived internally as a northern revenge against the former Kayibanda‟s southern 
regime. More political and economic privileges were reserved to people from two 
northern prefectures. The shrinking of resources from the early 1980s resulted in a 
competition for access to economic opportunities. Strife existed, even among the few 
privileged northerners who could no longer be equally satisfied. Privileges were 
unequally shared, more favour being reserved for those who were geographically or 
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otherwise closer to the ruling “akazu”.
339
 The marginalized southerners were more 
sensitive to abuses of privileges from which they were excluded. The most vocal among 
them who dared to speak out against some dubious practices of those in charge of 





Habyarimana‟s attitude towards the Tutsi was ambiguous. On one side, he is credited for 
having ensured that no more violent attack was directed against the Tutsi. This had 
prevailed from his coming to power in 1973 until the invasion of the Rwandese Patriotic 
Front in 1990. Under his regime, many Tutsi prospered in business and became not only 
prominent but also close friends or business associates of the ruling Hutu individuals. 
However, Habyarimana‟s protection of the Tutsi did not go as far as recognizing all their 
full rights. His regime enforced the discrimination initiated by the former government 
through the system of quotas that was implemented in the admission to secondary 
schools, to university and in public employment. Tutsi were no longer told that they were 
aliens, but they were constantly reminded that they were a minority. As Mamdani put it, 
from a nonindigeneous race, the Tutsi became an indigeneous minority. As an ethnic 
group, they could aspire to rights like other Rwandans; but as a minority, they would 




Under Habyarimana, no single Tutsi was appointed to be a leader in the local 
administration in the position of Prefect or Burgomaster. His successive cabinets never 
included more than one Tutsi minister and the number of Tutsi members of what was 
equivalent to the parliament was never beyond two out of about 70.
342
 Above all, 
Habyarimana continually opposed the return of Tutsi refugees to the country. It appears 
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that he was very careful not to allow the Tutsi to form a power centre that would be 
strong enough to challenge the status quo.  
 
Under the Habyarimana regime the peace of the Tutsi was conditional. They were not 
disturbed as long as they stayed away from politics. Their peace and security were to last 
as long as they were willing to accept the conditions and, of course, they would submit as 
long as they could not see any other alternative. If the Habyarimana‟s regime managed to 
keep the Tutsi inside the country under control for about seventeen years, those who 
escaped his control were the Tutsi in exile. 
 
3.4.2.2 Activities of the Tutsi in the diaspora 
Most Tutsi who left Rwanda after 1959 became refugees in neighbouring countries. As 
time passed, their hopes for a quick return to the country faded away.  Some of them 
dispersed further to other countries in Africa, Europe, Canada and the United States. 
Their life in the diaspora was marked with increasingly diversified situations, depending 
on their geographical location, and on how they positioned themselves in the host society. 
Some of those who, with the assistance of the UNHCR, had had access to education and 
were lucky to be employed in Europe, America or even in the Great Lakes Region, were 
generally better off than those who remained in refugee camps. Guichaoua described this 
diversity of life: 
 
In a way, being excluded from the local labour market, which was monopolized 
by nationals, pushed the refugees to try new professional paths where the 
characteristics of their communities (dissemination in various countries, high 
mobility, strong ties of solidarity) could be helpful. A limited number of 
individuals acquired a reputation for professional and financial success which was 
quite often exaggeratedly extended to the whole community in the Great Lakes 
area. But one should point out that many people remained in precarious social and 
economic situations: widows and families with a single male parent, lone young 
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The above description fits especially the situation of Tutsi refugees in Uganda, where 
both challenges and opportunities encouraged them to plan their return to Rwanda. As 
will be shown in the discussion below, Rwandans exiled in Uganda became the nucleus 
of the Rwandan diaspora and played a central role in activities and events that prepared 
for, and culminated in, the return of refugees to Rwanda after the Genocide. The 
following discussion on these Rwandans based in Uganda accounts for their vital role in 
the events reported, without neglecting the support they enjoyed from the Rwandan 
diaspora, worldwide. 
 
3.4.2.2.1 Organization of the Rwandan diaspora in Uganda 
Upon their arrival in Uganda, Rwandan refugees initially attracted some sympathy from 
the people of Uganda.  This was due to their helpless situation, as well as the thought that 
their stay in Uganda was temporary, as they were supposed to return home soon. As time 
went by, the struggle for survival eclipsed the prospect of their return in Rwanda. 
Conflicts over land and pasture arose between the indigenous people and the refugees.
344
 
In time, some Rwandans succeeded in reaching high status due to their traditional cattle-
rearing ability in a society where cattle were a yardstick for social status, others through 
education and subsequent employment or simply through intermarriages with prominent 
families. This social advancement attracted jealousy from the local people, who began to 




A more important determining factor in the fate of Rwandans in Uganda was their 
involvement in Ugandan politics. With their supposedly Roman Catholic background, 
Rwandans did not inspire much confidence in the then Ugandan President Milton Obote, 
whose party, the Ugandan Peoples‟ Congress (UPC), recruited mostly from the 
predominantly Protestant Ankole region.
346
 To prevent them from voting for the Catholic 
dominated Democratic Party, Obote organized a census in 1969 in order to keep the 
Rwandans away as non-citizens.
347
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Obote‟s hostility to Rwandans pushed them into the hands of Idi Amin, whose regime 
they welcomed and served. They did this for security and employment.
348
 By their service 
in Amin‟s notoriously oppressive espionage machinery, the State Research Bureau, 
Rwandans attracted hatred from the Ugandan people who were affected by Amin‟s 
oppressive regime.
349
 The indigenous people had the opportunity to show their feelings 
toward Rwandans when Obote returned to power in 1980. Only two years later, Tutsi 
communities were attacked by government-backed thugs and thousands of Tutsi were 




The eviction of Rwandans and their treatment by native Ugandans as hated foreigners 
increased the realization of their homelessness. The hardship of life in exile revived in 
their minds the image of a mythical Rwanda and an idealized past life, contrasted with 
the suffering they were enduring.  Many of them had left Rwanda as babies or were born 
in exile and had not personally witnessed the problems which pushed their parents into 
exile.  Therefore they imagined Rwanda as a country of milk and honey to which they 
were dreaming to return.
351
 Economic problems linked with their eventual return, such as 
overpopulation, overgrazing and soil erosion, were dismissed as Kigali regime 
propaganda.
352
 Unwanted by Obote‟s regime and unwelcome in their mother country, 
many exiled Tutsi found refuge in joining Museveni in the bush, from where his National 
Resistance Army was fighting Obote.
353
 Their support to Museveni was significant. 
When he took Kampala on 26 January 1986, his army included about 3000 Rwandans.
354
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After he assumed power in Kampala, Museveni was facing a rebellion from elements of 
the army of the former regime regrouped in southern Sudan. This obliged him to carry 
out recruitment to increase his fighting force. More Rwandans joined his army. 
Museveni‟s officer corps contained a disproportionately high number of Rwandan 
veterans.
355
 These were Museveni‟s older fighting comrades whom he trusted most and 
on whom he counted to fight the northern guerrillas and to strengthen his power in 
Kampala. In fact, his Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence was the Rwandan 
Major-General Fred Rwigema. Moreover, Museveni‟s friendship with Rwandans 
attracted more Rwandans, who converged on Uganda from all over the world and were 




The pervasive presence of Rwandans in Uganda‟s key political and economic sectors 
could not pass unnoticed by disgruntled Ugandans. Hostility to Rwandans was expressed 
especially by Museveni‟s negotiating partners from different rebel groups who were 
opposed to the presence of foreigners in the army. Museveni became increasingly aware 
that many Ugandans were irritated by various positions that Rwandans were holding in 
his regime. His old allies were becoming an encumbrance to him. Since he could not 
dispense with Ugandans‟ goodwill he was obliged to review his policy and change his 
attitude toward Rwandans. As part of this change of attitude, the promotion of Rwandans 
in the army slowed down, the hope of massive naturalisation died off and in November 
1989 Major-General Rwigema was demoted and rumours circulated about a planned 
census of Rwandans in Uganda.
357
 This new development in Uganda‟s politics was a 
blow to those among Rwandans who hoped to find an alternative haven outside their 
mother country. More than ever, the question of their return to Rwanda became one of 
urgency and they were prepared to spearhead the movement that campaigned throughout 
the Rwandan diaspora and acted for their return home.   
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The violent repression of which Rwandan refugees in Uganda were victims subsequent to 
the fall of Idi Amin Dada in 1979 had led to the creation of the Rwandese Refugee 
Welfare Foundation in June 1979. This welfare association was quickly turned into a 
political organization in 1980, under the name Rwandese Alliance for National Unity 
(RANU).
358
 The main objective of RANU was the return of the exiles to Rwanda. Since 
Obote‟s regime was not favourable to Rwandans residing in Uganda, RANU could not 
fully exercise its activities in Uganda until the fall of Obote‟s regime in 1986. The victory 
of Museveni in 1986 created an atmosphere more conducive to the political activities of 
RANU. It was in December 1987 that the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity changed 
into a more offensive political organization, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), which 
envisaged the use of armed forces to return to Rwanda.
359
 Once released from his 
functions in the Ugandan government, Rwigema could devote his full time to the 





3.4.2.2.2 RPF’s invasion and the October war 
The authorities of Kigali were certainly aware that the Rwandan refugees were preparing 
an attack on Rwandan territory. The threat of this invasion put Habyarimana under 
pressure, obliging him to soften his position on some issues on which he had always been 
intransigent. These issues included the right of the Rwandan refugees to return in the 
country.  
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Habyarimana had repeatedly claimed that the country was too small to contain 
everybody. He suggested that most refugees should seek to be naturalized in the countries 
that hosted them. The joint Rwando-Ugandan commission created in 1988, charged with 
examining the question of the refugees, had not yielded any result.
361
 A special 
commission on the problem of Rwandan refugees was created in 1989. While rumours 
about an imminent invasion of Rwanda spread, this commission was reactivated so that in 
July 1990 an agreement was reached with the Ugandan authorities on the modalities for 
the selection of Rwandan candidates for repatriation. This operation was scheduled for 
November, but the RPF was not interested in the kind of repatriation that was to be 
conducted on Habyarimana‟s terms. Foreseeing that this Kigali-initiated project could be 
attractive to some refugees, who would prefer to go home peacefully rather that risking 
the possible casualties associated with a military solution, the RPF launched its attack on 
1 October 1990, one month before the scheduled date for the implementation of the 
repatriation project.
362
   
 
If Habyarimana‟s offer to receive Rwandan refugees did not prevent RPF‟s military 
attack, it somehow weakened RPF‟s argument justifying the war with the refugees‟ long 
denied right to return home. In fact, since October, when RPF launched its attack, the 
emphasis was no longer on the refugees‟ right to return. The RPF was now fighting 
against what its leaders perceived as a rotten, undemocratic, corrupt, oppressive and 
discriminative regime.
363
 Leaders of the RPF had made up their minds to use a military 
solution in order to change the regime. Even some political reforms that Habyarimana 
was forced to accept were judged not good enough to deter the RPF from invading the 
country.   
 
While RPF was finalizing its attack plans, Habyarimana‟s regime suffered a serious blow 
that came from his French ally. During the Franco-African summit held at La Baule in 
June 1990, President Mitterrand made it clear to his African allies that France would link 
economic aid to political democratisation. He urged them to open their regimes up to 
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  Considering the economic crisis that the country was facing 
and rumours of a looming invasion by RPF, Habyarimana counted too much on French 
co-operation and assistance to ignore Mitterrand‟s instructions. In July 1990 he declared 
that he allowed the formation of political parties.
365
 This move was timely, as it was 
intended to weaken the argument that the RPF was using to justify the necessity for a 
military invasion in order to liberate the people from a dictatorial and undemocratic 
regime. Those in the country who were unhappy with the regime did not wait to know 
whether Habyarimana was sincerely committed to the political reforms that he 
announced. During the month that followed his July speech political parties were already 
being launched. 
 
From their exile in Uganda, leaders of the RPF were aware of political developments in 
the country.  The politico-economic crisis in the country may even have hastened the 
preparations for the invasion. They believed that the Rwandan political system was on the 
verge of collapse and any push from outside would complete the process.
366
 The attack 
was launched on 1 October 1990 from the Rwandan border with Uganda. It remained 
unclear what RPF‟s plan was for the protection of the Tutsi who were in the country at 
the moment of the invasion.
367
 From past experience, it was clear that any attack by 
Rwandan exiles would jeopardize the security of the Tutsi within Rwanda. This time their 
risk was even higher, as many of them had joined opposition parties. The predominance 
of Tutsi in the Liberal Party resulted in its being viewed by some as the RPF‟s “antenna” 
within the country.  
 
The situation of Tutsi in the country was indeed precarious. This became evident the 
fourth day after the attack.  After an overnight shooting in the capital city by government 
soldiers false rumours were spread that the RPF‟s men had infiltrated the capital. This 
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claim was advanced to justify the manhunt that ensued. Many prominent Tutsi were 
arrested and accused of being the RPF accomplices.  
 
As many as the cases of killing may have been subsequent to the RPF‟s invasion, these 
remained isolated cases, far from being a generalized and spontaneous reaction of the 
population.  In most parts of the country attention was focused more on the tension 
generated by the formation of opposition parties, daring for the first time to openly 
denounce the weaknesses of the MRND regime. It is true that the RPF‟s attack 
resuscitated the demons of suspicion against the Tutsi, especially after rumours spread 
about atrocities committed by RPF soldiers on civilian populations and the assumption 
that many Tutsi living in the country were accomplices of the enemy.  
 
The October invasion produced an effect contrary to what the RPF may have expected. In 
reaction to the invasion the people inside the country tended to increase their solidarity to 
Habyarimana and to view the RPF as a common enemy. Since Rwanda was now victim 
of an external attack, Habyarimana had justification to seek and obtain assistance from 
friendly countries. The effect of the attack was far from precipitating the expected 
collapse of the regime. In fact, within one month the RPF was defeated and forced to 
retreat back into Uganda, from where a guerrilla war was organized. But the attack at the 
border and political opposition in the country became a source of pressure that the regime 
in Kigali could no longer ignore. 
 
3.4.2.3 Political reforms under pressure 
The revived mistrust between Hutu and Tutsi was reflected in people‟s enlistment by 
political parties. While the two main opposition parties, the MDR and the PSD, led by 
Hutus, had very few Tutsi adherents, most prominent Tutsis in the opposition belonged to 
the Liberal Party, the PL. It did not take long, however, before these main opposition 
parties realized that they needed to overlook their differences to work together in order to 
successfully fight their common enemy, the MRND regime. The strategic unity of 
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On 17 November 1991, this group submitted a common memorandum to President 
Habyarimana in which they protested against the obstacles he was putting in the way of 
real democratisation. They called for a national conference to take over the organization 
of the whole process of democratisation.
369
 In response to Habyarimana‟s intransigence 
and intimidation, the coalition used popular mobilization and on 8 January 1992 they 
organized a massive demonstration to protest against the appointed Prime Minister and 
his MRND-dominated cabinet.
370
 The ever-mounting popular pressure, coupled with 
pressure from the RPF, obliged Habyarimana to accept the compromise and on 14 March 
1992 he signed an agreement with the opposition, according to which he consented to 
share power with the opposition in a transitional government.
371
 The principle of a 
national conference was agreed upon, as well as the peace negotiation with the RPF.  
 
In the new coalition government the MRND could not have the majority of seats any 
longer. Some key positions went to the opposition. These included the position of Prime 
Minister, the ministries of foreign affairs, finance, justice and education. This did not 
mean total surrender for the MRND, however. In addition to the presidency, 
Habyarimana‟s party had kept key portfolios such as defence, the interior, the civil 
service and transport. He therefore still had significant power and a great say in the 
orientation of events.
372
 However, the opposition-led government now had at least the 
minimum of required power to embark on the arduous task of redressing some injustices 
of the previous regime, although this was to be pursued amidst a climate of increased 
violence. It was especially daring to initiate contacts with the RPF at a time when many 
hardliners would see in such an initiative a grave betrayal of the nation.  
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From within the ranks of the members of the MRND arose a group of hardliners who in 
March 1992 formed a counter-opposition party, which they called the Coalition for the 
Defence of the Republic, CDR.
373
 From its creation the CDR claimed to be a Hutu party 
whose objectives, as its name implies, was to defend the Republic which was, according 
to them, threatened by the RPF and its accomplices. The CDR perceived the RPF as an 
organization of Tutsi monarchists and all the Tutsi inside the country were its 
accomplices.  If there was to be any negotiations with the RPF, which represented the 
Tutsi cause, only true representatives of the Hutu cause should constitute the other 
party
374
. The opposition parties, not understanding that logic, were not qualified to 
negociate with the RPF. This gave rise to the violent response to the meeting of Foreign 
Minister Boniface Ngulinzira with Patrick Mazimpaka, then Vice-Chairman of the RPF, 
in Kampala, on 24 May 1992. The news about this contact was the cause of a clash 
between the Interahamwe
375
 and CDR members on one side, opposing the negotiations, 
and youth from opposition parties supporting them. In Gisenyi barracks soldiers mutinied 




Far from being deterred by intimidation, members of the opposition met again with 
delegates from RPF on 6 June 1992, in Paris. An agreement was signed on the technical 
modalities of serious peace talks. The chosen venue for negotiations was the Tanzanian 
city of Arusha. Things seemed to go smoothly, when a cease-fire agreement was signed 
as early as 14 July.
 377
 This allowed the belligerents to pursue the negotiations that took a 
period of about two years. However, neither the CDR nor the MRND was supportive of 
these talks, which were beyond their control. There were frequent demonstrations in the 
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streets, with violent clashes between MRND and CDR  youth on one side and the 
youth of the opposition on the other side.  
 
While the CDR was insisting that it should be included in the government, the MRND 
was complaining that the delegation to negotiations was not consulting them. On 15 
November 1992 the President himself said that the government delegates were going 
beyond their mandate and he rejected the July cease-fire agreement, calling it „a piece of 
paper‟ that the government was not obliged to respect.
378
 Nevertheless, the negotiations 
continued and a power-sharing agreement was signed on 9 January 1993.
379
 This 
agreement defined the modalities for a broad-based government, including the political 
parties and the RPF. Of course not everybody was happy with this achievement and on 21 
January 1993 it was the turn of the National Secretary of MRND to reject the agreement, 
speaking for his party. Such confusing declarations created more tension and sporadic 
violence ensued. In this climate the negotiations in Arusha were suspended and, before 
they could resume, the RPF decided to break the cease-fire and on 8 February they 




The February attack had grave consequences. It provided an opportunity for those who 
were already opposed to the negotiations to argue that the RPF was not acting in good 
faith and could never be trusted. For them, this attack betrayed the Front‟s hardly hidden 
agenda to seize power by any means. It was reported that the RPF had committed a 
number of atrocities against civilian people and to some this was evidence that this was 
the Front‟s usual behaviour. Therefore Hutu people could not be safe under an RPF 
regime. 
 
The new development was a challenge to the opposition parties with respect to their 
rapprochement to the RPF. If the need to unite efforts to fight a common enemy had 
obliged both the RPF and the opposition parties to overlook their differences, this could 
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hardly imply that the two groups fighting the MRND regime had become strong allies.
381
 
Although their meeting around the negotiations table was considered by each group a 
possible way out of the crisis, this had not wiped out a great deal of mistrust that 
members of one group had always had with the other. From now on, divergences 
appeared among members of the opposition on the question of dealing with the RPF.  
 
In an attempt to prevent the disastrous effect that the RPF‟s attitude risked having on the 
negotiation process, opposition parties sent a delegation to Bujumbura to meet with the 
RPF. At the end of the meeting, that lasted from 25 February to 2 March 1993, the parties 
had agreed to continue with the negotiations in Arusha. Reacting to this meeting, 
President Habyarimana convened a “National Conference” that brought together, in 
addition to his MRND, all the minor parties that were not in the government. 
Surprisingly, representatives of the four main opposition parties involved in the 
Bujumbura meeting were also there. The resolutions of this meeting were, of course, not 
in line with the spirit of the Bujumbura meeting. The leadership of the four opposition 
parties who attended the Bujumbura meeting, disavowed their members who attended the 
National Conference, saying that they did not have the mandate to represent their 
parties.
382
 This was the beginning of open divisions among members of the democratic 
opposition. 
 
Despite increasing mistrust and opposition to the RPF, even among members of the 
parties that had adopted a moderate approach, the negotiations continued. A protocol on 
the repatriation of refugees was signed on 9 June 1993 and it was announced in Arusha 
that the signature of the final agreement was to be expected before the end of the 
month.
383
 The thorny issue of the organization of the future army was not yet solved, the 
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President being opposed to the posts requested by the RPF in the composition of the 
future officer corps.  Unfortunately, an additional confusion was added to the process, 
when the Nsengiyaremye cabinet that had worked in the negotiations was dismissed. On 
17 July 1993 Faustin Twagiramungu, the Chairman of the MDR, apparently in 
consultation with President Habyarimana, removed Dismas Nsengiyaremye from the 
position of Prime Minister and replaced him with Agathe Uwilingiyimana. 
Twagiramungu appointed himself the designated Prime Minister to lead the broad-based 
transition government after the signature of the Arusha Accords.
384
 The majority of his 
colleagues in the party leadership rejected his decision and deposed him from his position 
as chairman of the MDR, but since he had the support of President Habyarimana, he and 
a small faction of his party prevailed. This event further deepened the split in the MDR, 
from which the party never recovered. The new cabinet received from the President the 
mandate to sign the Arusha Accords on 4 August 1993.
385
   
 
The Arusha Accords comprised different agreements reached at different stages of 
negotiation. These included the power-sharing agreements defining the modalities for the 
constitution of the Broad Based Transitional Government and the National Transitional 
Assembly, as well as the agreement concerning the integration of armed forces. Being a 
product of so many tensions, the whole structure was pervaded by an almost obsessive 
concern to avoid dominance by any force of any other. The result was that the whole 
carefully balanced construction ended up being based on a strict consensus between 
mutually hostile elements. For the whole structure to be workable it required a great deal 




The negotiators had succeeded in the difficult task of defining the modalities of positions-
sharing in the government and the National Assembly among all the political parties and 
the RPF. Now a problem arose, when members of some parties failed to agree on the 
people who should take the positions attributed to their parties. Conflicting lists were 
submitted with totally different candidates from the same parties. The split that occurred 
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around the Bujumbura and Kigali meetings in March 1993 was deepening. Most affected 
was the MDR, the party which was supposed to provide a Prime Minister for the Broad 
Based Transitional Government. While these divisions within parties contributed to 
delaying the implementation of the Arusha agreements, those who were kin in rejecting 
the agreement altogether on the ground that the Tutsi of RPF could not be trusted 
received additional boost to support their contention, when President Melchior Ndadaye 
of Burundi was murdered. 
 
3.4.2.4 The socio-political consequences of the assassination of President Ndadaye 
Ndadaye was the first Hutu president in Burundi‟s history. His victory in a free and fair 
election was expected to bring an end to a history of Tutsi monopoly of power and to the 
resulting never-ending violent ethnic conflicts in Burundi. Despite the overwhelming 
victory of his party, the FRODEBU, Ndadaye had adopted a conciliatory attitude and was 
trying to minimize the tension generated on one hand by Hutu radicals wishing to 
capitalize on their victory in the polls and make up for the privileges from which they 
were excluded for years, and on the other hand by Tutsi extremists frustrated and afraid 
of losing their control of power. A group of Tutsi army officers kidnapped him and 




The similarities in social structure and a shared/parallel history constantly caused Rwanda 
and Burundi to be mutually affected by their socio-political developments. The 
assassination of Ndadaye therefore had far-reaching consequences on the political 
situation in Rwanda. This unfortunate event fuelled the propaganda according to which 
there was a plan to establish a Hamitic empire in the Great Lakes Region. President 
Museveni, who was thought to have sponsored the RPF‟s invasion of Rwanda, was now 
seen as supporting the Tutsi putschists in Burundi.
388
 The preachers of hatred found more 
arguments to convince many of those who were still hesitant to join their camp.  
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Of course the population of Rwanda was not immune to the psychological effects of the 
events in neighbouring Burundi. Many Burundians who fled the violent clashes that 
followed Ndadaye‟s assassination sought asylum in Rwanda, where they told their host 
villagers about the ordeals that Hutu people endured under the Tutsi army in Burundi. 
These reports increased fear among the Hutu population in Rwanda and served as a 
confirmation of what some Hutu extremists had been saying about the Tutsi. With 
President Ndadaye‟s murder the hysterical choice of kill-first-not-to-be-killed could be 




The assassination of Ndadaye did more than provide an argument for the position of the 
radical Hutu in Rwanda. Even the most moderate politicians were alerted to ponder the 
situation. The effect of Ndadaye‟s murder on the democratic opposition in Rwanda is 
described by Prunier: 
 
…they realized that institutional change was fragile and that at any time violence 
could overturn what a moderate process, either electoral or negotiated, had 
achieved. Then seeing themselves as (mostly) Hutu political group forced to 
collaborate with an armed Tutsi group brought back the uneasiness they had felt at 
the time of the February RPF offensive. What was really the aim of those 
Inkotanyi? Would they remain content with what they had achieved in Arusha or 
would they want a monopoly of power, in which case the Hutu opposition would 




Lastly, President Habyarimana himself may have drawn a lesson from the treatment 
meted out to Ndadaye, his neighbour, given some similarities in their social-political 
situations. If a political victory was not enough to provide security to a popular Ndadaye 
against armed Tutsi, what assurance could the less politically supported Habyarimana 
have that the Arusha Accords would put him in a better situation once his control over the 
army had been taken away from him? Much concern about his fate after the fall of his 
regime, coupled with pressure from those who insisted that Rwanda should be ruled by 
the majority, namely the Hutu, was surely behind Habyarimana‟s endeavour to sabotage 
the implementation of the Arusha Accords. After the signature of the Accords in August 
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1994, excuses were found to delay their implementation. Following a period of disputes 
and reticence, the date of the ceremony for the transfer of power was finally diarised for 
10 February 1994. But even at this time, Habyarimana was not ready and any incident in 
the country could serve as a pretext for the postponement of the ceremony. Thus from 10 
February, the ceremony was postponed to 22 February, then successively to 25 March, 26 
March and 28 March.
391
 At this time tension was high in the country. Incidents of 
assassination were many. At this juncture, the General Secretary of the Social Democratic 
Party, PSD, Felician Gatabazi, who was among those nominated for the position of 
minister in the awaited transitional government, was killed. This assassination, that 
caused more tension, was followed by the murder of Bucyana Martin, then Chairman of 
the CDR. In reaction to Bucyana‟s murder, violence erupted in the capital, resulting in 
many dead and wounded. This was a foretaste of what was to happen, with the 
catastrophic assassination of President Habyarimana. 
 
3.4.2.5 The assassination of Habyarimana and the apocalypse for the Tutsi 
The pressure from the international community upon Habyarimana to persuade him to 
consent to the transfer of power had not ceased to mount, but so far without the result 
hoped for. On 6 April 1994, Habyarimana went to Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, to attend a 
meeting that brought together the presidents of the region. They were supposed to discuss 
the situation in Burundi. During this meeting, the subject of the transfer of power in 
Rwanda may have been discussed and some believe that when Habyarimana flew back to 
Kigali, he was convinced that he did not have any other choice but to allow the ceremony 
to take place. Unfortunately he was unable to put his intention into practice, because his 
plane was shot down as it was preparing to land at Kigali Airport. President Habyarimana 
was killed, with all the people who were with him, the crew and the passengers, including 
President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi. The death of Habyarimana was the beginning 
of a bigger tragedy, the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. The question of who was responsible 
for the President‟s assassination is not resolved to date. Nobody claimed responsibility 
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The Presidential plane was shot down at about 20:30.
393
 That same night the violent 
reaction of the presidential guard (GP) started. The first victims seem to have been 
carefully selected. They included all members of opposition parties, most of whom were 
designated to hold prominent positions in the transitional government.
394
 The death of the 
president was announced on national radio early on the morning of 7 April and 
everybody was requested to stay at home. In Kigali, the capital, roadblocks were erected 
at every corner of all the streets and a house-to-house search started. During the following 
days, the systematic massacres that started in Kigali spread to the prefectures. 
 
The presidential guard was joined by the Interahamwe/Impuzamugambi
395
 militias. While 
the GP formed a regular unit of the army, the militias were young people recruited 
usually from the lower classes mostly unemployed young Hutu. Some of them had 
received sufficient training to enable them to handle military equipment such as hand 
grenades and assault rifles. Many of them were armed with machetes, clubs and knives. 
As soon as the massacre started, more thugs joined the initial nucleus of militia. Prunier‟s 
following description of the whole phenomenon seems fairly accurate:  
 
As soon as they went into action, they drew around a cloud of even poorer people, 
a lumpenproletariat of street boys, rag-pickers, car-washers and homeless 
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unemployed. For these people, the Genocide was the best thing that could ever 
happen to them. They had the blessings of a form of authority to take revenge on 
socially powerful people as long as they were on the wrong side of the political 
fence. They could steal, they could kill with a minimum of justification, they 




Beside the well-known liberal politicians, most of whom were killed during the first few 
days (apart from those who managed to hide), the target of the killers was anybody whom 
they identified (according to their own criteria) as Tutsi. All Tutsi were presumed to be 
accomplices of the RPF, the enemy. Incidentally, many Hutu were killed, not only those 
whose Hutu identity was not satisfactorily established, but also those who were percieved 
to associate too closely with the Tutsi, or to express some sympathy for them, let alone to 
attempt to protect them. 
 
On 9 April, Theodore Sindikubwabo, then speaker of the Assembly, announced on 
national radio the formation of a new government. This government comprised in 
addition to ministers from MRND, those from the “Power Wing”
397
 of the MDR, from 
PSD, PL and from PDC. Among the priorities set by the new government was to reopen 
talks with the RPF, which had renewed the fighting. The commander of the United 
Nations Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), General Romeo Dallaire, was willing and tried 
to negotiate a cease-fire, but the RPF was not interested in negotiating with those it saw 
as criminals. 
 
The resumption of fighting added more impetus to the massacre. As fighting intensified 
from the north of the country and later in Kigali, the capital, the parties in the government 
were calling for all their members to unite and resist their common enemy. The “Power” 
brand, which had been used for one wing of the MDR was now extended to all the 
parties. The rallying slogan became “Hutu Power”. The killings, initially perceived as an 
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angry reaction to the death of the president were given another motive. With the help of 
constant warnings and instructions announced through the media, the people could easily 
understand that the same people who killed the President were now on their way to seize 
power in Kigali and to subdue the Hutu tribe. To the fear of losing one‟s privileges 
(rational level) was added the fear of losing one‟s life (visceral level) and the fear of 




Within one week the killings that started in Kigali had spread to most parts of the 
country. More people were joining the initial nucleus of killers made up of 
Interahamwe/Impuzamugambi militia and the Presidential Guard. The combination of 
war and massacre brought about a climate of total confusion among the population for 
whom the massacre was the direct consequence of the war. The RPF‟s progress resulted 
in greater displacement of the population, who feared the reported imminence of the 
rebels‟ arrival in the area still under government control. People reacted differently to this 
increasingly tense atmosphere. There were those who were convinced that a Tutsi regime 
was a threat to their security and who resolved to support the ultimate solution of wiping 
them out to prevent the realization of their dominion.  Such people joined the killing 
groups or actively supported them. Others were convinced that their Tutsi neighbours had 
betrayed them in supporting the invading RPF and deserved their fate. Such people, even 
if they did not take part in the killing, were indifferent to what was happening to their 
neighbours. Others were deeply opposed to the killing, but were too intimidated to voice 
their opinion. Only a few heroes were able to speak their mind and in some cases they 
even tried to protect the victims. Most of such people paid with their own lives.
399
 If it is 
true that the majority of the population were not actively involved in the killing, there 
were many who were not resolutely opposed to it, either.  In fact the Genocide was 
possible not because of the great number of the people who were involved in the killing 
but because of the weakness of those who, though not supporting the massacre, could not 
do anything to stop it. 
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The pogrom that lasted for about three months claimed the lives of an estimated 800,000 
people,
400
 most of them Tutsi. The targeted Tutsi had almost nowhere to hide and those 
who survived can call it a miracle. Most of those who survived were those who, by one 
way or another managed to sneak into the zone under the control of the RPF or those who 
enjoyed the sympathy of a courageous, unsuspected or feared Hutu who would dare 
harbour them until the soldiers of the RPF could reach their hiding place. Finally, the 
massacre ended totally
401





Subsequent to the victory of the RPF, a new government was sworn in on 19 July 1994. 
This government had a challenging situation to manage. After three months of civil war 
and Genocide, the country had become a complete socio-economic disaster. An estimated 
10 percent of the population had been killed and 30 percent forced into exile.
403
 “Those 
people still in Rwanda were in a complete state of disarray. Many were displaced and 
living some distance from their ingo (homes). A large number (especially from the Tutsi 
survivors) had lost all they possessed, including their houses. Psychologically most 
people were in various states of shock”.
404
 Social relations were at the lowest level, as 
Hutu-Tutsi relations were more than ever characterized by mutual mistrust, fear and 
hostility. It was clear that the path to reconciliation was going to be difficult and long in 
post-Genocide Rwanda. 
 
3.5 Social relations in post-Genocide Rwanda 
The Government of National Unity, instituted after the Genocide, acknowledged that the 
restoration of peace and reconciliation was to be among the priorities. The success in 
achieving this goal was to depend on the way they handled various situations arising from 
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the war-Genocide context. After this tragedy, the Rwandan population could be grouped 
into different categories, according to the different situations people found themselves in. 
There were the Rwandans returning from exile, the Tutsi survivors of the Genocide, the 
Hutu population who had fled the country as the RPF was taking control of the country, 
the Hutu population internally displaced and those who had decided to stay in their 
homes. Any effort of reconciliation needed to consider peculiar problems arising from the 
situation of each of these groups. But the greatest challenge to national unity remained 
the gap in the relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi that had widened more than ever 
from the beginning of the Genocide. The victims of the Genocide were now living side 
by side with those perceived as their executioners. Social relations were to be 
characterized by bitterness and resentment from the former and fear and anxiety from the 
latter. 
 
3.5.1 Fear and anxiety in the aftermath of the Genocide  
After four years of war and a hate campaign the Hutu people had been taught that the 
Tutsi were their enemies to be feared or hated. The Genocide was evidence that there 
were many Hutu who subscribed to this divisive ideology.  Those who did not heed the 
call to kill had witnessed the tragedy of the Genocide against the Tutsi, carried out in the 
name of their social group and by people with whom they were identified. Thinking about 
possible reprisals from the former victims inspired fear, anxiety and uncertainty about the 
future. Millions of the Hutu population had opted for exile and were now living in 
refugees‟ camps, mostly in the neighbouring Congo and in Tanzania. Thousands were 
internally displaced, mostly in the “Humanitarian Zone”, and were hesitating to return to 
their homes. The majority had decided to stay in their homes, some with a clear 
conscience, hoping that their non-involvement in the Genocide would guarantee them 
some security, others aware of their guilt but hoping not to be identified, or accepting to 
face the consequences of their actions. If the Hutu were in this state of anxiety, fear and 
uncertainty, most devastated were the Tutsi, especially those who had witnessed and 
survived the tragedy of the Genocide. Their fresh wounds, their pain and trauma were 




3.5.2 Bitter sentiment in the aftermath of the Genocide 
The Genocide survivors were men, orphans and widows, all of them with physical and/or 
psychological wounds. Their relatives had been killed, their houses destroyed and their 
properties looted. There were raped women, many of them with unwanted pregnancies 
and/or HIV/AIDS. Given the horror they had endured, inflicted on them by the Hutu, one 
can understand the amount of bitterness they were likely to harbour against anybody 
perceived as their executioners. Many of them were calling for vindication and some 
would not hesitate to take „justice‟ into their hands whenever they could. The temptation 
to take revenge was even higher when the survivor was a son who had joined the battle 
with the RPF, only to come back after the war and find his family decimated. Since the 
real killers were not always identified or were not present, anybody related to him/her 
would sometimes pay the price. The situation was worse when some people sought not 
only to avenge their relative killed, but also to avenge their persecuted ethnic group. In 
such cases, any Hutu was the offender. In the same way that all Tutsi during the 
Genocide were labelled as “Inkotanyi”,
405
 after the Genocide the tendency was to 




The alleged collective responsibility of all Hutu in the Genocide was sometime cited for 
material purposes. This was often the case when the Tutsi returnees used this pretext to 
evict Hutus from their properties, which they usurped. Prunier describes this phenomenon 
as: 
…the real colonization of some parts of the country (mainly Nyanza, Nyamata, 
Kibungo and of course Kigali) by an increasingly massive influx of Tutsi 
returnees coming partly from Uganda and much more from Burundi. They 
grabbed whatever dwellings were „available‟ and at times evicted owners at 
gunpoint when the property they wanted was occupied. As a direct consequence 
of this state of affairs there was of course a sharp increase of criminality which the 
RPA alone could not suppress since there were no civilian police to work locally 
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Retaliation against the Hutu after the Genocide included eviction from properties and/or 
arrest. Many of those who were arrested simply disappeared and were nowhere to be 
found, living or dead. The most fortunate among them went to increase the population in 
prisons.
408
 The less fortunate were those who were simply executed. In connection with 
this, Human Rights Watch reported: 
 
…the indiscriminate massacre of individuals and groups bearing no arms, and 
posing no threat to them and the execution of individuals, selected according to 
their reputations, political party allegiance, denunciation by others in the 
community or after interrogation by RPF soldiers….All were judged to be the 
enemy by the fact of being alive, including, sometimes, people who were Tutsi 
and, often, people who had protected the Tutsi…These killing were widespread, 
systematic and involved a large number of participants and victims.
 409
   
 
Some have suggested that the killing of the Hutu after the Genocide was a result of a 
deliberate policy of the RPF.
410
 Others suggest that, without necessarily being planed, the 
killing resulted from a growing wave of Tutsi extremism, which was particularly strong 





The killings are not orchestrated deliberately but those that happen are seen by 
many Tutsi as something „natural‟ given the preceding Genocide. Very little effort 
is made to stop them even if they are unplanned. There seem to be a kind of 
winking and looking the other way on the part of the men on the ground….The 
killings are also probably considered as useful by some members of the RPF 
hierarchy in discouraging Hutu refugees abroad from coming back.
412
 
                                                 
408
 The population in Rwandan prisons was estimated at 120,000 people, who allegedly had participated in 
the Genocide. This number is too high for the capacity of prisons and all kinds of facilities were used to 
host these inmates. The number is probably not too high compared to the people who really committed 
these crimes. The problem is that the circumstances of arrest and the procedures followed meant that there 
were many among these detainees who did not deserve to be there. 
409
 Human Rights Watch. Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda. New York. Human Rights 
Watch. 1999, p 734 . 
410
 Concerning this allegation, Human Rights Watch seems to endorse the findings of a UNHR mission to 
Rwanda, headed by Robert Gersony. The team had declared that in the course of their investigation in 
Rwanda, they became convinced that the RPF had engaged in clearly systematic murders and persecution 
of the Hutu population in certain parts of the country. See Human Rights Watch. Leave None to Tell the 
Story, p 727. 
411
 Prunier, G. The Rwanda Crisis, p 325. 
412
 Prunier, G. The Rwanda Crisis, p 325. Those who could be interested in discouraging the refugees from 
coming back may have included those who had usurped their property and the politicians who could see in 




The international community, appalled by the attitude of the fallen Hutu government and 
impressed with the ideology of the RPF, had not paid much attention to reports about acts 
of violence perpetrated on the Hutu population until September 1994 when reports 
concerning these crimes were taken seriously. Following the pressure on the new 
Rwandan government by the international community, the killings abated. The Kigali 
government acknowledged that some people had been killed, but it contested the extent 
of the massacre. They explained the cases of civilians‟ deaths as the unavoidable 
consequence of combat, or as spontaneous acts of vengeance by new soldiers with 
insufficient training
413
. Similar explanations were given concerning the slaughter of 
internally displaced people at Kibeho. 
 
3.5.3 The case of the Kibeho massacre 
Kibeho was a location which became renowned when crowds from all over the country 
and from abroad flocked to the Kibeho Parish to listen to three girls who affirmed that the 
Virgin Mary had visited and talked to them.
414
 The name of the location was tarnished 
during the Genocide, when a crowd of Tutsi who had sought refuge in the church 
premises were mercilessly massacred inside the church building. Toward the end of the 
war this location fell under what was called the Safe Humanitarian Zone, protected by 
French troops of “Operation Turquoise”. This zone, declared free from hostilities, 
became the haven for the internally displaced people fleeing from the areas that had 
fallen under the control of the RPF. The new Rwandan government had never been 
enthusiastic about the creation of this zone, which it perceived as an open door for the 




Upon the departure of the French soldiers, the Rwandan government took over the 
control of this zone, which they perceived as harbouring criminals.
416
 It did not take long 
before they decided to destroy the camps in which there were more than 100,000 people. 
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The operation was conducted in a heavy-handed way, leading to many casualties as some 
saw in it as another way to make the Hutu pay for their „crimes‟.
 417
 The destruction of 
displaced camps should have served as a warning to Hutu refugees then living in camps 
in Congo who were considered to be from the same stock as those dislodged from 
Kibeho. But refugees in Congo probably thought that they were in a better and safer 
position and did not believe Kagame, who was then the minister of defense, when he 
repeatedly made it clear that their camps were not out of his reach.  
 
3.5.4 Reaction to the threat posed by the proximity of refugee camps 
Among millions of Hutu people in Congo refugee camps were members of the fallen 
governments, elements of the defeated army, members of the militia and many other 
people who had been active in the Genocide. These categories of people were rightly 
perceived as constituting a threat to security in Rwanda. The majority of people in the 
camps were normal civilians who, for various reasons, thought that it was not safe for 
them in the new Rwanda. In the eyes of the Kigali government, these camps had become 
havens for perpetrators of the Genocide who should pay for their crimes. The few 
innocent civilians living with them were “held in hostage” by those criminals who 




This position of the government was not totally groundless, because since late 1994 a 
phenomenon of infiltration into Rwandan territory had started. Members of the defeated 
army and the militia were entering Rwanda from Congo and they became a serious threat 
to security. They destabilized local administration and committed murders, most of the 
time threatening the lives of the survivors of the Genocide.
419
 The people in the north-
west of Rwanda paid heavily when the Rwandan Army reacted and undertook to fight 
and quench this infiltration. But heavier was the price paid by the refugees in Congo, 
when Kigali decided to attack not only their camps but also their host country. 
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3.5.5 The Congo war and the ordeal of Hutu refugees  
As far as the Rwandan government was concerned, the official reason presented for the 
invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1996 was to put an end to the threat 
posed by the presence of hostile forces in the camps. Unfortunately, the heavy artillery 
used to destroy the camps could not be directed at well-identified criminals. Most of the 
people who perished in the process were civilians, while the soldiers and the militias 
knew better how to save their own lives.  
 
The attack on refugee camps in Goma forced a great number of trapped fugitives to cross 
the border and return to Rwanda. Most of the panicking mass of refugees opted to enter 
the Congo forest, providing justification for the Rwandan army to hunt them as far as to 
Atlantic Ocean. Those who did not succumb to the bombs and the fire power of 
machineguns were swallowed by the hostile conditions of the Congo forest. Rumours and 
reports of massacres of these refugees were many, although no conclusive investigation 
was conducted. The fact remains that many Hutu refugees perished in the Congo and the 
few survivors of this tragedy keep a bitter memory of the events in Kisangani and Tingi 
Tingi, where many of the survivors left unburied the bodies of their loved ones.  Most 
resistant among those who survived the perils of this long walk tell moving stories of 
their journey from Goma to Gabon, through the hostile Congo forest and under fire from 
the Rwandan army. 
 
After the Congo war and the return of a great number of refugees, the situation continued 
to stabilize in Rwanda, with fewer incidents reviving ethnic hatred. The decrease in open 
conflict, however, did not mean automatic normalization of social relations. The war and 
the Genocide had widened the rift in social relations, making the long route toward 
reconciliation and national unity very rough and ardeous.  
 
3.5.6 The difficult work of reconciliation in the country 
The post-Genocide government was aware of the daunting task of achieving 
reconciliation and rebuilding unity. Efforts of the post-Genocide government to bring 
about peace and reconciliation drew from the terms of the OAU-mediated Arusha Peace 
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Accords, signed in August 1993, a few months before the Genocide began. Among major 
issues agreed upon in terms of this accord included: power-sharing in all public 
institutions, transitional arrangements that would lead to elections, the repatriation of 
refugees and resettlement of internally displaced persons, the integrations of the armies 




After the Genocide the political environment that had surrounded the negotiations of the 
Arusha Accords had changed, so that their implementation took a different turn. Different 
political parties that had taken part in the formulation of this accord had lost their power, 
while the victorious RPF credited for stopping the Genocide had leeway to deliberate on 
the destiny of the nation. The Arusha Accords were implemented with serious 
modifications, some of which were the direct result of the victory of the RPF. The 
question of the integration of armies became obsolete, since there was only one army 
remaining, the victorious RPA. The ex-FAR were out of the equation, not only because 
they were defeated, but because they were the indicted perpetrators of the Genocide. The 
repatriation of refugees was automatic, because the regime that had opposed their return 
had now fallen. As for the internally displaced, whose number had greatly increased since 
the signature of the Arusha Accords, these people had ceased to be the innocent victims 
of the war and had become the presumed perpetrators of the Genocide. The most 
important issues remaining for the post-Genocide regime to handle were the issues of 
power sharing, the administration of justice and the establishment of the rule of law.   
 
3.5.6.1 Power-sharing  
The Genocide and the military victory of the RPF affected power-sharing, which was no 
longer done according to the stipulations of the Arusha Accords. The former ruling party, 
the MRND, which had been a principal player in the negotiations and to which the 
Accords reserved the position of presidency in the transitional government, was now 
indicted for being the engine of the Genocide, excluded from the post-Genocide unity 
government and banned. The next main opposition party, the MDR, which was entitled to 
the position of Prime Minister was not to survive for long. After successive resignations 
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of two Prime Ministers hailing from this party, the MDR was finally banned on 
indictment of divisionism. Although reasons were provided for each case of resignation 
and banning, some saw in these phenomena RPF‟s strategy to reduce to the minimum the 
access of the Hutu to power. This perception was reinforced when few Hutu who had 
joined the RPF were dismissed from their prominent positions one after another. These 
included Sendashonga, then minister of home affairs who resigned and went into exile 
where he was murdered. Bizimungu, who was the President of the republic, resigned and 
was later sent to jail. Kanyarengwe, who was the chairman of the RPF, was removed. 
Beside the withdrawal of such prominent and vocal Hutu from the Unity Government, the 
political parties which were active before the Genocide grew weaker, so that none of 
them could designate a candidate to challenge RPF‟s incumbent President Kagame in the 
presidential elections held in 2003.  If today the Rwandan government is called a Unity 
Government, it is not because it is a multiparty government, but simply because it 
comprises Hutu and Tutsi members. To critics estimating that the Unity Government has 
simply collapsed, Kigali authorities respond that theirs is an inclusive government in 
which Hutu are in the majority. Another challenge for the post-Genocide regime is in the 
area of the administration of justice.  
 
3.5.6.2 Transitional justice in post-Genocide Rwanda 
In the aftermath of the Genocide, the demand for justice was more daunting than ever. It 
was as if the whole country was divided into victims calling for justice and presumed 
perpetrators awaiting trial and for their fate to be settled. The massive arrests that 
followed the Genocide sent more than 130,000 behind bars throughout the country, where 
all kinds of buildings were used as prisons. If arrests were easy to make, rendering justice 
was a different matter. Before the Genocide there were 758 judges, 70 prosecutors and 
631 personnel in the judiciary. After the Genocide the figures had dropped to 244 judges, 
12 prosecutors and 137 staff.
421
Under the then prevailing circumstances, criminal 
investigations would have taken years to process. The need to speed up justice, while 
making room for reconciliation, led to the decision to classify the Genocide crimes into 
three categories. To the first category belonged the crimes of planning, organising, 
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supervising and instigating Genocide. These crimes were referred to the International 
Criminal Tribunal at Arusha, Tanzania, and to national courts in Rwanda. Complicity in 
the Genocide belonged to the second category and was to be the competence of national 
courts and the Gacaca tribunals to judge. Crimes against assets belonged to the third 
category and were to be tried by the Gacaca tribunals.  
 
3.5.6.2.1 The International Criminal Tribunal 
The Interntional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was created by the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994. The resolution stipulated that the 
tribunal would be vested with the authority to prosecute persons responsible for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in connection with the Rwandan 
Genocide between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
422
 Since it began its work on 
26 June 1995, the tribunal faced a number of challenges
423
 that hampered its progress and 
efficiency. In 2005, about ten years after its creation, the tribunal had made only sixty-
nine arrests, processed twenty-five cases and handed down nineteen judgments.
424
 This 
slow process has attracted serious critics, especially from disappointed Rwandans.  The 
International Crisis Group, a group of observers reporting on the March 2001 local 
elections in Rwanda, lamented on the poor performance of the tribunal, in these words: 
Seven years on, it has still not been able to shed light on the design, mechanisms, 
chronology, organisation and financing of the Genocide, nor has it answered the key 
question: who committed the Genocide?
425
 The International Criminal Tribunal was 
scheduled to complete its work by 2010, the date by which all pending cases will be 
eventually transferred to national courts for trial. It is clear that this tribunal has not done 
much to alleviate the load borne by national jurisdictions. The Gacaca tribunals are 
expected to be a better alternative. 
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3.5.6.2.2 Justice and reconciliation through Gacaca 
Gacaca is a traditional institution used to settle disputes between members of a 
community in Rwanda. A quarrel arising between two families called for the elders of the 
community to come together, hear the matter and resolve it, always prioritising 
reconciliation and harmony in the community. The discussions were normally held in an 
open space, with people sited on a patch of common grass called Agacaca. It was from 
this grass that the institution took its name. With the introduction of an established court 
system the traditional Gacaca was progressively less used and almost completely 
disappeared. Faced with the daunting task of trying thousands of cases of alleged 
Genocide crimes, the Rwandan government decided to revive the Gacaca system. On 30 
August 1996 Gacaca was instituted by the law as a system of courts with power to deal 
with Genocide crimes of the second and third categories. The Gacaca system was 
instituted with the aim of reducing the overcrowded prisons and to avoid impunity. The 
idea was to bring back to the fore the reconciling aspect of the traditional form of this 
institution.  
 
The Gacaca courts were established in 2001 and started to operate in May 2002.
426
 These 
jurisdictions, operating at different levels of the state‟s administration, involve thousands 
of “judges” without relevant training and without remuneration. This situation raises 
hosts of questions, including the competence and ability of such tribunals to judge cases 
of gross violations of human rights and the question of knowing whether or not the 
process meets minimal trial requirements articulated in international law and verified by 
the Rwandan government.
427
   Villa-Vicencio has identified two camps with respect to 
public and professional assessment of the work of the Gacaca courts: 
 
Critics of the process, often made up of western legal commentators and human 
rights critics, tend to see the courts as lacking in due process as they are 
susceptible to community bias, have the potential to spawn revenge killings and in 
some instances could be a precursor to impunity. Others, largely government 
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officials and many community-based people, see the courts as making an 




 The Gacaca system has its challenges, limitations and abuses, but the idea behind this 
system of justice was not bad. It promised to be better than perpetuating imprisonment 
without trial under horrendous circumstances, with most prisoners serving more tha 10 
years in jail without judgment, or alternatively allowing alleged offenders total impunity 




The success of the Gacaca system was dependent on Rwandans‟ commitment to justice 
and reconciliation. While justice remained the domain of the Gacaca and the established 
courts, the aspect of reconciliation was to be the focus of another platform, namely the 
National Unity and Reconciliation Commission. 
 
3.5.6.3 National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
A special body, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, was created in 
March 1999 and was given the mission to promote unity and reconciliation within 
Rwandan society. The role of this commission included initiating programmes that 
promote national unity and reconciliation, co-ordinating and overseeing all other 
initiatives aiming at the promotion of national unity and monitoring the activities of 
government‟s organs, private institutions, political parties and of all the people in general, 




The National Unity and Reconciliation Commission can be credited for providing many 
Rwandans with a forum to express their individual views about important issues 
pertaining to the future of the nation. From discussion organized by this commission it 
was pointed out that the major problems of the Rwandan society revolved around some 
issues that included the following: 
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The history of the country: The responsibility of the colonial power in antagonizing 
Rwandan people is highlighted. The complaint is directed against the way Rwandan 
history has been told and taught. What has been said about ethnic identity and social 
relations in the pre-colonial and colonial periods continuously fuelled bitterness, mistrust 
and conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi. It is now recommended to rewrite the 
history of Rwanda and teach the present and coming generations a correct version of the 
history of the nation. The truth now to be upheld is that pre-colonial Rwanda was a 
harmonious society. The divisions were brought by a colonial power solely responsible 
for the oppression that the Hutu suffered under the monarchy. 
 
Bad governance: Those who link the problem of the country with poor political 
leadership normally trace the problem back to the change that took place in 1959. They 
maintain that right from 1959 Rwanda entered a dark period of internal divisions that 
bred mass murders and refugees.
431
  The indictment is directed against the two Hutu 
regimes that followed the monarchic and colonial regimes. The dictatorial and sectarian 
character of these two regimes is strongly condemned.  
 
Bankruptcy of the judicial system resulting in the culture of impunity: This is part of 
the weaknesses attributed to the two post-monarchical regimes. Reference is especially 
made to the many injustices and abuses that the Tutsi have been victims of from the 
people who knew that they could always get away with it.  
 
The problem of ignorance and poverty: It is stressed that poverty has often been 
among the causes and consequences of the lack of cohesion and harmony within 
Rwandan society. People whose basic physical needs are not met are vulnerable to all 
kinds of influences and manipulations.  Ignorance has been a hindrance to discernment, 
leading the mass to blindly yield to the fantasy of the leaders.  
 
The above assessment of the root causes of Rwandan social problems highlight the 
failures of the two regimes that preceded the current one. By coincidence, the indicted 
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regimes are those that are branded as Hutu regimes that lasted from 1959 to 1994.  There 
are objections to this analysis of the Rwandan situation. Some find it biased against the 
Hutu social group. It presents the Tutsi as the historically innocent victims. Such 
sentiments of indignation have been expressed in reaction to the initiative known as the 
Detmold Confession.  
 
In Detmold, Germany, a group of Rwandan Christians from Hutu and Tutsi backgrounds 
and some Europeans met in December 1996 to reflect on the Rwandan tragedy.  This 
group came to the conclusion that reconciliation in Rwanda requires that each of the 
groups involved in the conflict recognize its share of responsibility in the crisis and 
humbly apologizes to those it harmed. This conviction led the participants to take the lead 
in repenting. Grouped into three categories, the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Europeans, each 
group repented on behalf of the category it represented. If the initiative was generally 
welcomed by many Rwandans, there were others who censured its content, especially the 
confession expressed by the Hutu and the Tutsi groups, which is reproduced below. 
 
Confession of the Hutu group: 
 
We, Hutu Christians, present at Detmold, recognise that our group has oppressed the 
Tutsi in various ways since 1959. We confess to the massacre committed by the Hutu 
against the Tutsi group at different periods of Rwandan History, culminating in the 
Genocide of 1994. We are ashamed at the horrors and atrocities committed by the Hutu 
towards the Tutsi: torturing, raping, slitting pregnant women, hacking humans to pieces, 
burying people alive, hunting people with dogs as if they were animals, killing in 
churches and temples (previously known as places of refuge) massacring old people, 
children and sick in the hospital, forcing the people to kill their relatives, burning people 
alive, denying burial and thousands of other ways of cynically degrading and mockingly 
putting to death. 
 
We carry the terrible weight of this unspeakable crime and we accept to bear the 
consequences without resentment. We implore our Hutu brothers and sisters not to forget 
this terrible past when they judge the present reality in Rwanda. 
 
We humbly ask forgiveness of God and our Tutsi brothers and sisters for all the evil we 
have inflicted upon them. We commit ourselves to do whatever we can to restore our 
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Confession of the Tutsi group: 
We, Tutsi Christians, present at Detmold, are happy and feel comforted by the confession 
and demand of forgiveness made by our brothers and sisters. We likewise ask God and 
the Hutu to forgive the repression and blind vengeance which members of our group have 
taken, surpassing all claims to legitimate self-defence. “Inkoni ikubise mukeba uyirenza 
urugo”(justifying evil on the pretext that it affects a rival, ends up by turning back on the 
person who justified it). We also ask God and our Hutu brothers and sisters forgiveness 
for certain arrogant and contemptuous attitude shown them throughout our history in the 




This courageous initiative received commendation from many Rwandans, so that the 
number of signatories moved from the 24 initiators to several hundred, who later 
endorsed the confession and signed it. Those critical of the content of the confession 
lamented that it displayed an imbalance in the depth of repentance from the two groups. 
The issues raised against the confession, and pointed out by Gatwa, include the 
following:  
 
 The confession identifying a whole group as killers and another as victims 
seemed to incriminate a whole group. This could endanger the lives of 
innocent people belonging to the incriminated group and obstruct justice; 
 The repentant Hutu were naïve and underestimated the offences of the Tutsi; 
 The confession was unbalanced, with “extremely moving details from the 
Hutu not counterbalanced by the Tutsi group”; 
 The confession was flawed by sheer cover-up of many injustices, including 
the grave oppression that led to the 1959 revolution; 
 The repentant underestimated the systematic revenge conducted by the 




What all the above objections have in common is their apprehension of what the 
objectors perceive as unfair incrimination of one group, the Hutu, and a shallow emphasis 
on the responsibility of the other, the Tutsi. 
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The Detmold Confession and reaction to it did not result from a national forum and may 
be judged not to reflect the opinion of the majority of Rwandans. But the views expressed 
at this level seem to echo the sentiments expressed in some other instances.   
 
After the Genocide, very few among the Tutsi could resist the tendency to think of any 
Hutu as a criminal. To many, the 1994 Genocide was conclusive evidence that all Hutu 
are evil and that the Tutsi have always been the innocent victims of the wickedness of the 
Hutu.  Even the most reasonable among the Tutsi would think that good Hutu are rather 
scarce.
435
 Such blanket incrimination of the Hutu group creates in its members claiming 
their innocence a feeling of being victimized. 
 
The perception that the Hutu are unfairly treated was expressed in relation to the 
definition of the “survivors of the Genocide” needing assistance and comfort. 
Differentiation was made between the Tutsi, real victims of the Genocide understood in 
its technical use and the Hutu who were massacred during the Genocide, sometimes in 
the same conditions as the Tutsi, the only difference being that they did not belong to the 
targeted group.
436
 The practical result of this distinction is that: 
 
 Hutu victims are not included in the official burial and memorial ceremonies 
of the victims of the Genocide; 
 Hutu widows and orphans of the tragedies are not survivors of the Genocide 
and cannot claim assistance at the same level as their Tutsi neighbours;  
 Tutsi alleged perpetrators of crimes against humanity during and after the 
Genocide are not prosecuted at the same level as the Hutu alleged offenders, 
neither before the Rwandan regular tribunals, nor the Gacaca tribunals, nor the 
Arusha International Tribunal. 
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There are very few among the Hutu who are convinced about the fairness of these 
measures. It is not easy to explain to a Hutu who lost his loved   ones during, or even 
after, the Genocide that his/her pain is less than that of his Tutsi neighbour who lost loved 
ones during the Genocide. The crime that generated the loss may be different in terms of 
the law but the pain is always measured by the one who suffers it. The sentiment of 
victimisation, which is real among many Hutu, adding to the negative perception of Hutu 
as irredeemable slaughterers still prevailing among many Tutsi, works against the mutual 
trust between the Hutu and the Tutsi and undermines the efforts towards genuine 
reconciliation. Commenting on this situation, Pottier warns: 
 
The challenge in Rwanda today is complicated further in that the official 
discourse on the 1994 Genocide maintains in practice the ethnic division which 
the RPF-led government denounce in theory: only Tutsi are victims of Genocide; 
moderate Hutu who died in the massacre are victims of politicide. This distinction 




The Detmold Confession is a small initiative and probably the signatories did not 
conceive it as an ambitious reconciliation project. Nevertheless, there is an aspect in this 
small initiative that is worth commending. Members of each of the two groups involved 
were sensitive enough to allow those they perceived as their oppressors to express their 
own grief and to listen to them. Throughout the history of Rwanda, members of each of 
the two main social groups focussed only on the sufferings they endured and failed to pay 
any attention to the suffering that they, or those identified with them, inflicted on those of 
the other group. Today there are many among the Hutu and among the Tutsi who are 
sincerely convinced that their group has always been the historically innocent victim, 
with the resulting implication that those of the other group have always been the 
historically oppressors. This perception is a hindrance to genuine reconciliation. 
 
3.6 Summary 
The Rwandan Genocide was a result and a culmination of a history of conflicts, the roots 
of which are traced back to the pre-colonial period. The causes and factors responsible for 
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this tragedy, as well as its consequences, are many and not all can be easily identified. 
The preceding survey of the history of social conflicts in Rwanda helped to identify some 
of these causes which are rooted in history. The struggle for the control of limited 
resources antagonised the elites from the Hutu and the Tutsi and created conflicts that had 
serious repercussion on the masses. Unresolved conflicts between the two groups kept 
recurring increasing mistrust, fear and hatred in the community until a stage was reached 
when the social atmosphere was ripe for the Genocide to occur.  These negative feeling 
should have been overcome by the message of love preached by the church. Things did 
not work out that way. This is why people are justified in asking what went wrong with 


































CHAPTER FOUR: RWANDAN CHURCHES AND SOCIAL CRISES 
 
4.0 Introduction 
Throughout Rwandan history, Christians and church leaders have been part and parcel of 
social conflicts. Sometimes God‟s servants have been criticised for too much 
involvement in the politics that produced the conflicts. At other times they have been 
criticised for doing nothing to prevent or solve crises. This section undertakes to examine 
some of the challenges faced by the Rwandan church, its leaders and its members, in 
periods of conflict and to attempt an evaluation of some of their attitudes, ranging from 
too much involvement to too much silence. These attitudes varied during three main 
periods of Rwandan history namely, the colonial period, from independence to the 1990 
war, from the 1990 war to the Genocide in 1994.   
 
4.1 The church of the colonial period  
The church of the colonial period was the church of the European missionaries who 
arrived in the country with the European colonisers.  Beside the Roman Catholic Church, 
the Christian church comprised two Protestant missions. There was the Bethel Mission, 
started by German missionaries and whose work was taken over, after the defeat of the 
Germans, by the Belgian Society for Protestant Missions in Congo (SBMPC).
438
 This 
later became the Presbyterian Church of Rwanda. There was also the Church Mission 
Society (CMS), pioneering the Anglican Church in Rwanda.  These Protestant churches 
were not as prominent as the Roman Catholic Church and their involvement in social 
problems differed accordingly. 
 
4.1.1 Active involvement of the Roman Catholic Church 
While all these missionaries shared the biased view in favour of the Tutsi and readily 
supported the idea of racial supremacy, it was the Catholic Church that had the means 
and power to sponsor the translation of the supremacist ideology into social policies.  As 
Sibomana recorded, the Catholic Church developed to become the biggest power in the 
country; as the biggest employer, the biggest property owner and the biggest provider of 
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education and welfare, the ecclesiastic institution developed in perfect symbiosis with the 
colonial authorities.
439
 This was a period during which the Roman Catholic Church was 
an institution too powerful to be ignored by any enterprise undertaken within Rwandan 
society.    
 
The church worked alongside colonial powers to shape the socio-political atmosphere of 
Rwanda.  As Gatwa, referring to the colonial period, has observed, the church and the 
state are two institutions that converge spatially and temporally. They may collaborate 
with or oppose each other, they may even oppose each other and at the same time 
collaborate.
440
 The alliance between the colonial power and the Catholic Church of the 
time was enhanced by the religious affiliation of the members of the colonial 
administration, most of whom belonged to the Catholic political parties in Belgium. If the 
colonial powers are responsible for making policies that became the foundation of the 
ideology of race supremacy that aggravated the polarization of the society, Christian 
missionaries were their allies who played a key role in facilitating this regrettable 
orientation. 
 
The active involvement of the church in socio-political matters during the colonial period 
was marked by the missionaries‟ collaboration with the colonial power in their 
preferential treatment of the Tutsi, to the detriment of the other social groups.  This bias 
was manifested at first through ways that included the missionaries‟ subscription to, and 
propagation of, the Hamitic theory.  The ideology asserting the superiority of the Tutsi as 
a race who were born to reign was reflected not only in the colonial civil service, a 
domain reserved for the Tutsi, who were credited with vivid intelligence and excellent 
spirit of assimilation, but also in the missionary schools, conceived to be training grounds 
for future leaders. The missionaries‟ bias in favour of the Tutsi resulted in their being the 
priority focus of evangelisation. The missionaries hoped that once these elite was 
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converted, the masses would easily follow.
441
 The logical result of this policy was that the 
first indigenous church leaders were mainly Tutsi.  
 
The preferential treatment reserved for the elite Tutsi that paralleled the discrimination 
against, and exploitation of, the mass of mostly Hutu peasants encouraged a certain 
superiority complex among some privileged Tutsi.  Many of them liked the idea of their 
innate superiority and, whether they believed it or not, they exploited the occasion to 
enjoy the privileges and benefits attached. As Sibomana puts it, the Tutsi began to think 
of themselves as a superior people, whereas the Hutu were internalizing their inferior 
social and intellectual status. In any case, in the end, Rwandans became the people they 
had been taught they were.
442
 At the same time this climate progressively generated 
bitterness among the oppressed, mostly Hutu, increasing the tension between the social 
groups. 
 
Toward the end of the colonial period the traditional affinity between the Tutsi and the 
European missionaries regressed gradually, from 1945 onwards.
443
 A new generation of 
missionaries in the leadership of the church were affirming their commitment to the 
obligation of social justice.
444
 They became the sponsors of the emerging movement of 
Hutu revolutionaries who were raising their voices against social injustices, 
discrimination and marginalization. The motives suggested, explaining this volte-face of 
the Roman Catholic Church, can be summarized in two points: 
 
Change in white clerical sympathies: It was observed that after the Second World War 
the leadership of the Church was in the hands of a new generation of missionaries, 
recruited from the blue-collar strata of Flemish-speaking Belgians. This new generation 
of missionaries was inspired by the ideals of democracy and committed to the obligation 
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Struggle for the control of the Rwandan Church: This is a struggle said to have 
opposed the native clergy to the European missionaries. At this time the native clergy, 
who were almost exclusively Tutsi, formed about half the total number of clergy in the 
Rwandan Church.
446
 Confronted with ideas of social equality, democracy and 
independence, they were very much alert to the looming changes and they understood the 
possible implications of these new ideas to their traditional privileges. This awareness led 
them to join their voice with those who advocated the Belgian transfer of power. This 
stand may have sent a clear signal to the European clergy, who understood that they were 
not spared by the contestation of the colonial order.
447
 The perceived risk of losing 
control of the church to the native clergy may have brought an end to their historic 
sympathy for the Tutsi.  
 
The commitment of missionaries to the ideals of social justice may have been genuine, 
but more real was their preoccupation with the future of the church, its future relations 
with the state in the new socio-political atmosphere. Concerns of this order had called 
together the Catholic hierarchy from the Belgian colonies to meet in Leopoldville (today 
Kinshasa) in June 1956 to reflect on the future of church-state relations.
448
 Anticipating 
the inevitable forthcoming changes, as the international community was paying more 
attention to the plight of the Hutu and their call for emancipation, these missionaries were 
anxious to retain their political influence.  This encouraged them to support what they 
now presented as the just cause of the oppressed masses.
449
 The moral and material 
support of the church went a long way in helping these Hutu to succeed in what they 
called the social revolution and their subsequent conquest of power.  
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The church support for the emancipation of the Hutu was a U-turn on the part of the same 
institution that had strongly supported the now-attacked regime.  But this change resulted 
not necessarily from the church‟s awakening to its responsibility with respect to social 
justice.  The volte-face of the Catholic Church was regarded by some as a strategic 
adjustment on the part of the missionaries in anticipation of the unavoidable forthcoming 
socio-political changes. This adjustment permitted the Catholic Church to keep its 




4.1.2 Absence of the Protestant churches in the colonial period 
To the strong influence of the Catholic Church conversely corresponded the weakness of 
the Protestant churches. The colonial authorities from the predominantly Catholic state of 
Belgium were closer to the Catholic Church and more inclined to collaborate with it than 
with the Protestants hailing from the Protestant kingdom of England. Concerned about 
keeping the monopoly of influence in the affairs of the country, the Catholic Church was 
in favour of not encouraging the promotion of the Protestants.  
 
Less funded and equipped than the Catholics, the Protestants acquired the reputation of a 
second-class religion. Their physical facilities could not compare with cathedrals, 
churches, schools and hospitals built by the Catholic Church. Incapable of providing to 
their members training comparable to what the Catholic Church was offering in their 
seminaries, the Protestant churches used indigenous clergy and church teachers with little 
or no formal training. Sidelined by the colonial authorities and looked down upon by the 
Catholic Church, the Protestants had no means of claiming their place in the management 
of the affairs of the country. They seem to have recognized their lack of authority and 
influence, so that they focussed on the work of evangelism, living politic to the 
politicians.
451
 They remained absent in the pre-colonial period and this attitude did not 
change much even after independence. 
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4.2 From independence to the war in 1990 
The uprising of the 1950s brought changes in the socio-political atmosphere of the 
country. The Hutu activists managed to overthrow the Tutsi regime and to inherit the 
leadership of the country, at the time of recovering independence in July 1962. The 
events that occurred during this change of regime had lingering consequences throughout 
the period of the two successive Hutu regimes on power in Kigali. The unresolved 
antagonism between Hutu and Tutsi generated recurring conflicts that degenerated into 
the war in 1990. This is the period during which the contribution of the church remained 
wanting.  While the First and the Second Republics were practising ethnic exclusivism, 
the attitude of the church ranged from complicit silence to explicit support. 
 
4.2.1 Church and conflicts in the First Republic 1962-1973 
The Roman Catholic Church and the Protestant Churches adopted different attitudes on 
issues that generated conflicts subsequent to the independence of the country. What they 
shared in common was their failure to formulate a theology relevant to the socio-political 
context of the time. Neither the Catholic Church‟s involvement in politics nor the 
Protestants‟ withdrawal from politics helped the situation.   
 
4.2.1.1 The Roman Catholic Church in national politics 
The ties between the Catholic Church and the Hutu politicians that had started when the 
latter were struggling for their emancipation continued after they took power. The White 
Fathers and the Hutu activists had been companions in the struggle and now it was time 
for both to reap the benefits. The Catholic Church continued to be an unconditional ally 
of the Kayibanda regime. This president and many of his officials were good Catholics, 
not only raised in the Catholic faith but also groomed by the missionaries with respect to 
their political responsibilities. This was meaningful to the Catholic Church, which 
enjoyed a preferential consideration during the First Republic, with many privileges that 
the other denominations were not welcome to claim. 
 
The Church‟s support of the Kayibanda regime blinded the leaders of this institution to 
the abuses of the regime, especially its handling of the issue of ethnic relations. The 
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church concentrated on ensuring that the Hutu take power and forgot the fate of those 
from whom that power was taken. When the formely oppressed became the oppressors, 
this did not attract much attention from those whose first preoccupation was to see their 
chosen regime established. Gatwa has summarized the shortcomings of the Catholic 
Church during the period of the First Republic into three points: 
 
 The absence of self-criticism and apology for the church‟s earlier blind 
support of the ruling class and the promotion of the ideology of race 
supremacy; 
 The church‟s failure to support the plight of its former protégés when they 
became the new victims of the formely oppressed; 





It is this blind support that makes questionable the motives of the Catholic Church in 
siding with the Hutu. If they were driven by their commitment to the ideal of social 
justice, they should have used their moral authority and their relations with the regime to 
speak for the Tutsi now that they were in a position of weakness. This moral authority, 
which the Catholic Church enjoyed, but failed to use, was absent in the Protestant 
Churches.  
 
4.2.1.2 The Protestants’ silent presence in the First Republic  
The Protestant missionaries, who did not share with their Roman Catholic counterparts 
the same motives for shifting allegiance from the Tutsi in favour of the Hutu, did not 
contribute much to the revolution. Instead, some of them, like those of the CMS, may 
have persisted in their belief that the Tutsi would always be the leaders because they have 




If the Protestant churches were not conspicuous in the campaign for the emancipation of 
the Hutu, they did not do much, either, in defending the Tutsi when the Hutu took power. 
During the violence that followed the events of 1959-1961, the intervention of these 
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churches was rather timid. The courage of the Presbyterian Church, not great enough to 
enable them to confront the political leaders, was limited to sensitising the members to 
overcome fear, hatred, discord and greed and to remain motivated by the concern to obey 
Christ alone, the only chief of all believers.
454
 For the CMS their intervention was limited 
to the humanitarian aspect. Many Anglican Church premises were availed to Tutsi 
families fleeing the violence. From these places many of them were escorted to the 
borders of neighbouring countries that were willing to receive them. The Tutsi who did 
not go into exile were victims of discrimination throughout the period of the First 
Republic. Each time that those in exile launched their repeated attacks on the country, the 
Tutsi in the country paid the price as a target of violent reprisals. In all these cases of 
injustice, the church was, disappointingly, watching in silence.  
 
The acquiescence of the Protestants was not necessarily a result of their support for the 
regime. The Protestant church was not an ally of the government, as was the case with the 
Roman Catholic Church. In fact, the Protestants were sidelined by this regime, whose top 
officials were all Catholics. During this period, the Protestant missionaries were leaving 
the church in the hands of an indigenous clergy, generally poorly trained and looked 
down upon by the Catholics and the government. It is probably the resulting inferiority 
complex that hindered them from raising their voices to denounce the injustices. In 
addition, the concern not to appear as going contrary to the political trend of the time may 
have been a factor in the appointment of the first native bishop of the Anglican Church. A 
Hutu candidate was preferred to two Tutsi candidates who were relatively better 
trained.
455
 At this time, Tutsi occupied other prominent positions in the church, such as 
Archdeacons and Canons. Despite some changes in the relation between church and state 
in the Second Republic, the voice of the church did not become strong enough to 
influence change in the direction of improvement of social justice, especially with respect 
to the extremely sensitive domain of ethnic relations. 
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4.2.2 Second Republic (1973-1990) 
Although the regime of the Second Republic had not relied on the support of the church 
at the beginning, the new leaders were aware that that support was needed to consolidate 
their power. While maintaining the traditional pre-eminence of the Roman Catholic 
Church in Rwanda, the new politicians proved to be more open to the Protestant 
churches.  At the same time they attempted to keep the churches under their control, even 
the Catholic Church that had once controlled the state. 
 
4.2.2.1 The Roman Catholic Church under control 
Among the reasons presented to justify the putsch that brought Habyarimana to power on 
the 5 July 1973 was the issue of social relations that continued to deteriorate throughout 
the time of the First Republic. Posing as a promoter of peace and national unity, 
Habyarimana promised to put an end to ethnic and regional discrimination. While the 
Habyarimana regime can be credited for temporarily halting physical violence against the 
Tutsi,
456
 the same cannot be said for his regime with respect to restoring national unity. In 
his endeavour to break the monopoly of power concentrated in the hands of politicians 
from one region in the south of the country, Habyarimana transferred this power to his 
native region in the north.
457
 This development worsened the problem of sectionalism 
rather than solving it. The people from the south and the Tutsi, in particular, saw their 
access to education, public administration and political positions drastically restricted.
458
 
The regime adopted an obdurate resistance to the requests of Tutsi refugees in exile to 
return home. 
 
Amidst all these social problems, the church remained compromisingly silent and the 
Habyarimana regime did not waste any time in exploiting the situation. Although he had 
seized power without the help of the Church, Habyarimana knew that it was in his 
interest to keep the church on his side. To achieve this goal, Habyarimana used many 
strategies, ranging from attraction, infiltration and, mostly, intimidation. By his outward 
commitment to the Catholic faith he acquired a reputation of being a good member of the 
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 This attitude attracted some support from the Church that was proud 
of having not only him but most of his officials as Roman Catholics. This insured that the 
Church maintained its prominent place in the country.  
 
Habyarimana‟s identification with the Roman Catholic Church was not enough for the 
consolidation of his totalitarian regime. More aggressively, he infiltrated the church and 
attempted to make it an ally of his regime, so as to secure the same kind of support that 
the preceding regime had enjoyed from the same church. His personal friendship with the 
Archbishop of Kigali and especially the incorporation of this top leader of the church in 
the top organ of his single-party went a long way in helping him to achieve this goal.
460
 
In the Second Republic, Mgr Nsengiyumva was to Habyarimana what Mgr Perraudin had 
been to Kayibanda in the First Republic, difference being that this time around it was the 
head of state who had authority over the cleric and not the other way round, as it had been 
in the First Republic. 
 
If, through diplomacy, Habyarimana succeeded, to some extent, in blinding the church to 
social problems inherent in his regime, this was just complementary to what he achieved 
through intimidation. After he seized power, a new constitution was designed that 
established a single party, the MRND, into which every Rwandan was automatically 
enrolled as an active member, a “militant (e)”.
461
  Even the bishops were expected to be 
active members of the MRND. Various mechanisms were developed that aimed at 
indoctrinating the population to ensure that they were kept under control.
462
  Good 
performances were rewarded, while defiance attracted discipline.    
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The MRND was the only legitimate political organization from which all the institutions 
originated.
463
 Habyarimana‟s authority over all the institutions was coupled with the 
sacralisation of his person. He was called the “Father of the Nation”, the symbol of peace 
and national unity. Armed with the prerogative to nominate to all senior positions in the 
administration, the army, government-funded projects and corporations, he commanded 
allegiance from all he had nominated and all those aspiring to those positions. None 
would wish to have his name on the black list of those who oppose the “Father of the 
Nation”. People would rather compete to be positively known, if not by him, at least by 
his entourage or collaborators.  
 
In this climate, with the head of state venerated and his party all-powerful, it took 
exceptional courage and boldness to dare oppose the ruling clique. In the Roman Catholic 
Church some lower ranked organs of the church attempted to speak out. These included 
the priests that run Kinyamateka, a church newspaper that played a very important role in 
social communication in Rwanda. Under the management of Father Sylvio Sindambiwe, 
the paper took a critical stand against Habyarimana‟s regime, denouncing its abuses. The 
top leaders of the church were not comfortable with the line the paper was taking. They 
forced Sindambiwe to resign in 1985. Father Sindambiwe escaped several assassination 
attempts, but was finally crushed by a truck in November 1989.  
 
Father André Sibomana took over the management of the paper in 1988 and continued in 
the line of Sindambiwe. This placed him at odds with both the state and the church. The 
opposition of the church hierarchy did not deter him and he raised his voice so high as to 
be heard by the Pope himself.  When Cardinal Etchegaray, the chairperson of the papal 
Justice Peace Commission, visited Rwanda in May 1993, Sibomana expressed his 
concern in the following words: 
 
Your eminence, let me be frank with you: in this context of human rights 
violations, the main moral authority in the country, namely the Roman Catholic 
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Church, should have made every effort to rectify the situation and revive the 
people‟s consciences. Instead, it has distinguished itself by its complicit silence 
and its absence in the most stricken places. The cry of distress of the people of 
God has not always been heard on time; and with a few exceptions, Roman 





Sibomana escaped many assassination attempts before and during the Genocide. He 
continued to denounce human rights abuses even after the Genocide and he was at 
loggerheads with the post-Genocide authorities. When he fell sick in 1998 his doctor 
recommended his transfer abroad, but the authorities would not release his travel 
documents which had been confiscated earlier. He died on 9 March 1998. 
 
These two priests/journalists and human rights activists were not alone among the 
Catholic clergy in their fight for social justice. Sibomana mentions other cases of 
initiatives from lower ranking individuals or organs whose bold opposition to social 
injustices were ignored or opposed by the top leaders of the church. These cases include 
Father Gabriel Maindron‟s article, published in Dialogue, in which he criticised the 
church for its lack of insight, its passive attitude, its complicity, hypocrisy and position of 
compromise. The Archbishop of Kigali took this critique personally and slammed the 
priest for attacking him. In the same vein, the priests of the Kabgayi diocese published a 
40-page document attacking the passive attitude of the church in the face of increasing 
social injustice.
465
 Initiatives such as these from some Catholic priests were very scarce 
among the Protestants. 
 
4.2.2.2 Complacent Protestant churches  
Unlike his predecessor, Habyarimana paid attention to the Protestant churches that, 
despite their being sidelined in the Kayibanda regime, had grown to represent a social 
force significant enough to be noticed. Under Habyarimana‟s regime, Protestants were 
progressively allowed access to some privileges that had been so far exclusively enjoyed 
by the Roman Catholic Church. They were permitted to broadcast church programmes 
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and services on national radio, protestant bishops and legal representatives were granted 
diplomatic privileges in the state protocol, alongside their Catholic counterparts. 
Protestants could be nominated to top positions in the administration and, from time to 
time, there was a Protestant minister in Habyarimana‟s cabinet. Without necessarily 
breaking the pre-eminence of his Catholic church, Habyarimana was, in many ways, 
relatively favourably disposed towards the Protestants.  
 
This positive attitude toward the Protestants may have encouraged the emancipated 
churches to focus on the benefits granted by the regime and to lose sight of its 
weaknesses. Few, if any, Protestant leaders paid attention to the moral responsibility of 
the Church the way Sibomana did.  Protestant leaders were generally characterized by 
their blind support for the regime. This attitude can be illustrated by the following 
abstract of a congratulatory message sent by one Protestant denomination to president 




Excellency, Father of the Nation, the synod rejoiced because of the supreme 
decision taken by the 6
th
 Congress of the MRND to re-elect you as the President 
of the MRND for the next five years, thus we “militants” find in you a potential 
candidate in the presidential elections. We fully support the confidence 
manifested in you by the participants to the Congress and we also have confidence 
in you. 
 
Excellency, the President of the Republic and Founder-President of our 
Movement, to your policy of unity and peace, pillar of development with which 
you command our country with fidelity and integrity, we owe many good things 
which you helped us to realise; we are grateful to you. Thus the members of the 
Presbyterian Church will manifest their gratitude to you on the 19 of December by 
giving you a hundred percent vote.
467
         
 
This blindness to the socio-political realities of Rwanda was characteristic of all the 
protestant churches. Although this uncritical submission to the regime is difficult to 
explain, some contributing factors can be highlighted. For anybody to be able to stand his 
ground and challenge the abuse of the MRND regime, she/he needed a number of 
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qualities that were not necessarily found in the Protestant hierarchy. These qualities 
included an analytical spirit capable of seeing beyond the propaganda of MRND and 
understanding the oppressive character of its policies, so as to formulate a relevant 
theological response to the situation; a sense of responsibility convincing him/her to be 
involved in changing the situation; courage and boldness enabling him/her to face the risk 
and eventually pay the supreme price.  
 
During the Habyarimana regime the Protestant church was in the hands of leaders 
generally with a low level of training that would not help them to think through the 
situation and understand their responsibility. The training that most protestant bishops 
and legal representatives had received from the school of theology in Butare
468
 could not 
compare, for example, to the theological training received by their Catholic counterparts 
in the Nyakibanda Senior Seminary and abroad. Most pastors had a limited understanding 
of the church‟s moral and social responsibility and its prophetic role towards the state. In 
addition to this inadequate understanding of the social role of the church, the low level of 
training also had an inhibiting effect on the level of the pastors‟ self-confidence. They 
were conscious of being looked down upon by the state and the Catholics and this 
inhibited their boldness to speak out with authority and challenge the regime. Content 
with the work of evangelism and pastoral ministry in the church, many of them would 
even clearly distance themselves from anything that touched on politics which they 
regarded as a dirty and risky game.
469
 The few who were attracted to politics subscribed 
to the ideology of the MRND and remained under its grip. These are generally those of 
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the hierarchy mindful of Habyarimana‟s positive attitude toward the Protestants and not 
wishing to appear as ingrates or hoping to receive more favours.  The concern to avoid 
confrontation with the regime continued to characterise the position of the church 
throughout the troubled period that had started with the war in 1990 and culminated in the 
Genocide in 1994.  
 
4.2.3 From war to the Genocide 
The year 1990 is remembered in Rwanda for the socio-political turmoil that marked it. 
Amidst rumours of a looming war, the country witnessed divisions and tension resulting 
from the activities of nascent political parties opposing the MRND regime, even before 
they were officially recognized. This internal tension and the external pressure obliged 
the church, both Catholic and Protestant, to break their silence and address the issues.  
The visit of Pope John Paul II provided the Catholic Church the opportunity to express its 
view on the prevailing socio-political climate.   
 
4.2.3.1 The ambiguous stand of the Catholic Church 
As socio-political tension increased throughout the country, pressure on civil societies, 
who were asking for a stand against human rights abuses, was mounting. The Catholic 
Church responded with a series of messages in the form of pastoral letters addressed to 
the Catholic community. From early 1990 until the beginning of the war in October, the 
conference of the Catholic Bishops published their pastoral letter centred on the theme 
“Christ our unity”. The paper was divided into three parts focussing on “the unity of the 
Rwandan people” in February 1990
470
, on “justice for all” in May 1990
471
 and on “the 
centrality of the Word of God in the life of a believer” in August 1990.
472
  The letters 
referred to issues relevant to the context, though sometime revealing the caution of the 
Church not to denounce the abuses of the regime but rather to defend it, as this abstract 
shows:   
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We sometime hear people complaining that for reason of ethnic origin, they have 
been refused a job or a place in the schools, that they have been deprived of a 
privilege, or that the judicial system has not been impartial toward them. You are 
not unaware that the policies of ethnic balance at your workplace and in schools 
have been designed to correct the inequalities that favoured some to the detriment 
of others. The authorities do whatever possible to help the people of Rwanda to 
live peacefully together, they give us roads, newspapers, other sorts of avenues for 





The letters surveyed the problems of the time in Rwandan society, but failed to reach 
their roots. The Church spoke to the people, but omitted to speak to political leaders. At 
this time the church was preparing for the visit of the Pope.  Many, and especially those 
who were not satisfied with the attitude of the leaders of the Rwandan church, greeted the 
Pope‟s visit with great expectation, as Sibomana reveals: 
 
His visit was the object of great anticipation. The country was in a bad state, 
people were suffering, and we couldn‟t see the light at the end of the tunnel. 
Naively we believed that the Pope‟s visit would change things…. Unfortunately, 
the outcome of the visit failed to meet our expectations. The Pope kept repeating: 
A thousand hills, a thousand problems, a thousand solutions. His speeches, which 
were very dense, seem to have been written in advance and did not correspond to 




The Pope visited the country in September and only about one month later the war 
started. The message that continued to flow from the Catholic hierarchy tended to 
respond to new developments in successive political crises.  In November 1990, one 
month after the beginning of the war, the pastoral letter circulated with the title “Blessed 
are the peacemakers”.
475
 It focussed on the pacification of the country. The theme of truth 
and tolerance of the letter of May 1992 seemed to consider the atmosphere of 
confrontation among political parties. In his message of advent 1993, the Bishop had in 
mind the implementation of the Arusha Accords. The letter called upon different 
categories of people (politicians, soldiers, magistrates) to bring their contribution for the 
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creation of a new Rwandan society. Many other themes were covered in numerous 
pastoral letters that circulated between 1990 and 1994.
476
 
   
Despite the relevance of the themes covered by these letters, they did not achieve much in 
terms of influencing the course of events. Many factors may have contributed to this 
failure. These are to be found from both the authors and the recipients of the letters. The 
insufficient attention paid by the people to the Church‟s message may reflect the (lack of) 
seriousness with which the people took their Christianity, as well as the measure of 
authority they usually recognized to the instruction they received from the Church. The 
majority of key players in politics and the army were Christians, members of the Church. 
Had they heeded the call addressed in these letters, the events could have taken a 
different turn.  
 
The major weakness of the authors of the letters was that they were not able to convince 
their audience that they were unbiased and objective.  Their pitfall was mainly their 
concern to maintain unquestioned in their loyalty to political authorities. Cautious not to 
be perceived as bad citizens, they would yield, for example, to the pressure to exhibit 
their patriotism by denouncing the aggression of which the country was victim. By so 
doing they lost the credibility before the RPF and its supporters. In their sensitisation of 
the people to obey and respect the authorities, they omitted to denounce the abuses of 
which many among their audience were victim. It was said that the church was made up 
of “crowds who come into church on Sunday and are easily manipulated, and some 
committed personalities that are easily neutralized”.
477
 If the hierarchy is among those 
few committed who allowed themselves to be “neutralised” by the state, then they had no 
power to protect the crowds from being “manipulated”. Where the Catholic Church 
failed, the Protestants did not do better. 
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4.2.3.2 The Protestants’ response to the pre-Genocide crises  
The generally low level of training continued to be among the major handicaps that 
prevented the Churches from having people of calibre who could engage a theological 
reflection appropriate to various social situations that the country experienced.  This 
weakness rendered them prey to all kinds of propaganda, which they uncritically echoed. 
This is how, at the beginning of the war in 1990, the Protestants sided with the state 
without reservation and participated in the campaign destined to denounce the aggressors 
who had invaded the country.  In the process, they were compelled to become defenders 
of the Habyarimana regime, praising its achievement that the war was about to destroy. 
The position of Protestant leaders on such crucial issues as the war, the refugee problem 
and human rights flagrantly lacked any fair critique of the Kigali regime. 
 
The Protestant Council of Rwanda could have provided its member churches an 
appropriate forum for addressing critical issues affecting the society.  The Council 
grouped together the main churches. The Anglicans, the Presbyterians, the Baptists and 
the Methodists were full members of the Council, while the Pentecostals and the Seventh 
Day Adventists were affiliate members, associating with the council only in some social 
programmes such as education. The focus of the Council seems to have been mainly on 
evangelism and pastoral work than on the social life of the people. Even some social 
developments projects, such as in education and health, seem to have been designed as a 
means for evangelism.  
 
Amidst a growing climate of violence and political unrest, there was a trend within some 
members of the protestant churches advocating rethinking the expected prophetic role of 
the council. A commission was appointed in 1991 to discuss the guidelines for the 
Council‟s engagement in society. In 1992, a workshop was organized with the theme 
“The Protestant Council of Rwanda and its perspectives on development”.
478
 Each time 
suggestions were formulated, calling for the churches to engage more meaningfully in 
social matters. Some suggested the creation in the council of a secretariat for human 
rights, justice and peace.  Many church leaders were not very enthusiastic with the idea of 
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venturing into this sensitive area. Not many were ready to take a stand and, if need be, 
speak out against the policies and practices of the regime. In1993 a commission for 
justice, peace and reconciliation was created but, like the Bureau for Refugees, which had 




The political crisis was reaching an impasse, as Habyarimana refused to implement the 
Peace Agreement signed in Arusha.  At this time the main opposition parties were split 
giving Habyarimana the pretext to delay the implementation of the Peace Agreement as 
long as he could not know which faction would be represented in the transitional 
coalition government.  The Protestant churches joined the Catholic leaders and created 
what they called the “comité de contact”.
480
 Through this committee, co-chaired by the 
President of the Protestant Council and a Catholic bishop, the Churches attempted to 
mediate among political parties and among factions of political parties in order to 
unblock the process of the implementation of the peace Agreement. Even this laudable 
initiative achieved little. By this time polarisation had reached a level where a remedy 
was difficult. Many politicians who did not believe in the impartiality of the Church 
suggested that it should stay away from politics.
481
 The Church had waited too long and 
its contribution was now too small to make any difference. More importantly, the Church 
had failed to prove its impartiality that could have qualified it to speak with authority for 
the voiceless and against injustice. Having been unable to work for the prevention of the 
Genocide, it was more difficult for the Church to stop the tragedy when it commenced. 
 
4.3 Summary 
The Rwandan Genocide was a reflection of the failure of Rwandans to build a 
harmonious society. Political leaders led the people astray and church leaders failed to 
make any difference. Similarly, the division of the kingdom of Israel recorded in 2 Kings 
12:1-24, was a result and a culmination of social conflicts. The context of the Rwandan 
Genocide can help understand the roots and processes that brought about this ancient 
socio-political crisis. Therefore this study includes a historical analysis of the text of 2 
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Kings 12:1-24 aiming at providing information with respect to the socio-cultural, 
economic, political or religious aspects reflected in the passages that may have 
corresponding or dynamically equivalent situations in the Rwandan context. Prior to the 
historical analysis, which will be described in Chapter Six, a literary analysis of the 
passage is necessary to look at the situation of conflict in Israel as it is narrated in the 


































CHAPTER FIVE: LITERARY ANALYSIS OF 1 KINGS 12:1-24 
 
5.0 Introduction 
The event of the division of the kingdom of Israel is narrated in 1 Kings 12:1-24. 
Therefore this passage occupies a central place in the present work. The passage is part of 
a larger narrative running from the book of Deuteronomy to the books of Kings, a 
narrative that has been called the “Deuteronomistic history”.
482
 Scholars have voiced 
their various opinions on the process through which older traditions may have been used 
by one editor or multiple editors to compose this narrative. The present chapter does not 
enter into such redaction criticism debate, neither is it aimed at investigating the 
historicity of the events presented in the narrative. It will focus on the narrative provided 
in the final text and the way it describes the event of the division of the kingdom. While 
the analysis of the text will involve some historical-critical aspects, the focus remains on 
its literary examination, which considers its narrative form so as to pay attention to 
elements characteristic of a narrative, such as setting, plot, characters, time and place. 
This literary approach aims at pointing out issues involved in the narrative about the 
division of the kingdom of Israel, around which a dialogue with the context of ethnic 
conflict in Rwanda can be carried out.  The selected passage of 1 Kings 12:1-24 is 
examined in its larger literary context that contributes to its meaning.  
  
5.1 Literary context of 1 Kings 12:1-24 
The passage of 1 Kings 12:1-24 is part of a unified narrative contained in the books of 
Samuel and Kings. These books, now divided into four, seem to have been one book 
originally.
483
 The division into four books may have resulted from the influence of the 
Septuagint, where they appear as one book, under the name „Book of Kingdoms‟,
484
 but 
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divided into four parts. In the Hebrew Bible the four books were initially presented as a 
unity. In the traditional terminology of the Hebrew Bible, Samuel and Kings were 
included in the second part of the Hebrew Canon, the part called „Former Prophets‟ 
(rî`šônîm), which included Joshua and Judges.
485
 This corpus of „historical books‟ 
contains a long narrative describing the situation of the people of Israel in the Promised 
Land. The passage of 1 Kings 12:1-24 is therefore located in the larger context of the 
Former Prophets and consequently it shares some of the characteristics of this narrative.  
 
5.1.1 Location of 1 Kings 12:1-24 in the Former Prophets 
The books of the Former Prophets that constitute a larger literary context of 1 Kings 12:1-
24 were found to be connected in style and themes to ideas reflected in the Book of 
Deuteronomy. These common aspects include emphasis on the central Jerusalem cultus, 
the idea of prophecy fulfilled in human events, the concept of divine justice rewarding the 
faithful, the retribution of the ungodly and the condemnation of idolatry.
486
 The 
observation of these aspects led Noth to argue that a single exilic author used older 
traditions to compose a theological “history” that runs through the six canonical books.
487
 
While there are scholars who dissented from Noth‟s view, many scholars now accept the 
hypothesis of a Deutoronomistic history, though sometimes with suggestions of different 
compositional hypotheses. Provan has pointed out that “the current debate about 
Deuteronomy and the historical books is not for the most part, then, about whether a 
Deuteronomistic history exists, but rather about its precise nature and date.”
488
  Provan 
may not be totally correct because there are among recent scholars those who do not 
subscribe to the Deteuronomistic theory.
489
 However, most scholars generally admit to 
the reality of the shared basic themes in Deuteronomy and the historical books. The text 
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of 1Kings 12:1-24, selected for the purpose of this work, is approached with the 
awareness that it is part of the Deuteronomistic history. 
 
The material that makes up this corpus seem to have been woven together and united by 
the purpose of the author/editor(s) to report what he/they purported to be the events 
happening in Israel in the land of Canaan, that is, from the time of the conquest of Canaan 
to the time of the deportation in Babylon. The present work focuses on social relations 
among the tribes of Israel in Canaan. It considers the different types of political 
leadership that the people are reported to submit to in Canaan and the effects of 
successive political regimes on social relations in the pre-monarchical period, the 
transitional period from theocracy to monarchy and the period of the united monarchy.   
 
The part of pre-monarchical period covered by the books of Joshua and Judges 
corresponds to the time when the people are said to be led by military deliverers 
appointed by Yahweh. These charismatic rulers include Joshua, who led the people to the 
conquest of Canaan. Joshua‟s leadership is portrayed as the continuation of that of Moses 
and his position as a commissioned leader of the people parallels Moses‟ position.
490
  
Appointed by Yahweh to complete the work that Moses had started, Joshua enjoys the 
same support that his mentor had enjoyed from Yahweh: “As I was with Moses, so I will 
be with you” (Joshua 1:5).   His commission is confirmed by a theophany (Joshua 5:13-
15) in a way that recalls Moses‟ burning bush (Exodus 3:6). The narrative in Joshua is the 
story of Yahweh‟s mighty act in enabling his people to conquer the land of Canaan. This 
conquest is accomplished under the leadership of Joshua who, after Moses‟ death, 
becomes Yahweh‟s representative among the people. In Joshua the people are 
represented as a cohesive entity under the central authority of Joshua. Although they are 
arranged hierarchically under tribal authority, the text continually reinforces the idea that 
the people are to find their primary identity as part of the unified whole, “all Israel”; tribal 
identity is to be secondary.
491
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Joshua is followed by the book of Judges, in which Israel is described as a confederation 
of tribes led by the Judges, spirit-filled heroes directly raised by Yahweh to meet 
successive crises in Israel‟s affairs.  The Judges lead campaigns to defend the conquered 
land from invading neighbours. Their leadership style is regarded as having been 
acceptable to, and understood by, the community, who presumably viewed it as a 
continuation of the functions exercised by Moses and Joshua.
492
 In Judges, the inclination 
to the charismatic form of leadership is clearly affirmed, as the voices calling for the 
institution of dynastic kingship are resisted. Opposition to kingship is expressed in 
Judges, through Gideon‟s rejection of such a position, with the claim that the Lord is the 
only one to rule over Israel (Judges 8:23). Gideon‟s negative view of kingship is 
vindicated in Abimelech‟s narrative and in Jotham‟s parable (Judges 9). Abimelech 





The last five chapters of Judges break with the scheme of apostasy, oppression, cry and 
deliverance that served to organize the stories of the previous chapters providing a 
predictable pattern for the account that follows (Judges 2:6-3:6). 
494
 These last chapters 
provide a series of loosely connected narratives describing what can appear as inter-tribal 
degeneration. The comment, “In those days there was no king in Israel and every man did 
what was right in his own eyes” (Judges 17:6, 18:1; 19:1; 21:25), repeated four times in 
this part of the narrative, points to situations of anarchy that preceded the rise of the 
monarchy
495
. This comment provides a frame for the last part of Judges and a transition 
to the monarchical books of Samuel and Kings, which it introduces.
 496
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The books of Samuel and Kings focus on the period of the monarchy, beginning with 
suggested conditions that called for the institution of a monarchical regime in Israel and 
ending with the circumstances considered to have brought an end to it. The material in 
Samuel and Kings were united into a continuous account of the history of Israel, so that 
the division of this account into four parts (1 and 2 Kings and 1 and 2 Samuel) appears to 
be arbitrary.
497
 However, although the account is continuous through the four books, 
peculiarities can be noted for each of the books of Samuel and Kings.  
 
The book of Samuel describes the transition from theocracy to monarchy. It tells the story 
of three key individuals in this transition, namely Samuel, Israel‟s last judge, Saul, her 
first king, and David, the founder of a dynasty that would endure for over three 
centuries.
498
 At the time of Samuel‟s birth, the institution of judgeship seems to have 
already evolved. Eli, the judge then in office, is also a priest. This makes his office 
different from that of the judges who led Israel before him. While the earlier judges were 
raised in response to a crisis, Eli‟s office was rooted in Yahweh‟s election prior to Israel‟s 
arriving in the land having any need of deliverers (1 Samuel 2:27-29). In addition, the 
future of Eli‟s house had been divinely sanctioned, whereas in the case of the judges their 
duties did not extend to the future (1 Samuel 2:30, 35).
499
 Eli and his house were called to 
lead and serve the people, but their office became thoroughly corrupted. The account of 
the corruption of the house of Eli already pointed to the weakness of any dynastic style of 
leadership.  At the end of Eli‟s rule, Samuel, a charismatic leader appointed by Yahweh, 
takes over the leadership of Israel instead of the corrupted sons of his predecessor.  
 
Samuel inherited Eli‟s combined offices of priest and Judge, to which was added that of 
prophet. The transition of leadership from Eli to Samuel was therefore not simply from 
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one man to another, but also from one kind of leadership, namely priestly, to another 
kind, namely prophetic.
500
  In the early part of the narrative Samuel rises as a prophet-
priest (1 Samuel 1-4). It is after the arch narrative (1 Samuel 5-6) that he is portrayed as a 
judge (1 Samuel 7). In his office of judge, Samuel is not exactly the kind of charismatic 
deliverer raised by Yahweh in response to an immediate crisis. In fact, Samuel is 
portrayed less as a military leader than as an interpreter of Israel‟s law and an 
administrator of justice.
501
 It is this aspect of judgeship that his sons are said to have 
inherited from him (1 Samuel 8:1-3). Samuel‟s institutionalized judgeship could not 
provide the military leadership, however temporary, of the charismatic judgeship. It 
became inevitable, then, that the judgeship be displaced.
502
 The arch narrative points to 
the constant danger from the Philistines, while the account of the corrupted sons of 
Samuel indicates the absence of the “charismatic-deliverer” kind of judgeship at the end 
of Samuel‟s rule. These are two elements that work in the narrative to prepare for the 
people‟s request for a king who would lead them in battle (1 Samuel 8).  
 
The people‟s expressed dissatisfaction with the leadership of Samuel‟s house is the 
motive for their requesting a king. In Samuel‟s objection to this request he provides a 
negative description of the monarchy, a description probably inspired by the oriental type 
of kingship of the time. The people, however, seem to be requesting neither an oriental 
kingship like that described by Samuel nor the destruction of the covenanted tribal 
league; rather they want a king who will continue Israel‟s traditions but who will remain 
a military commander, able to defeat their enemies.
503
 This is exactly what Saul does 
after his appointment. In putting down the Ammonite threat he acts as the military king 
that the people demanded and thus wins more support from them (1 Samuel 11:1-15). 
Saul ruled as a military king and he achieved some remarkable successes, as summarized 
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Samuel‟s final discourse (2 Samuel 12) marks the end of the period of judges and the 
beginning of the monarchical era. This speech provides a summary of the events from 
exodus, the entrance into the land, the time of the judges and the origin of the monarchy. 
It provides some clues for the understanding of subsequent history, especially by alluding 
to the possible failure of kingship and the end of the people.
505
 This failure already 
appears in the story of Saul. On the eve of his downfall, Saul is portrayed as a king 
concerned about establishing a dynasty, distracted by his conflict with David, his rival, 
and no longer focusing on his main duty to fight Israel‟s enemies. Nevertheless, Saul dies 
on the battlefield as a military king, performing the duties he had been appointed to do. 
Despite his repeated disapproval by Samuel, he is not reproached for behaving like the 
kind of king that Samuel had warned the people against. The narrative does not report 
any dissatisfaction of the people about his conduct. The decline of Saul‟s rule is presented 
in the narrative in parallel with David‟s rise. 
 
David‟s story is reported in three narrative cycles. The story of his rise (1 Samuel 16 -2 
Samuel 5) relates the beginning of his career, his relation with the house of Saul and his 
early success that put him at loggerheads with Saul and propels him to the throne. The 
apex of David‟s reign (2 Samuel 6-8) includes the arch narrative and Nathan‟s oracle 
promising to David a dynasty that will be established forever. The last part is the 
succession narrative (2 Samuel 9-1 Kings 2).
506
 This is the story of David‟s decline.   
 
David‟s public rise and his ultimate success in achieving the throne are firmly based on 
his early military victories. His battle with Goliath and the subsequent refrain on the lips 
of women, “Saul has slain his thousands, and David his ten thousands”, highlight David‟s 
credentials, making him a suitable candidate for a military king. It is his military skills 
and experience that made him relevant to the northern tribes when they went to ask him 
to be their military leader. In the early part of the first book of Samuel (2 Samuel 2-10), 
David is a military king who not only fights and defeats Israel‟s enemies but also 
conquers more territory and expands Israel‟s kingdom. However, alongside these 
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achievements, the narrative notes some other preoccupations on the part of David.  He 
builds himself a great palace with the help of Hiram, king of Tyre (2 Samuel 5:11, 12); he 
takes more concubines and wives from Jerusalem (2 Samuel 5:13-16); then a prophecy 
announces that his throne shall be established forever (2 Samuel 7:1-27). This description 
brings David‟s kingship closer to oriental despotism.
507
 David‟s shift of focus away from 
his duty as a military king is openly expressed in the story of his affair with Bathsheba. 
At the time when kings go to war, David sends Joab and his servants, but he remains in 
Jerusalem and eventually has an affair with the wife of his servant (2 Samuel 11:1-5). 
Preston interprets David‟s behaviour in this affair as capitulation to the oriental despot 
view of kingship. In Preston‟s estimate: 
 
David has in essence abandoned the concept of king as a military leader, upholder 
of the covenant, and sustainer of the covenanted tribal league. His seduction and 
seizure of Bathsheba violates several laws of the covenant; but it is primarily the 





The Bathsheba affair marks the beginning of the story of David‟s fall reported in the 
remaining part of the book of Samuel. The turmoil in David‟s family is reported as the 
fulfilment of Nathan‟s punitive prophecy pronounced against him (2 Samuel 12: 10-11). 
At the end of David‟s reign, kingship in Israel had taken the shape of the despotic kind 
earlier described by Samuel. With Solomon taking over from his father, Israel had 
become a kingdom like any other nation. In the book of Kings, charismatic leadership 
disappears, giving way to dynastic kingship, which the people still attempt to resist. 
 
The books of Kings continue the “history” of the monarchy in Israel, from the transition 
of power from David to his son Solomon, through to the release of Jehoiachin, Judah‟s 
last king, from Babylonian captivity. The long narrative of Kings reports three crises that 
marked the history of Israel. Beside the division of the kingdom, which is the focus of the 
present study, the two other crises are the fall of Samaria and the fall of Jerusalem. These 
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three crises have often been used as references in the delineation of the structure of 
Kings.   
 
5.1.2 Structure of Kings 
Divergence of opinion over the book of Kings is not so much over its inner divisions as it 
is over its compositional history. Those who follow Noth in his argument for a single 
redaction hypothesis consider Deuteronomy-Kings as a self-contained literary unit which 
was composed by a single author, the “Deuteronomist,” writing after the fall of 
Jerusalem.
509
  This view allows that a single continuous narrative may have attracted 
subsequent fragmentary additions, but which are neither continuous narratives nor 
lengthy redactional layers.
510
  Advocates of multiple redactions range from those who 
postulate two or three authors/editors, to those who postulate many more.
511
 Attempts 
were undertaken to identify different redactions in the Deuteronomistic history, but 
scholars reach diverging conclusions.
512
 Supporters of the double redaction hypothesis 
generally think that the first redaction was composed in the reign of Josiah and the second 
during the Exile.
513
 In this light, the book of Kings has been understood as a pre-exilic 
history of the monarchy, revised in the light of the Judean exile, after 587 B.C.
514
 The 
dividing point for the two editions is placed by some at 2 Kings 24:7.
515
 Others suggest 





 as well as change of themes, are among the main indicators 
suggesting the change of writer.
518
 The present study looks at the whole narrative of 
Kings as a continuous literary unit. 
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  divide the book of Kings into four parts, as follows: 
 
 Epilogue to the „succession narrative‟ (1 Kings 1 and 2); 
 The history of the reign of Solomon (1 Kings 3-11); 
 The history of the divided kingdom down to the fall Samaria (1 Kings 12-2 Kings 
17); 
 The history of the kingdom of Judah down to the second fall of Jerusalem and the 
final deportation (2 Kings 18-25). 
 
The first section is not really regarded as a major section of the Book of Kings, but rather 
as the continuation of the „succession narrative‟ in 2 Samuel. This can be gathered, for 
example, from Gray‟s following comment:  
 
The note in I Kings 2: 46, „So was the kingdom established in the hands of 
Solomon‟, suggests that this was the end of a certain self-contained block of 
traditions, and its obvious connection with the court history of David in II Samuel 
9-20 suggests that it belongs to the same source which is generally designated in 










 simply incorporate the first part (1 Kings 
1-2) into the history of the reign of Solomon, so as to have only three divisions in Kings. 
The present work considers 1 Kings 1-2 as a part of the succession narrative that reports 
Solomon‟s accession. It joins those who incorporate this succession part in the first 
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section of Kings, presenting the account of Solomon‟s reign. This option allows for the 
division of Kings into three parts only, each ending with a crisis. The division of the 
kingdom, the fall of Samaria and the fall of Jerusalem are events said to have resulted 
from the unfaithfulness of Israel‟s kings. The divine retributive justice characteristic of 
the Deuteronomistic history is thus reflected in these crises, including the event of the 
division of the kingdom, which is the subject of this study. The Deuteronomistic historian 
seems to have organized the material in Kings in a way that shows that these three serious 
tragedies that befell the people of Israel should not be understood as an indication of 
Yahweh‟s failure nor his unfaithfulness, but as a result of the disobedience of his people 
and their kings. The suggested purpose of this composition was captured in the following 
analysis: 
 
That exilic viewpoint was designed to make sure the exiles stopped blaming God 
for their defeats and instead confessed their own responsibility for failure. It also 
was geared to providing the only ray of hope possible in the middle of exile: 
God‟s unswerving faithfulness to David, even through the past reigns of faithless 
kings. Just as God‟s promise of discipline for sin was certain, so also was his 
promise of blessing. It was up to the people of God to decide if they would repent 
from their careless attitude toward God during the captivity and faithfully wait for 




The Deuteronomistic interpretation of history appears throughout each of the three 
sections. In each part the narrator presents his material in a way that prepares the reader 
to understand the crisis ahead. This Deuteronomic strategy is apparent in following 
survey of the three sections.  
 
5.1.2.1 From the rise of Solomon to the division of the kingdom (1 Kings 1-11) 
The first section of Kings (1 Kings 11: 41-43) narrates the events related to the united 
monarchy under King Solomon. Solomon‟s story can be divided in two parts. The first 
part portrays him as a wise king. Despite the court intrigues that bring Solomon to the 
throne (1 Kings 1:1-53) and a number of executions paving the way to the consolidation 
of his power (1 Kings 2: 1-46), Solomon‟s story opens with emphasis on his wisdom. In 
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his dream at Gibeon, an event that makes up for the absence of divine election at the 
beginning, Yahweh grants him a wise heart (1 Kings 3:4-15). The report of this event is 
followed by a description of Solomon‟s organization of the kingdom (1 Kings 4), his 
reputation for wisdom (1 Kings 5) and then the account of the construction and the 
inauguration of the Jerusalem Temple (1 Kings 5-8). These achievements confirm the 
accomplishment of the divine promise in 1 Kings 3:4-15. The Temple achieved during 
the reign of Solomon occupies a central role throughout the book of kings. Jeroboam will 
be condemned for creating sanctuaries in Dan and Bethel which appear as illegitimate 
concurrence with the temple of Jerusalem. All subsequent northern kings will be 
systematically blamed for what is designated as the sin of Jeroboam. The southern kings 
will be evaluated on the basis of their loyalty to the Jerusalem temple.
527
 This mostly 
positive view of Solomon ends with his long speech (1 Kings 8), in which he ascertains 
that Yahweh has realised all his promises to David. Yet, while inaugurating the temple, 
Solomon foresees its destruction and the exile of the people
528
 (1 Kings 8:44-49). 
 
Despite the positive characterization of Solomon, the narrator does not totally cover his 
weaknesses. The court intrigues that bring him to power depart from the pattern of 
charismatic rulers raised by Yahweh. The narrator mentions the executions for which 
Solomon is responsible, his marriage to Pharaoh‟s daughter (1 Kings 3:1) and his 
sacrifice at the high places (1 King 3:2), all which are brought to the knowledge of the 
reader. Beyond a wise king (1 Kings 2:3-28) who loves the Lord, walking in the statutes 
of his father David (1 Kings 3:3) and the beloved of the Lord who rules with divine 
wisdom (1 Kings 3-4), the reader is shown a despot of the kind Samuel warned the people 
against.  
 
Among realisations counted for Solomon as a display of his wisdom (1 Kings 4: 29-34) 
are his administrative policies, that deliberately ignored the ancient organization of the 
tribal league,
529
 and by which he took power from the elders to give it to his own officials 
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 as well as his heavy collections imposed on the people (1 Kings 4:20-
28). The account about his devotion to Yahweh is followed by a description of his further 
success (1 Kings 9), popularity and splendour (1 Kings 10), but a careful reader will 
easily notice that this glory and splendour is achieved at the expense of the people who 
were subjected to hard labour and taxation. Solomon‟s attitude towards the people (1 
Kings 5:13-18) epitomizes the negative aspect of the monarchy that reportedly made it 
displeasing to Yahweh (1 Sam 8:10-18).  
 
In the second part of Solomon‟s story (1 Kings 9-11) his weaknesses are even more 
openly recognized as such. In this part, the Solomon who loved the Lord by walking in 
the statutes of his father David gives way to the Solomon who loved many foreign 
women who turned his heart towards other gods (1 Kings 11:1-8). His attitude towards 
material possessions is highlighted at length in 1 Kings 10: 14-29 which exposes the 
king‟s deviation from the disposition of Deuteronomy 17:14-17.
531
 As a consequence of 
his apostasy, Solomon loses the favour of the Lord. The decline of his reign, described in 
1 Kings 11, appears as the fulfilment of the stipulations of the Davidic covenant (1 
Samuel 7:14-16). At his death, he will leave behind a divided kingdom, with the greater 
part of it being given to his servant (1 Kings: 11: 9-13). The similarities in both language 
and content with the rejection of Saul (1 Samuel 15:28) is obvious, for these events 
constitute an important element of the patterns that were created by the narrator within 
his representation of Israel‟s past.
532
  God‟s judgment against Solomon is carried out 
through a socio-political crisis reported in the selected passage of this study, 1 Kings 
12:1-24.  
 
5.1.2.2 From the division to the fall of Samaria (1 Kings 12- 2 Kings 17) 
The second section of the book of Kings provides what the author(s)/editor(s) purport(s) 
to be the history of the divided monarchy, down to the destruction of the northern 
Kingdom in 721.  This section (1 Kings 12- 2 Kings 17) relates a parallel story of the two 
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kingdoms in accordance with a fixed scheme. Among the fixed ingredients of the scheme 
are the synchronism of the kings of the two kingdoms and the evaluation of their reigns. 
A pattern that is recurrent in this account is the verdict rendered on each king, based on 
an evaluation of his loyalty to Yahweh and to the “True Religion”. This evaluation 
appears in the concluding formula which, together with the introductory formula, 
constitutes a framework that gives the book its distinctive literary character.
533
  All the 
northern kings, regardless of their eventual political importance, are generally censured 
on the grounds of their religious syncretism, the norm being Deuteronomic orthodoxy.
534
 
The “sin of Jeroboam” is a motif that continues to appear in their evaluation until 2 Kings 
23:15, when Josiah destroys the altar in Bethel, thus putting an end to Jeroboam‟s cultic 
innovation.
535
 According to the narrative, the destruction of Samaria and the subsequent 
Assyrian deportation is to be understood as grounded in Yahweh‟s purpose in judging the 
kings‟ disloyalty to his Torah and their negligence of his repeated warning through the 
prophets (2 Kings 17).  
 
The indictment reserved for southern kings is less harsh. Although their imperfections are 
mentioned, a number of them are qualifiedly approved. While the tendency is for 
northern kings always to do evil, albeit different degrees of evil, the kings of Judah 
always do what is right in the eyes of Yahweh, albeit with qualifications and exceptions, 
which is why the fate of Israel ultimately hastens upon them.
536
 The Deuteronomistic 
concern to highlight Yahweh‟s faithfulness to his covenant with David (2 Samuel 7:4-
17), implied in the prophecy of Ahijah before the division (1 Kings 11:26-40), is 
expressed, after the division, through the report of the uninterrupted dynastic succession 
to the throne in the southern kingdom of Judah, and at the fall of Samaria, through the 
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5.1.2.3 From the fall of Samaria to the fall of Jerusalem 
The last section (2 Kings 18-25) continues with the history of the Kingdom of Judah, 
from the time of the destruction of Samaria to the fall of Jerusalem and subsequent final 
deportation. The narrative is about seven kings, of whom three are key to the 
Deuteronomistic interpretation of history. The account characterises Hezekiah and Josiah 
as good kings, fearing and trusting Yahweh. Hezekiah is credited for abolishing the 
illegitimate cults and cult places and Josiah for undertaking a tremendous reorganization 
of the cult, making Jerusalem the only legitimate sanctuary.
537
 Because of Hezekiah‟s 
loyalty he is protected against the threatening Assyrian invasion (2 Kings 18:3-8). With 
Hezekiah‟s story, the author(s)/editor(s) buttressed the point that loyalty to Yahweh 
results in security and prosperity. As for Josiah, his total devotion to the Torah makes him 
a model king. As Brueggemann has noted, Josiah is the one who embodies the central 
mandates of Moses to Joshua at the beginning of this “history”,
 538
 a mandate expressed 
in these words: 
 
Only be strong and very courageous. Being careful to act in accordance with all 
the law that my servant Moses commanded you; do not turn from it to the right 
hand or to the left, so that you may be successful wherever you go. This Book of 
the Law shall not depart out of your mouth; you shall meditate on it day and night, 
so that you may be careful to act in accordance with all that is written in it. For 
then you shall make your way prosperous, and then you shall be successful. I 
hereby command you: Be strong and courageous; do not be frightened or 
dismayed, for the Lord your God is with you wherever you go (Joshua 1:7-9).
  
 
Conversely, Manasseh and the rest are evildoers who attract final judgment upon the 
kingdom of Judah. The account of Manasseh‟s disregard of Yahweh‟s Torah and the 
resulting destruction of Jerusalem illustrates the contention that disloyalty to Yahweh is a 
direct cause of socio-political debacle.  Manasseh‟s reign in Judah is reported as a 
paradigm of disobedience and a point of reference in the evaluation of those who came to 
the throne after him, as it was in the case of the reign of Jeroboam I in Israel. Both are the 
opposite of David and Josiah. As was the case with Israel at the fall of Samaria, 
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Jerusalem‟s destruction is presented not as a mere result of the Babylonians‟ geopolitical 
and military actions, but as a direct judgment from Yahweh (2 Kings 24).  
 
Acknowledging the Deuteronomistic theological interpretation that pervades the account 
presented in the book of Kings does not necessarily imply making any judgment about 
the historicity of facts behind the event interpreted. Both facts and interpretations are 
important for the purpose of understanding how the people of the Old Testament lived 
and what they believed about their Yahweh. The present chapter focuses on the account 
of the division of the kingdom, paying attention to socio-political situations described in 
the biblical narrative and perceived as being behind the division. In the next chapter an 
attempt will be made to analyze the socio-historical situation lying at the background of 
this crisis. Attention is now focused on the event of the division of the Kingdom of Israel 
as reported in 1 Kings 12, which is the subject of a detailed literary analysis. 
 
5.2 Analysis of 1 Kings 12:1-24 
The analysis of this selected passage considers its narrative character. Elements of the 
narratives that receive attention include its setting, inner structure, plot and characters.  
 
5.2.1 Setting of 1 Kings 12:1-24  
Critics have designated the unit as a story with folkloristic artistry that makes it a 
folktale.
539
 The story is often believed to originate from a circle of Solomon‟s advisors 
intending to assert that the division of the Kingdom resulted from Rehoboam‟s rejection 
of their experienced advice.
540
 It is noted, however, that the story could as well emanate 
from northern Israel.
541
 This view accounts better for the story‟s positive characterisation 
of Jeroboam and its siding with the cause of the northern tribes, underlining Rehoboam‟s 
responsibility in the division of the kingdom of Israel. 
 
From a more literary perspective, the story is the continuation of the immediately 
preceding account about Jeroboam in 1 Kings 11:26-40. It reports the return of the rebel 
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who, in the preceding account, had gone into exile and, more importantly, the passage 
reports the event of the division as a fulfilment of Ahijah‟s prophecy reported in the 
preceding account (1 Kings 12:15). The story is situated in the transitional period 
between the reign of Solomon and his successor Rehoboam and the transition from the 
united monarchy to the divided monarchy. It is, of course, an introduction to the socio-
political change in the history of Israel reported in the accounts that follow.   
 
5.2.2 Inner structure of 1 Kings 12:1-24 
From a historical-critical perspective this passage has been viewed as comprising one 
main unit, to which additional stories have been added. The length of the main unit has 
been differently identified by scholars. There are some who see the end of the main unit 
at verse 17
542
, others at verse 19
543
 and others at verse 20.
 544 
The text of 1 Kings 12:1-20 
has been regarded as a self-contained unit, intended to narrate the rise of Jeroboam in 
fulfilment of the prophecy.
545
 The remaining part (1 Kings 12:21-24) reports a series of 
scenes with events reportedly subsequent to the rebellion of the northern tribes.  The great 




The literary approach adopted in the present work considers the passage of 1 Kings 12:1-
24 as one unit, regardless of the subdivision suggested by historical critics. The unit 
reporting the event of the division comprises a prologue (1-3a), the heart of the narrative 
(3b-17) and an epilogue (18-24). This epilogue continues and completes the story of the 
main unit, reporting a number of events directly linked with the event of the division, 
including the role assigned to Yahweh in predetermining the course of history. As Long 
has observed, this last part follows on, and depends for its sense upon, the story of 
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Jeroboam‟s rise and the kingdom‟s dissolution.
547
 That is why it is joined to the preceding 
unit to form one plot object of our analysis. 
 
5.2.3 Plot 
The scenes in this passage are arranged in a way that shows a straightforward movement 
of the plot. After the protagonists are brought together in the prologue, the plot moves 
with the introduction of the crisis, as Rehoboam meets the people for the first time. 
Attempts to resolve the crisis result in further complication, as the king‟s advisors are 
divided. The crisis reaches its paroxysm in the king‟s second meeting with the people, 
before it is finally resolved with an unexpected ending, as the epilogue confirms. The 
following exposition of the text is guided by this movement of the plot. 
 
5.2.4 Exposition of 1 Kings 12:1-24 
The present section analyses successive scenes of the narrative, paying attention to its 
main characters. The aim is to look at issues involved in this event of the division of the 
kingdom of Israel, as reported in this passage, around which a dialogue with the context 
of ethnic conflict in Rwanda can be established. The analysis follows the scenes as 
arranged in the narrative. 
 
5.2.4.1 Movement to Shechem: verses 1-3a  
The unit opens with a movement to Shechem, the venue for an expected important event. 
Rehoboam travelled from Jerusalem, the Israelites had come from all the parts of Israel 
and Jeroboam had come from Egypt. Although the announced purpose of the meeting is 
the coronation of Rehoboam, this introduction of the protagonists allows the reader to 
foresee a situation of possible conflict.  
 
5.2.4.1.1 Rehoboam  
Rehoboam is presented at the beginning of the story without much introduction. If not for 
the mention of his name in the preceding concluding formula marking the end the 
account of the reign of Solomon (1 Kings 11:43), he would appear unknown to the 
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reader. It is this concluding formula that informs the reader that Rehoboam inherited his 
father‟s throne. In the absence of details about the process of Rehoboam‟s selection to 
succeed his father, Rehoboam is presented as the only legitimate successor of Solomon. 
In fact he is the only son of Solomon known by name. The reader is thus made to see him 
as the already chosen king and apparently already approved in Jerusalem and in Judah. 
He is king already, although he still needs to travel to Shechem for the coronation 
ceremony. 
 
A question arises from the beginning about Rehoboam‟s need to travel to Shechem. The 
purpose of this trip, as indicated in the narrative, is his coronation, because all Israel had 
gone to Shechem to make him king. The reader will begin to have an idea about the need 
for this ceremony to be held at Shechem and not in Jerusalem, the capital city, as he/she 
discovers the identity of the people referred to as “all Israel” that the king is going to 
meet there. 
 
5.2.4.1.1 All Israel 
It is reported  that all Israel went to Shechem. “All Israel” is the English rendering of 
 whose literary understanding would imply that the whole people of Israel 
gathered at Shechem. The phrase could also be taken as a hyperbole, a figure of speech 
using exaggeration simply to indicate that many Israelites were there. “All Israel” was 
used a number of times to designate the whole people as the bearer of political, military 
or ceremonial authority. The other terms used in the same sense are “the people of 
Israel”, “the men of Israel”, “the assembly”, “the people”, or simply “Israel”.
548
 In the 
present context the expression cannot be taken literally and it is not a hyperbole. “All 
Israel” refers more probably to representatives of the people.  
 
The people gathering at Shechem are also referred to as  “the whole 
assembly of Israel” (v3). The Hebrew word used here for assembly is ל . The term could 
be used to designate an assembly specially convoked, for war or invasion, for example, as 
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it appears in Numbers 22: 4; Judges 20:2, 21:5-8; 1 Samuel 17:47; Ezekiel 16:40, or used 
with reference to the whole community of the people of Israel, as in Deuteronomy 23: 2 
Numbers 16:3, 20:4; 1 Chronicles 28:8; Nehemiah 13:1, or more generally in the sense of 
“company”, in reference to a multitude of people such as in Genesis 35:11, 28:3, 48:4.
549
 
It was suggested that the term could refer to a congregation as an organized body, a 
societal institution with regulatory responsibilities.
550
 In the pre-monarchical period such 
power belonged to the „Elders”, who were heads of local communities. It seems that with 
the establishment of the monarchy the authority of the elders was weakened to the degree 
that the king‟s power increased, but appeal could still be made to them in a time of 
national emergency.
551
  The agenda of the meeting, as well as the venue, give a hint to the 
identity of people referred to in this passage.  
 
The venue of the meeting is  .This word, meaning “shoulder”, may refer to the 
location of this city at the eastern pass between Mount Ebal and Mount Gerizim, placed 
as a neck between the shoulders.
552
 Shechem was a site known for its early cultic 
importance. It had a significant record in Israelite tradition and held a special place 
among the northern tribes.
553
 Events associated with Shechem that made it an important 
tribal place include: the covenant ceremony (Joshua 24); the story about Abimelech‟s 
attempt to establish his kingdom (Judges 9); the altar on Mount Ebal, just above Shechem 
and the stones with terms of the covenant instructed by Moses (Deuteuronomy.27) and 
implemented by Joshua (Joshua 8); the blessings and curses ritual (Deuteronomy 11); the 
narratives about the patriarchs Abraham (Genesis 12:6-7) and Jacob (Genesis 33:18-29). 
The northern tribes may not have approved of its being overshadowed by Jerusalem by 
the concentration of the cult in Jerusalem under David and Solomon.  It was not by 
accident that Shechem was made the first capital of the northern kingdom after the 
secession. The northern tribes are to be understood to be the ones pushing for the meeting 
to be held at Shechem. The matter at stake was similar to that which, some years earlier, 
                                                 
549
Brown, Francis ; Driver, Samuel Rolles ; Briggs, Charles Augustus: Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs 
Hebrew and English Lexicon. electronic ed. Oak Harbor, WA : Logos Research Systems, 2000, S. 874. 
550
 Cogan, M. I Kings: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, p 347. 
551
 Tadmor, H. “Traditional Institutions and the Monarchy”, p 242. 
552
 Gray, J. I&II Kings: A Commentary, p 303. 
553
 Cogan, M. I Kings: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, p 346. 
 
 184 
had brought the elders of the same people to Hebron, where they concluded a covenant 
with David (2 Samuel 5:1-3). It is logical to understand that this time, again, those who 
gathered at Shechem were mainly, if not exclusively, the elders representative of the 
northern tribes of Israel. The reported purpose of the assembly suggests this 
understanding. 
 
The purpose of people‟s going to Shechem is expressed by the phrase  “to 
make him king”. The causative form of the Hiphil indicates that the people are to perform 
the action of making Rehoboam king, while the infinitive specifies that this is the purpose 
of their coming to Shechem. The need for this ceremony has been explained against the 
traditional right of the people of making king the prince whom God had chosen, anointing 
him and paying homage to him.
554
 That the people of Israel were involved in the king-
making process is attested in the stories about the kings who reigned before Rehoboam. 
Rehoboam‟s situation seems not to be identical to any of the three Israelite kings who 
preceded him, however.  
 
In the case of Saul, it is reported that all the tribes of Israel acclaimed a king chosen by 
Yahweh at their request (1 Samuel 8:1-21). In all the recorded traditions concerning the 
rise of Saul, he is portrayed in a position of strength, so that he does not go after the 
people; they are the ones who need him (1 Samuel 10:17-26). Although Saul arose to 
power when Israelite society was far from being united
555
, he is not reported as a seeking 
separate coronation from different camps. 
 
Closest to Rehoboam‟s situation is the case of David, who did not reign over the northern 
tribes until he had made a covenant with them. But in David‟s case there was a rival king 
whom the northern tribes had initially followed and David was not their king until he won 
their allegiance. Yet, even in this situation, as the narrator indicates, it was the people 
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who needed David and came to look for him at his palace. Another explanation of 
Rehoboam‟s need to travel to Shechem is the argument that David‟s kingship had been 
dual – over Judah and over Israel – and it had to be ratified by elders of both regions.
556
 
Yet a ceremony of this kind is not mentioned in connection with Solomon‟s coronation. 
 
The report about the coronation of Solomon in the succession narrative mentions only the 
event happening in Jerusalem.  The biblical account does not mention anything like the 
king‟s need to seek a separate approval of the people outside Judah.
 557
 According to the 
biblical depiction, Solomon hardly made any public appearances before ascending to the 
throne. We hear nothing of possible negotiations with political bodies or representatives 
of various regions.
558
 Even the tradition suggesting that Solomon went through the 
process of popular acclamation (1 Chronicles 29:22) mentions that this ceremony 
concerned the whole people, not separate tribes.  It was argued that Solomon dispensed 
with the formality of negotiating the allegiance of the northern tribes, due to his elevation 
to co-regency with David, while the Hebron covenant had been still valid with David in 
his lifetime.
559
 In any case, the succession narrative does not mention any incident related 
to Solomon‟s relation to the northern tribes. It is as if his coronation was smooth from 
that side. However, the apparent acquiescence of the northern tribes may not necessarily 
indicate that at this time they did not have serious complaints against the house of David. 
It may simply be that they were not strong enough to successfully challenge it. Their 
situation may be seen as analogous to that of the Hutu in Rwanda, in their submission to 
Tutsi regimes that oppressed them in the pre-colonial and colonial period, or that of the 
Tutsi voting for Hutu post-colonial regimes that discriminated against them.    
 
Although the purpose of the assembly at Shechem is said to be the coronation of 
Rehoboam, the king‟s need to journey to Shechem arouses some suspicions in the mind 
of the reader with respect to the allegiance of the northern tribes to the new king. Keil, 
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following Kimchi, saw in the choice of Shechem for the venue of their meeting an 
indication that the northern tribes sought an opportunity for transferring the government 
to Jeroboam. Instead of going to Jerusalem, they preferred Shechem which belonged to 
Ephraim, whilst Jeroboam was an Ephraimite.
560
 This view concurs with the suggestion 
that the Shechem assembly had a mutinous character. Montgomery objects to such 
claims, arguing that if that was the case, the king should have taken proper military 
precautions.
561
 For Gray, the gathering at Shechem was analogous to the situation in 
which Abner, on behalf of the tribes of the north, through their elders, approached David 
at Hebron (2 Samuel 3:17-21) to offer him kingship over the northern tribes.
562
  Here he 
comes close to those who contend that Rehoboam, as a new king, needed to renew the 
covenant with representative of the tribes. Objecting to this view, Tadmor states:  
 
The conclusion of a covenant between the king and the people is actually 
mentioned only twice in the history of the united and the divided Monarchy. Once 
at the founding of the Davidic dynasty, when David – already king of Judah – was 
crowned at Hebron as king of all Israel (2 Samuel 5:1-3), and again at the 
restoration of the dynasty when the infant Jehoash was crowned after the 
Davidides had been almost decimated by Athaliah (2 Kings 11:17). Both cases 
were exceptional, since they both signified the beginning of a dynasty. We have 
no evidence, I submit, that a renewal of the covenant was necessary when the 
crown passed in a normal manner from father to son or when the people through 
the act of acclaiming  “long live the king” were inevitably supposed to 




Montgomery‟s view that the discontented northern tribes had now the opportunity of 
making their bargain with the new king is better confirmed in the narrative than his 
contention that the hereditary rights of the Davidic dynasty were not yet established.
564
 It 
can be observed that, from the rise of the monarchy, Israelite princes such as Jonathan, 
Ishbosheth, Mephiboshet, Absolom, Adonijah and Solomon are reported, each at a certain 
point in time, behaving as if their dynastic rights to inherit their fathers‟ thrones were 
granted. On the other hand, however, the people repeatedly showed their bias in favour of 
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the charismatic type of leadership, either by objecting to automatic dynastic succession 
that implied departure from the charismatic style of leadership, as in the case of Eli‟s sons 
and Samuel‟s sons, or by supporting military kings such as Saul and David. Solomon had 
ascended to power through court intrigues and had reigned as an Assyrian monarch.
565
 
The people did not want to see in the reign of Rehoboam a repeat of what his father‟s rule 
had been. Montgomery was of the opinion that the people wanted to negotiate a better 
deal before they could acclaim the new king. 
 
Tadmor has suggested that Rehoboam‟s pilgrimage to Shechem was an expression of 
good will on his part, an act of appeasement in an attempt to calm the growing 
dissatisfaction.
566
 But the narrator is not overt about Rehoboam‟s pre-knowledge of the 
people‟s discontent. What the narrative does suggest is that the northern tribes were not 
bound by the apparent approval that Rehoboam may have enjoyed in Jerusalem and in 
Judah and the legitimacy of his rule over the north required the acquiescence of the 
northern tribes. Their consent was to be expressed through a coronation ceremony. The 
people‟s intention to negotiate a deal transpires through their precaution to send for 
Jeroboam whom they made part of the negotiating team.  
 
5.2.4.1.3 Jeroboam 
Jeroboam was introduced in the preceding account concerning the end of the reign of 
Solomon (1 Kings 11:26-38). Ahijah‟s prophecy in this passage constitutes a prophetic 
announcement of the division of the kingdom and provides the ideological groundwork 
for understanding the event, as well as the consequences of the division.
567
 In this story, 
Jeroboam is described as one of the adversaries that God raised against Solomon, 
punishing him for his apostasy. Ahijah‟s prophecy promising Jeroboam the throne in 
Israel made him a rival and enemy of David‟s house, so that he was obliged to flee for his 
life and stay in exile in Egypt. Having been promised the throne, he was persecuted by 
the incumbent king, just as David suffered under Saul.  
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The text reports, in verse 2, that Jeroboam received the news and he remained in Egypt. 
The verb used here  from  means, he sat, he remained, or he dwelt. This suggests 
that the news reached him while he was in Egypt. The Hebrew verb  “when he 
heard” is not provided with a direct object. The English translations supply the pronoun 
“this” or “it”, implying that the news that reached Jeroboam was about the Shechem 
assembly mentioned in verse 1. This reading does not match with the rest of the narrative 
that makes Jeroboam a participant at the Shechem assembly from the beginning. Since 
Jeroboam was at Shechem at the beginning of the meeting, the news that reached him 
while he was still in Egypt cannot be about the meeting, but probably about the death of 
Solomon. Upon hearing this news, he returned home. It is from home that he was called 
to come to the assembly (verse 3a). This reading is obtained by using the verb , 
meaning “he turned back”, or “he returned”, instead of  meaning “he sat”, “he dwelt” 
“he remained” used in this text.
568
 Jeroboam has now surreptitiously returned from exile 
to his homeland – a cloud on the distant horizon – or an agent waiting for the moment to 
ripen. For the reader who knows about Ahijah‟s prophecy, the ambiguity of Jeroboam‟s 
intentions in coming to Shechem conveys mystery and arouses expectations, but the 




In the present account, Jeroboam is introduced alongside the assembly of Israel, but he is 
not just part of the crowd. He is singled out and identified by his name, so as to highlight 
the importance of his presence at the event. Jeroboam is well known to the people as a 
northern leader under whom they worked when he supervised their labour (1 Kings 
11:28). They know him as a  i “man of valour”, the same description used for 
Gideon the Judge (Judges 6:12) and Naaman the Aramean commander (2 Kings 5:1). 
Jeroboam is described as a man endowed with qualities that the people had been looking 
for in their early charismatic deliverers. His former position as a supervisor of the hated 
labour had not affected his relations with the people, who still trust him enough to make 
him a member of the delegation charged with the mission to negotiate with the king. 
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Once the protagonists are introduced, the setting is established and a conflict can be 
expected.  
 
5.2.4.2 The king meets the northern tribes: 3b-5 
The first scene at Shechem brings the characters together. Besides Jeroboam, the 
attention of the narrator is first on the congregation of Israel. It is to be noted that, despite 
the attention drawn to Jeroboam at the beginning of the story, he quickly gives way to the 
people, who are the real protagonists. It is the congregation that takes the lead and speaks 
first. They are the protagonists who speak and Rehoboam, the antagonist, responds. 
Opening the discussions, they lay down the terms on which Rehoboam can be crowned 
and rule over them. They feel that they have been oppressed by the previous regime 
under Solomon. This complaint reminds the reader of Samuel‟s warning about the 
monarchy (1 Samuel 8:11- 18). The people are crying out as Samuel said they would do, 
asking the king to lighten the service required from them, a service which, to them, is a 
yoke. 
 
The word  o meaning yoke, normally referring to cattle, is usually used figuratively to 
mean servitude. This kind of service has been defined as the obligation to perform 
periodically certain services for one‟s landlord or for the state.
570
 Its use with reference to 
burdens and service imposed by a superior is attested in such passages as Genesis 27:40; 
Deuteronomy 28:48; Isaiah 14:25; 47:6; Jeremy 27:8; Ezekiel 34:27.
571
 In this case, what 
was referred to as a yoke is evidently both taxes and enforced labour imposed on the 
people by Solomon‟s economic and social policies, previously mentioned (1Kings 4:1-
28; 5:13-18). The representatives of the northern tribes feel that their people have 
suffered under the Jerusalem regime and condition their loyalty to the end of the 
oppression. It is around this question of service and loyalty that the tension is built. The 
people have presented their request, but the king has no answer for them. They need to 
wait three days before they can know the king‟s position.  The conflict created is 
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therefore not solved immediately. With the adjournment of the meeting, the scene is 
closed, the “curtains” are drawn but the plot continues as the people are told to wait for 
three days.  
 
It is sometimes suggested to interpret the phrase “ ” (literally: depart for 
three days) in the sense of “a short time”, just like the English “a couple of days”. The 
phrase is thought to have that meaning in such verses as Genesis 22:4; 34:25; 1 Kings 
3:18; 2 Kings 20:5, 8; Esther 5:1.
572
   There is no reason, however, to prefer the rendering 
“a short time”,
573
 especially as it is said that the people knew exactly when to come back 
without needing to be re-invited. The tradition followed in 2 Chronicles explains that they 
were asked not to “depart for three days” but to “come back in three days”, which they 
did. Meanwhile, the king finds it necessary to consult his advisors. The negotiations are 
adjourned, the protagonists separate, the tension is relieved, but the conflict is not solved. 
The narrative introduces the next scene. 
 
5.2.4.3 The king consults with his advisers: 6-11 
In the next scene, a new setting is introduced. The people who have expressed their 
feelings and presented their request are now withdrawn, waiting for the king to come up 
with a response to unblock the situation. The narrator and his readers follow Rehoboam, 
whose attitude is expected to determine the outcome of the conflict. The focus is now 
principally on Rehoboam. Having remained passive in the first scene, not much is known 
about him thus far. In the second scene he is going to act and interact with people and 
respond to the challenge, allowing the narrator to display his character.   
 
Rehoboam did not negotiate with the concerned people; he prefers to discuss the matter 
with his chosen advisors. The verb  is the Niphal form of , meaning “advise”, 
“counsel”. It conveys the idea of “consult together” or “exchange counsel” and is here to 
be rendered with “he consulted” or “he took counsel”. The same rendering is understood 
in its use elsewhere as in 2 Kings 6:8; 1 Chronicles 13:1; 2 Chronicles 10: 6, 8; 2 
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Chronicles 32:3; Isaiah 40:14 and generally the advice is being sought from people who 
are in a position to express a valuable opinion, but just an opinion.
574
 This is different 
from taking a matter to a body for deliberation and decision.  
 
The advice is sought first from the “elders”. The Hebrew word  can be interpreted 
as “the elders” or “the old men” and can refer to age or to status.  It has been suggested 
that these people could be understood to be an “advisory council”, with roots reaching to 
the pre-monarchical period; that they were “patriarchal notables” who “served in an 
advisory capacity”.
575
  In the pre-monarchical period reference is often made to elders 
who intervene at a time of crisis. The elders of Gilead appointed Jephtah to lead the 
campaign against the Ammonites (Judges 11). It was also the elders of Israel who made a 
covenant with David in Hebron (2 Samuel 5:1-3). In this story, the elders are not called 
upon to make a decision. Besides being described as those who had served Rehoboam‟s 
father Solomon, the elders are contrasted with   “the youngsters”. The emphasis 
is on their age, experience
576
 and wisdom. The narrator‟s interest is obviously not in their 
current function. His point seems to be that there was wisdom available for Rehoboam, if 
he had been wise enough to make good use of it. The elders‟ view on the matter was that 
the king should heed the request and become a servant of the people. 
 
The noun  translated “servant” can also mean “slave” and the Qal form of its 
cognate verb  means to “serve” or to “be a slave”. It is not necessary to understand the 
advice as meaning that the king should forget about his status and his authority to submit 
to the orders of the people.  The king is advised to serve the people simply by kindly 
answering them and speaking good words to them ( ). He is advised 
to consider the welfare of the people. The phrase  is sometimes understood as 
implying more than just good words and should rather be interpreted as “good 
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conditions”.  The elders are advising the king to grant relief to the people.
577
 From their 
experience, they know that there is another way of ruling the people, by serving them 
instead of enslaving them. They knew the old times, when charismatic leaders were 
appointed to deliver the people. Through the voice of the wise elders the narrator seems 
to address his critique against a monarchical regime that enslaves the people instead of 
serving them. 
 
The elders‟ position is interesting. These are the people understood to have served the 
regime now indicted by the northern tribes. They can be perceived as people who were, in 
some way, involved in the conception or implementation of policies now questioned by 
the people or had benefited from the people‟s heavy service. The fact that Rehoboam 
could approach them for advice implies that they were not among those who were 
complaining. In the Rwandan context of tribal politics, such people are likely to be 
members of the king‟s own tribe, region or political organization. Yet here they choose to 
support the plight of the oppressed people, regardless of where they come from, or the 
social group they belong to. Unfortunately, as was observed with many peaceful 
Rwandans in times of socio-political polarization, despite all their wisdom and good will, 
the peaceful wise do not have the power to impose their view. The king simply ignores 
their advice. 
 
The verb  is the Qal imperfect form of  meaning “leave”, forsake”or “loose”. In 
the context of this account, the forsaking is by “failing to follow, obey advice, wisdom” 
as in Proverbs 2:13, 4:2, 6; 10:17; 15:10; 27:10. This points to the foolishness of the king, 
who fails to make good use of the wisdom that could have brought harmony in his 
kingdom. Rehoboam is not pleased with the advice from the elders. Although Rehoboam 
has not yet announced his position, the narrator considers that the king‟s decision to seek 
further advice implies his rejection of the advice already received from the elders. He 
turns to the youngsters. 
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The word  is the plural form of meaning “child”, “boy”, “son” or “youth”.  In 
the context of this story it refers to young men who grew up with Rehoboam. It was 
suggested to understand  as a technical term referring to a special group of 
youngsters raised at court, the sons of officials and courtiers.
578
 All that is said is that 
these were young men who grew up with Rehoboam and were obviously his 
contemporaries. According to 1 Kings 14: 21, Rehoboam was 41 when he acceded to the 
throne.
579
 Those of the second group of advisors were about that age. Compared to the 
elders, who had served his father, they could be called young men, but certainly not 
boys.
580
 In the writer‟s view they deserve this latter description probably because their 
advice is so naive.
581
 They are Rehoboam‟s age-mates and the only regime they knew 
was that of Solomon. They are therefore contrasted with the experienced elders, who 
knew about the charismatic style of leadership where it was the leaders who served the 
people and not the other way round. The inexperienced youth, who knew only the 
privileged life of the monarchy, advised Rehoboam to sound even harsher than his father. 
The youths‟ advice is expressed in a pithy remark, with the ring of a known proverb or, at 
least, makes use of imagery that usually accompanies proverbial sayings
582
: “My little 
finger shall be thicker than my father‟s loins”.   
 
The phrase “my little finger” found in many English versions is the rendering of the 
Hebrew  (literary “my little”). It has for cognate the verb ן  meaning “be small” or 
“be insignificant”.  Used as an adjective ן  means “small”, “young”or “insignificant”. 
Without the word “finger” supplied in this phrase the phrase could simply read “my little 
thing”. It was even suggested to read “my penis”!
583
 This rendering would make the 
king‟s answer more arrogant and insulting. To clarify the meaning of the riddle the king 
is advised to add not only that the yoke will be heavier but that discipline will be harsher. 
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I will discipline you with “scorpions” (verse11). The noun  “scorpions” is from the 
singular  Here it refers to a barbed whip with its barbs likened to the sting of a 
scorpion. The contrast between the  (whip, scourge) used by Solomon and the 
scorpions  to be used by his son indicates the extent to which Rehoboam is advised 
to worsen the situation of the people.  
 
 
Rehoboam‟s consultation of his advisors is reported as a dialogue. Dialogue and 
quotations contribute to characterization and to the development of the plot.
584
 In the 
present account the dialogue between Rehoboam and his advisors is replete with 
repetitions that enhance the style, the flavour and the impact of the narrative.
585
 The 
request of the people expressed in the first scene (verse 4) is repeated in Rehoboam‟s 
query to the youth (verse 9) and in the youth‟s advice to Rehoboam (verse 10).The main 
expressions used in the youth‟s advice (verse 11) are repeated in Rehoboam‟s answer to 
the people (verse 14) and these two verses repeat the key words used in the people‟s 
request (verse 4). Each time the narrator takes up a phrase or motif of a precedent verse to 
which he sometimes makes some additions as the action develops. The effect of all this 
repetition is to recapitulate continuously the very first scene. It is a constant presence in 
our hearing the deliberations with Rehoboam‟s camp.
 586
 The dialogue and the quotations 
are also used in characterization, as shall be seen below. 
 
5.2.4.4 The king’s answer to the people: 12-15 
This scene brings the protagonists back together. On the appointed day Jeroboam and all 
the people are present. This time the narrator‟s focus is on Jeroboam and the people. It is 
they who set the scene in motion, while Rehoboam is left to react to their firm initiative. 
Jeroboam and the people have not changed anything in their initial request. They have 
come to hear what Rehoboam has to say about it. The reader has an idea of what the 
answer is going to be because the narrator has helped him/her to follow the consultation 
process but the people do not know and the reader does not know how the people are 
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going to react to the king‟s answer. The tension had been relieved to some degree as the 
king promised to examine the people‟s request. There is now uncertainty for the people 
waiting for the answer and for the reader waiting to see the people‟s reaction to the king‟s 
address.  
 
The king‟s address is harsh.  The harshness of the answer is not only in the tone of the 
speech but also in the content of the address. The adjective  normally means “hard”, 
or “severe”. With reference to language it means “rough”, “rude” or “severe”. Here it is 
used to qualify the verb  “and (the king) answered”. The literal translation supplies 
“things” to make it “hard things” this adjective is also used adverbially after “speak” 
(Gen 42:7, 30) or after “answer” 1Samuel 20:10; 1Kings 14:6). The idea is that of a rude 
or rough language. Although Rehoboam acknowledged that the yoke imposed on the 
people by his father was heavy, his own intention is to make it even heavier. The metric 
form of his answer highlights its sarcasm:  
 
My father made your yoke heavy,  
But I will add to your yoke:  
My father disciplined you with whips,  
But I will discipline you with scorpions. 
 
 
The rhythm of this poem appears better in its Hebrew form:  
 





The king‟s language is rude enough, even with his omission of the ruder metaphoric 
expression suggested to him by his young advisers: “my little thing (or my penis) will be 
greater than my father‟s loins”. Noticeable is the absence of any motivation whatsoever 
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to justify the need to increase both the corvée and the discipline. Rehoboam is 
characterized as a despot who does not indulge in dialogue with the people. Even when 
they initiate the dialogue, Rehoboam turns his back, preferring to exchange ideas with his 
advisors, but not with the people. Although he admits that the people were submitted to a 
heavy yoke under his father‟s regime he has no apology for that and is not willing to 
change anything. He is a monarch before whom the people have no other option but to 
submit.  
 
For the narrator, Rehoboam‟s foolish answer does not simply result from bad advisers. It 
has a divine origin and has an ultimate purpose as he indicates in his comment. The 
“thing” was from the Lord.  “This thing” is rendered from “ה ” meaning “turn of 
affairs”, “round about” or “turn-about”. The crisis is described as a “ה ” from Yahweh. 
Here it is to be understood as the “turn of affairs”, an “unhappy development”
587
.  It is 
Yahweh who is punishing disobedience and this is in fulfilment of prophecy. Like later, 
in the cases of the fall of Samaria and the destruction of Jerusalem, there is a divine 
purpose fulfilled by means of an “apparently” mere human action.  This theology 
pervades the Deuteronomistic history. In each case, Yahweh intervenes to judge the 
disobedience of the king (or kings). In the present case, Yahweh‟s judgment had been 
pronounced through the prophet Ahijah against King Solomon. Ahijah‟s prophecy of 
judgment designated Jeroboam as the instrument by which the judgment would be carried 
out.  
 
In this narrative, a twofold explanation is provided for the direct causes of the division of 
the kingdom. There is, on the one hand, Yahweh‟s overriding will enunciated in 
prophecy, a favourite theme for the Deuteronomistic historian and, on the other hand, 
Rehoboam‟s obstinacy, dramatically contrasted as his despotism over others‟ will for 
freedom.
588
  The narrative also directs a critique against Solomon and, through him, 
against the whole dynastic monarchical style of leadership which enslaves the people 
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instead of serving them. However, the narrative reserves a greater share of responsibility 
to Rehoboam for the division.  
 
5.2.4.4.1 Rehoboam 
Throughout the narrative, the overall characterization of Rehoboam is negative. His 
weaknesses as a leader are exposed from the first scene. Rehoboam has to travel all the 
way from Jerusalem to Shechem to be crowned king, but he has no control over the 
coronation ceremony. He wants to rule over the people, yet he has no answers to 
questions that the people ask. Instead of discussing issues with the concerned people he 
turns his back on them and at the end imposes his position on them. He works 
indecisively, reacting throughout to the firm initiative of the people. He takes a distance 
from the people and identifies himself with the privileged youth, as can be seen by his 
inclusive question “what shall we answer… (Verse 9)?” With this description, the 
narrator introduces Rehoboam as an incompetent despot.  
 
More of Rehoboam‟s character is revealed in his dialogue and interaction with his 
advisors. The elders who advise him observe that Rehoboam‟s relations with the people 
would improve if he would accept being a servant.  In him they saw an autocrat, not a 
servant of the people. In advising him to speak good words they may have noticed, as the 
narrative suggests, that he was rather arrogant and he later confirms it by his speech. The 
hortatory discourse of Rehoboam‟s young advisors reveals their level of influence on the 
king. They tell him what to do: “Thus you should speak to the people…thus you shall say 
to them…” (Verse 10).  He is swayed by his young advisors who go as far as dictating to 
him word by word the answer to give to the people. Frequent repetitions in Rehoboam‟s 
dialogue with his advisors focuses and sharpens the characterisation of Rehoboam as 
arrogant, brash, politically naïve and insensitive.
589
 Repetition has also a contrastive 
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Rehoboam is too naïve to worry about the people‟s capability to cause any harm to him 
and his regime. Insensitive to the conditions of his subjects he prefers intimidation over 
negotiation and dialogue. Rehoboam is portrayed as a fool who cannot appreciate the 
socio-political situation of his state so as to come up with an appropriate response.  He is 
wrong in rejecting the council of his wiser advisors, in following and preferring the 
advice of the arrogant younger advisors and he is wrong in sending Adoram to the angry 
people. A poor diplomat, he went to his coronation but only managed to alienate his 
people, pushing them to crown his rival. At the end he carries the responsibility for the 
division of the kingdom. He cannot listen until Yahweh himself confronts him, urging 
him to refrain from a violent response to his defeat. Having failed to appreciate the 
implications of the people‟s discontent, Rehoboam opts for an attitude that does not bring 
the relief expected by the people. He does not resolve the crisis but, instead, he 
aggravates it.  
 
The narrative exposes Rehoboam as an autocrat who exemplifies the negative aspects of 
the monarchy described by Samuel in 1 Samuel 8. He does not want to serve the people 
but wants the people to serve him and wants to enjoy economic privileges at their 
expense. Through him it is the dynastic-monarchical style of leadership which is 
criticized. The tendency for a small privileged group to enjoy economic privileges to the 
exclusion of the people is exposed. The people‟s reaction to Rehoboam‟s answer pushes 
the tension to paroxysm. 
 
5.2.4.5 The people react to the king’s intransigence 16-17 
The last scene of the main unit of the narrative focuses on the disappointment and anger 
of the people. The narrative presents the people answering in unison. Their plural voice is 
contrasted with the singular voice of Rehoboam.  The people understand that the king is 
not sensitive to their plight, but has resolved to perpetuate their oppression. He has failed 
to solve the crisis, but the people have their own solution namely, separation. Their 
answer to the king makes it clear that they do not want to have anything to do with him 
anymore.  As if they wanted to pay back the sarcasm that characterized the king‟s answer 
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the people express their reaction through the lyric outcry the earlier rebels had used 
against the same Davidic dynasty:  
 
 
What portion have we in David?  
Neither have we inheritance in the son of Jesse: 
 To your tents, O Israel:  
 
To which an additional line is added: 
 
Now see to your own house, David. 
 








The rhetorical question “ ;” is generally translated “what share do we have 
in David?” The word  means “portion”, “tract”, “territory”, and is often used for 
“share of booty” (Genesis 14:24; Numbers 31:36; 1 Samuel 30:24), or a portion of food 
(Leviticus 6:16; Deuteronomy 18:8).  These terms are considered as highly significant in 
an agrarian society as terms for inheritance.
591
 In the context of this chorus, the term 
would connote the idea of “vested interest”. This is stressed further by the statement of 
the second verse of the chorus, paralleling the first one: “ ” The central 
word in the second statement is “ ” generally meaning “possession”, “property”or 
“inheritance” (Numbers 18:23; Deuteronomy 10:9; Psalm 16:6; Ruth 4:6; Joshua 14:3, 
19:51), but sometimes also meaning  “share” or “portion” (Isaiah 54:17; Psalm 37:18; 
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127:3). The people mean that there is no benefit to be expected from their clinging to the 
house of David. Rehoboam is seen here as the representative of his forefathers. The use 
of “ ” (in the son of Jesse) instead of “ ” (in David) in the first line as the use of,  
“ ” (share) instead of “ ” (portion) in the second line may be a form of repetition for 
emphasis, as often used in poetry. However, the fact that the people, in rejecting 
Rehoboam, make reference to his grandfather and great-grandfather, reveals not only 
their sensitivity to kinship ties but especially their rejection of not just Rehoboam but of 
the Davidic dynasty.  
 
The people rebel against Rehoboam and reject the rule of his family. The negation of any 
benefit that the northern people could expect in return for their allegiance to the house of 
David is an argument to support the fact that they do not have any binding obligation 
towards that house. Therefore, the people who do not have anything to gain in the 
coronation of Rehoboam are justified in denying him this privilege; they can go “each to 
his own tent” and forget about this king who ignored them and took them for granted.  
 
The Hebrew word translated as “tent” is “ ”. This term was sometimes used for 
“dwelling” or “home” (Psalm 91:10; Judges 19: 9; Daniel 11:45). It is not therefore 
necessary to understand that the people were urged to go to some tents temporarily 
erected to host the tribal representatives during the Shechem assembly.
592
 The same 
slogan was used in the incident of Sheba‟s rebellion. At this time the term “ ” could 
not refer to a temporary shelter because the context does not make room for that. Here the 
expression can be understood as a slogan telling the people that they can forget about the 
coronation ceremony and go home. The king is told that he should look after his own 
house. 
 
The Qal imperative> “ ” is from the verb  “see” “look at” or “look after”. It is used 
in Genesis 39:23 in the sense of “care for” or “attend to”. A suggested ironic meaning 
may be: look who is left with you and over what sort of house you will rule, now that you 
                                                 
592
 Cogan, M. I Kings: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, p 349. 
 
 201 
will not rule over the house of Israel!
593
  The last line of the chorus “look at your house, 
O David”, which is not found in the same chorus in the case of Sheba‟s revolt, seems to 
make it clear that the people are not rejecting Rehoboam only, but his entire lineage.  
 
The secessionist chorus, with its tribal tone, displays shallow socio-political unity in the 
“United Kingdom of Israel”. The people‟s reaction is not directed against Rehoboam 
only. Beyond and through him, the northerners revolt against his father and his 
grandfather, showing that they had never really been wholeheartedly committed to the 
hegemony of David‟s house. In fact, the repetition of the same slogan thrown at his 
grandfather somehow connects the two rebellions. Rehoboam‟s problem appears to be 
reminiscent of a conflict older than himself and even older than his father.s regime and 
which, according to the narrative, neither David nor Solomon‟s regime had totally 
calmed. Commenting on this chorus, Keil states: 
 
These words with which Sheba had once preached rebellion in the time of David 
(2 Samuel 20:1), gives expression to the deep-rooted aversion which was 
cherished by these tribes towards the Davidic monarchy, and that in so distinct 
and unvarnished a manner that we may clearly see that there were deeper causes 
for the secession than the pretended oppression of Solomon‟s government; that its 
real foundation was the ancient jealousy of the tribes which had been only 





In the first rebellion, against Rehoboam‟s grandfather David, the conflict arises from a 
dispute between the “men of Judah” and the “men of Israel”. The former argue that their 
closer kinship with the king gives them some kind of pre-eminence, while the latter 
complain about being sidelined, despite being the majority (2 Samuel 19:41-43). The 
deeper causes of the conflicts alluded to in Keil‟s comment were recurrently expressed in 
tribal terms, but they were deeply economic. They had everything to do with the struggle 
for the control and the distribution of resources. King Saul, in his time, was overt about 
this in his earlier support-seeking argument: “Will the son of Jesse give every one of you 
fields and vineyards, and make you all captains of thousands and captains of hundred?” 
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(1 Samuel 22:8). Keil may not be necessarily right in qualifying the people‟s complaint 
against oppressive policies as a “pretext” and their historic jealousy as the “real cause” of 
the conflict.  In the narrative, the wise advisers, who understand better the socio-political 
realities of the nation, vindicate the people. In the context of a scramble for the control of 
resources that follows tribal lines, as happened in Israel and in Rwanda, it is exclusion 
from privileges, real or the threat of it, that fuels jealousy, not the other way round. 
 
At Shechem, the infuriated northerners declared that Rehoboam should see to his own 
house. Reference here is not to the house of Rehoboam but to the house of David. The 
reader, who is aware of the ideology in Nathan‟s prophecy about establishing David‟s 
house forever, understands that it is the Davidic dynasty which is referred to.  The same 
people who submitted to David when they perceived him as a charismatic leader (2 
Samuel 5:2) now dissociate themselves from a monarchical-dynastic regime of his house 
which exploits them instead of serving them. The narrative confirms and fulfils the 
predictive discourse of 1 Samuel 8, which strongly opposed the introduction of a 
monarchical regime in Israel.  
 
The northerners insinuate that since Judah has enjoyed preferred treatment they had 
interest in clinging to the regime that favours them; as for northern Israel, they were free 
from any obligation to the house of David.
595
    In this conflict it is once again surmised 
that the people of Judah side with their king, without any sympathy for the exploited 
northerners. The message from the disappointed northerners seems to go like this: Stay 
with your historic supporters who have a share in the privileges offered by the regime and 
have nothing to do with us anymore! The people act as they say, opting for separation as 
the way to resolve the crisis. They departed to their tents without crowning Rehoboam. 
This is a twist in the plot. 
 
The departure of the people to their tents (verse16) is paralleled by the departure of 
Rehoboam (implied in 17), who returns to Jerusalem to reign over Judah. This clause, 
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“Israel departed to their tents” (verse 16), may be seen as proleptic,
596
 being inserted here 
by the narrator who knew the end of the story he was telling. It is followed with a 
recapitulative statement in verse 17: “But Jeroboam reigned over the children of Israel 
who dwelt in the cities of Judah”. All happens as the people said. They controlled the 
situation from the beginning. Rehoboam had no authority to impose his position on them 
and their position prevails.  
 
The people who actually remain faithful to Rehoboam are here defined not explicitly by 
tribal identification but following their geographical location. They are said to be “the 
children of Israel who dwelt in the cities of Judah”. This description makes room for the 
inclusion in this smaller kingdom of people who, though not belonging to the tribe of 
Judah, inhabit the territory of Judah. The narrator seems not to be interested in specifying 
the identity of the people who remained loyal to Rehoboam. His point is that the majority 
of the tribes rejected the Davidic dynasty and the rejection was final. As the protagonists 
separate, the tension that had mounted with Rehoboam‟s response is now relieved. But 
the conflict is not yet over. The epilogue that follows comprises a number of stories 
reported to have followed the failed negotiations.  
 
5.2.4.6 Epilogue to narrative 17-24 
A number of events are reported to have followed the rebellion of the northern tribes 
against the Jerusalem regime. The first one, which is also an expression of that rebellion, 
is the stoning of Adoram (18-19), the second is the coronation of Jeroboam (20) and the 
last one is Rehoboam‟s reprisal plans which were vetoed by Yahweh (21-24).  
 
5.2.4.6.1 The stoning of Adoram (18-19) 
Rehoboam appears to be ill-prepared for the reaction of the people. He had come to 
Shechem to be confirmed as king, but now the events were taking an unplanned course. 
He feels that he should intervene, but this time not in person but through a representative. 
The officer sent to try and calm the situation is named Adoram. A man of this name had 
held the same position under the reign of David (2 Samuel 20:24). Under King Solomon, 
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the one occupying a similar function is called Adoniram (1 Kings 4:6), but the one sent 
by Rehoboam is Adoram (1 Kings 11:18), or Hadoram in the tradition followed in 2 
Chronicles 10:18. These seem to be variants of the one same name.    
 
The forced labour that Adoram is said to have been supervising is named   Though 
often translated “task-work”, “forced labour” or even “selfdom”,   is usually used to 
refer to occasional work that does not involve the status of permanent serfdom. This more 
degrading labour, to which Israelites could not be subjected, is referred to as  . The 
levy that King Solomon imposed on the people of Israel is  (1 Kings 5:27), different 
from the   he imposed on non-Israelites (1 Kings 9:21). The temporal character of 
this forced labour did not curb its oppressive weight on the Israelites. What the narrator 
says is that this was an exploitative forced labour.  
 
The mandate given to Adoram is not clarified. Was he sent for a second round of 
negotiations?  Was he charged to go and enforce the decision of the king to maintain and 
even increase both labour and discipline? It has been suggested that Adoram was actually 
sent to explain the distinction between the occasional corvée which might be levied on 
Israel and the perpetual liability of the non-Israelites.
597
 There is no evidence to support 
this claim, however, especially as it is nowhere stated that Rehoboam ever agreed to 
make the yoke lighter.  
 
Even if Rehoboam‟s aim was to negotiate with the rebel tribes and pacify the assembly, 
the choice of Adoram itself has been regarded as tactless
598
 and a mark of lack of political 
sensitivity.
599
 Placing affairs in the hands of the man who was in charge of forced labour 
was, at best, a highly provocative act.
600
 In his position of commissioner of the corvée, 
Adoram is the one who had been implementing the oppressive policies and, in that 
capacity, he is likely to have been unpopular. In this narrative Adoram is simply a 
representative of structural oppression and the intervention of such a character in this 
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narrative highlights Rehoboam‟s preoccupation with his economic lifestyle, which he 
does not want to lose. He is not there to negotiate, since throughout the story there is no 
place for negotiation with the people. The reception reserved to him by the people 
confirms this perception.  
 
The stoning of Adoram is to be perceived as an expression of the people‟s resistance to 
oppression. It sent a clear message to the king that Adoram represented. It was not only 
his throne which was threatened but also his life was in danger. Rehoboam‟s reaction is 
described with the use of the verb   a Hitpael form of   normally meaning “be 
stout”, “be strong”,” be bold”or “be alert”. The Hitpael use is attested elsewhere with the 
sense of being determined (Ruth 1:18). In this account the verb may be rendered with 
“make oneself alert” or “make haste”. It was argued that the verb does not indicate so 
much the haste with which Rehoboam mounted his chariot as his rallying of his faculties 
to do so.
601
 Maybe it is better to agree that both aspects are included. In any case, 
Rehoboam‟s hasty return to Jerusalem is contrasted with the people‟s departure in 
dignity. He threatened to discipline the people, but it is they who discipline him and he 
flees in fear.  
 
The king‟s hasty return to Jerusalem marks the end of his control over the northern 
territory. The rejection of Rehoboam is reported as a rebellion. The qal imperfect  
from  (to transgress, to revolt, to rebel) means that they rebelled. The verb is here 
used in the sense of violating a political obligation.
602
 This may further indicate that, in 
rejecting Jeroboam, the people did not follow any existing constitutional avenue. They 
rebelled. The secession was a revolutionary act. According to the narrator, the rejection 
of Rehoboam was expressed and understood as a rebellion ; “against the house of 
David”. This may indicate that the reign of both Solomon and Rehoboam had always 
been regarded as a continuation of the reign of the house of David. The people rebelled 
not only against the obduracy of Rehoboam but also against the hegemony of the house 
of David. The extension of the rejection to the whole house of David and the emphatic 
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link between David and Judah added both a tribalist and a dynastic connotation to the 
rejection. The narrator‟s own comment is that the rebellion was effective and had a long-
lasting effect. The secession was materialized by the coronation of Jeroboam. This 
unplanned coronation is another twist in the plot. 
 
5.2.4.6.2 The coronation of Jeroboam (verse 20) 
The expression  often translated “and it come to pass” usually introduces an episode or 
scene by providing a background for the story to follow.
603
 This introductory clause does 
not inform about how much time elapsed from the murder of Adoram to the coronation of 
Jeroboam. The juxtaposition of these events makes them form one story. The people‟s 
precaution to call Jeroboam and to associate him with the negotiation process and his 
coronation, subsequent to the failure of the negotiation, have been interpreted as an 
indication that the people came to Shechem with an alternative leader and that plotting 
had been involved in the rebellion.
604
  Objecting to this view, however, Tadmor has this 
to say:  
 
There is no allusion in 1 Kings 12 that the assembly intended to displace the 
Davidites, less to establish a new dynasty. All we can conclude from this source is 
that the coronation of Jeroboam was subject to a condition – politely but firmly 
phrased – and which stands in stark contrast to Rehoboam‟s arrogant reply – that 




This episode shifts the focus from the people‟s rejection of Rehoboam to a report about 
the people‟s coronation of Jeroboam. The coronation of Jeroboam was not the object of 
the account of the Shechem assembly. It is reported as a corollary.
606
 It is reported that, 
after Rehoboam‟s debacle, all Israel heard about the return of Jeroboam. The infinitive 
construct  can be translated “upon hearing”, suggesting that the people acted after 
hearing. According to this tradition, the news about Jeroboam should have reached the 
people still assembled at Schechem, as it is implied in the statement they sent and 
summoned him to the assembly.  
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The Hiphil form in the sentence  literally meaning “and they caused him to reign”, 
is translated “and they made him king”. The statement here confers to Jeroboam a passive 
role, unlike his characterisation in verses 2 and 3. In contrast with Rehoboam, who 
attempted to impose his rule on the people, Jeroboam is chosen by all Israel, summoned 
by them and crowned by them (verse 20). The people reject the autocratic, non-elected 
Rehoboam and crown the popularly elected Jeroboam.  The coronation of Jeroboam 
sounds like a rejection of the monarchic-dynastic style of leadership and a reversion to 
the charismatic style of leadership.  
 
It is hypothesised that in the coronation of Jeroboam, the assembly acted as a political 
body invested with legislative and judicial duties and that the scene in the text, confers 
legitimacy on Jeroboam.
607
 To this it can be objected that the behaviour of the assembly 
could be legitimate only if, in the then existing politico-administrative structure, the 
assembly was a recognized organ invested with constitutional power to act as they 
reportedly did. Rehoboam‟s attitude shows that he was not mindful of any constitutional 
power held by the assembly. The event could rather be qualified as a revolution in some 
way analogous to the Hutu revolution in Rwanda in 1960, when they abolished the 
monarchy. They organized themselves to do away with a dictatorial and oppressive 
regime imposed on them and replace it with a regime they chose.    
 
The account is emphatic in stressing that there was none that followed the house of David 
except the tribe of Judah only. The obvious translation of tribal kinship into political 
allegiance is easily understood in Rwanda and in most parts of Africa. This unswerving 
support of the regime is guarantied only from those who enjoy its privileges and do not 
suffer its oppression. The emphasis brought by “only”, or “alone” in this statement, 
referring to the “house of Judah” diverges from what is stated in verses 17, 21 and 23, 
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where it is implied that some other people not belonging to the tribe of Judah remained 
on the side of Judah.  However, these details are not very important for the narrator, 
whose emphasis is not on the identity of those who remained loyal to Rehoboam. The 
narrator‟s point is that Rehoboam lost the north and was left alone. Everything happened 
as the people declared in their slogan (verse 16). With the coronation of Jeroboam, the 
problem of the people is solved, the tension is relieved, but the conflict is not totally 
solved, because Rehoboam has not surrendered. While the victorious people are left with 
their king, the narrator shifts his focus and follows Rehoboam in Jerusalem, the setting of 
the next scene.  
 
5.2.4.6.3 Rehoboam’s reprisal plans vetoed by Yahweh (21-24) 
Rehoboam, who is the major loser, is not ready to easily accept the defeat. His next move 
proves that he is neither ready to lose his dynastic privileges, nor has he abandoned his 
dictatorial style of leadership. His intimidating speech having failed to yield the results he 
expected, he reverts to the use of military force. Once back in his capital city, Rehoboam 
organizes a military expedition to put down the rebellion. He assembled “all the house of 
Judah, and the tribe of Benjamin”. From the people who remained faithful to him 
Rehoboam was able to choose an important army of “one hundred and eighty thousand 
selected warriors”. Even after the people had made it clear that they do not want him, 
Rehoboam, an obdurate dictator, still attempts to rule over them by force. His 
determination to subdue the northern tribes is shown in the size of the army he recruited 
in order to restore the kingdom to himself. However, despite the large size of 
Rehoboam‟s army, it became useless, because the intended expedition is frustrated by 
divine intervention through a man of God.  
 
The intervention of God is a further vindication of the northern tribes. Having obtained a 
solution to their problem, they are withdrawn from the scene. In the face of the continued 
aggression of Rehoboam, God intervenes and continues the battle on their behalf and in 
their absence. The reader was already told that God was involved in this event from the 
beginning, directing the turn of affairs, albeit without openly interacting with the 
characters. This time he intervenes to defend the outcome of the conflict which he willed. 
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Through Shemaiah, his representative, God becomes Rehoboam‟s new antagonist on 
behalf of the people. 
 
The “word of God” came unto the “man of God”. This is a title normally given to a 
prophet, e.g. Elijah (1 Kings 17; 18); Elisha (2 Kings 4:9); the unnamed messenger of 
Yahweh (1 Kings 4:9).  Outside the present context Shemaiah remains an obscure figure, 
not spoken about in the book of Kings.  Montgomery has noted that the story reported 
here is almost ad verbum identical to a parallel tradition in 2 Chronicles 12, except that 
the latter ignored the earlier Ahijah narrative as quite anti-dynastic.
608
 In the tradition of 
the Greek supplement (1 Kings 12:24a-z LXX), it is Shemaiah, not Ahijah, who brings to 
Jeroboam the prophetic message about the up-coming division of the kingdom. This 
version was said to be a late Judean adaptation of the story and Shemaiah was believed to 
have been a Judean prophet.
609
 The identity of Shemaiah is not the preoccupation of the 
narrator. In this scene, Shemaiah is simply the messenger of God and his message is that 
Yahweh is opposed to Rehoboam‟s plans.  
 
The prohibition is introduced by the verb  “you shall not go up” or “you shall not 
set out”. The verb   “to go up” or to “ascend” is often used to convey the idea of a 
hostile movement, an attack, as in Judges 1:4; 1 Samuel 7:7; 1 Kings 14:25. Here the 
prohibition is emphasised with the addition of an object, the verb>  repeating 
the interdiction “you shall not make war”. The content of “the word of God” that came to 
Shemaiah was that there was no cause for fighting the northern tribes since God was 
responsible for the secession. 
 
Despite the crisis, the northern and the southern tribes were still brothers. This 
perspective that overlooks tribal difference and abhors civil war is clearly in contradiction 
with the statement found later in 1 Kings 14:30, that “there was war all the time between 
Rehoboam and Jeroboam all their days”. So it is suggested that verses 21-24 might have 
come “from the hand of someone living at a later time, when local differences had been 
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forgotten, and to whom civil war in Israel was intolerable. This may reflect the post-exilic 
period or perhaps the rapprochement of Judah and the Northern elements in the time of 
Josiah”.
610
 The abatement in the civil war may have resulted from Shishak‟s expedition in 
Rehoboam‟s fifth year (1 Kings 14:25-28), where Shemaiah appears again, giving to the 
historical situation a theological interpretation. Whatever the case, the narrative presents 
the northern and the southern tribes of Israel as brothers. Unfair and exploitative 
leadership is dividing them, but they are still brothers. 
 
The message given to Shemaiah is to be addressed not only to Rehoboam, but also to the 
house of Judah, to the house of Benjamin and also to “the rest of the people”. Judah and 
Benjamin are the two tribes that supported a dynastic-monarchical regime in Israel. The 
army recruited by Rehoboam to restore such regime was made of men from the two 
tribes. Shemaiah‟s message was to be addressed especially to them, so they may refrain 
from supporting a regime that God rejected. But Shemaiah‟s message was also addressed 
to the “rest of Israel”. Since Israel was used throughout the narrative to refer to the 
northern tribes, these may be the same people addressed by Shemaiah. The message from 
God concerned all the people of God who, before him, were still brothers. God was not 
restricted to the dynastic-oriented tribes of the south nor had he rejected the rebellious 
tribes of the north. The king and the people should accept the development as ordained by 
God. The reader overhears the private word from God to the prophet and must assume 
that Shemaiah carried out his commission because the narrator immediately adds that the 




At this point the pattern now changes, Rehoboam is reported obeying the word of God 
and the intimation of the man of God to give up and go home. For having refused to listen 
to the people or his elders, Rehoboam has learned something, for he does now listen to 
the prophet. He could fight the people but not Yahweh. In the movement of the plot, 
Rehoboam, like the reader of this narrative, easily understands that Shemaiah‟s prophecy 
is in line with the earlier prophecy of Ahijah. In both prophecies, Jeroboam is not a mere 
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illegitimate usurper but somebody designated by Yahweh and enjoying his support. 
Rehoboam could no longer claim exclusive legitimacy. While the words of Rehoboam 
had failed to compel the people to submit to him, the word of God compelled everybody 
go home accepting the new situation. It is this word of God that brings the final resolution 
of he conflict. The division of the kingdom is complete, Jeroboam has become king and 
the situation is irreversible. The tension is over. 
 
5.3 Summary 
The fatal division of the kingdom of Israel into two nations is recounted as a divinely 
fated event resulting from Yahweh‟s judgment on Solomon‟s unfaithfulness. The sin 
explicitly reproached to Solomon is his apostasy that resulted from his marrying many 
foreign wives who turned his heart after their gods (1 Kings 11). It is important to note, 
however that Solomon‟s apostasy has an economic aspect. Most of Solomon‟s many 
wives resulted from his alliances in pursuit of economic advantages. The cost of the 
maintenance of his harem was supported by the labouring people.  As for Rehoboam‟s 
foolish decision that became the immediate cause of the rupture, this is presented as 
means that God used to accomplish what he had already ordained. Schenker makes the 
same observation:  
 
Read in the overall context, 1 Kings 11-14, the MT shows a tension between the 
recounted episode in itself and its global contextual framework. The rejection of 
the Davidic dynasty by the tribes of Israel is actually explained by the 
intransigence of the king and the arrogance of his young counsellors. This is 
precisely the object of the narrative. The arrogance of power causes its own ruin. 
That is what this story wants to show. But in the MT the cause is different. Verse 
15 states it in explicit terms. It is the effective prophetic word of Ahijah of Shilo 
(1 Kings 11:29-39), and behind it the Lord, who has decided to punish Solomon 
(1 Kings 11:11-13). Thus the hard-line rigidity of Rehoboam and the arrogance of 
his young ministers are not the cause of the rejection of David and his house by 




Schenker finds the real causes of the division of the Kingdom in the foolishness of 
Rehoboam and the arrogance of his advisors. While the attitude of Rehoboam and of his 
younger advisors remains the immediate cause of the unexpected resolution of the crisis, 
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still they are not the cause of the crisis. The Shechem discussions focused on a socio-
economic matter, the exploitative character of the monarchical regime. The issue was 
complicated by the obduracy of Rehoboam and those around him, who were enjoying the 
economic privileges of the regime and were not ready to lose those privileges, while the 
people were determined to obtain change. The narrative reflects a constant opposition 
between the dynastic-monarchical leadership, generally described as benefitting the elite 
while oppressing the people, and the more people-oriented charismatic leadership, 
generally preferred by the people.  The long history of tribal antagonism that threatened 
for many years to split Israel
613
 is to be understood in the context of this socio-economic 
and political scramble.  While the present chapter has tried to place the focus on the 
account of the division in the text, the next chapter quite deliberately focuses on what we 
might reconstruct historically and sociologically behind the text regarding the conflict 
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CHAPTER SIX:  INTERTRIBAL RELATIONS IN ISRAEL 
  
6.0 Introduction  
The analysis of the text of 1 Kings 12:1-24 in the preceding chapter has shown that the 
division of the Kingdom of Israel was reported as a crisis that resulted from the issue of 
the service imposed on the people of Israel by King Solomon, a service which they 
perceived as a yoke. In the immediate context of the passage it is the foolishness of 
Rehoboam and the arrogance of his young advisors that occasioned the crisis. The larger 
context of this passage provides the background for the people‟s complaint to the new 
king, confirming that Solomon‟s regime subjected the people to exploitative measures. 
This larger context reveals aspects of tribal discrimination, jealousy and competition that, 
though not explicitly pointed out by the narrator in direct connection with the crisis, could 
have negatively affected the relationship between the northern tribes and the Jerusalem 
regime. The narrator, more interested in the theological interpretation of the event of the 
division, seems to have not paid much attention to the socio-political aspects of the 
problem, so as to highlight their possible contribution to the crisis. 
 
The crisis interpreted as a divine judgment is narrated as a socio-political event, the root 
causes of which could be found beyond those emphasised by the narrator. Since the 
problem of the corvée was there before Rehoboam took over the leadership, this chapter 
intends to go beyond the problem of Rehoboam‟s foolish arrogance to examine the socio-
political aspects, involved in the crisis. As was observed, the larger context of Kings hints 
at these aspects but the narrator may not have adjudged them to be so important for the 
story he wanted to tell as to elaborate on them.  The people‟s rebellion against the regime 
of what they called the “house of David”, and the subsequent secession that followed 
tribal lines, are among some elements that give a tribalistic connotation to the crisis. The 
present chapter‟s aim is to seek to understand the reasons behind the peoples‟ rejection of 
the “house of David”.  This will require going beyond the account reported in the book of 
Kings to investigate the history of the social relations among the tribes that formed the 
nation from the pre-monarchical period. The scope of this chapter includes an 
 
 214 
examination of social relations among the tribes of Israel, before and during the 
monarchical periods.  
 
6.1 Intertribal relation in the pre-monarchical period 
The question of intertribal relationships arises from the time the tribes of Israel started to 
live together as one community. Therefore the discussion of the issue of socio-political 
relationships among the tribes includes the examination of the origin of Israel and its 
tribes and the way the different tribes related.  According to biblical traditions, the pre-
monarchical period extends from the time of the patriarchs to the time of the institution of 
the monarchy in Israel with the coronation of King Saul, the first king in Israel. These 
traditions provide elaborate details about the history of the people of Israel before their 
settlement in Canaan. However, many scholars, basing their argument on extra-biblical 
evidence, arrive at different conclusions about the early history of Israel. Some even 
question the existence of the “people of Israel” before the settlement in Canaan and 
suggest different opinions about the origin of the tribes of Israel. This section summarizes 
the most popularised theories about the origin of Israel and its tribes, followed by a 
discussion of their social relations.  
 
6.1.1 Origin of Israel’s tribes 
While biblical traditions trace the origin of Israel and its tribes back to the period of the 
patriarchs, there are other views, which explain the early history of Israel differently. The 
earliest extra-biblical evidence refers to the possible existence of Israel not earlier than 
1200B.C.E. An inscription known as the Merenptah stele, listing the towns destroyed by 
the Pharaoh Merenptah, about 1200 B.C.E., contains a statement referring to Israel in 
these words: “Israel is laid waste, its seed is not”.
614
 This means that there had been, 
around this time, an entity called Israel. Archaeologists have observed a widespread 
destruction that affected nearly all the important urban centres of the region during the 
period of transition from Late Bronze Age to Early Iron Age. At some of the destroyed 
sites appeared a new and homogeneous type of construction including an expansion of 
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mostly unwalled villages in the highlands.
615
  These phenomena have been connected to 
the emergence of Israel into Canaan. To some scholars these facts could confirm the 
biblical account about Israel‟s conquest of Canaan.  
 
Others, however, questioning the biblical tradition about the early history of Israel, 
explained the phenomena mentioned above differently. They suggested different    
hypotheses attempting to explain the emergence of Israel in Canaan. These different 
views of the history of Israel result in different explanations of the origin of Israel‟s 
tribes. An exhaustive discussion of these different hypotheses is beyond the scope of this 
study. Their brief description below intends to account for their varying views of early 
Israel‟s history, as much as these differences affect the understanding of the origin and 
interrelation of Israel‟s tribes. Four major hypotheses have been suggested to explain the 
emergence of Israel in Canaan, namely the Conquest Model, the Peaceful Infiltration 
Model, the Peasant Revolt Model and the Agricultural-Resettlement (or Symbiosis) 
Model. 
 
6.1.1.1 The Conquest Model 
The conquest hypothesis contends that the Israelites, coming from outside Canaan, 
entered the land, forcibly conquered the indigenous Canaanites who dwelt in its cities and 
occupied the land. This traditional version of the conquest, found in the biblical account, 
suggests that even long before their entry into Canaan the twelve tribes of Israelites 
constituted one people, descending from the same patriarchs. These people sojourned in 
Egypt where they were enslaved before being delivered by Yahweh through Moses who 
led them through the wilderness to the gates of the Promised Land.  This is the view of 
biblical scholars who uphold the historical validity of biblical accounts. 
 
Extra-biblical support for the conquest hypothesis came from the domain of archaeology. 
The renowned archaeologist William Foxwell Albright is known to have defended the 
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model from 1920s untill his death in 1971.
616
 From this domain two main arguments were 
used to support the conquest model. Firstly, a widespread destruction of the Canaanite 
cities in the approximative period when Israel is believed to have entered the land was 
used as evidence supporting the biblical account of the conquest. Reasoning along this 
line, Bimson has argued: 
 
Such widespread destruction of fortified cities could only have been achieved 
through the concerted effort of a large body of people. It is therefore likely that 
the situation sketched in the biblical tradition – a large and fairly unified group of 




Some material evidence of a homogeneous type of occupation at some of the destroyed 
sites was interpreted, by the supporters of the conquest theory, as indicating the cessation 
of the Canaanite culture in large parts of Canaan in the periods of 1230-1200 B.C.E. and 
for the introduction of Israelite culture in the same areas immediately thereafter.
618
  But 
this view, which remained unquestioned until the twentieth century, was later judged 
unconvincing by many contemporary scholars, for whom biblical narratives of the 
conquest are incompatible with modern historiographic methods.
619
  It is also argued that 
the kind of conquest described in biblical narratives lacks support from external 
evidences.  
 
From the same domain of archaeology that had backed the conquest, arose arguments 
refuting the possibility of this model. A number of sites in Palestine believed to have 
suffered fire and destruction around the right time are not mentioned in the biblical 
account of the conquest, while a number of cities mentioned did not suffer destruction, 
according to archaeological record.
620
 Cities such as Jericho, Ai, and Gibeon, that are key 
                                                 
616
 Dever, W.G. Who Were the Early Israelites and Where Did They Come From? Grand Rapids, Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans. 2003,p 41. 
617
 Bimson, J. Redating the Exodus and Conquest. Sheffield: University of Sheffield Press. 1981, p 223. 
Quoted in Dever, W.G. Who Were the Early Israelites and Where Did They Come From? ,p 40. 
618
 Gottwald, N.K.The Tribes of Yahweh: A Sociology of the Religion of the Liberated Israel 1250-1050 
B.C.E., London: SCM Press, 1979, p 194. 
619
 Stager, Lawrence E. “Forging Identity: The Emergence of Ancient Israel” in Coogan, Michael D. The 
Oxford History of the Biblical world. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, p 127. 
620




in the biblical account of the conquest, were later said to provide no archaeological 
evidence of occupation during the assumed period of the conquest. As for the widespread 
destruction observed in the region during the transition from the Late Bronze Age to the 
Early Iron Age, this is not convincing evidence to those who question the Conquest 
Model. They suggest a number of other possible causes of this phenomenon.
621
  Most of 
those who reject the conquest theory argue that this destruction was a long and gradual 




The biblical account of the conquest is criticised for failing to monolithically support a 
conquest model. Attention is noted between the sweeping claims of the Numbers-Joshua 
account of the conquest and the version of the occupation of the land reported in the book 
of Judges.
623
 While the Numbers-Joshua account suggests a systematic conquest of the 
whole Promised Land in a relatively short period of time by a unified Israel, under the 
leadership of Moses and Joshua, the Judges accounts gives the impression that settlement 
in the greater part of the land was without military activity or destruction of cities.
624
 
Where military force was involved this was in the form of scattered operations 
undertaken by individual tribes.  Some find the kind of occupation described in the Book 
of Judges closer to the reality than the account in the Book of Joshua. According to 
Judges, the Israelites‟ conquest of Canaan was not completed easily, as opposed to 
claiming that the land was conquered in a lightning series of campaigns.
625
  The idea of 
possible peaceful settlement seen in the books of Judges is in line with an alternative 
hypothesis explaining the emergence of Israel in Canaan, namely the Settlement or 
Immigration Model to which we now turn.   
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 6.1.1.2 The Immigration/Settlement Model 
This alternative hypothesis was first proposed by the German scholar Albrecht Alt, in 
1925.
626
 In his theory, Alt agrees with the biblical view that Israelites arrived in Canaan 
as foreign migrants. But he differs from the biblical account in his perception of these 
migrants, not as constituents of one people unified by common ancestry, but as loosely 
connected bands of pastoral nomads from independent tribes. The attested existence of 
semi-nomadic groups in the area throughout history and the assumption that the earliest 
settlements of Israel were in the hill country are advantages of this theory.
627
 Backers of 
this model reject the idea of conquest and submit that different tribes gradually infiltrated 
Canaan from the desert and settled there in a largely peaceful enterprise. Once in the land, 
for various reasons, these tribes banded together into a loose federation that eventually 




Separate units of traditions gathered from biblical narratives are often used to support the 
peaceful occupation of the land, treaty-making with the Canaanites inhabitants and even 
sometime with cases of outright intermarriage. The Immigration Model stresses the great 
length of time involved in Israelite settlement, extending from the patriarchs to the time 
of David.
629
 Some variants of this model admit the possibility of military conflict, seen 
either in the form of limited invasion by exodus or other Israelites, or as a slow 
accumulating crisis as the immigrating Israelites finally came into open conflicts with the 
Canaanites.
630
 The Model allows the possibility for at least some of the tribes that entered 
Canaan to be linked with the Patriarchs, the exodus and the wilderness wandering. It is 
easily reconciled with some biblical references to various foreign groups of people 
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joining Israel on its journey and after entrance to the land (Numbers 22-25; Judges 4:11; I 
Samuel15:6) and to instances of peaceful settlement in Canaan without account of a 




The Settlement Model is not exempt from censure. Contrasted with the Conquest Model, 
it has been criticised for its dependence on bits and pieces of materials drawn randomly 
from the text, without regard to the overall biblical perspective. This model is also said to 
fail to account for the so powerful unity of Israelite people that could scarcely have 
resulted from such fragmented beginnings.
632
 The Model‟s description of the tribes that 
entered Canaan has been also criticized for its reliance on an obsolete concept of the 
pastoral nomads who subsisted on the meat and dairy products they produce and live in 
blissful solitude from the rest of the world.
633
 This model is said to “require more 
pastoralists than can be reasonably posited”.
634
 Noll‟s argument points out the weakness 
of this model: 
 
Shepherds existed on the fringes of Palestine in all periods since the late Neolithic 
period but they were never numerous. Usually, pastoralists numbered no more 
than about 15 per cent the total population, and often were far fewer. How can an 
appeal to pastoralists settling down to become farmers account for the dramatic 
population increase in the Cisjordan Highlands during the Iron Age I?
635
 
    
Against the Settlement Model, it was argued that it resulted from a misconception about 
Bedouin life. According to Dever, Bedouins typically have never been „land-hungry 
hordes” and they do not usually infiltrate or settle on their own initiative unless they are 
compelled by circumstances such as drought, famine or adverse political conditions.
636
 A 
search for a better explanation of the emergence of Israel in Canaan eventually produced 
what is called the Revolt Model.    
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6.1.1.3 The Revolt Model 
The Revolt Model was submitted as an attempt to explain the widespread layer of 
destruction discovered in Palestine dating from the late thirteenth and early twelfth 
centuries B.C.E. Rejecting the idea that this turmoil corresponds to the biblical narrative 
of the conquest of Canaan, advocates of this theory, such as Mendenhall and Gottwald, 
argue that this destruction was due to an internal peasant revolt that toppled the existing 
Canaanite power structure. These oppressed Canaanite peasants revolted against their 
masters, who dwelt in the large urban centres, and withdrew from the urban enclaves of 
the lowlands and valleys to seek their freedom elsewhere, beyond the control of the urban 
elites.
637
   In opposition to the settlement model, the revolt theory alleges that the people 
who became Israelites were not immigrants from outside Canaan. They were merely an 
underclass of former Canaanites who took a new identity and became Israel. Both 
Mendenhall and Gottwald propose, however, that a group of infiltrators from outside 




The Revolt Model is said to deal with archaeological evidence for thirteenth century 
destructions much more flexibly than the Immigration and the Conquest Models tended 
to do.
639
  It allows the possibility to explain the destructions of the cities, which cannot be 
attributed to Israel, by many other possible agencies including, beside the invading 
Israelites, the revolting Canaanites under-classes, the Egyptians punitive operations to 
quell the spreading revolts or the neighbouring countries trying to take territories. 
Advocates of the model affirm that it provides an explanation to aspects of cultural 
changes observed from early Iron Age. For the revolt theorists: 
 
The typological evidence for a distinctive early Iron Age culture falling between 
Late Bronze Canaanite and later Philistine culture would attest to the developing 
Israelite and lower-class Canaanite symbiosis in a Yahwistic confederation. The 
fact that new kiln techniques seem to appear with Iron I may suggest that the 
potters were killed off or were driven out with their Canaanite lords, so that the 
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exodus Israelites and lower–class Canaanites Yahwistics had to develop their own 
procedure in pottery-making.
640
    
 
Although the promoters of the Revolt Model reject the idea of the conquest, as narrated in 
biblical accounts, as well as the immigration hypothesis, they seem not to rule out the 
possibility for involvement of foreign elements in the revolting Canaanites. It is 
suggested, for example, that the oppressed peasant Canaanites who revolted were the 
uprooted property-less persons. Among contributing factors to their helplessness were 
their lack of rights as foreigners in the place where they lived. The origin of these 
migrants is linked to the Apiru,
641
 who are sometimes thought to be an ethnic group of 
Semites with whom the Israelite patriarchs are connected.
642
 On the other hand, advocates 
of the revolt model generally admit that a group of former slaves, escaped from Egypt, 
often referred to as the “exodus group”, played an important role in the revolt. 
Mendenhall notes the presence of a small religious community named Israel with its 
beginnings in the escape from Egypt, and that spearheaded the revolt. He states: 
 
The appearance of the small religious community of Israel polarized the existing 
population all over the land: some joined, others, primarily the kings and their 
supporters, fought. Since the kings were defeated and forced out, this became the 
source of the tradition that all the Canaanites and the Amorites were either driven 





According to this theory, the exodus group arrived in Canaan when the Canaanite society 
was not all one piece. There were cracks and strains and outright disaffection, especially 
among the oppressed lower classes looking for relief and seizing the opportunity to better 
their lot.
644
 Yahwism, the religious movement brought by the exodus group, served as a 
catalyst for revolutionary change. The attraction of Israelite Yahwism for these oppressed 
Canaanites may be readily located in the central feature of the religion of the entering 
                                                 
640
 Gottwald, N.K.The Tribes of Yahweh, p 217. 
641
 Stager, Lawrence E. “Forging Identity”, p 140. 
642
 de Vaux, R. The early History of Israel: From the Beginnings to the Exodus and the Covenant of Sinai. 
London: Dalton Longman &Todd. 1978, p 216. 
643
 Mendenhall, G.E. “The Hebrew Conquest of Palestine” in Carter, C.E. and Carol L. Mayers. Eds. 
Community, Identity, and Ideology, p 164. 
644
 Gottwald, N.K.The Tribes of Yahweh, p 214. 
 
 222 
tribes: Yahwism cerebrated the activity of deliverance from socio-political bondage and it 





The new religious movement transcended tribal religion and created solidarity among 
pre-existent social units. The subjection of individuals and groups to a non-human 
Overlord by covenant and the solidarity of the newly formed community meant that they 
could and they did reject the religious, economic and political obligations to the existing 
networks of political organizations. By this process they became “Hebrews”.
646
 Entire 
groups having a clan or “tribal” organization joined the newly-formed community, 
identified themselves with the oppressed in Egypt, received deliverance from bondage 
and the original historic events with which all groups identified themselves took 
precedence over, and eventually excluded, the detailed historical traditions of particular 
groups who had joined later.
647
 According to Mendenhall, Joshua 24 is reminiscent of an 
early moment when the emergent tribes were „called upon to forsake their inherited tribal 




However, there are many objections to the revolt hypothesis. It has been criticised for its 
attempt to present the Apiru/„Hebrews‟ and Israelites as virtually synonymous terms. 
Some critics of the Revolt Model see it as a modern construct superimposed upon the 
biblical traditions, a wishful projection from contemporary attention to social and 
political revolution.
649
 According to Miller, the theory upheld by this model that Israel 
emerged from Palestinian peasants‟ revolt finds no basis in biblical material. There is no 
slightest hint in the biblical traditions regarding the revolution which supposedly brought 
Israel into existence. On the contrary, the idea seems to have been ingrained through 
Israel‟s memory that the ancestors were tent dwellers who entered Palestine from 
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elsewhere and that they were conscious of not being one with the people of the land.
650
 
The emergence in Iron Age I of small agricultural communities and egalitarian villages 
spreading out beyond the confines of premonarchic Israel make it unlikely that all these 
newly founded settlements resulted from the Yahwistic revolution only.
651
   
 
Among those who were not satisfied with the peasant revolt hypothesis was Niels Peter 
Lemche.
652
 Lemche supports the idea that Israel emerged from among indigenous 
inhabitants of Canaan, but argues that its formation may have resulted from a long-term 
development spanning the whole Late Bronze  Age or longer.
653
 The idea of a long-term 
development has also been adopted by Coote and Whitelam,
654
 who explain the 
emergence of Israel in terms of gradual evolution and cultural continuity. For them the 
transition observed in the Iron Age I highland settlements should be viewed as a process 
lasting for half a century or longer. These changes can be understood as part of longer-
term trends in the history of the region. Israel‟s origin is therefore viewed as a pattern of 
settlement and agriculture in the highlands that is analogous to the cyclical settlement in 
the whole region. These cycles were influenced by a variety of factors that include 
urbanism, interregional political and economic relations and local socio-political 
structures.
655
 The broader historical context of the changes in the Iron I settlement is 
acknowledged in what is often called the Symbiosis Model.   
 
6.1.1.4 Symbiosis Model 
The Symbiosis Model is described as “a blend using sophisticated archaeological 
research and the best aspects of the previous models.”
656
 This hypothesis upholds the 
aspect of the Peasant Revolt Model, where the people of the Iron I highlands are viewed 
as Canaanites and not invaders from outside. As in the Peaceful Settlement Model, the 
                                                 
650
 Miller, M. J. “The Israelite Occupation of Canaan”, p 279. 
651
 Stager, L. G. “Forging Identity: The Emergence of Israel”, p 140. 
652
 Lemche, N.P. Early Israel: Anthropological and Historical Studies on the Israelite Society Before the 
Monarchy. Leiden: E.J. Brill 1985. quoted in McNutt, P.M. Reconstructing the Society of Ancient Israel, p 
57. 
653
 McNutt, P.M. Reconstructing the Society of Ancient Israel, p 57. 
654
 Coote, R. B. and Keith W. Whitelam. “The Emergence of Israel” pp 107-147. 
655
 McNutt, P.M. Reconstructing the Society of Ancient Israel, p 58. 
656
 Noll, K.L. Canaan and Israel in Antiquity: An Introduction, p 160. 
 
 224 
symbiosis theory acknowledges that some of the highlanders were local pastoral nomadic 
people who had settled and started farming. The Model proposes that Iron I highland 
people were “a blend of farmers from the lowlands and some ex-pastoralists who, 
together, settled into a new „symbiotic‟ economic relationship in the highlands”
657
 The 
explanation furnished by this Model is summarized by McNutt, as follows: 
 
The pastoralist “Israelites” had lived in close proximity to, and in symbiosis with, 
villages and cities (what is referred to in anthropological literature as “enclosed 
nomadism”). The origins of these pastoralists are traced to a period of urban 
collapse at the end of Middle Bronze Age (ca. 1600 – 1550 B.C.E.), when they 
migrated to the highlands and a substantial element of the population 
subsequently became retribalized throughout the Late Bronze Age, living on the 
margin of the settled areas or perhaps in their midst. As the Late Bronze Age 
declined, these highland pastoral nomads lost the trading market on which they 
had depended for agricultural products, the pastoralism constructed around 
symbiosis with the Late Bronze Age urban settlement system became impossible, 
and thus out of necessity, during the thirteenth through twelfth centuries B.C.E. 




Holders of this view diverge in some details such as the circumstances that led to the 
settlement in the highlands. Among the best-known advocate of this view is Finkelstein, 
who argues that the emergence of early Israel was an outcome of the collapse of the 
Canaanite culture, not its cause. Finkelstein explains that with the collapse of the Late 
Bronze Age city-states the pastoralists could no longer purchase needed grain from the 
economic network that had existed, but now they were forced to begin growing their own 
grain on a larger scale than previously.
659
 Dever partly shares some of Finkelstein‟s views 
about the emergence of Israel. He has outlined in eight points his agreement with 




While the historicity of biblical traditions about the Israel‟s occupation is widely 
questioned, all the approaches based on extra-biblical evidence have not yet reached 
certainty and consensus. The one thing that can be said with confidence is that the 
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process by which Israel gained possession of the land of Canaan remains unclear. 
Referring to the currently existing models explaining the emergence of Israel in Palestine 
McNutt has observed: 
 
There is still, and is likely to continue to be, considerable debate concerning 
which, if any, is most representative of the processes that occurred in the 
transition from Late Bronze Age to Iron Age I in Palestine. But the general 
acknowledgment of the complexities associated both with the interpretive process 
and with the processes of social development brings us together to constituting a 




The puzzle regarding the origins of Israel may not necessarily be solved by one adequate 
model that will gain the unanimity of all scholars. Just as it was observed in the case of 
the origins of the Rwandan social groups, there are competing narratives, very often of 
our „origins‟, and each is trying to say something significant, irrespective of which is 
historically „true‟. Probably each of the existing hypotheses has a contribution toward the 
elucidation of this complex phenomenon.  Hess was apparently reasoning along this line 
when he pointed out aspects of Israel‟s origins which he believes are not invalidated by 
any of the hypotheses. Without venturing into a kind of synthetic model, Hess identified 
from the aspects suggested by different models those which, he thinks, are not proved 
wrong.  He listed the following: 
 
 That a group of slaves could have escaped from Egypt and made their way to 
Canaan; 
 That a group of nomadic tribal people could have entered and settled in 
Canaan from east of the Jordan River; 
 That people in the hill country could have found themselves involved in 
competition for natural resources, in rivalry with other migrating groups and 
with existing Canaanite “city-states” and that this could have involved 
skirmishes and “wars”; 
 That early Israel could have held to a faith in a deity known as Yahweh. 
 That Israelites could have entered the land and been involved in the 
destruction of such cities as Hazor; 
 That nomadic and other people forced to flee for economic or political reasons 
could have become Israelite at any time during its appearance and growth in 
Canaan; 
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 That dissatisfied elements from Canaanite city-states could have become 
Israelites; 
 That Egyptian “buffer groups” in Northern Palestine or Hapiru groups in 
Bashan, east of the Sea of Galilee, could have become Israelites; 
 That Middle Bronze Age hill country settlers who had taken on an “enclosed 
nomadic” existence during the Late Bronze Age (1550-1200 B.C.E.) could 




Hess is careful not to affirm that any of the above scenario actually happened, but that 
each remains a possibility. What is agreed by all the approaches is the observation that 
the people of Israel were in Canaan during the Late Bronze Age.  In all these hypotheses, 
Israel that emerged in Canaan was a tribal community. The issue of how the different 
tribes of this community related socially, economically, politically and religiously has not 
yet come to any kind of consensus. The next section discusses different views on the 
social structure and the social relations of Israel subsequent to its emergence and 
settlement in Canaan.  
 
6.1.2 Social organisation and relations in Israel of the tribal period 
In biblical traditions, the „Israel‟ that entered and settled in Canaan was constituted by the 
twelve tribes descending from the Patriarch Jacob. The unity and solidarity of this 
community was grounded on their kinship relation, their shared experience in Egypt and 
in the wilderness and their covenant with Yahweh. Biblical scholars think that the new 
community that became Israel were of various origins and gained possession of their 
respective territories under different circumstances. For some scholars, the tribalisation 
process may have occurred largely after the settlement and in accordance with the 
topography of Palestine. The sense of kinship and mutual loyalty which these tribes came 
to share emerged gradually after the settlement, due to such factors as geographical 
proximity, similar lifestyles elicited by the physical features of the mountainous regions, 
shared sanctuaries, and the necessity for combined warfare during the pre-monarchical 
period and would also have been a significant ingredient in the emerging sense of inter-
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tribal kinship and loyalty.
663
  Social organisation and social relations among the tribes are 
both aspects of the tribalisation process. 
 
6.1.2.1 Social organisation of tribal Israel 
The social structure of Israel was sometime seen as a tribal confederation, equated with 
the system of amphictyony. The term amphictyony was used for the first time in 
reference to Israel by the sociologist M. Weber, who described Israel during the tribal 
period as a warlike confederation with its social order guaranteed and its prosperity 
assured by Yahweh. He suggested that Israel was the name of a cultic league which may 
have had „amphictyonic‟ rites.
664
  The idea was later expanded by M. Noth
665
. Basing his 
analysis on the frequency of the figure twelve in the tribal list of the Old Testament, Noth 
drew an analogy between Israel‟s tribal system, organized around the worship of 
Yahweh, and the Greek and Italian tribal systems organized around sacral unions called 
amphictyonies in Greece and tribal leagues in Italy. In such unions, members grouped 
into twelve or six units were bound by an oath around a common sanctuary. Individual 
members preserved their autonomy and their representatives had the mandate to ensure 
that the members observed the oath. Noth suggested that Israel had a similar organization 
during the period of judges. According to Noth, Israel was a league of twelve tribes, with 
a common sanctuary situated first at Shechem, then at Bethel, Gilgal and finally at 
Shiloh. The account preserved in biblical traditions in Joshua 24 would refer to the 
occasion when at Shechem members of the league were united with each other by a pact, 




The amphictyony hypothesis, which became famous, was later rejected by many scholars 
such as de Vaux, who objected to the fact that the socio-political structure of pre-
monarchical Israel never displayed any of the essential elements of an amphictyony, such 
as a central sanctuary, an amphictyonic council, amphictyonic law or any collective 
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action to protect the amphictyoinic sanctuary.
667
  Lemche has thought along the same 
lines saying that there is no single concrete detail dating from the second millennium 
BCE which indicates that Israel was ever constituted as a permanent coalition, which 
could have been the basis of the conception of a united Israel. Nor is it possible to point 
to any single sanctuary which might have been employed as the centre of such a 
league…”
668
 For Gottwald, the twelve tribes amphictyonic model is an erroneous over-





While the amphictyonic character of pre-monarchic Israel‟s tribal confederation is widely 
rejected, it is generally noted that, from the time of the settlement in Canaan, Israel was a 
confederation of segmented tribes. At the basis of the social structure were self-sufficient 
socio-economic entities called the “ ” house of the fathers. These were grouped 
into associations of families, the “ ” that, in their turn made up the “ ” or 
tribes.
670
 The organization culminated in a confederation of tribes. Through the bodies of 
elders drawn from the  and , village and regional decisions were made and 
the process was carried to the level of a council of elders for the entire . Whether 
there existed a regular body of elders drawn from all the tribes in Israel is unclear, but 
given the fact that covenant linkages among the tribes would have required joint 
decisions by elders from different tribes, it seems likely that the modes for intertribal 
consultation by the elders were developed.
671
 It is also suggested, however, that the 
Israelite tribes were regional alliances of essentially independent clans and that the real 
power resided with the clans, or a few of them, but not at tribal level.
672
 The terms 
“alliances” or “confederation” used in the description of Israel‟s tribal period refer not 
only to the diversity of the people but more to the unity that characterized their relations, 
keeping them together and allowing them later to develop into a state. 
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6.1.2.2 Inter-tribal relations in pre-monarchical Israel 
Pre-monarchic Israel is described as a segmented tribal society characterised by the 
typical absence of permanent, centralized power and absence of specialized institutions of 
law and order or political office.
673
  The biblical traditions concerning the pre-
monarchical period refer to tribal leaders, the judges, whose status, role and duties are not 
well clarified. Although they are called „judges” or said to have judged Israel, most of 
them are portrayed as military “deliverers”. Some of them are said to have held office 
over “all Israel”, others only over one or a group of a few tribes. In one case there is 
reference to a failed attempt to institute permanent leadership (Judges 6-8). The extent to 
which this construct reflects the reality of Iron Age I Israel is not easy to tell. Attempts to 
understand the situation that prevailed then is sometimes made in reference to what 
happens in contemporary tribal societies. In these „comparative‟ societies, Weber has 
observed, leadership is confined to the status-bearing men of the community or 
clan/lineage and the family (often referred to as elders). Choice of leaders above the level 
of family tends to be based on an individual‟s reputation and such personal qualities as 
“charisma”, persuasiveness and prowess as a warrior.
674
  For McNutt, memories of this 





Gottwald made a distinction between the elders drawn from the  and , who 
embodied the regularized diffusion of political functions in the society, and the political 
and military leaders who were assigned temporary assignments in crisis situations. He 
argues that the assignments of the latter carried a built-in tendency for strong leaders to 
usurp more than their share of assigned power and, particularly, to try to pass on their 
power to their sons (or conversely for their sons to try to claim or extend their power). 
676
 
The biblical traditions about Gideon and his son Abimelec (Judges 8, 9) may illustrate 
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this tendency. In this way, chiefdoms attempted to make inroads into egalitarian Israel.
677
 
Gottwald estimates that Israel‟s dire need for military co-ordination predisposed the 
society to succumb to chiefdom centralisation and social stratification tendencies but 
Israel‟s basic thrust towards locating power in equivalent and equal extended families 
prevailed.
678
 Among the factors that may have prevented chiefdoms to take root in early 
tribal Israel, Gottwald suggests the following: 
 
 Ranking privileges which typify tribes with chiefdoms were fiercely resisted in 
Israel and the claim of certain families to greater wealth and honour than others 
ran against the grain of egalitarian levelling mechanisms guarded by the 
protective family associations; 
 The concentration of economic surplus in particular families was checked and 
retarded by the obligation to share with other families through mutual aid; 
 Since Israel‟s economy remained agricultural and pastoral, the opportunity for 
strong families to monopolize economy through trade or craft specialization was 
minimized; 
 The ecological distribution of the major food sources deprived the chiefdom of its 




In Gottwald‟s view, Israel was a confederacy or league of tribes and the basic 
characteristic of this confederacy included a common concern for the Yahwistic cult, 
shared laws and ideology, a commitment to economic egalitarianism and readiness to 
organise military opposition against external forces such as the Canaanites and the 
Philistines.
680
 Lemche agrees with the view that tribal alliances may have existed, though 
he feels that they would not necessarily have been stable and fixed.
681
 For Lemche, 
individual tribes maintained a sense of social identity on the basis of shared interests in 
keeping the territory in their own hands.  Tribal identity could have been based not only 
on kinship, but also on other factors such as actual or fictitious blood ties, common 
history, common economic interests, or common external enemies. In Lemche‟s view, as 
reported by McNutt, there is no concrete evidence indicating that Israel was ever 
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Pre-monarchy Israel is perceived by most scholars to have been a confederation of tribes 
without centralised institutions. The tribes that made up the confederation are believed to 
have been regional leagues of essentially independent clans. Having secured their 
respective territories in Canaan, the different tribes may have progressively consolidated 
their union toward becoming one people. The understanding of many scholars is that the 
different tribes were not necessarily united by blood or kinship relations. The factors 
perceived by many to have contributed to this union are rather the kind such as those 
mentioned by Gottwald and Lemche, which include socio-political, religious, economic 
and security related preoccupations. The need to combine against their common enemies, 
the shared economic interests and the shared faith in Yahweh are mentioned as some of 
the unifying factors. The political structure of the time, described as that of a segmentary 
society, where the organization of power and leadership followed a lineage system and 
kinship units may have minimized the tendency to social stratification and its corollary of 
competition and eventual conflicts. De Vaux believes that these factors may have 
encouraged the tribes to develop a feeling of belonging together ethnically and sharing a 
common origin, which was expressed in term of kinship.
683
 If this was the case, which is 
not impossible, then this example of early Israel may strengthen the view that the 
hypothetical different origin of the Rwandan “tribes” is not an irremediable obstacle to 
social unity. 
 
Some have suggested that the pre-monarchic tribal league was the life-setting for the 
early traditions of Israel. Gottwald looks at Israel‟s traditions as an amalgam of diverse 
materials drawn from the several ingredient members of the league. These materials may 
have been worked up in cultic recitations as enlargements of a series of basic themes, 
demonstrating Yahweh‟s saving activity among his people Israel.
684
 Mendenhall has 
hypothesised that the tradition that all tribes were linear descendants of a single ancestor 
                                                 
682
 McNutt, P.M. Reconstructing the Society of Ancient Israel, p 87.  
683
 De Vaux, R. The Early History of Israel, p 747. 
684
 Gottwald, N.K.The Tribes of Yahweh, p 205. 
 
 232 
was an attempt to give expression to a unity which was created by the religious factor.
685
 
These assumptions imply that social unity can be created and developed when the 
concerned people are motivated to do so. The unity of Israel‟s tribes, however forged it 
may have been, was later translated into the formation of a state gathering all the tribes 
under one monarch. However, the rise of the monarchy was obviously accompanied with 
socio-political and economic changes that affected the relations among the tribes. 
 
6.2 Social relations during the period of the united monarchy 
Springing from a tribal federation of some kind, Israel developed into a national state. 
The process of this development is understood differently. The biblical traditions describe 
Israel‟s state in an embryonic form during the reign of King Saul that develops later into 
an empire under kings David and Solomon. Extra-biblical evidence points to a more 
complex process in the formation of Israel‟s state. Below is a survey of different views 
about the formation of Israel‟s state which will be followed by a discussion of social 
relations during the period of the united monarchy.  
 
6.2.1 The emergence of Israel’s state  
The biblical traditions present two seemingly opposing views relating to the emergence 
of the monarchy in Israel. One is the story in which the elders of Israel take the initiative 
and request Samuel to appoint a king who would rule over them. This move appears to be 
motivated by a permanent threat of invasion from neighbouring countries such as the 
Ammonites (1 Samuel 10:27), the Amalekites (1 Samuel 30:1), Moab, Edom and Syria (1 
Samuel 14: 47; 2 Samuel 8: 1-14), but especially from the Philistines (1Samuel 4). The 
tribes that could no longer manage their affairs under the leadership of a judge wanted to 
have a king to lead them in battle, like other nations. Samuel, here described as a judge 
and a priest, does not approve of the idea of the elders, neither does Yahweh who, 
nevertheless, instructs Samuel to give to the people what they want, warning them about 
the problems associated with a monarchical regime.  In another opinion, it is Samuel the 
Seer who, under the inspiration of the “Spirit of God”, takes the initiative to secretly 
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anoint Saul. Later, after his victory over the Ammonites, Saul is acclaimed by the people, 
who accept him as king (1Samuel 9-11). 
 
Biblical scholars perceive the emergence of the state in Iron Age I Israel as resulting from 
a more complex development than what is reported in biblical traditions found in 
1Samuel 8:1-21. External military pressure, with internal stimuli stemming from socio-
political conditions, combined to produce a new political form that could meet both kinds 
of pressure.  The aspect of security is noticed in the people‟s demand for a king who 
would lead them into battle. A judge appointed by one or a few tribes had limited 
authority over other tribes that followed him only when their interests were at stake. 
Conversely, centralised political systems could not only offer their subjects protection 
from military threats, they could also co-ordinate and organise numbers of people, cutting 
across tribal or geographic divisions, and provide access to resources.
686
 The monarchy 
was expected to provide the needed permanent leadership that could assemble the tribes 
in precarious situations.  
 
The external pressure is thought to have come mainly from the Philistines, sometimes 
thought to have enjoyed the monopoly of iron technology.
687
 On the contribution of the 
Philistine to the rise of Israel‟s state, Lemche, otherwise known for his rejection of the 
historical reliability of biblical traditions related to this period
688
, seems to pay attention 
to the traditions preserved in the books of Samuel (1 Samuel 4: 13-14) about the 
Philistine entry in the hill country, for he comes to the conclusion that “When Saul 
emerged as a leader of Israelite tribes, there were Philistine governors at various points in 
the hill country north of Jerusalem. It must accordingly have looked at this point as if it 
was only a matter of time before the Israelite tribes had to succumb”.
689
 Further 
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commenting on the external pressure from the Philistines on the Israelite tribes, Lemche 
stated: 
 
Confronted with the Philistine threat the Israelite tribes had of necessity to face 
one of two alternatives: they could submit, or they could intensify their internal 
solidarity. Had they followed the first course, they would have been integrated 
into the Philistine states, and within a few years they would have lost both their 
tribal organization and their specific identity. In the other case, they would 
possibly be able to resist the political and military threat from without. There is in 
any event no doubt about which course the Israelites chose. As a result, they 





The external threat to the security of the tribes was once acknowledged as the necessary 
and sufficient explanation for the rise of the monarchy. Today many biblical scholars no 
longer believe that it can be taken in isolation from other factors such as internal forces 
that are likely to have been at work within the society. Pointing to socio-economic factors 
responsible for the rise of the monarchy in Israel, Coote and Whitelam have observed that 
“the switch to the monarchy was a formal political redefinition of product distribution 
and labour arrangements carried through in order to regularise the intensification of 
productive relations and processes, to support the increased defence costs”.
691
   
 
Social-scientific studies grounded on anthropological theories suggest that the emergence 





 Coote and Whitelam
694
 are among those who opine 
that Israelite segmented tribal organization developed first into chiefdom in the process of 
its evolution toward statehood.
695
 Flanagan concurred, submitting that “Saul‟s leadership 
as portrayed in the biblical construct is typical of a chiefdom, that the traditions about 
David‟s reign reflect the transition from a chiefdom to a state, and that full statehood did 
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 objected to the 
“chiefdom phase” hypothesis for which she substituted what she called the “early state”. 
After a review of socio-scientific models of state formation that she perceived as being 
relevant to Iron Age Palestine, Schäfer-Lichtenberger distinguished three phases at the 
stage of early state, namely, the inchoative early state, the typical early state and the 
transitional early state. Each of these three phases has its distinctive characteristics with 
respect of the role of kinship in political activity, the level of centralisation of 
government, the type of economy, the level of social stratification and relationship 
between the social strata.
698
 Schäfer-Lichtenberger concluded, on the basis of biblical 
texts, that Saul‟s reign was an inchoative state and David‟s was a transitional early state 




The foregoing sociological consideration is helpful for appreciation of the relations of the 
structural development described in the biblical traditions to the logic of an early state‟s 
development described in social sciences. Assuming that the editors of the traditions 
contained in the books of Samuel and Kings did not make them up, as the “minimalists” 
believe, but that they had access to materials from a variety of sources,
700
 as is still the 
view of many biblical scholars.
701
 It can be surmised, on the basis of both biblical 
traditions and sociological descriptions, that what is reported about Saul and David‟s 
regimes reflect the transitional stage, described by some as the “chiefdom” phase, and by 
others as the “inchoative state” phase, while traditions concerning Solomon and the kings 
coming after him may correspond to the time when socio-political structures had 
developed into full statehood. Most of those who, like Noll, argue that the biblical 
narratives are not descriptions of real past events may at least agree with Noll‟s opinion 
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that the social and political world reflected in them was the real world of the Iron Age 
Palestinan highlands.
702
 The characteristics associated with the different phases in the 
development of the state are to be taken into account in the examination of social 
relations during the period of the united monarchy. 
 
6.2.2 Socio-political relation in the period of united monarchy 
The early period of the state of Israel preceding the division of the kingdom is often 
referred to as the period of the united monarchy. Among scholars who reject the 
historicity of biblical traditions many generally deny that the united monarchy ever 
existed.
703
  Even scholars who admit that there was once a united monarchy in Israel are 
not agreed on the extent to which the united monarchy was really united. The biblical 
accounts themselves reveal divisions in the united monarchy leading to the conclusion 
that the united monarchy was in fact nothing but separate kingdoms, sharing one king.
704
 
The issue of the unity of the kingdom is directly connected to the relations of the tribes of 
Israel, which are examined in this section. The discussion focuses on the relationships 
among the tribes during the successive reigns of the kings connected with this period, 
namely Saul, David and Solomon. 
 
6.2.2.1 Socio-political relations at the time of Saul  
From the biblical traditions about Saul‟s rise to power it appears that he first arose as the 
leader of a contingent of Israelites, most likely drawn from his own tribe, to respond to 
the threat posed by the Amorites to the city of Jabesh Gilead (1 Samuel:11). In this he is 
portrayed as not much different from the charismatic leaders who preceded him. 
However, some aspects of Saul‟s rule differentiated him from the charismatic deliverers 
of the period of judges. The permanence of his office and the expectations of his close 
servants affected the social relations among the tribes.  
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6.2.2.1.1 The ambiguous character of Saul’s office  
Taking over from the judges, Saul first appeared as one who was to continue in their line. 
As in the cases of the judges, Saul‟s appointment was made urgent by the threat of 
imminent attacks from neighbouring nations. His first mission was to deliver the people 
and in this he enjoyed considerable support from the people across all the tribes. Saul 
arose when the Israelites were facing continuing oppression especially from the 
Philistines (1 Samuel 4-7). In spite of their repeated attacks, the Philistines appear not to 
have managed to occupy Israelite territory. Their aim may have been to weaken the 
Israelites, deprive them of the means of manufacturing weapons and prevent their 
expansion into the plains. The continuing threat to Israelite tribes was perceived as the 
reason why Saul‟s leadership was made permanent.
 705
   
 
Not everybody is convinced, however, that the preoccupation with security could have 
been the only reason behind the rise of the monarchy. It is argued that there have been 
many instances elsewhere of decentralised peoples uniting under a single military 
command without resorting to state organization. Thus, although the tribes designated 
Saul as commander-in-chief of their armed forces, there would have been no grant of 
further powers and no office of “king” to occupy once the military crisis passed.
706
 If the 
constant threat may have necessitated the prolongation of Saul‟s military services, it 
seems that he did not achieve the stature of a king from the beginning. In Gottwald‟s 
estimation, Saul could not be called a king, since he had no detectable non-military 
powers beyond the capacity to reward followers with honours and possibly with modest 
land grants.
707
 Questioning Saul‟s kingly position, Gottwald formulated the following 
arguments: 
 
There was no indication of taxation or conscription beyond the outlay of men and 
supplies for tribal levies, which, given the seriousness of the Philistine threat, 
were probably readily volunteered for the most part. There is no account of Saul‟s 
keeping records, nor is there evidence of his role as head of the judicial system or 
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as a pontiff of the religious cult. In keeping with his limited exercise of power, 





The nucleus of Saul‟s territory seems to have been his own tribe of Benjamin. But his 
early military success would have gradually rallied an expanding group of followers and 
created an area of control beyond Benjamin.
709
 Other tribes, especially those from the 
north of Jerusalem, may have associated themselves with Saul‟s leadership for longer or 
shorter periods. The account concerning Abimelech‟s rule in Shechem could suggest that 
the northern tribes, who had earlier moved toward a centralised form of government were 
more disposed to accept Saul‟s rule. After Saul‟s death his son, Ishbaal, inherits a 
territory that includes, beside Benjamin, Gilead, Asher, Jezreel and Ephraim (2 Samuel 
2:9). 
 
Saul‟s influence in the south is less clear. A number of city-states still separated the 
territory of Judah in the south from the northern tribes. These cities inhibited 
communication between both sides. This separation remained until the time of David, 
who conquered these cities, including Jerusalem, and integrated them into his empire. 
However, Saul seems to have enjoyed some influence in Judah. He could pass through 
Judah to fight the Amalekites and neither David, as a Judean rebel, was out of Saul‟s 
reach, nor could David‟s parents feel safe in their territory (1 Samuel 22:1).  
 
Saul is perceived by some as a chief whose powers went beyond those of a judge, without 
reaching the level of kingship. Even Gottwald, who saw in Saul no more than a military 
chief, has noted that the biblical traditions picture him and his supporters as assuming that 
his powers would devolve to his successors, which implies dynastic pretensions and thus 
aspiration to permanent rule.
710
 In Schäfer-Lichtenberger‟s opinion, the fact that the 
political association over which Saul ruled survived him is proof that it was advanced 
beyond the era of chiefdoms. The political association would have dissolved immediately 
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Saul‟s rise to power appears to have been followed by the appearance of a small standing 
military force and a rudimentary administrative apparatus, consisting of a group of 
specialists in whose hands were concentrated the society‟s resources.
712
 Such an 
apparatus was to be sustained with regular delivery from the people. This group of 
leaders and helpers of leaders had to be fed by the rest of society and, from this situation, 





From a sociological perspective, Saul‟s rise to power is to be located within a process of 
state formation, which did not happen as sudden transition from tribe to state, but as a 
development that implied “eroding” tribalism in tandem with “creeping” or “incremental” 
statism.
714
 Being part of this process, Saul‟s tenure seems to have undergone an 
“evolution” which evades his portrayal in a fixed type of leadership position. De Vaux 
refers to this development as a move from a charismatic leader, the “ ”
715
 (1 Samuel 9; 
16; 10:1), to becoming the “ ”, the king (1 Samuel 11:15)”.
716
 In Schäfer-
Lichtenberger‟s “early state” theory, Saul is perceived as reigning over an “inchoative 
state”, a phase of which one of the major characteristics is the dominance of kinship and 
community ties in its political structures.
717
 The dominance of kinship in Israel‟s political 
structure under Saul‟s rule is reported in the biblical accounts, with cases which today can 
be seen as sheer nepotism. 
                                                 
711
 Schäfer-Lichtenberger, C. “Sociological and Biblical Views of the Early State”, p 98. 
712
 Lemche, P. L. Ancient Israel: A New History of Israelite Society. Sheffield, England: JSOT Press. 1988, 
p 136. 
713
 Lemche, P. L. Ancient Israel: A New History of Israelite Society., p 136. 
714
 Gottwald, N K. “The Participation of Free Agrarians in the Introduction of Monarchy to Ancient Israel: 
An Application of H. A. Landsberger‟s Framework for the Analysis of the Peasant Movement” Semeia 37 
(1986), 77-106. 
715
 “dyGinA”is here understood to mean “commander”, although the meaning of the term underwent an 
evolution corresponding to stages in the development of Israel‟s socio-political organization. See Flanagan, 
J.W. “Chiefs in Israel” in Exum, J. C. ed. The Historical Books. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press. 1997, 
p 181.  
716
 De Vaux, R. Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions, p 94. 
717




6.2.2.1.2 Elements of nepotism during the reign of Saul 
Although not much is said about Saul‟s administration, most of his known aides seem to 
have been recruited from his close relatives. In his military campaigns, using an army of 
militia, his second-in-command was his own son, Jonathan (1 Samuel 13:2). When he 
later decided to appoint a commander for his army, he gave the position to his cousin, 
Abner (1 Samuel 14:50-51). Even the young David who, for a time, was King Saul‟s 
bodyguard (1 Samuel 22:14), had first become the king‟s son-in-law. The practice of 
appointing relatives to significant positions is said to correspond to that of an inchoative 




After Saul‟s death, his son, Ish-Boshet, was made king in his place. Only three officials 
who served this new king are mentioned by name. One was the army commander, Abner, 
Saul‟s cousin.The two others are Baanah and Recab, leaders of raiding bands, both being 
Ish-Boshet‟s tribesmen, from Benjamin (2 Samuel 4:1-3). Actually, although Ish-Boshet 
reportedly reigned over a confederation of tribes, his fighting troops seem to have been 
recruited preferably from his own tribe of Benjamin. In the war that pitted him against 
David, the war that was described as opposing the “house of David” to the “house of 
Saul”, it is reported that David‟s men killed three hundred and sixty Benjamites (2 
Samuel 2: 31).  The influence of kinship in Israel‟s politics is seen in dynastic pretensions 
associated with succession to Saul‟s rule. 
 
6.2.2.1.3 Dynastic aspirations during Saul’s rule  
Dynastic tendencies are reported to have been manifested, but resisted, throughout the 
period of Judges. With the rise of the monarchy, the concept of dynasty resurfaced as a 
normal corollary. Saul made it clear that he expected his son, Jonathan, to succeed him. 
He is reported investing time, energy and resources hunting David down, in a bid to 
eliminate a rival whose ever-mounting power and fame was a threat to the establishment 
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of his house on the throne.
 719
 Gottwald submits that “Saul‟s “falling out” with David, in 
itself, did not indicate competition for dynastic kingship, but rather rivalry over who was 
the most skilled and loyalty-evoking military leader.”
720
 However, Gottwald 
acknowledges that the reported dynastic aspirations in Saul‟s time may reflect the 
intentions of leading citizens, drawn from his tribe of Benjamin and the adjacent tribes of 




The competition for power seems not to have been limited to Saul and David as 
individuals, as Gottwald suggests. Saul is reported reminding his Benjamite tribesmen 
that he counted on their natural loyalty to him in his fight against the “son of Jesse”, who 
was becoming a serious threat to his dynasty (1 Samuel 22:6-8). In Tsumura‟s 
understanding, by the rhetorical questions that Saul asked his fellow Benjamites in this 
episode, he tried to convey that “since the Benjamites will not have any hope of enriching 
themselves by feudal grants and appointments if the Judahite David should become king, 
they have no reason to support him.”
722
 Saul actually told his tribespeople that they had 
all to gain if the throne remained within their tribe and everything to lose if it passed to 
another tribe, so they should help him defend and keep it. Saul‟s argument, appealing to 
kinship as motivation for political support, connotes what can be perceived today as tribal 
politics.  
 
At his death, Saul did not leave behind a united monarchy. The extent of his kingdom is 
reported to have included Gilead, Asher, Jezreel, Ephraim and Benjamin (2 Samuel 2:9), 
and other tribes or parts of them, both in Galilee and in Judah, perhaps for shorter 
periods.
723
 Saul ruled over a number of tribes which appear to have retained a great deal 
of their autonomy.
724
 Apart from his military office, the authority that he exercised is not 
clearly described. Flanagan estimated that Saul was unable to establish a state of 
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dependency through redistribution, which otherwise might have stabilized his leadership. 
The fact that his successor, Ishbosheth, was forced to lead from afar, probably with only a 
fraction of Saul‟s following, indicates, in Flanagan‟s view, the extent of Saul‟s failure.
725
 
Beside the autonomy of the tribes that made up Israel, the scramble for power and 
associated privileges resulted in the creation of boundaries between those who held 
power and wanted not to lose it, namely the Benjamites and associated northern tribes, 
and those considered a threat to the interests of the first group, that is, the Judah of David 
and the potential allied tribes. The rift between the two groups became more evident 
when, after Saul‟s death, Judah did not waste any time in appointing their own leader, 
David, breaking away from the rest of the northern tribes. The boundaries appearing 
during the reign of Saul survived him and continued to appear during the time of David 
and beyond. 
 
6.2.2. Intertribal relations during the reign of David 
David is often referred to as the founder of the Israelite kingdom. A great deal of 
achievement is attributed to him, which includes territorial unification and expansion, as 
well as political and economic consolidation. Under him, Israel came to be recognised as 
the nation holding the greatest political power in the ancient Near East.
726
 With respect to 
social unity, however, he seems to have faced important challenges. The circumstances 
surrounding his rise to power affected the unity of the kingdom, as became evident in the 
two rebellions that were organized against his regime. The context of David‟s accession 
to the throne and the challenges that he faced are discussed in the sections that follow. 
 
6.2.2.1 The rise of King David 
David was still young when he became a servant of Saul. The biblical traditions about his 
rise to power are presented in varying versions. In one story, David is designated by 
Yahweh through Samuel to take over from the discarded Saul. Samuel goes to anoint 
David at his home in Bethlehem, where the young man was keeping the sheep of his 
                                                 
725
 Flanagan, J. W. “Chiefs in Israel” in Carter, C.E. and Carol, L. Meyers. eds. Community, Identity and 
Ideology, p 328. 
726
 Kaiser, W. C. Jr. A History of Israel: From Bronze Age Through the Jewish Wars. Nashville, Tennessee: 
Broadman and Holman Publishers. 1998, p 241. 
 
 243 
father, Jesse (1 Samuel 16:1-13). David was preferred not only to Saul, whom he was 
called to replace, but also to his elder brothers. This version that makes David the 
preferred elect of Yahweh is perceived to be a product of the Deuteronomistic edition.
727
 
In another story, David begins his career as a famous warrior by defeating Goliath, the 
Philistine giant (1Samuel 17). But the mention, in 2 Samuel 21:19, of a Goliath killed not 
by David but by Elhanan has led some to suggest that David was attributed this mighty 
deed of the unknown Elhanan.
728
 In a third version, David is invited to Saul‟s palace, 
where he becomes an armour-bearer, while his music helps to bring relief to his 
depressed master (1 Samuel 16:14-23). In Soggin‟s view, there are some materials 
relevant for the historian to be gathered from the different narratives about David‟s rise to 
power. These include the suggestions: 
 
that David was a Judahite who entered the service of the king while still quite 
young; that he became, through gallantry and valour, but also through great 
cunning, a military leader under Saul; that he soon fell into disgrace, either 
because of the pathological jealousy of the king or else because Saul realized 
David‟s budding ambitions for the throne; that he was compelled to flee from the 
royal court; that he enlisted a small but efficient personal army; …that at Saul‟s 




Towards the end of Saul‟s rule, David seems to have grown into a rival to be reckoned 
with. The biblical account in the book of Samuel portrays David as a victim of Saul‟s 
pathological jealousy. The king, worried about the ever-mounting fame of the young 
David, sees in him a threat to his throne and his dynasty and undertakes to persecute him. 
The traditions that present David as unjustly persecuted while he is the one predestined 
by Yahweh to rule over Israel are not overt about the concrete actions he may have 
undertaken to realize this destiny. David seems not to have been totally passive in this 
competition for power and Saul‟s suspicions concerning David‟s ambitions were not 
necessarily groundless. In contrast to his portrait as somebody constantly refraining from 
laying his hand on his rival and from fighting his way to the throne, a different picture of 
him appears in his dialogue with Abigail. This wise woman clearly advises David to 
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refrain from fighting his way to the throne, but rather to allow the Lord to accomplish that 
which he has spoken concerning him (1 Samuel 25:28-31). Preston sees, in this incident, 





Faced with the hostility of his master, David is said to have withdrawn from Saul‟s court 
to the southern hills of Judah, where he became the leader of all those who had any kind 
of grudge against Saul‟s regime. While he was at loggerheads with Saul, David 
endeavoured to maintain cordial relations with Judah so that, even from his exile, he 
would send gifts to the elders of Judah with whom he remained in contact (1 Samuel 
30:26-31).  This attitude can be perceived as part of David‟s campaign for the high 
position he was expecting to occupy one day. When later he felt that he was not out of 
Saul‟s reach in Judah, he sought and obtained protection from Saul‟s enemies, the 
Philistines. It is suggested that David‟s alliance with the Philistines was not necessarily 
out of desperation, as if he had exhausted all other means of self-preservation, but was 
part of his astute tactics.
731
 Incidents related to Saul‟s jealousy are part of the story about 
the rise of David
732
 and, as such, this story is likely to be biased in favour of David 
glossing over his share of responsibility. David‟s real ambitions and intentions become 
clear after Saul‟s death.  
 
6.2.2.2 David’s reign in Hebron: a tribal monarchy 
Contrary to the traditions that presented David as a popular hero, divinely elected to take 
over Saul‟s throne, David clearly did not expect to be the first choice of the people of 
Israel to succeed Saul so he did not waste his time waiting for all Israel to crown him. 
Forgetting for a while about the northern tribes, he worked first on the people of Judah 
with whom he had kinship ties. He moved back to Hebron, to be crowned king over 
Judah. The biblical account gives limited details on the circumstances surrounding 
David‟s crowning at Hebron. It is reported that after he had consulted an oracle he went 
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up to Hebron and the men of Judah came to anoint him (2 Samuel 2:1-4). David‟s active 
role in conquering the throne at Hebron is not explicit. Soggin suspects that David had 
already occupied Hebron and the men of Judah in crowning him were not acting on their 
own free will but were recognizing and legitimatizing a de facto situation which was in 
fact now irreversible and which may have reduced somehow their power of decision-
making.
733
 This allegation is not clearly confirmed, but as the northern tribes did not 
spontaneously crown Ishbaal until later, when they were invited to do so by Abner, one 
can surmise that David found ways of encouraging or urging the elders of Judah to crown 
him, as he did later after the thwarted rebellion of Absalom.   
 
Whatever arrangements David may have made to ascend to the throne in Judah, he 
needed to confer on his move a degree of legitimacy. This was brought by involvement of 
the elders. The appeal to the elders for legitimating David‟s kingship is perceived as an 
indication that the elders, probably leaders of various lineages, had the prerogative of 
electing the kings on behalf of the rest of the society.
734
 Lemche sees in this power held 
by the elders as an indication that the introduction of the monarchy was not synonymous 
with the dissolution of the tribal society. To the contrary, he argues, the tribal society not 
only still existed but, in addition to being an important social factor, it played a political 




As much as the continued influence of tribal society is observed in the crowning of David 
in Hebron as a military chieftain, aspects of movement away from the status quo could be 
noted in the north.  On the death of Saul, the northern tribes apparently remained united 
around the house of their master. More consistent with tribal society would have been 
either for each tribe to remain autonomous or for the elders from the northern tribes to 
appoint a new military chief of the confederation and Abner was a good candidate for this 
position. Abner seems to have spent about five years trying to reorganize both the army 
and probably other aspects of public life, before allowing Ishbaal to inherit his father‟s 
throne. During this interregnum, Abner is thought to have functioned as a king in 
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 because he was never appointed to that position.  Abner may 
have harboured some ambitions for the highest position (2 Samuel 3:7-11), but, despite 
his influence and fame, he probably noticed that the people were in favour of the idea of 
the continuation of Saul‟s dynasty.  The people‟s loyalty to a weak prince Ishbaal, who 
was preferred to a charismatic military chief, can be seen in the context of a step in the 
movement towards the perpetuation of a dynastic monarchy. 
 
In assuming the crown over Judah, David seems to have exploited the indifference, or 
perhaps enjoyed the support of the Philistines, who should have been happy to see Israel 
divided.
737
 But David‟s plan was not limited to assuming kingship over a tribal kingdom 
of Judah. His reign in Hebron was meant to be a springboard for military expeditions 
such as for the conquest of Jerusalem, and for laying diplomatic foundations materialised 
by alliances such as the one sealed by David‟s marriage with a princess of Geshur and 
possibly ties with Ammon (inferred from 2 Samuel 10:2). This strategy enabled him to 
outflank the northern tribes of Israel and thus facilitate the achievement of his second 
phase, namely, the conquest of northern Israel.
738
 Malamat saw in David a man who was 
driven by the universal motivations which have steered all political figures to success: 
attainment of security, attainment of power, attainment of glory. 
 
6.2.2.3 David king of Israel and Judah: a dual monarchy 
David‟s intention to extend his rule to the north could already be noticed in the content of 
the letter that he addressed to the people of Jabesh-Gilead, praising them for giving a 
honourable burial to Saul and his sons (2 Samuel 2:5-7). At the end of this letter he 
exhorts these northern people to strengthen their hands and be valiant, reminding them 
that their master Saul is dead, and that the house of Judah has anointed him king over 
them. The intention is certainly to invite the people of the north to do something 
similar.
739
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David‟s diplomatic approach to winning over the north seems not to have yielded the 
expected results. This may explain his resolve to resort to military means (2 Samuel 2:12- 
3:1). Northern Israel, still recovering from the defeat inflicted by the Philistines, was 
weak in the face of the mounting pressure from David‟s army. Abner‟s commitment to 
supporting his master‟s son was eroded by Ishbaal‟s accusation that Abner was seeking 
his own succession to the throne of Saul. In an apparent attempt to secure a safe and 
prominent position under the command of David, who was certain to emerge the victor 
over the inept Ishbaal, Abner is reported to have facilitated the transference of the throne 
to David, by convincing the elders of Israel and the whole house of Benjamin to submit to 
David (2 Samuel 3:17-19).
740
 Meanwhile, David had secured for himself the capacity of 
legitimate successor to Saul‟s throne by claiming and receiving back his wife, Michal, 
Saul‟s daughter, so that after the death of Saul and his sons David was in the line of 
succession to the throne of his father-in-law.
741
  In clinging to Michal, David cleverly 





After the death of Abner and Ishbaal, the elders of the northern tribes seem to have had 
no other option but to submit to David. Their decision to anoint him is reported to have 
been based on a threefold motivation, namely, kinship: “indeed we are your bone and 
your flesh”; David‟s military success: “you are the one who led Israel out and brought 
them in” and appeal to the choice by the deity: “the Lord said to you, you shall shepherd 
my people” (2 Samuel 5:1-2). These good words, that portray David as a ruler desired 
and loved by the men of Israel, were surely not shared by many former followers of Saul 
who, like Meyers, rather saw David as a usurper. In Meyers‟ opinion, David was a widely 
successful usurper, but the later pro-Davidic narrative of the DH justifies his replacement 
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of Saul‟s line. Having established a loyal patronage among Judeans, the army and a 
priestly faction, David was well situated to move into the position of God‟s chosen one, 
once Saul had died.
743
 Not much different from Meyers‟s view is Soggin‟s submission 
that David‟s success in conquering the throne was due to his ability to skilfully exploit his 
own position of strength, the chaos prevailing in the north and the benevolent neutrality 





David‟s accomplishment of having himself crowned king of both Judah and Israel is 
perhaps rightly perceived as one of his most important achievements.
745
 However, uniting 
Israel and Judah under one monarch could not be equated with uniting the tribes, as 
Aharoni seems to suggest.
746
 The unity of the kingdom had many challenges and some of 
them outlived David‟s reign. The unity of the kingdom of Israel under David had to 
reckon with the presence and interest of the Philistines.  Formerly strategically allied to 
David, the Philistines may have viewed with favour or indifference David‟s rise to power 
in Hebron, as Soggin surmises. 
747
 However, they may not have felt comfortable seeing 
him extend his rule to the northern tribes. He was surely becoming too powerful a vassal.  
Their apparent attempt to stop him failed and it is after he defeated them twice that they 
were obliged to recognize his supremacy (2 Samuel 5:17-21; 23-25). It is probably after 
these Philistine campaigns that David captured Jerusalem (2 Samuel 5:6-9). Jerusalem 
was a Jebusite city, a territory which was wedged between Judah and Benjamin and made 
communications difficult between the centre and the south.
748
 The conquest of Jerusalem 
is viewed as David‟s main step taken to consolidate his power from within, after he had 
become free from external danger,
749
 and its conversion into the royal capital as the first 
and most decisive action and a choice of genius.
750
 The new capital was strategically well 
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located not only with respect to its defence against enemies, but also for its historical and 
topographical independence of tribal allotments that made it possible for it to belong fully 
to the crown. Located midway between Israel to the north and Judah to the south, the city 
offered a strategic political location and, of course, had not been involved in the recent 




David‟s conquest of Jerusalem could be seen as a step toward the unification of „Israel‟. 
However, the geographical unification seems not to have been followed with unity among 
the tribes. De Vaux has noted that, in acknowledging David as their king, the men of 
Israel did not rally to the kingdom, already established, of Judah, nor was Judah absorbed 
by the more populous Israel. Just as the men of Judah had anointed David king over the 
kingdom of Judah (2 Samuel 2:4), so the men of Israel anointed him king over Israel (2 
Samuel 5:3).
752
 The political union of Israel and Judah at this stage has been defined as a 
“personal union”, meaning a form of government by which two or more nations, 
politically independent of one another, have the same sovereign, but each has its own 
administrative organization.
753
 Disagreeing with this description, Malamat preferred to 
see this union as a Realunion, which is formed by two political entities joining together to 
become a single legal entity in its external aspect, while remaining composite internally. 
The unity is expressed, inter alia, in a united army and a united foreign policy.
754
 All 
these views point to one thing: the united monarchy was not totally united.  
 
The historical separation and independence of Israel and Judah remained a challenge to 
their unity, but this was not the only challenge that there was for David‟s united kingdom. 
Having vanquished the Philistines, who constituted Israel‟s immediate threat, and 
established his capital in Jerusalem, David embarked on a series of campaigns against 
neighbouring nations. According to biblical traditions, David was able, through conquest 
and alliances, to expand his kingdom, which he transformed into an empire. This empire 
comprised territories with differing status. In addition to Israel and Judah, there was 
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Jerusalem and Ziklag, belonging to the dynasty in a personal form, there were various 
territories conquered and cities annexed, as well as kingdoms that had accepted a vassal 
relationship. Such complex structure gave rise to equally complex and often contradictory 
situations.
755
  The presence in these territories of people of ethnic and religious diversity 
and with a natural tendency to seek to regain independence, was likely to complicate their 
administration.  
 
In Soggin‟s view, with the rather loose composition of David‟s kingdom, religion was the 
main uniting or dividing factor. Soggin postulates the probability of an attempt carried 
out by the government to create something like a national religion, which would bind 
together all subjects of the realm. It is against this background that Soggin sees David‟s 
decision to bring the ark to Jerusalem, his newly acquired “federal” capital, as well as his 
foiled plan to build a temple.
756
 In the political field, David‟s reign is said to have brought 
a period of peace and prosperity after the early war-filled years. But some tensions and 
open rebellion reported in the succession narrative reveal that unity remained fragile, 
especially between the two Hebrew entities. Meyers has observed that state systems break 
down as a result of jealousies among leadership factions over the prerequisite of being at 
the top of a distribution system that clearly advantages the king and his courtiers.
757
 This 
applied to Israel and Judah under David. 
 
6.2.2.4 Cracks in the united monarchy  
In succeeding to Saul‟s throne, David displaced many of the followers of Saul, whose 
privileges he jeopardized and who always perceived him as a usurper. There were 
certainly many Benjamites who agreed with Saul‟s conviction that the throne should 
remain within Benjamin and the northern allies (1 Samuel 22:7). They harboured bitter 
feelings toward the “usurper” of their privileges. If they kept quiet it was simply because 
they could not safely challenge him. When David was placed in a weaker position some 
of them used the opportunity to speak their minds. This is what was observed during the 
event of Absalom‟s coup and its offshoot, the rebellion of Sheba.  
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6.2.2.4.1 Absalom’s revolt 
Absalom is likely to have been David‟s eldest living son when he organised a plot against 
his father (2 Samuel 3: 2-5)
758
 Absalom‟s attitude is not easily understandable, since he 
was the heir apparent and normally he did not need to attempt to take power by force. But 
given his earlier estrangement from his father after the murder of Amnon, it may seem 
that Joab‟s mediation had not totally healed the rift. It appears that Absalom had reason to 
suspect that he was not his father‟s favourite for the succession. He decided to force his 
way to the throne, following the pattern of now familiar coup d’état, whereby those who 
want to overthrow existing regimes find a weakness to put forward in justification for 
their irregular venture. The main weakness stressed in biblical sources that Absalom used 
to rally the people around his project was spotted in the legal administration, in which 
allegedly no official or king‟s representative was available to listen to the complaints of 
the people.  
 
Absalom is portrayed as exploiting the grievances of the people, but not inventing their 
complaints, which may have been real. In Anderson‟s opinion, such complaints may have 
included issues concerning military duties, taxation, forced labour, or royal 
encroachment, in general, since, as Anderson observes, in other situations it would have 
been difficult for Absalom to give plausible opinion or judgments, day after day, in the 
absence of opposing legal parties and witnesses.
759
 Absalom may have been feeding the 
ears of the complaining people with an innovative proposal of a relevant office while, in 
David‟s view, royal authority was far too important to be delegated to some other person. 
Therefore, for practical reasons, it was difficult to gain access to the king in order to 
obtain a hearing and to penetrate the “defences” of bureaucracy.
760
 The same analysis of 
the situation is provided by Tadmor, who believes that David created a ramified 
bureaucratic system, a well-developed class of stewards, whose power derived from the 
king himself and not from any local, tribal-territorial factors. In so doing, the king was 
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now cut off from the people by a strong bureaucracy which, though impartially inclined 
to various tribes, gave much cause for unrest and anger, in that it prevented the people 




The rebellion of Absalom, which Anderson considers to be the most serious revolt in 
Israel‟s history
762
 may have involved a wide range of factors, going beyond the 
grievances concerning the administration of justice. With reference to the possible 
motives that encouraged the people to abandon David and to rally around Absalom, it 
was suggested that David‟s imperialistic policy and his behaviour in the matter of 
Bathsheba and Uriah
763
 may have provoked much disapproval in certain circles and that 
David‟s position was weak in Israel, where the charismatic and democratic kind of 
leadership had a stronger background than was the case in Judah.
 764
 Other motives 
suggested by various people as being behind the people‟s discontent with David include 
David‟s ruthlessness in war;
765
 the struggle between pre-monarchical elements in Israel-
Judah and the bureaucracy created by David;
766




Elaborating more on the aspect of tribal rivalries in this event, Tadmor has recorded that 
Judah and its traditional leadership played a major role in Absalom‟s conspiracy. He 
notes, especially, that Absalom‟s kingship was proclaimed at Hebron, the sacred city of 
Judah, his commander-in-chief was Amasa, a Judahite, and his advisor was Ahithofel, a 
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 In Tadmor‟s analysis, the people of Judah and its tribal institutions found 
much cause for disappointment in David‟s reign because, up until Absalom‟s revolt, 
David did not give them the special status they had hoped for. Tadmor suspects that, 
during their negotiations with David at Hebron (2 Samuel 5:3), the Elders of Israel may 
have imposed some conditions in the nature of precautions, limiting the privileges of 
Judah and its preferred status in the new structure.
769
 In Tadmor‟s estimation, David took 
special pains to consolidate his kingship outside the scope of narrow tribal interests and 
he showed no special favour to the traditional institutions of Judah, from the capture of 
Jerusalem up to the revolt of Absalom. One tangible example was the establishment of 





David may have tried to show no special favour to his tribe of Judah, but this was not 
enough for soothing those who thought that it was at their expense that he had acquired 
power. These included Mephibosheth, who is reported to have expected the house of 
Israel to give him back the kingdom of his father when David was forced into exile by 
Absalom‟s coup (2 Samuel 16:3). To Campbell‟s question concerning the grounds on 
which Mephibosheth could have thought that the kingdom would be given back to him,
771
 
Flanagan suggested that Mephibosheth could have assumed that David had been a stand-
in, who led in place of his wife Michal, perhaps for one generation or until Micah 
(Mephibosheth‟s son) achieved his majority.
772
 David‟s moderate treatment of 
Mephibosheth may have been encouraged by the king‟s awareness that this prince still 
had in his northern constituency a significant number of people who could back him. 
 
More vocal among the Saulides was Shimei, who used the occasion of Absalom‟s revolt 
to express openly how his people viewed David‟s rise to power. Shimei cursed David, 
calling him bloodthirsty (2 Samuel 16:5-8). While the biblical traditions portray David‟s 
rise to power as brought about by Yahweh‟s support and achieved without bloodshed on 
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David‟s part, Shimei gives utterance to a diametrically opposed view of David. To him, 
David is a man of blood; he has killed his way to power; he is now paying for the blood 
of the house of Saul. Campbell saw in these words, attributed to Shimei, an indication 
that a different view of the rise of David may have existed at the time.
773
 The words of 
Shimei expressed the animosity between David‟s house and the house of Saul and the 
deep rift that existed between the two factions.  
 
Shimei did not mention any names of those David may have killed, but he could be 
alluding to the death of Saul and his three sons in the battle with the Philistines, then 
David‟s allies; he could be referring to the death of Ishbaal, but especially the reference 
could be to David permitting the wholesale slaughter of Saul‟s family, in what was 
presented as a blood feud with the Gibeonites (2 Samuel 21:1-9). This massacre cost the 
lives of all surviving male heirs in Saul‟s house, except for Jonathan‟s son, the crippled 
Mephibosheth, and his son Michah (2 Samuel 21:7). In Flanagan‟s view, Shimei, a 
supporter of Saul‟s house, was alluding to this massacre when he cursed David for his 
complicity in the extermination of Saul‟s house. Viewed more widely, Shimei‟s 
accusation may imply that David clawed his way to power, aggregating superior military 
power until he was finally in a position to force the house of Saul from the throne of 
Israel.
774
 This is the perception that is likely to have been shared by many northerners 
especially among the Benjamites and their allied northern tribes.  
 
David was able to quell his son‟s rebellion, thanks to his personal troops, but the death of 
Absalom did not mean automatic restoration of his father to the throne. David still needed 
to placate the people who, for various reasons, had rallied around his rebellious son. 
David‟s first attention was to the people of his tribe. Tadmor thinks that, after the 
rebellion had been quelled David took stock of the situation and realized that he could not 
reign as a king over the united monarchy unless he used Judah as a power base.
775
 It is 
reported that while all the tribes were discussing the way forward, after the death of 
Absalom, David sent messengers to elders of Judah (2 Samuel 19:11). The mission 
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assigned to David‟s messenger was either to advise or to command the elders of Judah to 
go and meet him at the Jordan to welcome him as a king.
776
 Tadmor suggests, rather, that 
the religious leaders were sent to negotiate the restoration of David to the throne. And for 
Tadmor, these negotiations included the issue of the preferred status of Judah, which was 
immediately raised in the crossing of the Jordan. David may have promised the Judahites 





Whatever promise David may have made to his people of Judah is not revealed. What is 
clearly reported is that he appealed to his kinship with them to win them back. Kinship-
based self-definition, once used by Saul in his attempt to protect his throne from the 
threatening camp of David, reappears in David‟s diplomatic attempt to recover his throne 
after Absalom‟s death. His argument is that, since these elders are his brethren, his bone 
and his flesh, they should not be the last in restoring him to his throne (2 Samuel 19: 11-
12). Here David uses a tribal kind of “ammunition” to re-conquer his throne. He used the 
same argument to win back Amasa, former commander of the army under Absalom, 
whom he promised the position of commander of his own army in the place of Joab (2 
Samuel 19:13). Kaiser sees in this tactic a move intended to serve as an olive branch and 




Clemency was used especially in David‟s approach to the people from the north who had 
expressed their grudges against him. David‟s reconciling attitude towards Shimei can be 
viewed in this light (2 Samuel 19:18-30). Perdue saw in David‟s forgiving attitude to 
Shimei a deceit motivated by his awareness that this Saulide had with him a thousand 
men from Benjamin (2 Samuel 19:17-24).
779
 In Perdue‟s analysis, David recognised that 
it was not an auspicious time for dispatching his rival, but he also knew that one day a 
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better, more convenient occasion would surely arise for settling old debts.
780
 The 
treatment reserved to Mephibosheth is to be understood in the same way. David knew 
that the execution of Jonathan‟s son would only alienate the tribe of Saul, while by giving 
to Ziba half of his former master‟s land to repay his loyalty, the king reminded 




The death of Absolom had placed David‟s opposition in a weaker position. David had 
once again proved the superiority of his military skills and strength. He was now in a 
position to influence the course of events. The people who had openly rejected him had 
no other alternative but to show at least outwardly, that they were now behind him. The 
ability of a not-so-popular king to get support from the people who seem to have had 
good reason to reject him or, at least, to remain indifferent about his fate, can find its 
parallel in many cases of contemporary veteran leaders in Africa and in Rwanda, in 
particular. Leaders in Rwanda have always been able to force a display of an alleged 
overwhelming popular support, expressed not only through “free and fair” elections, but 
even through streets demonstrations. Among those who went to meet David at Jordan, 
were many who, a few days earlier, had almost spontaneously supported the rebellion to 
topple him. Most of those who did not like David‟s rule showed their genuine feelings 
when he was on the run. Once he had shown that he could still “bite”, they competed with 
each other to show him their support. 
 
After Absalom‟s revolt, David was able to win back both the northern and the southern 
tribes, but not to unite them. Rather, his attitude toward their competitive claims soon 
became apparent to the point of igniting an open conflict and another rebellion. In 
David‟s restored kingship, the men of Judah argued that, on the basis of their kinship 
relation with David, they should have pre-eminence. The northern tribe would not 
tolerate this, arguing that pre-eminence be theirs, considering that they were in majority. 
The quarrel between the men of Israel and the men of Judah was marked by the use of the 
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binary opposition “you” versus “others”, a common feature of ethnic self-definition.
782
 
Fokkelman has recorded that the Israelite tribes addressed their complaints to David, but 
the response came from the men of Judah. He understands, then, the final comment “the 
words of the men of Judah were fiercer than the words of the men of Israel” (2 Samuel 
19:43) suggested that the Judeans‟ arguments seemed, to David, weightier than those of 
the Israelites.
783
 In any case, it seems that the northern tribes, that initially intended to 
welcome David back were happy neither with the Judeans‟ behaviour nor with David‟s 
attitude. The extent of the offence was such as to justify the rejection of David‟s kingship 
over the northern tribes, expressed in what is known as the revolt of Sheba.  
 
6.2.2.4.2 Unity in jeopardy: Sheba’s revolt 
Sheba was certainly among the Benjamites who perceived David as a usurper. Now that 
Sheba and his group were, probably reluctantly, compelled to submit to the rule they had 
rejected, they were discouraged by the provocative arrogance of their rival group. 
Flanagan believes that it was the long-standing feud between the two factions that fed the 
imagination of Sheba, as had been the case in Absalom‟s revolt.
784
 Upset by the 
arrogance of the men of Judah, Sheba convinced or reminded the northern tribes that the 
“son of Jesse” had no legitimate claim to rule over them and that they were not bound to 
serve him. The northerners‟ early unifying statement “we have ten shares in the king…” 
(2 Samuel 19:43) was then easily reversed by Sheba‟s secessionist slogan: 
 
“We have no shares in David, 
no parts in Jesse‟s son! 
Every man to his tent O Israel!” (2 Samuel 20: 1)  
 
Soggin finds in Sheba‟s cry an indication that the north had spontaneously entered the 
empire through the personal union and decided to leave when the original reasons for its 
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involvement no longer existed.
785
 Sheba‟s argument was convincing enough to turn the 
people against David (2 Samuel 20:2) and to rally his own followers from all the tribes (2 
Samuel 20:14). David took Sheba‟s threat very seriously. He realized that the situation 
was far more dangerous than Absalom‟s revolt. His very right to rule the ten tribes of 
Israel was now being denied and his kingship, as king of Israel and Judah, was put to a 
severe test.
786
 Absalom‟s revolt was directed against David‟s person, but Sheba‟s revolt 




As in the case of Absalom, it was because of David‟s superior military power that he was 
able to put down Sheba‟s rebellion. It appears, so thinks Soggin, that it was David‟s 
mercenary army which was able to prevail over the popular troops of the north, thanks to 
its greater efficiency and ruthlessness.
788
 If it was easier for David to gain back the 
allegiance of his fellow Judeans, convincing them to invite him back to the throne, it 
appears that he needed military power to maintain his rule over the northern tribes, who 
wanted, but failed, to reject him. Soggin, who believes in the existence of a historical 
kernel in these narratives about the rebellions, thinks that they demonstrate that among 
the Israelite population the ideal of a United Kingdom encompassing the whole of Israel 
and Judah, and ruled over by David, rested on rather feeble foundations.
789
 The rebellion 
that shook David‟s reign was a political expression of economic concerns. As Coogan has 
observed, states systems are usually not contested by a groundswell of public complaint 
against monarchic hierarchies, policies, conscriptions, or even taxes. Rather they break 
down as a result of jealousies among leadership factions over the perquisites of being at 
the top of a distribution system that clearly advantages the king and his courtiers.
790
 Saul 
tried to keep the support of his courtiers by reminding them that it was not the Son of 
Jesse who would guarantee economic advantages to any of them (1 Samuel 22:7). He was 
right, because David had his own people and courtiers to satisfy, as a priority. 
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6.2.2.5. Tribalism and nepotism during the reign of David  
As his predecessor had done, David preferably surrounded himself with people from his 
own tribe. Joab, the army commander, and his two brothers, Asahel and Abishai, were 
David‟s nephews, the sons of his sister Zeruiah. Jonathan, another top army officer, was 
the son of Shimeah, David‟s brother (2 Samuel 21:21). David‟s own sons were royal 
advisors (2 Samuel 8:15-16). Amasa, son of Jether, who was appointed by Absalom to be 
his commander-in-chief, was a close relative of David (2 Samuel 17:27). David stressed 
their close relationship when he later offered him the same position in a bid to obtain his 
support after Absalom‟s coup had aborted. King Solomon, who succeeded David, had an 
example to follow and among his twelve district governors, at least two, Ben-Abinadab, 
governor of Naphoth-Dor, and Ahimaz, governor of Naphtali, were his sons-in-law.  
 
David‟s reliance on the people of his tribe was observed from the beginning of his rise to 
power. As King Saul began to track David down, the first people who decided to rally 
around David were his own brothers (1Samuel 22:2). The safest place for him to hide was 
in his tribal land of Judah (1Samuel 22:5). He was wise enough to maintain a relationship 
of close friendship with the elders of his tribe, to whom he sent presents (1 Samuel 
30:26), knowing that he needed their support to ascend to the throne. Commenting on 
David‟s use of economic favours to attract support, MacNutt explained: 
 
As chief, David paid his debts to his loyal clients by redistribution of portions of 
the newly acquired territory. This in turn stimulated further differentiation in 
wealth because of limited access to such limited resources. Those who had fought 
with David, his clients, eventually developed the kind of values typical of agrarian 
elites, seeking to broaden their powers of taxation and control of the agricultural 
surpluses that had previously been redistributed among the freeholding peasants 




It is not by chance or mere coincidence that the people who decided to anoint David king 
were his own tribesmen from Judah, while all other the tribes followed Saul‟s son Ish-
Boshet (2 Samuel 2:8-9).   
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The practice of nepotism and the adherence to the dynastic principles were used as 
instruments of favouritism, discrimination and exclusion, especially during the 
monarchical period. While the dynastic principle intended to ensure that the power 
remained within the family, the clan and the tribe that held power, nepotism was a 
practice by which privileges were granted to members of those social groups that held 
political power. These practices were very attractive and regarded as mutually benefiting 
by the leaders, on the one hand, and their kins-peoples, on the other.  The whole system 
worked as a series of related transactions, by which the leaders granted positions and 
privileges and secured loyalty and support from the people they could generally trust the 
most for their physical security or the security of their positions. Participation in the 
privileges of power made the kins-people of the leaders the stakeholders of the regime 
that they were motivated to defend, because it stood and fell with them.  As much as 
nepotism and the dynastic privilege made their beneficiaries happy, they also made 
unhappy those excluded from the privileges or denied of their full rights. The more 
privileges were given to some, the more others suffered exclusion and more jealousy was 
aroused resulting in tribal conflicts 
 
Apparently David was able to “keep the lid” on internal opposition that rendered 
precarious the unity in the kingdom that he passed on to his son.
792
  The economic 
character of the challenge to the unity of the kingdom became more evident. 
 
6.2.3 Intertribal relations under the reign of Solomon 
Biblical traditions portray Solomon as a wise and great emperor, who expanded and 
solidified the empire of Israel that he inherited from his father. Achievements credited to 
him include his building works, especially the building of the Temple, his foreign policies 
and diplomatic contacts, by which he secured an unprecedented era of peace for his 
kingdom and his active involvement in the sphere of trade and economic affairs.
793
 These 
achievements, however, seem not to have positively impacted on the unity of the 
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kingdom of Israel. The tribes that apparently contributed little to his rise to power seem to 
have more endured his regime than enjoyed it. This is what can be construed from the 
incidents of the revolt of Jeroboam and the rejection of Rehoboam after Solomon‟s death. 
The following section examines the impact of Solomon‟s reign on the relations between 
Israel and Judah.  
 
6.2.3.1 Solomon’s rise to power 
Solomon‟s rise to power, as reported in the book of Kings, departs from the pattern 
observed in the cases of Saul and David. In each of these previous cases, the king is said 
to be chosen by God and acclaimed by the tribes. The account of Solomon‟s ascension to 
the throne seems not to make any such claims. As in the case of Ishbaal, the 
circumstances surrounding Solomon‟s rise to power seem to imply that dynastic 
succession was expected at this stage of state development. But, unlike Ishbaal, 
Solomon‟s succession to his father David‟s position was not automatic, since there was 
his senior brother Adonijah, who aspired to the same position and apparently was 
privileged by his seniority. Adonijah may have worried about his succession, either 
because of David‟s prolonged silence about it or, more probably, because he was aware 
of a plot to give the throne to his younger brother.  Having succeeded in rallying part of 
the court leaders to his side, he made the first move and organised his coronation 
ceremony. Unfortunately for him, the opposing group succeeded in persuading the old 
David to appoint Solomon as his successor designate and Adonijah‟s plan was frustrated. 
Once his throne was secured, Solomon‟s next move was to get rid of his opponents.  
 
In the process of his accession to power, Solomon seems to have ignored both the 
traditional role of the people, who normally acclaimed the designated king and the 
dynastic principle that gave priority to the senior son among the eligible heirs.
794
 Soggin 
may be right in stressing that Solomon ascended the throne independent of both 
traditional, charismatic-democratic designation through the people and the institutional-
dynastic criterion of legitimacy which has always been the accepted procedural pattern in 
                                                 
794





 As for divine election, which was another requirement for the 
appointment of kings in early Israel, the account of Solomon‟s dream at Gibeon (1 Kings 
3:4-15), where Yahweh appears to him, is perceived to have a Deuteronomic origin and 
to provide Solomon‟s kingship with divine approval, which was initially lacking.
796
 The 
noted irregularities that marked Solomon‟s accession to the throne did not prevent him 
from achieving greatness. But this success did not outlive him. 
 
Solomon‟s accession to power marked a new phase in the existence of the kingdom of 
Israel. David had followed an aggressive policy of territorial expansion. Under him, new 
territories had been constantly added to the Palestinian nucleus. When Solomon ascended 
to the throne, the process of growth of the empire had come to an end.
797
 It was now 
necessary to preserve and consolidate as far as possible the existing conditions, to go over 
to the defensive, to organize and to amalgamate.
798
 This is what Solomon spent his time 
doing and he is reported to have achieved the following: the establishment of districts, 
mainly for the purpose of levying taxes, the reorganization of the military forces, the 
fortification programme, forced labour, the development of trade and commerce, the 




6.2.3.2 Centralisation at the expense of traditional tribal structure 
The consolidation of the kingdom and the increased centralisation of its administration 
were further steps in the transition from tribal society to a state. In Lemche‟s opinion, the 
consolidation of the state was to be achieved at the expense of the traditional political 
significance enjoyed by the tribal society.
800
  For Lemche, the attempted administrative 
subdivision of northern Israel was presumably intended to reduce the political influence 
of the northern tribes, by replacing the local form of leadership with that of a centralized 
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administration. The undermining of the tribal society that took a definite shape under 
Solomon meant that Israel was to be transformed into a state like those which had 
previously existed and the king was to be the only authority in the country, while the 
population was to be reduced to the status of his slave.
801
 This view is not shared by 
Meyers who contends that the elders and all the people of Israel had a voice in 
governance and that the Israelite monarchy was not a strongly authoritarian regime and 
certainly not an oriental despotism. It is unlikely, argues Meyers, that Solomon, in 
establishing his twelve officials, was setting up new administrative districts in order to 




Even Lemche, who maintains that the survival of the monarchy depended on its capacity 
to destroy the political significance of the tribal society, thought that this was to be a 
process that was to take some time, so that the introduction of the monarchy was not 
synonymous with the dissolution of tribal society.
803
  The coexistence of the monarchy 
and the tribal system has been described by Soggin as: 
 
two sets of contrasting elements: one centripetal, emanating from the palace, with 
the strong trend to eliminate, or at least to curtail, local autonomies in favour of 
the central, royal government; the other, centrifugal, emanated from the traditional 
organs of local government, had strong „democratic‟ tendencies, and was quite 
ready to accept the united kingdom concept so long as it gave peace and 
prosperity, law and order. Its sustainers were, however, equally willing to reject 
the concept of the combined states as soon as it showed trends to overrule local 
government and to introduce forms of taxation, of levies, and of corvées, which 




The monarchy under Solomon may have brought peace, law and order to the people of 
Israel, but they seem not to have approved the cost they were asked to pay for its 
consolidation and its prosperity. Aspects of the central administration that may have 
kindled the people‟s bitterness include the system of labour and taxation. 
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6.2.3.3 Consolidation and its cost to the people 
Solomon‟s reign was marked by huge building projects. Beside the temple and the king‟s 
palace, that remained the centrepiece of his building programmes, he undertook to 
refortify strategic cities such as Hazor, Megiddo, Gezer, Beth Horon Baalath and Tamar. 
Most of these cities were built along the main trade route through the kingdom. These 
monumental cities, together with their temples, military palaces, administrative chambers 
and oversized granaries, were built by the people subjected to the corvée, under the 
supervision of Adoram.
805
 A glimpse at what these projects cost to the people is provided 
in the biblical account in 1Kings 5:13-18. To build fortresses, palaces and the temple, 
Solomon reportedly enlisted a crew of 30,000 men from all over Israel. He deployed 
them in teams of 10,000 each for a month at a time in Lebanon and two months off at 
home. Their task was to cut, haul and ship timber from Lebanon. Solomon recruited 
80,000 stonecutters and 70,000 basket carriers as forced labour. The staff that kept this 
army of workers at their tasks numbered 3,600. These scores of thousands were fed from 
state stores or forced to bring food from home stores. Other work could be done only by 
skilled craftspeople from the cities of the Phoenician coast, who required payment and 
feeding.
806
 Scholars can debate, as they do, the exact terminology to use in describing the 
work imposed on the people at this time, whether forced labour, corvée or slavery.  One 
thing that seems to be clear is the involuntary character of this labour. This was a kind of 
work, observes Soggin, which individuals and communities alike were unrelated and had 




The same people who were sweating to support Solomon‟s building projects were also 
sustaining his army. David had maintained an economical army, with a small chariot 
corps and most garrisons inherited from the Philistines. His voluntary tribal infantry 
supported itself through normal subsistence. Solomon‟s army was differently organized. 
It included a larger standing army of charioteers, mercenaries and a drafted infantry. 
According to biblical record, Solomon‟s chariots numbered 1,400 (requiring at least 
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4,200 horses, at three horses per chariot); and horsemen, up to 12,000.  All these 
personnel were supported on food provided by the people. Chariots cost 600 shekels each 
and trained horses, 150 shekels (1Kings 10:26-29).  The expense of this army to the 
people is shown in the following description: 
 
Each vehicle required three horses, so chariot and team came to 1,050 shekels. 
Then there were the accessory costs; crews, maintenance personnel, weapons, 
spare parts, housing for personnel, storage areas and repair shops, stables and 
fodder. Frequent disassembly and lubrification with olive oil were essential. The 
corps thus consumed a large quantity of the basic foodstuffs of Palestine. The 
horses required months of training, then ongoing practice and grooming by skilled 
personnel. The chariot army all told required an outlay on the order of 1, 470.000 




Beside the requirements for his building projects and his army, Solomon subjected his 
people to financing the opulence of his palace. According to the biblical record, each day 
Solomon and his men and their families ate thirty sacks of flour, sixty sacks of meal, 
thirty oxen, a hundred sheep, assorted antelope and fowl and unspecified quantities of 
wine and oil. To this should be added the annual payment in kind to Hiram for his timber: 
20,000 cors of wheat and 20 cors of pressed oil.
809
 The burden of maintaining Solomon‟s 
regime weighed heavily on the people who were required to pay heavy taxes and corvée. 
It was recorded that the people endured the cost of Solomon‟s opulence more than they 
enjoyed the benefits of his prosperity. 
 
During Solomon‟s days Jerusalem became increasingly affluent. The wealth of 
the world flowed to Solomon‟s court and was reflected in the glory of the capital 
city. But bureaucracy grew as well. The nation‟s wealth was no longer based on 
the land and what it produced. Increasingly the government controlled the wealth 
of the land, and taxes drained wealth from the people and funnelled expenditure 
through the central government. The glory was a superficial thing; prosperity was 
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A feeling that they were not receiving an equitable share in the benefits of their hard 
labour exacerbated the bitterness of these exploited people. Exploitation may have 
involved aspects of tribalism and sectionalism. 
 
6.2.3.4 Sectionalism and tribalism in Solomon’s administration 
Aspects of tribalism and sectionalism in Solomon‟s administration were pointed out by 
Halpern, who contended that King Solomon‟s military, administrative and economic 
policies were dictated by sectional Judahite interests. Halpern looks at sectionalism as the 
main cause of the schism and suggests that partisan conflicts in the united monarchy are 
traceable back to the time of David, especially from the time of the revolt of Absalom. 
Among the issues mentioned to underline Solomon‟s sympathies with Judah at the 
expense of the northern tribes are his attitude toward the revolts in the territory and the 
sale of Cabul, but especially his administrative reforms.
811
 Both issues are described 
below. 
 
Solomon‟s policies that could attract northern antipathy were first, his administrative 
policy.  All of Israel, exclusive of Judah, was divided into twelve districts, over which 
Solomon appointed governors. This arrangement may have allowed Solomon through the 
representative of his regime to control the corvée, taxation and military levy. Lemche 
refers to this as an administrative apparatus used to squeeze the population for both 
revenue and labour.
812
 While Judeans favoured by the crown had no problem with the 
royal power, northern leaders grumbled that the wealth of the capital did not sufficiently 
extend to them. During David‟s reign and much of Solomon‟s, the law of spoil and 
tribute meant that the tax burden for the royal building projects were minimal, or perhaps 




Solomon‟s administrative arrangement helped him not only to pursue his policy of 
“stripping the north to clothe the south”, but also to seize control of all political and 
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economic machinery, at the expense of northern tribal elders.
814
 The challenging attitude 
of the tribal leaders at the time of Rehoboam‟s coronation at Shechem (1 Kings 12:1-5) is 
sometimes understood in this context. They united against a regime that ignored them and 
usurped their authority. Under the leadership of Ephraim, the northern tribes stood their 
ground and resisted a regime that had become not only exploitative and oppressive but 
also totalitarian and exclusivist. They rejected a regime that was frustrating their ambition 
of having a significant role to play in the leadership of the country and a significant share 
in the benefits. 
 
Halpern notes a contrast between Solomon‟s treatment of the revolts in the earlier 
captured territories. He suggests that while Solomon did not waste any time in quelling 
the revolt led in the south by King Hadad of Edom (1 Kings 11:14-22), he seems not to 
have shown the same enthusiasm in defending the north from the revolt of Rezon, who 
went as far as seizing Damascus, then Solomon‟s provincial capital (1Kings 11: 23-25). 
In Halpern‟s opinion, Solomon‟s inability or unwillingness to deal properly with the 
Damascus insurrection may have been felt by the northern tribes as reflecting his 
preoccupation with, and predilection for, the affairs of Judahite defence.
815
  Also 
significant to the northern tribes was the alienation of the plain of Akko, the Cabul 
region, given by Solomon to Hiram of Tyre, in exchange for 120 talents of gold (1 Kings 
9:10-14). It seems that the proceeds of this sale of a northern land were used for the 
fortification of the south. This discrimination may have been part of the reasons for the 
attempted coup by Jeroboam (1 Kings 11:27).  
 
6.2.3.5 The revolt of Jeroboam 
During the reign of David the challenge against his house‟s right to rule over Israel came 
mainly from the tribe of Benjamin. This tribe had once enjoyed the privilege of 
leadership under Saul‟s reign and was not ready to give up those privileges without a 
fight. But David had prevailed and his house was established, while the Benjamites grew 
weaker. In the time of Solomon, the tribe of Ephraim, that was reported to have been 
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prominent in the times of Joshua and of the prophet Samuel, re-emerged. They took 
leadership of the northern tribes and led the opposition that successfully challenged the 
house of David. From a socio-political point of view, the division of the kingdom of 
Israel resulted from the mistakes of the house of David that provided a ground for his 
rival tribes to rebel against his leadership. The attitude of the men of Ephraim, such as 
Jeroboam and Ahijah, who led the opposition, became decisive in the division of the 
kingdom.  
 
Jeroboam was one of Solomon‟s officials, who became his most challenging enemy. 
Impressed by Jeroboam‟s abilities while he was building the Millo at Jerusalem, Solomon 
had promoted him to the position of overseer of the labour force over the house of Joseph 





thinks that in this position Jeroboam was given sufficient power to enable Solomon to 
evade the established strongmen of the fractious territory of Joseph and still hold it.
818
 
Solomon may have found it wiser to assign the task of implementing his unpopular 
policies in Ephraim, a place where they were most likely to be resisted, to an influential 
local man.  Strategies of this kind were often noted in Rwandan politics, where 
penetration into perceived hostile constituencies was attempted by putting forward 




Contrary to what Solomon may have expected, Jeroboam‟s promotion did not make him 
subservient to the regime. He soon “raised his hand” against Solomon.” This obscure 
expression has been understood as indicating an act of revolt or rebellion. Rabbinic 
exegesis circumscribed Jeroboam‟s rebellious act as inciting the public against Solomon, 
especially concerning the harsh levy of the king.
820
 In the narrative, the revolt is 
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presented as initiated by Yahweh as a way of his judgment against Solomon. Jeroboam‟s 
attitude toward Solomon changed at the instigation of Ahijah, a prophet sent by Yahweh 
to initiate the implementation of this judgment. It seems, however, that the position given 
to Jeroboam put him in a better position to notice the regime‟s oppressive policies that his 
fellow northerners were subjected to and about which they later complained.  
 
Jeroboam‟s identification and sympathy with the people of his tribe and his region may 
have prompted him to distance himself from the regime, which had become unpopular in 
the north. This can be deduced from his ability to maintain good relations with the 
exploited people. They were probably aware of his position against the forced labour he 
was sent to supervise. When the time came for the people to speak out against it they 
knew that they could count on him and they called him. On the other hand, Jeroboam 
may have wanted to use this socio-economic situation as an occasion or a pretext for 
fulfilling the ambition he may have always nourished to climb to the top, lead the 
secession and become king. As a mighty man of valour, he had the qualities that the tribal 
communities were looking for in a leader, similar to the pre-monarchical judges or the 
subsequent kings such as Saul or David.   The involvement of the prophet Ahijah from 
Shilo has led to the interpretation that the religious group in Shilo may have backed the 
revolt against Solomon and this could result from rivalry between Shilo and Jerusalem.
821
 
Like Absalom, Jeroboam seems to have enjoyed enough popularity to inspire in him a 
desire to aspire for the top seat. 
 
In one way or the other, the contemplated possibility of Jeroboam‟s becoming king at 
Solomon‟s expense may have reached the incumbent king, who then sought to kill his 
rival and thwart his plans. Jeroboam fled to Egypt and Solomon seems to have been able 
to keep the unrest under control, but without mending the rift. As Kaiser stated: 
 
For forty years Solomon ruled his people, but the seed of defection from the union 
had been established in his own day. Though he would die before the fruits of 
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some of his disastrous policies would come to fruition, the division of the 




Perhaps the remedy was still possible, had Solomon‟s son and successor, Rehoboam, 
been wiser. Unfortunately, as seen in the preceding chapter, unity and harmony were 
apparently not the priorities of the new king and his preferred advisors around him.  Their 
failure to identify with the pain endured by the northerners and the concern not to lose the 
privileges that they had become accustomed to prevented them from correctly 
appreciating the socio-economic situation and its political implications. It was the short-
sighted position of these Judahites in power that took the division of the kingdom beyond 
repair.   
 
The division of the kingdom was “one of the most decisive and traumatic events in 
Israel‟s long history”.
823
 At the division, the Davidic Empire dissolved neither Israel nor 
Judah, being capable of holding its constituent states together. It was an opportunity for 
the countries previously conquered by David to claim their independence. “Israel and 
Judah, therefore, were left as two of the half-dozen or so minor kingdoms in Palestine, 
whose fortunes during the succeeding centuries were to be determined by greater powers 
from outside, namely Damascus, Syria, Egypt and Babylon”.
824
 The division became a 
remote cause for the deportation of God‟s people, an event that put an end to the 
enjoyment of one major aspect of God‟s promise to his chosen people, namely the 
promise of the land.  
 
Although it was generally thought that the disagreement over the people‟s demand for the 
relaxation of the corvée was the main bone of contention that led to the division
825
, this 
was just one aspect of the problem. Many more socio-economic issues contributed to 
fostering the alienation of the northern tribes from Judah, even before the Shechem crisis. 
This chapter has shown that the Shechem crisis had its roots in the early history of Israel. 
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argue that tribal jealousy was the primary cause of the division of the monarchy.  Of 
course tribalistic tendencies were noticed in both the discriminatory attitude of the 
Jerusalem regime against the north and in the secessionist cry of the northerners against 
the pre-eminence of David and his “house”:  
 
“We have no inheritance in the son of Jesse;  
To your tent, O Israel!  
Now look after your own house, David!” (1 Kings 12:16).   
 
It is helpful to differentiate the root causes of the conflict from the way it was expressed. 
Israelite conflict, like the Rwandan conflict, took a tribal line, but was not rooted in tribal 
differences. The tribes separated not because of their tribal differences, but because of 
their failure to agree on the way to fairly share the resources available to them all. 
 
The Deuteronomistic editor, believed to be responsible for this version of the narrative,  
explains the division underlining Solomon‟s idolatry as the main sin that called for 
Yahweh‟s judgment (1Kings 11: -13). He sinned against Yahweh by marrying many 
foreign women who led him to worship their gods. However, even for this editor, 
Solomon‟s sin may have been broader than idolatry alone. His attitude towards material 
possession (1Kings 10: 14-29) was contrary to God‟s will (Deuteronomy 17:14-17). His 
attitude towards the people (1Kings 5:13-18) epitomises the negative aspect of the 
monarchy that made it displeasing to Yahweh (1Sam 8:10-18). Solomon‟s sin consisted 
of both his disloyalty to Yahweh and his oppression of the people. Brindle (1974, 232) 
suggests that Solomon gradually entered into open violation of three divine rules Yahweh 
had given to govern the conduct of kings: (1) he multiplied military forces with chariots 
and horsemen (Deuteronomy 17:16; (2) he loved many foreign women (Deuteronomy 
17:17); (3) he amassed silver and gold (Deuteronomy 17:17). Solomon‟s extravagance 
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resulted in moral deterioration and religious apostasy. He permitted the thinking and 
customs of other nations to influence his decisions and manner of living. Solomon 
specifically broke the covenant stipulations of Exodus 20:3-6, concerning going after 
other gods and Exodus 20: 22-23; Deuteronomy 4:15-15, 25-28; 5:7-9; 7:3-4 concerning 
intermarriage with unbelievers foreigners. Brindle seems to adopt the Deuteronomist 
view as he assert that Solomon‟s sin struck at the heart of theocracy and God‟s 
sovereignty and providence were at work in the various factors that contributed to the 
division of the kingdom.  
 
In Brindle‟s analysis, if God was involved in the event of the division, but acted through 
already existing situations where human agents acted freely, so that all those who were 
involved in the causes and in the event of the division are responsible for their acts. 
Neither the division nor its immediate and remote causes were created by God to be 
imposed on the people. The people involved deliberately played an active role. In 
punishing Solomon, it is reported that the “Lord raised up” enemies against him. 
However as the narrative makes it plain, the Lord did not “create” Solomon‟s enemies, 
the House of David made them. 
 
6.3 Summary 
The division of the kingdom of Israel cannot simply be blamed on God. However, despite 
the pervading divine involvement in this event, Yahweh is not perceived as the main 
responsible agent for this unfortunate event. The responsibility of the human parties 
involved is highlighted, so that Yahweh is neither reproached for imposing this 
misfortune on his people nor for doing nothing to prevent it. From this perspective, the 
account of the division provides a useful framework for approaching the theological 
questions arising from the event of the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. 
 
Rwanda is not a theocratic monarchy, but this does not make the problem of the Rwandan 
conflict solely susceptible to a socio-political analysis, the problem is also theological and 
so theological analysis is also appropriate. Like the Israelites, most Rwandans affected by 
the horror of the Genocide have been taught both the attributes of God and religious 
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virtues, such as love, equity, justice and unity, that happen to be among Christian values. 
They have good reasons to ask questions about God‟s attitude in the conflict that affected 
them and, as Tschuy observes, “Despite many cases of courage, self-sacrifice and 
martyrdom, the churches have to face up to the problem of Christians killing Christians 
and of churches and church centres becoming mass graves for thousands”.
828
  In the next 
chapter this theological question and its underlying socio-political aspects, is approached 
by means of a dialogue between the context of the division of the kingdom of Israel and 
the context of the Rwandan Genocide. The chapter will outline some tribal-related issues 
present in the background of the division of the Kingdom in Israel that are dynamically 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: ISRAELITE AND RWANDAN CONTEXTS IN DIALOGUE 
 
7.0 Introduction  
The examination of the root reasons for the division of the Kingdom has allowed us to 
note that this event had more to it than just Solomon's sin and God‟s punishment, as 
emphasised by the biblical redactor. The context described in the biblical tradition as well 
as the social history of Israel indicate that the division resulted from socio-economic 
problems that developed throughout the history of Israel. These problems revolved 
around the people‟s resistance against the leaders who exploited and oppressed them 
instead of serving them. The conflicts that resulted took tribal lines, as the leaders 
appealed to kinship relations to support their regimes. Aspects of this socio-economic 
conflict in Israel find parallels in the Rwandan conflict, examined in the second and third 
chapters of the present work. The present chapter attempts to sum up some major socio-
economic and political issues involved in both conflicts, as discussed in the previous 
chapters, and to examine the extent to which tribal diversity contributed to the conflicts.  
 
As was explained in the second chapter of this thesis, the present work follows a 
comparative and evaluative approach. This approach aims at the actualisation of the 
theological meaning of the text in today‟s context, so as to forge integration between faith 
and life and engender commitment to personal and societal transformation.
829
  To this 
end, the biblical text and the Rwandan context examined in the preceding chapters are 
brought together for a mutual and dynamic interaction in this chapter.  My deliberate 
choice to read the text and its context from the perspective of the victims of exploitation 
and discrimination, or, in West‟s words, my ideo-theological orientation influenced by 
my social location,
830
 guided the choice of the analytical categories selected from both 
contexts for interaction. The dialogue in this chapter is a back-and-forth movement 
between text and context, as Draper has described it.
831
 Generally, the discussion begins 
with the Rwandan context used as the subject of interpretation, so that the biblical text is 
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interpreted against the background of the Rwandan experience with the aim of arriving at 
a new understanding of the text.
832
 Yet this approach does not rule out the possibility of 
starting with the biblical text, then using the biblical insights to provide a theological 
foundation for issues raised in the Rwandan context. The movement is dialogical since 
text and context “talk” to each other. 
 
Issues covered are basically taken from the materials of chapters three and four, which 
discussed the Rwandan context, on the one hand, and from chapter five and six, which 
concentrated on the analysis of the biblical text and its context, on the other. However, 
the dialogue between the Rwandan context and the biblical text is still possible beyond 
the limits of the text and context of 1 King 12:1-24 selected for the purpose of the present 
work. This broader applicability of the approach is evidenced by the inclusion in the 
following interaction of some comparative categories which are taken from outside the 
materials of the preceding chapters, but that fit well into this comparative approach.  
 
The people, whose responsibility in conflicts comes to the fore in the discussion, fall into 
four following categories. There are the political leaders and their divisive regimes; then 
the people heeding divisive messages. The discussion includes the contribution of 
external powers to internal conflicts; and ends with the examination of the attitude of 
God‟s servants in times of conflict. Attention is given first to the role of political leaders. 
 
7.1. Inequitable regimes jeopardize social unity 
In Israel, as in Rwanda, autocratic leaders were determined to maintain their grip on 
power and to monopolize the control and distribution of resources. In their bid to secure 
and keep power and its privileges, these leaders sought and obtained support and loyalty 
from their closest kin, whom they rewarded with privileges, to the exclusion of those 
judged “outsiders”, and at the expense of the labouring masses that bore the price of the 
production of these resources. Such nepotistic regimes fit the description of a trend now 
known as patrimonialism, found in many states in Africa. This section examines aspects 
of patrimonialism in Rwandan regimes and discusses the effect of patrimonialism in 
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promoting tribal polarization, in favouring small groups of influential people close to the 
leader, referred to below as “Akazu”, and in rejecting any wisdom that does not serve 
their interests. Attempt is made to understand the context of tribal conflicts in Israel in the 
light of patrimonialism. 
 
7.1.1. Patrimonialism and tribal polarization in Rwanda 
Patrimonialism is a term used by Weber
833
 to describe a system of authority whereby 
those lower in the hierarchy are not subordinate officials with defined powers and 
functions, but retainers whose positions depend on a leader to whom they owe allegiance. 
The system is held together by loyalty or kinship ties, rather than by a hierarchy of 
administrative grades and functions.
834
 This tendency, which Gifford deems prevalent in 
African states, makes them different from Western societies, which rest on another type 
of authority described by Weber as a “rational-legal authority”. In this system, estimates 
Gifford, power has come to be exercised through legally defined structures, for a publicly 
acknowledged aim. Operating these structures are officials who, in exercising the power 
of the office, treat other individuals impersonally, according to criteria which the 
structure demands.
835
 Features of patrimonialism observed in successive Rwandan 
regimes are not much different from what occured in dynastic Israel. 
 
7.1.1.1 Patrimonialism in Rwandan political leadership 
Patrimonialism, as described by Gifford, was prevalent in pre-colonial Rwanda. This is a 
period during which clientelism worked through a hierarchy of “power brokers”,
836
 
namely, local leaders whom the central figure entrusted with power and socio-economic 
privileges. They acted as representatives of the central authority in their constituencies. 
The central figure delivered benefits to the local grandee, who, in turn, delivered the 
support of his area to the supremo.
837
 This structure continued into the colonial period, 
thanks to the Germans‟ and Belgians‟ “Indirect Rule” that continued and reinforced the 
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traditional social structure. In pre-colonial and colonial Rwanda, patrimonialism was 
practised along kinship lines, as the central figure was always a Tutsi king who entrusted 
power and privileges to local chiefs who were predominantly Tutsi. 
 
The successive post-colonial regimes did not correct the social imbalances they 
disapproved of in previous regimes.  As a matter of fact, independent Rwanda has now 
had three regimes, each of which ousted its predecessor on the indictment of social 
discrimination and exclusion. To the classic patrimonial system, where clientelism was 
formally acknowledged as the official form of government, the post-colonial regimes in 
Rwanda substituted what Gifford tagged “neo-patrimonialism”. This is a system formally 
constituted on the principle of rational legality, where states function with the apparatus 
of a modern state, but officials tend to exercise their powers as a form not of public 




All the post-independence regimes in Rwanda claimed to be democratic and to serve the 
interests of the masses. What was noted, however, was a persisting determination of the 
leading elite in the successive regimes each time to look after the interests of its 
constituent tribe or group and, by that token, the preoccupation to acquire a kind of 
legitimacy as the authentic representative of that group.  In this neo-patrimonial Rwanda, 
clientelism continued to follow kinship lines. Loyalty to kinship was easily harnessed in 
the power scramble by the leading elite promising to restore the dignity, security and 
socio-economic privileges of a particular tribe or group, really or allegedly oppressed by 
the preceding regime. Each time, the “deliverers” of one social group became the 
oppressors of the other groups to whom they denied the same rights they were fighting 
for. The finding of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission of 2002 was that 
bad governance has been historically a major cause of disunity among the Rwandan 
people.
839
 The Commission named, among other elements of bad governance, dictatorial 
and sectarian leadership and biased teaching given to Rwandans over generations.
840
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Patrimonialism, coupled with tribalism, exacerbated division in Rwandan society. A 
similar trend was observed during Israel‟s dynastic regimes.   
 
7.1.1.2 Patrimonialism in Israel 
The rise of the monarchy in Israel meant the formation of a centrally administered 
territorial state in an area that was formerly structured along tribal lines. As Dietrich
841
  
pointed out, this development brought about decisive economic and thus social changes. 
These changes included the development of a new centre of economics and wealth 
surrounding the royal court, a centre that profited mainly the king and his family, as well 
as his loyal followers. A group of elites that had not previously existed then emerged, 
meaning that not everyone participated equally in the increasing political and economic 
wealth created by the kingdom. In general, we can assume that the rulers particularly 
cared for their own power bases by granting their supporters a series of privileges.
842
 This 
situation is evident through a description of Saul‟s royal table, where the king sat upon 
his seat, Jonathan, the crown prince sitting opposite, Abner the leader of the Army and 
king‟s cousin sitting by the king‟s side, the next seat being for David, the commander of 
the mercenary troops and the king‟s son-in-law (1 Samuel 20:25). All these top leaders in 
Saul‟s kingdom were the king‟s close relatives. 
 
The patrimonial character of dynastic regimes in Israel is better described in the so-called 
“rights of the king” (1 Samuel 8:11-17). This text, believed, though with no certainty, to 
originate from early monarchy,
843
 contains a list of exploitative measures associated with 
dynastic monarchy in Israel. Indications pointing to practices similar to those described in 
this passage are found further in the accounts of the kings that reigned over the united 
kingdom. Saul‟s reported scolding of his fellow Benjamites (1 Samuel 22:7-8) may 
indicate that the king‟s servants, most of whom were his close relatives, were rewarded 
for their loyalty and services with land and with prominent positions. Commenting on the 
land alluded to in Saul‟s speech, Dietrich observed:  
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The text does not say from where he took these lands. It stands to reason that they 
were not his own or that of his family; these lands would not have been large 
enough, and the Benjamites – according to the words used – were no stewards of 
royal lands but rather owners of their own lands and vineyards. It seems that Saul 
provided them with land – or allowed them to provide themselves with land that 




If Saul favoured the Benjamites, David favoured the Judahites and the Jerusalemites. As 
seen in the preceding chapter, the top positions formerly occupied by Saul‟s family were, 
later in David‟s kingdom, given to David‟s relatives such as Joab, Asahel and Abishai, 
sons of the king‟s sister, Jonathan, his brother‟s son (2 Samuel 21:21) and many others of 
his relatives or his mercenaries, most of whom were from Judah.
845
 David‟s own sons 
were royal advisors (2 Samuel 8:15-16). In Solomon‟s kingdom socio-economic 
imbalances were enhanced by taxes and compulsory labour imposed on northern 
Israelites, while Judah was exempted from such obligations (1 Kings 4:12).  
 
Frick has used two concepts to describe the practices by which the sovereigns in early 
Israel used socio-economic privileges to legitimate and strengthen their own positions of 
leadership. He referred to “clientship”, a bond between a political superior and a person 
to whom he has delegated part of his authority, and to “reciprocity”, a system whereby 
successful patrons who have accumulated material wealth are able to use their positions 
to gain more clients and more power.
846
 In the united kingdom of Israel, dynastic 
monarchs who controlled the redistribution of resources reverted to clientship and 
reciprocity to win support and loyalty, mainly from their kinspeople, members of their 
tribe. Social tensions and conflicts resulted from the reaction of the tribes that were not 
given equal opportunity for access to such privileges.  The phenomenon described above 
in Frick‟s terms in relation to Israel is nothing less than the patrimonialism described by 
Gifford in relation to African states. 
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A pattern characteristic of patrimonialism has been the emergence of small groups of 
very influential people surrounding the heads of states, often closely related to them. In 
many cases this group grows so powerful that they come to constitute an unofficial nerve 
centre of state power, masterminding decisions that neither the head of the state nor any 
other constituted organ can overrule.  This phenomenon was referred to as Akazu
847
 in 
Rwandan politics, but finds its parallel in Israel‟s regimes.  
 
7.1.2 The “Akazu” phenomenon: headquarters of oppression 
A Rwandan popular saying “Umwami ntiyica hica rubanda” can be paraphrased, “It is 
not the king who executes, but the people around him”. The saying refers to unpopular 
attitudes and decisions often adopted by kings and for which they are justly held 
responsible, even though such decisions originate not from the king himself but from his 
entourage. This saying finds application in the intransigence of Habyarimana, who 
succumbed to the influence of his entourage, thus hastening his fall.  It may also apply to 
the influence of Rehoboam‟s young advisors, which brought an end to the hegemony of 
„David‟s House” over Israel. Both leaders paid too much attention to the sycophants they 
had surrounded themselves with.  
 
7.1.2.1 The “Akazu” phenomenon in Rwandan politics 
The pre-colonial and colonial periods were marked by Tutsi regimes, but the power was 
not distributed equally among all the Tutsi. One particular group of blood-related Tutsi 
from the Nyiginya clan constituted the oligarchy that succeeded in maintaining the 
monopoly of political power for centuries.
848
 Their hegemony lasted until late in the early 
20th century, when a rival Tutsi clan, the Bega, succeeded in toppling them, in what was 
called the “Coup d’état of Rucunshu”.
849
 It was this new dynasty that suffered the 
interference of the colonisers and the challenge of the Hutu. It was the attempt to remove 
them from power and their resistance that turned violent, forcing many Tutsi to go into 
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exile. During the Bega regime the “akazu” of a Tutsi extremist group, the so-called 
“Abagaragu b’umwami bakuru” (the senior servants of the king) arose to oppose the 




The Hutu regime that took over from the Tutsi was not better in terms of power-sharing. 
Claiming to be republican and democratic, the new leaders did not establish a new 
dynasty. But it was soon to be observed that political power was concentrated in the 
hands of people from one region of the country. There was a time when half of the 
members of the government originated from two districts among the 149 that made up the 
whole country. Power was not in the hands of the then President, Kayibanda, but in the 
hands of a small group behind him.  It was this situation that provided a pretext for a 
group of army officers, led by Major General Habyarimana, to organize a coup that 
toppled the regime on 5 July 1973. The organisers of the coup were from the northern 
region of the country, a region they reckoned to have been marginalized by the previous 
regime, and so they undertook to correct the imbalance. The government‟s centre of 
gravity shifted from Nduga in the south to Rukiga in the north, or, more exactly, from 
Gitarama prefecture to Gisenyi prefecture.
851
 This was the beginning of a social rift in the 
country, which led Rwandans to be identified according to an oversimplified binary 
division as either northerners or southerners.  
  
The new regime‟s determination to vindicate the “marginalized” northern region of the 
country was openly expressed through the so-called “equilibrium policy”. This policy 
was implemented through a quota system allocated to each prefecture and to each ethnic 
group, with respect to admission to public schools and employment.
852
 The principle 
itself was unpopular enough among the “southerners” whom it disfavoured and 
frustrated. The abuse of it by some “northerners”, wishing to secure and maintain the 
monopoly of power and privileges, further increased the rift and created tension between 
the two camps, north and south. During this time the feeling of being marginalized 
shifted from the north to the rest of the country. This sentiment somehow reduced the 
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social gap between Hutu and the Tutsi of the “south”, who faced a common challenge 
from the “north”.  
 
It was in the face of mounting pressure from those who felt excluded that a nucleus of 
northern hardliners emerged who were determined to maintain their power and 
subsequent privileges. Most members of this Akazu were related to the President through 
his wife. They became so powerful, to the point of highjacking power, that Habyarimana 
could no longer decide anything against their wishes. Members of this Akazu are 
perceived as responsible for Habyarimana‟s reticent attitude towards the people‟s demand 
for genuine democratisation of the institutions and especially his repeated postponement 
of the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement, which, when implemented, 
considerably reduced his power and influence and, by the same token, put an end to the 
dominion of the Akazu.  This group of northerners exerted a heavy pressure on 
Habyarimana, who could not safely ignore the opinion of his closest supporters who were 
opposed to political changes that implied power-sharing and unavoidably the end of the 
northern Hutu hegemony. This kind of influence is equally noticed throughout dynastic 
Israel.  
 
7.1.2.2 Influence of Akazu in dynastic Israel 
Israel‟s leaders were good at surrounding themselves with people of their own tribes and 
families. One of the corollaries of the patrimonialism that pervaded political leadership in 
Israel was the tendency observed among the people surrounding the king to cling to the 
privileges that they enjoyed by virtue of their kinship relationship to the king.  These 
people would endeavour to hold on to power, which they deemed to be a property of their 
tribe, and were very reluctant to release it. This attitude is observed with the Benjamites 
when Abner suggested the transfer of power from Saul‟s house to David‟s. Abner knew 
that it was not enough to ask Ishbaal to resign, he also needed to convince the house of 
Benjamin to release the throne (2 Samuel 3:19). Power belonged not to Ishbaal but to the 
“Akazu” of the Benjaminites. The extremists among them such as Sheba and Shimei, 




The men of Judah surrounding king David manifested the same sentiment when they felt 
that their claim to pre-eminence was threatened (2 Samuel 20: 42, 43). Fokkelman‟s 
pertinent observation that the complaint of the men of Israel, in the incident reported in 
the passage above, was addressed to David, but that the response came from the men of 
Judah,
853
 might reveal the kind of control the men of Judah intended to have or believed 
they had over the king. They felt free to speak for the king who, needing them to maintain 
his throne, would not dare contradict them. This is at least the view of Tadmor, who 
believes that it was David‟s failure to reserve a special status to his men of Judah that had 
pushed them to support Absalom‟s revolt.
854
 David had now learnt his lesson. The 
attitude of the prominent men of Judah throughout the revolt of Absalom revealed that 
they had a grip on power and the king could hardly secure his throne without their 
support.  
 
The division narrative that presents the division of the kingdom as a direct result of 
Rehoboam‟s arrogant answer to the people‟s petition still makes it plain that the king‟s 
answer was dictated by his advisors.  Rehoboam faithfully communicated to the people 
the decision taken by a group of advisors whose opinion he valued highly.  The 
description of these advisors as young men who grew up with Rehoboam may help 
understand their attitude. Their being young implies that they were inexperienced and, as 
such, they are contrasted with the older and wiser advisors whose advice the king 
rejected. However, as young as the preferred young advisors could be, they were 
Rehoboam‟s age-mates and this seems to surmise that they were mature enough to 
understand the pain of the oppressed people. But there is more in their description. That 
these “young men” had probably grown up with Rehoboam may indicate that they were 
men from Judah who had not suffered the hard labour imposed on the northern tribes, but 
who had been and were still benefiting from this exploitation and oppression.  
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The Rwandan Genocide resulted directly from the intransigence of the President, whose 
determination to hold on to power led him to ignore the wishes of the people. But in his 
intransigence the President was just the speaker of a small group of his closest allies, 
whom he had permitted to usurp the power which normally should belong to the whole 
people.  The supreme leader of the nation ended up becoming a prisoner of the “Akazu”, 
losing the freedom to exercise his authority. Similarly, the harsh answer of Rehoboam 
that triggered the division of the kingdom in Israel was a direct consequence of 
patrimonialism that pervaded political leadership. By surrounding himself with people 
who prioritised their own interests and the interests of their social group above the 
interests of the whole people, Rehoboam put himself in a position where he could no 
longer satisfy his people‟s expectations. Even if he wanted to be moderate and 
reasonable, he was not free to do so. Power did not belong to him, it belonged to the 
“Akazu” from the tribe of Judah. The same abuse of patrimonialism greatly contributed 
to social conflicts in both contexts. Unfortunately, unlike in Israel, where the oppressed 
people managed to successfully resist the oppressor, in Rwanda the people paid heavily, 
as the ruling “Akazu” resorted to the Genocide in its attempt to break the resistance. But 
in Israel, as in Rwanda, the conflict reached an undesirable end because the voice of 
hardliners was louder than that of the peacemakers, whose wise contribution was ignored. 
 
7.1.3 The ignored voice of the wise  
Beside the groups of intransigent and arrogant hardliners responsible for the 
unyieldingness of the regimes in Israel and in Rwanda, there were surely in each context 
another group of wise, experienced and moderate politicians advocating peace and 
reconciliation. Unfortunately, the wisdom of these wise peacemakers could not save the 
situation because it was ignored by the headstrong decision-makers. In the division 
narrative, these wise people are identified and their contribution revealed. In the case of 
the Rwandan conflict such people are not well known. In this case, what is known from 
the context of the biblical text may help to recognise and to understand what is not very 




7.1.3.1 The ignored voice of the wise elders in Israel  
The elders who had served under Rehoboam‟s father understood better the situation of 
the complaining people because they knew its background. They were there when 
Solomon‟s administrative policies were implemented, they were part of the oppressive 
regime and they witnessed the suffering of the people. Besides, the fact that Rehoboam 
could approach these elders for advice may indicate that they were not part of the 
complaining group. It is then most probable that they belonged to the tribe of Judah. 
Since these elders had served under Solomon, they had been part of the regime that 
imposed a heavy yoke on the northern tribes and benefited, even if unwittingly, from the 
benefits of this exploitation. This may raise the question of their responsibility in the 
oppression of the northerners. 
 
The attitude of the elders indicates that they were not in support of the oppressive 
measures. Maybe they never supported this exploitation from the time of its conception, 
but still they served the regime that conceived and implemented it. The exploitative and 
oppressive character of the regime may have disturbed them, but they did not oppose it. It 
was only when a crisis confronted them, and when their opinion was sought, that they 
were courageous enough to speak the truth. But was this all these wise people could have 
done? Was their advice not too little and coming too late? 
 
The narrative describes these wise elders as a group of people whose position under 
Solomon implies some responsibility in the regime‟s exploitation of the northern tribes. 
Unfortunately, the narrative does not provide full information that can allow for a fair 
judgement of their attitude. Whether they enjoyed the benefits of this oppression and 
actively took part in it, or whether they were silent and passive observers, or whether they 
had occasion to speak out against it, the text is silent.  
 
The elders‟ advice to Rehoboam may simply indicate that there had been among 
Solomon‟s collaborators officials who did not support his unpopular measures. But the 
presence of diverging opinion did not prevent the implementation of his policies. The 
reason may be that such people were not bold enough to challenge the regime, fearing for 
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their personal security and that of their positions. It may be that they, or some of them, 
were not in favour of the exploitation but remained indifferent, feeling that they should 
not interfere, since the exploitation, was not directed against them and their families. It 
may be that they did speak, but their voice was too soft and easily ignored, when the 
voice of the hardliners was louder and stronger. A similar situation is observed with 
respect to some peoples‟ attitude toward the Rwandan Genocide 
 
7.1.3.2 The weak voice of the peacemakers in Rwanda 
It is generally agreed that not all the Hutu, peasants or politicians, actively participated in 
the Genocide, not even all those who were members of the most indicted political party, 
Habyarimana‟s MRND, nor those who were members of his army. Some of these Hutu 
people made clear their position against the Genocide, either through their boldness in 
speaking out against it or through their courageous attitude in protecting the Tutsi 
targeted by the killings. There are many others whose personal participation in the 
Genocide is not established, but who are credited with little or no express act of opposing 
it. The question of their responsibility defies easy answers. 
 
In an attempt to distinguish different levels of responsibility in the Rwandan Genocide 
the people involved have been grouped into categories.  For instance, Sibomana
855
 places 
at the top those who planned the Genocide, followed by their technicians who 
implemented the plan, then the people who carried out orders, and the chain includes the 
spectators who, though not active in the killing, were present at the scene of the crime. 
Those who belong to this last category are guilty for their tacit agreement, their 
indifference, or their failure to revolt. For Sibomana, this attitude of silence determined 
the success of the enterprise. The law on the crimes of the Genocide adopted by the 
Rwandan government in August 1996 follows a similar approach of categorising the 
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Despite these laudable efforts to differentiate the level of responsibility in order to render 
an even-handed justice, it remains difficult to establish the responsibility of those whose 
alleged crime is that they did nothing. Their indictment is essentially based on the mere 
assumption that since they were there, they could do something, which they failed to do. 
Sibomana believes that had all those who held their peace shouted in opposition to the 
killings, their noise could have made a difference. Sibomana‟s argument is based on the 
assumption that the Genocide happened because there were not enough voices against it. 
This logic is in line with the opinion of those who wonder how a minority of extremists 
ended up having their own way. The fact is that crimes like the Genocide are not adopted 
following a democratic vote so that the opinion of the majority may prevail.  
 
Speaking out might have made more of a difference in preventing the Genocide than in 
stopping it. Even at the prevention level the voice that could have made a difference 
would have been that of people expressing themselves through organized social structures 
rather than the voices of individuals. Had such voice been heard calling for reconciliation 
and power-sharing before, or at least after, the events of 1959-1962 that cost the lives of 
many Tutsi and sent more of them into exile, Rwandan history could have taken a 
different turn and may have avoided the Genocide. Had the Rwandan church and the civil 
societies in general united their voices to speak for the Tutsi refugees when they were 
expelled from Uganda by Obote‟s regime in 1982, and denied entry into Rwanda by the 
Habyarimana regime, the RPF would probably have had more problems in motivating its 
attack on Rwanda in 1990. Unfortunately, during such periods of crises that later 
produced the Genocide, the peacemaking voice was weak, if there was any. 
 
To stop the Genocide after it had been launched much noise could have been good, but 
surely not enough, because the effect of these noises still depended on the willingness of 
the perpetrators to listen. In the absence of the will to listen to „normal‟ logic, these 
killers needed to face something more persuasive than mere opposing opinion. The 
militiamen involved in the killings may have been fewer in number, but they were 
equipped, encouraged and often co-ordinated. Those who resisted had no power to make 
the killers listen to them. All who resisted did so in isolated cases. They couldn‟t count on 
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anybody for protection or support; the few politicians perceived as potential objectors to 
the killings having been the priority targets of the massacre. There was nobody to 
encourage the people to resist and oppose the Genocide.  Surely the RPF, through its 
Radio Muhabura, called upon the few people who listened to their broadcasts, giving 
some instructions as to how to behave. However, the RPF was too far from most of the 
people and could not grant them any protection whatsoever to enable them to safely stand 
against the killing. For many of the silent observers, abstaining from active participation 
in the killing was all they could do to remain clean and keeping quiet was all they could 
do to remain safe. Any form of resistance was an act of heroism. Heroism is not a 
common virtue and, as Sibomana admits, nobody can be condemned for not being a hero!   
 
7.1.4 Summary 
As noted earlier, the practice of patrimonialism was mutually benefiting to the leader on 
the one hand and his kinsfolk on the other hand.  By surrounding himself with the people 
of his tribe, the central figure hoped to secure loyalty and support from the people he 
could generally trust the most. By granting them strategic positions he made them 
stakeholders, whose vested interest in the regime would motivate them to support and 
defend it. From the “Abagaragu b’umwami bakuru” in monarchic Rwanda, to the 
Gitarama politicians under Kayibanda and then the members of Akazu of the 
Habyarimana regime, each group, in its time, was determined to keep the monopoly of 
power and to exclude those they deemed outsiders. These extreme aspects of 
patrimonialism were attested even when the concerned regimes claimed to be democratic. 
Kayibanda abolished the monarchy, to replace it with a democratic regime, which 
Lemarchand later evaluated as a “democracy for the Hutu.”
857
 Habyarimana promised to 
be more democratic, but his “democratie responsable”
858
 could simply be called a 
“democracy for the northern Hutu”. Nowadays, it is often argued that democracy in 
Africa ought to be different from the Western type of democracy. Yet, nobody has ever 
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described the kind of democracy that is suitable for the African context. Therefore, 
whatever is suitable to the leader and his group is often called democracy.  
 
A minister in the current regime in Kigali reasoned that this regime is democratic, since 
“the majority of members of cabinets are Hutu, the prime minister and the speaker of the 
house are Hutu and approximately seventy percent of the members of parliaments are 
Hutu, while several opposition parties (however small) sit in the assembly”.
859
 The 
emphasis here seems to be on the numbers of Hutu who hold prominent positions, not on 
how they got there, and not on the extent to which the people have a say in the 
governance of their country. The post-Genocide regime in Rwanda has an understandable 
concern to prevent multi-party politics from taking shape along ethnic lines, which could 
revive ethnic disputes that would undermine national unity. This concern prompted the 




The Rwandan case illustrates situations where the Western kind of democracy, with its 
corollary of majority rule, is deemed unsuitable. Majority rule in Rwanda means Hutu 
rule and, to some, this risks discrimination against the Tutsi. The question I would 
suggest for further investigation is the following: What kind of democracy will be 
suitable for Rwanda that would be democracy for all? This is an urgent question, and may 
be pertinent to many other African countries.  
 
In monarchic Israel, each of the first four kings sought and enjoyed support from an 
„Akazu‟.  King Rehoboam, who was mindful of how much he counted on this kind of 
support for his personal security and the security of his throne, could not ignore the 
opinion of his supporters. The young men at his palace were more than mere advisors, 
they were stakeholders in the regime, who were determined to preserve their own 
interests and the interests of their tribes. They probably saw in the petition of the northern 
tribes an attempt to question their rights to enjoy exclusive political and economic 
privileges. Their suggested answer clearly intended to intimidate and silence the people 
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who should not dare question the status quo. Rehoboam‟s young advisors formed a group 
of influential people wishing to hold on to political power and associated privileges and 
used their power and influence to direct the decision of the head of state.  
 
The case of the division of the kingdom in Israel illustrates the disheartening reality that 
peacemakers in our societies may not necessarily have the last say in decisions affecting 
social harmony. They may be many, but still lack ways of making their voices heard. 
From both the Israel and the Rwandan cases it was noted that the extremists do not need 
to be in the majority to pull the situation their way. This is not surprising in these days 
when, in many parts of the world, the possession and exercise of power, be it military or 
political, does not have much to do with the opinion of the majority. The Rwandan case 
seems to indicate that even majority rule is no longer seen as a guarantee for peacemakers 
to get their own way. The need for, and ways of, empowering peacemakers in Rwanda 
and in Africa remains a challenge. It is an issue that should be explored further, but which 
extends beyond the scope of the present study.  Peace-building is the responsibility of 
every reasonable citizen, especially those who lead. The people are easily divided by their 
leaders, as is discussed in the next section. 
 
7.2 The People’s response to divisive ideologies in Rwanda and in Israel 
The inequitable distribution of privileges in Rwanda and in Israel negatively affected 
social unity, by dividing the society into groups with opposing interests. On one hand, 
those having access to privileges were united by the common interest to defend them. On 
the other hand, those excluded from the desired privileges were drawn closer by their 
common need to fight for their ignored rights. As shared interests drew people together, 
conflicting interests loosened even pre-existing social ties. Myths and traditions
861
 were 
used to cement this estrangement. 
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7.2.1 Diverging interests loosen social ties in Rwanda 
Although the social categorisation of Rwandan people into Hutu, Tutsi and Twa existed 
in pre-colonial Rwanda, there seems to have been enough commonalities among the three 
social groups, who perceived themselves as one people descending from one common 
ancestor. Traditionally, all Rwandans, Hutu, Tutsi and Twa perceived themselves as Bene 
Kanyarwanda “the descendants of Kanyarwanda”. This conviction was strong enough to 
transcend the social barriers and minimise the dividing effects of the existing 
categorisation.
862
 It was the consciousness of their common identity, somehow 
contradicted by the reality of their social diversity, that led Rwandans to come up with 
aetiological myths to explain the causes of the diversity in the homogeneous Rwandan 
society. Apart from the Hamitic Hypothesis brought by the foreign colonisers, most 
myths and stories invented by Rwandans to elucidate these contradictions never departed 
from the basic affirmation of kinship among all Rwandans.  
 
As time went by, uneven distribution of political and economic power among the social 
groups, and the subsequent scramble for the control of this distribution, resulted in 
widening the gap among the groups, weakening the perception of Rwandans that they 
belonged to the one same homogeneous group. With leaders harnessing kinship on their 
way to power, interests and challenges were progressively shared among members of a 
particular social group rather than among all as Rwandans. It was these shared 
interests/challenges that brought together the Hutu, on the one hand, and the Tutsi, on the 
other hand, and it was the conflicting interests between the two social groups that 
estranged them one from the other, when each group perceived the other as its rival, 
opponent, or enemy. Following the need of the moment, the divisive Hamitic hypothesis 
was preferred to the unifying tradition of common descent. The Hamitic hypothesis was 
welcomed first by the Tutsi, who found in it a better argument to serve their interests, as 
it supported their right to exclusive privileges. Later, it was the turn of the Hutu to fall 
back on the same theory in their bid to justify their resolve to exclude the Tutsi from 
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power and associated privileges. The conflicting interest between the two groups emptied 
the traditional kinship of its meaning and relevance, so that each group began to see the 
other as alien.  A similar pattern was observed in Israel. 
 
7.2.2. Diverging interests loosen tribal ties in Israel 
Israel emerged as a confederacy of tribes living in an egalitarian society.  Despite their 
recognized tribal diversity, the Israelites were able to develop a feeling of belonging 
together ethnically, which they expressed through kinship and traditions of common 
descent.
863
 Shared interests and common challenges reinforced their unity. This feeling of 
unity lasted as long as tribal Israel resisted social stratification tendencies and the 
resulting concentration of economic power in the hands of a few privileged families. The 
rise of the monarchy brought its corollary of centralisation and subsequent ranking 
privileges that progressively challenged the egalitarian levelling mechanisms of tribal 
Israel. In dynastic Israel, the kings‟ reliance on kinship to support their regimes 
encouraged those related to the kings to claim exclusive rights to power, pre-eminence 
and privileges to the exclusion of other tribes. Divisions and conflict followed.  
 
The biblical traditions that portray Israel as one people comprising twelve tribes locate 
this unity in diversity in a period when these people valued their being the “children of 
Israel”. Descending from one common patriarch, Jacob, the children of Israel are 
organised into different tribes. This categorisation into tribes does not affect their 
common identity as long as there are no tribal interests conflicting with the interests of 
the whole community, but, more especially, as long as there are no conflicting interests 
among the tribes. Rather, their shared identity is reinforced by common challenges. 
Traditions about the situation of slavery in Egypt, the hardship of the wilderness 
wandering, the wars they fought together and the common goal to reach their promised 
land, all these common challenges and shared interests kept them together, minimizing 
the effects of their classification into tribes. 
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According to biblical traditions, all the tribes of Israel managed to preserve their unity as 
one people throughout the pre-monarchical period. This was a time in their history when 
no tribe managed to monopolize social, political and economic privileges to the exclusion 
and expense of the other tribes. The incident reported as the revolt of Korah shows that 
the community was very sensitive to the issue of the monopoly of power. This concern 
became more evident with the rise of the monarchy, when different tribes began to 
believe that they were entitled to exclusive rights to political leadership. Political 
ambitions triggered jealousies and competitions that jeopardized unity and harmony 
among the Israelite tribes.  
 
At the time of the division of the kingdom, two antagonistic groups had emerged from a 
people who at a certain time called themselves “children of Israel”. At this time the tribes 
were no longer united under the same name „Israel‟. Only the northern tribes, united 
against a common adversary, still called themselves “Israel”.
864
  As for those of the 
opposing group, their identity is no longer established (by their opponents) with reference 
to the common ancestor Jacob, but to one they consider to be a “stranger”. Rehoboam and 
his camp are no longer the children of Israel, they are viewed to as the “sons of Jesse”, 
with whom the “true Israel” has “no share” (1Kings 12: 16). To remain united, Israel‟s 
tribes needed to have less, or no, diverging interests and have more interests in common.    
 
7.2.3 Shared interests/challenges: a basis for self-identification 
Experience has shown that blood kinship is a key factor in social identity and 
categorisation. Turaki has argued that the most powerful principle of social organisation 
is the concept of “brotherhood”, which is derived from “blood relationship”, which is 
characterized by “kinship affinity, loyalties and obligations of relatives”.
865
 He states that 
the unifying factor and the stronger bond of relationship of a given society is created by 
the fact of blood relationship. He notes that (a) common ancestor(s) or origin strengthens 
kinship ties. Genealogical relationship and the legend or the tradition of a founding 
                                                 
864
 The secessionist chorus distinguishes between the “house of David”(the tribe of Judah) and “Israel” (the 
northern tribes). This exclusivist ideology reappears after the exile, this time around it is those of Judah 
who call themselves Israel (Ezra 5:5; 6:16-21; 19; Nehemiah 1:6; 9:1-2; 13:3). 
865
 Turaki, Y. Tribal Gods of Africa. Nairobi, Kenya: Ethics, Peace and Justice Commission of the 
Association of Evangelicals in Africa. 1997, p 52. 
 
 294 
ancestor provides the philosophical basis of unity in a clan or lineage.
866
 It can be argued, 
however, that blood kinship in itself is not the unifying factor, but a phenomenon around 
which more shared and vital interests revolve. Blood relationship loses its force whenever 
there is conflict of interests even among siblings. In Rwanda, for instance, the entrenched 
myth of a common ancestor could no longer serve as a catalyst for national unity when 
interests began to be defined along tribal lines.  
 
As important as blood relationship is in defining the identities and boundaries of social 
communities, it remains far from being the only way of construing identity. Historians 
and anthropologists have associated the Hutu with the Bantu people found in many 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, while the Tutsi were identified as related to the so-
called Nilotes. There is no evidence, however, showing that the Hutu of Rwanda tend to 
have more affinity with the Bantu of the neighbouring countries than they have with the 
Tutsi of Rwanda. The Tutsi of Rwanda do not tend necessarily to associate themselves 
better with the Nilotes of the region than with their Hutu countrymen and women.   
 
Conversely, the similarity of culture and language, coupled with a shared history, brought 
together the people of Rwanda and those of Burundi, who associate fairly easily. While 
the similarity of challenges definitely played a key role in the rapprochement of the 
corresponding ethnic groups of the two countries, namely, the Tutsi of Rwanda and the 
Tutsi of Burundi, on the one side, and the Hutu of Rwanda and the Hutu of Burundi, on 
the other side, the rift between Hutu and Tutsi in both countries grew wider as each group 
was more and more persuaded that the other group constituted a threat to their well-being, 
their development, their security and their existence. As a result of this shared threat, each 
of the two ethnic groups in each country tended to extend their boundaries to include their 
counterparts across the borders. Solidarity between the analogous social groups was 
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Such formulations of boundaries between social groups seem to have resulted less from 
blood relations among their respective members than from some shared social interests 
and challenges. In fact, there is no myth or tradition that presents the Hutu of Rwanda as 
descendents of one same ancestor, let alone any allusion to a common ancestor with the 
Hutu of Burundi. The same applies to the Tutsi. But, as Brett has noted, there are many 
kinds of identities and many ways of construing identity.
868
 Self-identification does not 
always need to be based on blood relationship. The history of Rwandan politics is replete 
with phenomena that illustrate this reality.  
 
Coalitions transcending traditional identities were sometimes observed in Rwanda. For 
example, the implementation of the policy of ethnic and regional equilibrium by 
Habyarimana‟s Hutu regime was perceived by many as a way to favour the people from 
the northern part of the country, from where the top leaders of the regime hailed, at the 
expense of the southerners. This perception encouraged a relative rapprochement of the 
southerners from both Hutu and Tutsi social groups who shared the fate of being 
discriminated against with respect to access to public education and to employment. In 
fact, the time of the Habyarimana regime was the period during which ethnic relations in 
the country were relatively harmonious. Some extremists from the Hutu-dominated 
northern part of the country never forgave the Hutu from the south for associating too 
closely with the Tutsi, sometimes going to the extent of claiming that there was no 
unadulterated Hutu to be found in the south.  
 
This peaceful interethnic coexistence was strong enough to somehow resist the pressure 
brought by the war in 1990. Contrary to what used to happen previously, each time that 
an attack was launched against the country by Tutsi refugees, there was no generalised 
violent retaliation against the Tutsi inside the country, at least not among the rural 
populations. When the social atmosphere became tense, after political parties were 
allowed to operate, cases of violent clashes between the youth of different political 
parties became very frequent. Even in these cases, it was mainly the youth of the ruling 
party who were violently opposed to those of the opposition. It was very seldom that 
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violent conflicts emerged among the members of different opposition parties, even 
though membership of most of them reflected ethnic sympathies. The tendency, rather, 
was for political parties of the opposition to play down their ethnic differences and unite 
against the ruling party. It took a sustained campaign through the media, and even the use 
of threat, for Hutu hardliners to break that peaceful cohabitation, rallying all Hutu people 
to unite against a “common enemy”. The resistance to this campaign resulted in the split 
of almost all the political parties of the opposition, divided into those who adhered to the 
ideology presenting the Tutsi as irreducible enemies whom they should fight at all costs 
and those who rejected that ideology, some of them at the cost of their own lives.  This 
short period of rapprochement between Hutu and Tutsi, however shallow the affinity may 
have been, demonstrated that it is possible for these social groups of Rwandan society to 
unite around one goal. What they need is to have that goal and the determination to 
achieve it. Shared interests could also bring together the tribes of Israel. 
 
7.2.4 Shared interests hearten tribal coalition in Israel 
Coalitions that transcend kinship ties can equally be noted in Israel. When Judah, a tribe 
presented in tradition as of the “sons of Leah”, is sidelined and estranged from Israel in 
rebellions led by the “sons of Rachel”,
869
 it is noted that the other “sons of Leah” join the 
“sons of Rachel”, to declare that they do not have any share with David. This strategic 
coalition against the house of David indicated that there was at stake an issue that was 
important enough to supersede the bond resulting from descending from the same 
matriarch.  Similarly, it was clear in the years that preceded the Genocide in Rwanda that 
being a Hutu was not enough reason to be a supporter of Habyarimana‟s Hutu regime. 
Many Hutu preferred to work with the Tutsi to challenge a regime that they saw as “their 
common enemy”. If it is true that diverging interests break the bonds of any social 
relations, including blood relations, it is equally true that converging interests catalyse the 
rapprochement of the concerned parties, notwithstanding their diverse identities. It was 
seen above, in relation to the emergence of Israel, that factors such as cohabitation in the 
same geographic location, the need to combine against common enemies, shared 
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economic interests and the shared faith in Yahweh were unifying factors of Israel‟s 
society.  Neither blood relations nor biological kinship is a sine qua non for social unity.  
 
The attitude of the northern tribes in Israel and the people in Rwanda may serve to show 
the fact that ethnic/tribal identity is not necessarily a barrier to social harmony.  It is 
rather interests defined and defended along ethnic/tribal lines that generate tribal/ethnic 
conflicts, while interests that transcend tribal/ethnic boundaries catalyse unity and 
solidarity among different social groups. Unfortunately, the tendency has been for 
politicians and leaders wishing to conquer or maintain political power to sensitise the 
people, reminding them of their ethnic differences, rather than uniting them around 
common interests. These ethnic politics witnessed in many parts of Africa are a central 
cause of the continent‟s misery.  
 
Politicians and leaders wishing to achieve national unity in multi-ethnic communities 
may encourage such concerns that give people a reason to favour their solidarity. In 
Rwanda, especially, where fear and mistrust between Hutu and Tutsi has continually and 
violently antagonized them, the way to unity and harmony passes through the 
identification and eradication of all sources of mistrust between the two social groups, so 
that they may cease to regard each as a threat to the life of the other. Social differences 
endemic to any society may be unavoidable, but what can be avoided is exploiting the 
social differences and using them as a stepping-stone toward personal power acquisition. 
One way of achieving this is by encouraging the people to channel their energies into 
working together for their shared interests. As long as the interests diverge, reasons and 
arguments will be invented to support competing claims. This is shown by myths and 
traditions used to fuel conflicts in Rwanda, as in ancient Israel.  
 
7.2.5 Myths and traditions at the origins of oppression and revolution  
In Rwanda, as in Israel, social groups believed or pretended or aspired to have exclusive 
rights to enjoy some social, political and economic privileges. To support such claims, 
appeal was made to invented myths and distorted traditions that were manipulated to suit 
the fantasy of those who invoked them. The oppression resulting from this attitude and 
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the resistance against it resulted in open conflict. In this respect, the myth and traditions 
concerning the origin of the Rwandan ethnic groups parallels the biblical tradition about 
the origin of the tribes in Israel.  
 
7.2.5.1. Aetiological myths and traditions in support of inequalities in Rwanda 
The commonalities and the differences noticed among the social groups that lived in pre-
colonial Rwanda compelled them to formulate a myth to elucidate the mystery 
surrounding their origin. It was said that the Hutu, Tutsi and Twa of Rwanda descended 
from one same father who, on the basis of the merit of some and the demerit of others,
870
 
preordained the fate of each group and the order of their future subordination. The three 
social groups descended from one same ancestor, but they were unequal in rights and 
privileges. The myth is, of course, naïve, but has had a persuasive narrative power to 
reconceptualise reality. It was invented at a time when the Tutsi were enjoying the 
monopoly of socio-political privileges and it tended to provide an explanation and a 
justification for that situation. The claim was that the supremacy of the Tutsi was 
deserved and that therefore the other social groups were occupying their rightful 
subordinate places and so should not dare question the status quo.  
 
The idea of natural supremacy of the Tutsi of Rwanda was given impetus by the Belgian 
colonisers, who suggested a “scientific” explanation by means of the Hamitic Hypothesis. 
This theory diverged from the traditional myth, in that it contended that the Tutsi 
belonged to a totally different race, having almost nothing in common with the two other 
subgroups, the Hutu and the Twa.  According to this theory, the Tutsi were endowed with 
natural ability that predisposed them to be leaders. They were born to reign. What the 
Hamitic Hypothesis had in common with the traditional myth was the capacity to provide 
an explanation and justification for the prominent position of the Tutsi. This position was 
deserved and could then never be questioned. 
 
                                                 
870
 According to the myth, the Father Kigwa tested his three sons with milk which he gave them to keep. 
The forefather of Twa was greedy and drank the milk; the Hutu was careless and spilt it, while only the 
wise Tutsi kept it. 
 
 299 
The Hamitic hypothesis initiated by the Belgian colonisers was used to justify their 
opposition to political and administrative reforms that could have allowed for the 
promotion of the dominated and exploited social groups. It is not easy to evaluate the 
extent to which this hypothesis was believed to be true, especially by the Tutsi that it 
favoured. What is certain is that most of those whose exclusive privileges it tended to 
protect were not champions in challenging this hypothesis until it began to be used 
against them.  
 
When the time came for the Hutu to assert their right to pre-eminence in Rwanda, appeal 
was made to traditions that attributed to them priority in the order of settlement. 
Historians and anthropologists had suggested for a long time that the Twa had been the 
first settlers in Rwanda, where they lived foraging in the forest. The Hutu, coming 
second, were the first to exploit the land. The Tutsi were said to be the last-comers and 
this was used to underline that they had the fewest rights in the land that they found 
already occupied. 
 
The Hamitic Hypothesis itself, which had been used to support the superiority of the 
Tutsi, was now turned against them. The argument in favour of their superiority was 
based on their being a different race, originating from outside Africa and closer to the 
„more intelligent‟ European whites. The potentially dangerous element in this argument 
was that it made the Tutsi aliens, who came from outside Africa. This idea became a 
weapon at the disposal of some extremist Hutu, who already claimed their priority of 
citizenship on the basis of the alleged order of settlement in the land. By making the Tutsi 
non-Africans the Hamitic hypothesis resulted in making them simply aliens, whom some 
Hutu would not hesitate to call usurpers. The theory portraying the Tutsi as usurpers who 
should return to their own home was particularly emphasised during the Genocide in 
1994. Thus, the same theory that once served the argument of the superiority of the Tutsi 
over the Hutu was used by the latter to defend their exclusivist ideology against the 
former. This use of myths and traditions for ideological purposes in Rwandan history 




7.2.5.2. Traditions and ideologies in Israel’s tribes 
The double use of the same tradition by competing groups is attested in Israel, where the 
same tradition concerning the patriarchal blessing served to support the claim to pre-
eminence by two rival tribes. While Ephraim could fall back on the tradition according to 
which Jacob‟s blessing upon Joseph predestined him to be a prince among his brothers 
(Genesis 49:26), Judah could claim that the sceptre and the lawgiver were given to him 
(Genesis 49:10).  
 
The traditions recorded in the Joseph narrative functioned like the Rwandan traditions, to 
explain and justify some tribes‟ claims to socio-political privileges. The ideological 
interpretation of these traditions was present in the conflicts that led to the division of the 
kingdom. Rehoboam‟s intransigence, which became the direct cause of the division of the 
kingdom, may have been encouraged by his conviction of being the legitimate and 
unquestionable king of Israel. Rehoboam‟s legitimacy was grounded on the tradition that 
attributed to Judah considerable leadership prerogatives. According to this tradition, 
probably originating from Judah, the sceptre and the lawgiver (understood as symbols of 
leadership) would not depart from Judah (Genesis 49:10).  
 
The ideology giving pre-eminence to the tribe of Judah that took root in the patriarchal 
blessing was more explicit in the so-called Davidic Covenant by which Yahweh himself 
undertook to establish the throne of David‟s kingdom forever (2 Samuel 7:13). 
Rehoboam‟s arrogant attitude at Shechem was surely encouraged by this tradition that 
supported his exclusive claim to the throne.  Was not he the only legitimate heir of David 
and a descendant of Judah? Unfortunately for Rehoboam and his supporters, these 
traditions were understood or interpreted differently by those who opposed him. To those 
of the opposition, none of these traditions ruled out the possibility for anybody else from 
outside the tribe of Judah becoming king in Israel. On the contrary, they could appeal to 
the same or similar traditions to support their own claim to leadership positions. 
 
While Rehoboam and the descendents of Judah could appeal to the patriarchal blessing to 
support their claim to leadership, Jeroboam, the Ephraimites and their supporters could 
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refer to the whole Joseph narrative to uphold their traditional pre-eminence. This 
narrative extensively emphasized that Joseph was the most deserving among his brothers. 
Joseph‟s was not only the most beloved son of Jacob, born from the most beloved Rachel, 
he is also positively characterized as better behaved than his brothers. The “ ”, a 
princely tunic received from his father, the dreams he dreamt, the leadership skills he 
exhibited in Egypt, all point to his being destined to become great.  Ephraim‟s aspiration 
to greatness could be linked to this tradition presenting Joseph as one “consecrated (or 
prince) among his brothers” (Genesis 49:26).  
 
Since each camp could appeal to traditions to support their claim to pre-eminence, the 
enjoyment of this privilege depended less on the strength of the argument used to defend 
it than on the willingness of the brothers to acquiesce to the claim. None of the two 
groups could take the other for granted.  The acquiescence of the dominated group would 
always depend on the way they were treated by the group in power. In case of oppression, 
the patience would last just the time necessary to prepare and equip themselves for a 
successful challenge to the regime. 
 
7.2.6 Summary 
The above discussion of the people‟s response to divisive ideologies allows dialogical 
space in pointing out some similarities in the two contexts of Rwanda and Israel. There 
was a time in each society when social diversity was not much of a problem. In Israel and 
in Rwanda, conflicts resulted from attempts of certain groups to monopolise privileges, to 
the exclusion of the other groups. The scramble for access to, and control of, resources 
triggered jealousies and competition and encouraged rivalries divisions and enmity. 
Under the pressure of conflicting interests even kinship relations became irrelevant and 
obsolete. In both contexts, social groups that initially affirmed their shared identity ended 
up treating each other as aliens when they were competing for the control of power and 
associated privileges. Social relations in these two contexts serve to illustrate the fact that 




Kinship relations continue to be major tools used by politicians in Africa for rallying 
support on their way to power, although the present work has reasoned that blood relation 
in itself is not the unifying factor but a phenomenon around which shared and vital 
interests revolve. It is noted that most of the time the labouring masses who help their 
kins-people come to power do not necessarily share in the benefits. Immediately after 
electoral campaigns these people are left alone to their misery, still supporting their 
leaders. The elucidation of this phenomenon may require more space than the present 
study allows for. 
 
In Israel, as in Rwanda, history and traditions have been factors contributing to conflicts 
among later generations. The myth of Kigwa, the common ancestor of Hutu, Tutsi and 
Twa, who rewarded the better-behaved Tutsi with a destiny to reign over his brothers, 
parallels the tradition about the patriarch Jacob rewarding the better-behaved Joseph with 
a “ ” “a robe of many colours”, or “a long sleeved robe”, pre-ordaining him to 
be a “prince among his brothers”.   In the same way that the Hamitic hypothesis used to 
support the alleged superiority of the Tutsi and their right to enjoy exclusive privileges 
has similarities with tradition of the “sceptre” and “lawgiver” in Jacob‟s blessing and the 
“everlasting kingdom” in the Davidic Covenant, narratives that served to support the pre-
eminence of David‟s house.  As was also noted, the same tradition can be differently 
interpreted, depending on the ideology it is made to suit. Both Hutu and Tutsi referred to 
the Hamitic hypothesis, each to exclude the other from equitably sharing in political and 
economic privileges, as Ephraim and Judah could each refer to the patriarchal blessing to 
claim pre-eminence. 
 
But history and traditions are merely particular attempts to narrate events as they are 
believed or imagined to have happened. Some of these events are laudable and worthy of 
being celebrated, others are negative and regrettable. The impact of past events on later 
generations depends on the way they are interpreted and the objectives motivating appeal 
to them. Too often appeal to supposed events of the past is done with the secret or 
expressed objective of seeking arguments to support egoistic and discriminative 
ideologies. This results in endless conflicts. The effects of the past on the present depend 
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on the way the present handles the past.
871
 While a genuine focus on the common interest 
of the people as a whole resists the negative and divisive events of the past, an exclusive 
ideology results in jealousy and competition that destroys unity even among brothers. A 
people united around a common goal will even resist eventual pressure from external 
power waiting for an opportunity to exploit the division for their own geo-political 
interests. The next section discusses the external contribution to internal conflicts in Israel 
and in Rwanda.  
 
7.3. External contribution to internal conflicts 
The conflicts that culminated in the division of the kingdom in Israel, on the one hand, 
and in the Genocide in Rwanda, on the other, were obviously internal. However, these 
conflicts were not free from international interference. Both Israel and Rwanda, each in 
their respective situations, attracted interest from foreign countries that directly or 
indirectly contributed to their conflicts.  
 
7.3.1 External contribution to tribal conflicts in Rwanda 
Much has been said about foreign participation and responsibility in the Rwandan 
conflicts. Most denounced are the Belgian colonisers and missionaries who supported and 
aggravated the exploitation and oppression of the Hutu by the Tutsi and later supported 
the violent revolution that removed the Tutsi from power and sent them into exile. As 
much as it is unfair and dishonest to shift the entire blame onto the Belgians, as if they 
created Rwandan conflicts from scratch, their great share of responsibility in the 
Rwandan context is worth highlighting.  
 
Having explained their colonising enterprise by the need for “civilisation” and 
“progress”, they went ahead to tell everybody that their support of the traditional Tutsi 
hegemony was justified by the inner qualities they discovered in this social group. But 
among themselves the foreign colonisers reminded each other that it was not because of a 
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pure love for tradition or local colour that they kept the native kings,
872
 but that the 
traditional structure would rather provide a familiar décor, permitting them to act behind 
the scenes without alarming the people.
873
 A similar agenda was behind the missionaries 
championing of the thesis of Tutsi supremacy. This is clear from Monsignor Classe‟s 
words:  
 
The question is whether the ruling elite will be for us or against us; whether the 
important places in native society will be in Catholic or in non-Catholic hands; 
whether the Church will have through education and its formation of youth the 
preponderant influence in Rwanda.
874
    
 
When the Tutsi became a threat to the interests of the Belgian colonisers, their superior 
qualities and their abilities to rule became a thing of the past. When the missionary saw a 
Hutu counter-elite rising, they knew that their former protégés could not for long 
guarantee the preponderant influence they wanted; therefore, they abandoned the “Tutsi 
born to lead” theory, which was no longer serving their interests. 
 
If the first Hutu regime enjoyed the support of the Belgian colonisers and the Catholic 
missionaries, the best-known supporter of the second Hutu regime was President 
Mitterand of France. Mitterand is often said to have unreservedly supported 
Habyarimana‟s regime before, during and after the Genocide, providing his friend with 
France‟s economic, political and international diplomatic support.
875
 An accord of 
military co-operation signed in 1975 permitted Habyarimana to receive the support of 
750 French soldiers a few months after the Rwandese Patriotic Front invaded Rwanda in 
October 1990.
876
 During the Genocide, as the RPF was gaining ground, the hunt for the 
Tutsi was still carried on, and the presence of the UN peacekeepers was scaled down, 
France unilaterally launched Operation Turquoise, officially designated as a 
humanitarian intervention to protect civilians and hinder a mass flow of refugees. Those 
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who view France‟s move in a negative light believe that French soldiers came to Rwanda 
to protect not so much the civilians at risk as the killers and to keep pockets of 




France‟s intervention in Rwandan internal affairs seems not to have been merely based on 
personal friendship between the two heads of state. In Verschave‟s analysis, France 
replaced Belgium, the former colonial power, in the Great Lakes Region through 
business, commercial and economic interests, francophonie
878
 and personal relations.
879
 
A year after Habyarimana took power Rwanda was integrated into the French-speaking 
countries grouped in OCAM (Common Organisation for Africa and Madagascar), of 
which Habyarimana was to become the chairperson. This community of French-speaking 
countries has continued to provide France with a forum through which it exerts its 
geopolitical influence. Chrétien has suggested that, in coming to Habyarimana‟s rescue, 
Mitterrand intended to defend the status quo in France‟s Francophone “backyard”, now 




Beside France‟s own hegemonic agenda, its presence in Africa is sometime perceived as 
a geo-strategic and political plan agreed upon between the European and North American 
powers, France being perceived as playing the part of a policeman for the West to 
preserve Western interests in Africa.
881
 Seeing France as a representative of Western 
interests may be too simplistic, however, since the interests of these powers do not 
always converge. It was noted that in the case of the Great Lakes conflicts, divergences 
between France and the United States were serious enough to hinder some United 
Nations‟ decisions on this conflict. Prunier has recorded such an incident, when the issue 
of the Rwandan invasion of the DRC (then Zaire) was discussed; whenever France was 
ready to apply pressure on Rwanda, this was blocked by the U.S.  Similarly, whenever 
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the U.S. wished to put pressure on Zaire, this was blocked by France.
882
 With converging 
or diverging interests, the western powers seem to have intervened in Rwanda not merely 
with a humanitarian concern, but, as Bah sees it, because they had political and economic 




The Rwandan conflict has been described not merely as an internal conflict in which 
international powers intervened, but as a conflict involving the development of a regional 
dynamic. In Mamdani‟s analysis: 
 
The critical impetus behind RPF crossing the border in October 1990 was the 
confluence of a citizenship crisis in Uganda with that of Rwanda. The invasion 
was at the same time an armed repatriation from Uganda and an armed return 
home. Having embraced the Banyarwanda refugees as “comrades-in-arms” during 
their hour of need in the Luwero Triangle, Ugandan guerrillas-turned-government 
did not hesitate to “solve” their first major crisis in power by dispensing with the 
same comrades. The combination of loss of state positions for the elite and refusal 
to give grazing land to ordinary pastoralists highlighted the continuing 
homelessness of the generation born of 1959 Tutsi exiles. This same development 
also dramatically underscored the limits of Habyarimana‟s internal reform. Thus 




The regional dimension of the Rwandan crisis involved not only Uganda but many other 
countries of the region, especially those bordering Rwanda. The same citizenship crisis 
that drew Museveni into the Rwandan conflict also existed in the Zaire of Mobutu, where 
the Kinyarwanda-speaking groups had for years been at loggerheads with the other tribes 
surrounding them and with the Zairian government. The increasing uncertainty of their 
citizenship encouraged many of these Kinyarwanda-speaking people, identified as Tutsi, 
and now known as Banyamulenge, to join the ranks of the RPF, fighting the Rwandan 
Hutu government.
885
 Contrary to Museveni‟s attitude, Mobutu did not support this group 
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of people considered to be Rwandans in their fight against the Rwandan regime. Instead 
he sided with his friend Habyarimana. Beside a personal relationship between these two 
heads of states, their shared support and influence from France and subsequent allegiance 
to that same godfather may have kept them close. In supporting Habyarimana, Mobutu 
may have intended to fight Museveni, an enemy of his regime, who was backing the RPF. 
Museveni had reportedly always seen Mobutu as the African stooge of imperialism 
incarnate
886
 and the two leaders had been engaging in mutual destabilising activities, each 
supporting the other‟s opposing groups.
887
 Chrétien has observed that since Museveni‟s 
ascent to power, Mobutu‟s regime in Zaire and Habyarimana‟s in Rwanda immediately 
understood him to be an atypical leader – one who was preoccupied with restoring the 
rule of law – and dangerous competition.
888
 Relations between Museveni and his two 
neighbours were characterized by anything but trust and warm friendship. Clearly, in 
supporting Habyarimana, Mobutu was helping a friend, but he was also defending his 
own regime against an already declared enemy.   
 
Another neighbour who could not remain indifferent to what was happening in Rwanda 
was President Buyoya of Burundi. The historically close relations between the people of 
Rwanda and those of Burundi had given them much to share, including social 
categorisation into Hutu and Tutsi and all the problems related to this identification. 
Burundi was the country most directly affected by the first Hutu-Tutsi clashes that 
preceded and accompanied independence in Rwanda in 1959-61. As the Hutu took power 
in Rwanda and many Tutsi went into exile, mostly in Burundi, serious repercussions were 
felt by the Burundian people, as summarized by Chrétien: 
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The Rwandan syndrome rapidly infiltrated the Burundian ruling class: to the 
Tutsi, the spectacle of ten thousands of Rwandan refugees inspired distrust toward 
the Bahutu; and to the Hutu, the prospect of having absolute power seemed a very 




The mutual socio-political influence between the two countries was apparent especially in 
times of crises, through sympathy between the homologous social groups, but also at the 
level of the political leaders. The Rwandan Tutsi fleeing the violence of the 1960s were 
welcomed in the then Tutsi-ruled Burundi, from where, with the complicity or the 
passivity of the Burundian Tutsi authorities, they organised and launched several attacks 
against the Kayibanda Hutu regime. The massacre of Hutu in Burundi in 1972 provoked a 
hostile reaction from Kayibanda‟s Hutu government and created tension in the Rwandan 
population, causing many Tutsi to be violently dismissed from schools and from their 
jobs, with cases of massacres in certain regions. The climax of mutual socio-political 
contamination between Rwanda and Burundi was the crisis caused by the assassination of 
President Ndadaye of Burundi. The repercussions in Rwanda of this assassination are 
captured in Mamdani‟s following analysis: Ndadaye‟s death was taken as a prophetic 
lesson that the only alternative for the Hutu was between power and servitude, that there 
could be no sharing of power between Hutu and Tutsi.
890
 Following Ndadaye‟s 
assassination, cross-border ethnic solidarities were now in the open. More than ever the 
Hutu in Rwanda distrusted the RPF, which they perceived as close to the majority Tutsi 
Burundian army. Meanwhile, two of Ndadaye‟s Hutu ministers who escaped to Rwanda 
attempted to create a government in exile, with Habyarimana‟s blessing. While outraged 
Hutu in Burundi were retaliating against their Tutsi neighbours, killing thousands of 
them, these ministers were allowed to use Radio Rwanda to broadcast their messages 





Not much has been said about Buyoya‟s attitude towards RPF‟s attack against 
Habyarimana. However, the foregoing description of the relations between Rwanda and 
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Burundi at the time of these leaders may lead us to surmise that Buyoya may not have 
been unhappy about the attack, to say the least. If the extent of his involvement in the 
Rwandan internal conflict is not known, his support to the Rwandan-initiated invasion of 
the DRC may indicate that he was closer to Kagame that he could possibly have been to 
Habyarimana. 
 
The magnitude of the involvement of foreign powers has been greatly highlighted, to the 
extent of sometimes making them the main cause of the problem. The Belgians have been 
blamed for creating ethnic differences among the Rwandans, the Ugandan government 
for invading Rwanda in 1990, the French government for taking part in the Genocide, the 
United States and the United Kingdom for making Rwanda the victim of their interests in 
the region. Such perceptions highlight the fact that the Rwandan conflict is not purely 
internal and that any lasting solution should take into account its regional and 
international dimensions. Nevertheless, no matter how significant each of the above-
mentioned foreign involvements was, the Rwandan conflict remained mainly internal and 
Rwandans remain the main parties responsible for it, as well as the ones most impacted 
by its consequences.  Speaking about the European colonisers‟ contribution to ethnic 
conflicts in Rwanda, Sibomana stated: 
 
…it was not the whites who invented the terms Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, nor did they 
invent the traditional stories and tales which articulate different ways of thinking. 
The whites conceptualised differences which they observed. They imposed on 
Rwandan society a set of ideologies which were based on real differences. They 
transformed these differences by making them deeper and cutting off the bridges 
between ethnic groups, but they did not create them. Steeped in their racial 




The Ugandan government under Museveni may have cheated and conspired against the 
Habyarimana regime, but it was not the Ugandans who in the first place condemned the 
Rwandan Tutsi to life in exile, motivating their bitterness against the regime that 
excluded them.  The Western powers may have encouraged the conflict but they certainly 
did not create it. Most of the foreign intervening powers were either invited or offered 
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opportunity by the Rwandans themselves. While it is important for Rwandans to analyse 
the impact of foreign intervention in the conflict, the focus should first be on a sincere 
and honest examination of the responsibility of Rwandans themselves. Shifting the blame 
is neither fair nor helpful for understanding and dealing with the situation. Similarly, the 
conflict that led to the division of the kingdom in Israel had external contributions but its 
roots were internal. 
 
7.3.2 External contribution to the division of the kingdom  
The division of the kingdom of Israel was surely a product of internal conflicts. However, 
external powers played such an important role that without them the events leading to the 
division may have taken a different turn. If open tension between northern and southern 
Israel can be traced back to David‟s conquest of the Saulide north, it was noted that the 
Philistines functioned as a wonderful tool for this task. It was under the protection of the 
Philistines, beyond the reach of Saul, that David planned and acted to conquer northern 
Israel,
893
 an enterprise accomplished with the benevolent neutrality of his allied 
Philistines.
894
 In addition to his military campaign in the north, David‟s diplomacy 
toward the inhabitants of Jabesh Gilead (2 Samuel 2:4-7) and his marriage with an 
Aramean princess of Geshur (2 Samuel 3:3), had the effect of putting pressure on 
Ishbaal‟s kingdom from both sides.
895
 Commenting on the conditions under which Israel 
was united under David, Dietrich observed that the foundation of this unified monarchy 




External involvement in Israel‟s internal affairs is noted under Solomon, especially in his 
alliances with Hiram of Tyre. In terms of their trade agreement, Hiram provided building 
materials and technicians to Solomon who paid for these services with natural produce 
(produced by the labouring masses) and eventually with the concession of a part of his 
territory.  Donner has convincingly argued that, in this bilateral alliance, it was Solomon 
who was in a position of weakness. In Donner‟s estimate, Hiram‟s activities in Solomon‟s 
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commercial expeditions and in the construction of the temple betray the dependence of 
Israel on Tyre, for in both cases Solomon was plainly not in a position to do without 
Phoenician know-how and the transfer of a whole district was no triumph for Solomon‟s 
foreign policy.
897
 Donner‟s point is that Hiram‟s involvement in Solomon‟s business was 
not a result of him being Solomon‟s vassal; he freely entered into this relationship, 
motivated by the political and commercial advantages he drew from the situation.
898
 The 
cost of these advantages was paid for by the labouring masses. Hiram was not a coloniser 
of Israel in the way the Belgians were of Rwanda. At least he came invited  and he was 
not directly involved in the administration of Israel. Like the colonial Belgians, however, 
he supported and benefitted from internal policies that exploited and oppressed the local 
people. As with the Belgians of colonial Rwanda, he may have had a share of 
responsibility in this exploitation and the conflicts that resulted. However, still greater 
responsibility remains with the local regime that initiated the indicted policies, just as the 
Belgians‟ share of responsibility in Rwandan historic conflicts cannot obliterate the 
essentially local origin of these conflicts.  
 
The other most noted foreign involvement in Israel‟s affairs came from Egypt. The 
Egyptian interest with the state of Israel is reported in the form of friendship and 
generosity, hardly concealing geo-political interests. Egypt‟s first rapprochement to Israel 
reported in Kings was through a marriage alliance between Solomon and Pharaoh‟s 
daughter. This marriage, which sealed a treaty (1 Kings 3:1), was based more on politics 
than on love. Royal diplomatic marriage, as a means of cementing international relations 
and as a practical alternative to warfare, was a cornerstone of Solomon‟s foreign policy.
 
899
  Malamat has observed that it was not the habit of Egyptian kings to marry off their 
daughters to foreign potentates whom they apparently regarded as inferior and that 
Pharaoh could not plausibly have undertaken an entire campaign against Gezer solely in 
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order to hand this fortress over to Solomon (1Kings 9:16).
900
  Both Solomon and Pharaoh 
had political and strategic agendas. It was suggested that in conquering Gezer, which was 
given to Solomon as a dowry, Pharaoh‟s initial goal might have been to take Jerusalem in 
a bid to restore the Egyptian hegemony over the land of Canaan. Dissuaded by Solomon‟s 
strength, he may have reverted to diplomacy. Another hypothesis is that Pharaoh, 
possibly Siamon of the 21
st
 dynasty, who was facing an internal threat from elements of 
the army of Libyan origin, ancestors of Shishak who held strong ties with the Philistines, 
may have sought in Solomon political support for neutralizing this threat. Siamon may 
have contemplated having a share in Solomon‟s international trade or having right of way 
for his own agents and goods into Asia.
901
  Perhaps he calculated the possibility of one 
day having a grandson on the throne in Israel. In any case, Pharaoh‟s move toward 
Jerusalem certainly had some economic and strategic motivation. 
 
The extent to which this alliance might have satisfied Pharaoh‟s strategic plans is not 
very clear.  The daughter of Pharaoh, whose name is not even known, seems to have not 
played a significant role in Israel‟s politics, contrary to what her father may have 
expected. Her relocation from the City of David to a new palace (1Kings 7:8) was 
interpreted by the Chronicler as motivated by the concern to keep this foreign woman 
away from a holy place (2 Chronicles 8:11). Apart from some reports that Solomon may 
have imported Egyptian chariots (1 Kings 10:28-29; 2 Chronicles1:16-17; 9:28)
902
, in 
general Siamon‟s economic expectations may have been frustrated since, apparently, not 
only did Solomon exclude Egypt from his commercial ventures, but he even set up a rival 
cartel, bypassing the traditional Egyptian monopoly over raw material, precious metals 
and exotica coming from Africa.
903
 As for Solomon, the treaty may have allowed him to 
secure the peace he wanted and to strengthen the empire he inherited from his father, by 
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the same token consolidating his power and standing. The marriage and treaty may have 
inaugurated a period of détente between the two countries lasting for about twenty years 
until the twenty-first dynasty in Egypt was superseded by Shishak in 945 BC.
904
 Shishak, 
the founder of the 22
nd
 Egyptian dynasty, was less friendly to Solomon and this was first 
seen in his enthusiastic harbouring of Jeroboam, Solomon‟s foe. 
 
After his rebellion against Solomon, Jeroboam found asylum in Egypt under Shishak 
who, as became evident later, pursued Egyptian ambitions for Asian dominion. Halpern 
may be right with his explanation of Jeroboam‟s revolt as a reaction to the discrimination 
and exploitation that his kinsfolk from northern Israel were victims of under the regimes 
of the house of David.
905
 This contention does not explain Shishak‟s involvement. On this 
point, Halpern‟s analysis may be completed by Malamat‟s submission that either 
Jeroboam thought that a new dynasty in Egypt antagonistic to Solomon bettered his 
chances of success, or Shishak himself was inciting anti-Davidic elements, especially in 
the embittered northern Israel.
906
 Shishak‟s siding with Jeroboam against Solomon may 
be perceived as a change in political affinity resulting from the change of regime in 
Egypt, since Solomon had been close to the Pharaohs of the 21
st
 dynasty, whose power 
Shishak had now taken over. Or this may have been part of Shishak‟s planned strategy 
against Solomon, whose capability to fight back may have dissuaded Shishak‟s 
predecessors from launching a direct attack against him. In any case, Shishak‟s 
hospitality and support for Jeroboam was not out of mere sympathy or sheer generosity. It 
is more likely to have been politically motivated. 
 
Shishak‟s plans for Israel and the whole eastern region were executed after Solomon‟s 
death, not only when he released Jeroboam to go and lead the opposition to Rehoboam, 
but especially when, in the fifth year of Rehoboam‟s reign, he launched his attack against 
Israel. Given Jeroboam‟s previous alliance with Shishak against Solomon, it can be 
surmised that Jeroboam may have encouraged this attack directed against Rehoboam. It 
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seems, however, that Shishak was not much preoccupied with his “ally‟s” interests. 
Shishak was contented with Rehoboam‟s submission and gifts and he did not go to the 
extent of crushing him, as Jeroboam probably would have wished. Rehoboam remained 
strong enough to sustain continuous wars against his brother enemy. This is possibly all 
Shishak wanted, as a way to keep these petty kings in check while he remained the master 
of the region. Like Hiram, the Egyptian Pharaohs were more interested in what they 
could get out of Israel than what they could contribute to the welfare of the Israelites, just 
as it was noted concerning international involvement in the internal conflicts in Rwanda, 
in the Great Lakes Region and elsewhere in Africa and in the world.  
 
7.3.3 Summary 
A popular saying in Rwanda: “Usenya urwe umutiza umuhoro” can be paraphrased as, 
“you do not deny your machete to the one borrowing it to destroy his/her own house”. 
The saying is more often used with a cynical tune to mean, “If somebody is foolish 
enough to destroy his/her own home, it is not the responsibility of those watching him/her 
to stand in his/her way”. The conflicts in Israel and in Rwanda, as discussed in this work, 
originated from within the respective communities.  In both contexts the conflicts resulted 
from the failure of social groups to equitably share the privileges and responsibilities that 
their respective nations offered.  In both cases, social groups resorted to exclusion and 
exploitation and oppression to enjoy the monopoly of those privileges.  
 
There has been a perception that each case of foreign involvement was based on 
particular affinities that each of the intervening foreign powers had with a particular party 
in conflict in the country.  Some opinions have stressed particular sympathy that 
prompted the foreign intervening powers to step in and help “their friends”.  This was 
said about the Belgians who loved the Tutsi, of the friendship between Habyarimana and 
the then French President Mitterand, of the friendship between President Museveni of 
Uganda and the Rwigema group. Of course there may have been “lobbying” and 
“connections”, but there is a fallacy in leaving the matter at the level of sentiments. 
Foreign interference was certainly based more on strategic geo-political interest than on 
feelings. That is why, whenever these interests were threatened, the former alliances 
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faded away. In a world that has become a global village, some countries are seeing their 
sovereignty significantly reduced because of the interest they represent for more powerful 
external powers. Small countries may not even be free to plan for peace when there are 
external powers interested in conflict. Such external influence on internal conflicts in the 
developing countries is rarely correctly acknowledged. This is another area that can be 
investigated further. 
 
In Israel, the agenda of the intervening foreign powers, though not very explicit, it is not 
always covered. It is not disguised under friendship or some humanitarian concerns. The 
political interest is expressed, for example, through the explicit mention that the daughter 
of Pharaoh, given to Solomon, was to seal a treaty, while the hospitality offered by 
Pharaoh to Jeroboam finds its explanation in the attack that the same Pharaoh launched 
later against Rehoboam. Pharaoh supported Solomon‟s opponent because he had his 
personal political agenda against Israel.  The attitude and motivation of Pharaoh is not 
much different from that of all the foreign powers that enthusiastically offered their help 
to parties in the Rwandan conflict. Motivation is not always for human rights, not for the 
promotion of social justice, not on compassionate grounds, but with a hardly hidden 
political agenda. Such “friends” are always available, ready to “fish in the troubled 
water”. This external opportunism is facilitated by internal selfishness from groups of 
people who prioritise their own interests to the detriment of the interests of the whole 
people.  In Israel, as in Rwanda, the external intervention in internal conflicts was 
facilitated by particular internal groups of people pursuing, acquiring or maintaining 
exclusive privileges and being willing to achieve these at any cost. Peace-building is not 
always the main preoccupation of those involved in the scramble for power, nor of those 
external powers intervening in internal conflicts. However, a concern for peace is 
expected to characterize the custodians of moral authority, more than most. These include 
God‟s servants and representatives in the society.  So we examine next the attitude of 




7.4 God’s servants in times of socio-political crisis 
The socio-political issues involved in the crisis that culminated in the division of the 
kingdom seem not to have been the main preoccupation of the narrator of the event of the 
division. They equally seem to have escaped the attention of the contemporaries of the 
regimes of David‟s house. Quite surprising is the silence of the prophets, who were the 
only people who could speak to the king on behalf of the people. The apparent silence of 
Israel‟s prophets, who witnessed social injustice in their time, recalls the silence of the 
Rwandan churches in the periods of social crises that prepared the ground for the 
Genocide. The present section examines the attitude of the prophets who were in office 
under the reign of David‟s house. The evaluation of Israelite prophets at this time may 
shed some light on the situation of God‟s servants in Rwanda, helping us to understand 
the challenges they faced and exposing their strengths and weaknesses in discharging 
their prophetic role. On this issue of the prophetic ministry, the biblical context takes the 
lead in the dialogue.  
 
7.4.1 The prophetic ministry and the division of the kingdom of Israel 
The biblical traditions mention four prophets whose ministries are connected with the 
regimes of the house of David in the united kingdom. The ministry of these prophets is 
situated in the early times of prophetism in Israel, when prophets worked more with 
individual leaders (usually kings), in contrast with the later prophets who addressed the 
entire people.
907
 The focus of this section is on the work of each of the four prophets who 
served at the court of the king to whom each was expected to minister. Of the four, 
Ahijah and Shemaiah are mentioned in direct connection with the conflict leading to the 
division, so that their position on this conflict is known. The third, Nathan, though not 
directly connected with the conflict, is presented as an influential man at the court of 
David and Solomon. The fourth, Iddo, is not referred to in the succession narrative that 
was the direct focus of the present work. He is mentioned only in the tradition of the 
Chronicler. His inclusion in this discussion serves once again to substantiate my assertion 
that the comparative approach followed in the present work is applicable beyond the 
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limits of the selected text of 1 Kings 12:1-24.  Best known of the four prophets is Nathan, 
who apparently preceded the other three in office.  
 
7.4.1.1 Nathan’s prophetic ministry at the court of David’s house 
Nathan‟s name and role are recorded in three major incidents of his career as a court 
prophet. He is the prophet to whom King David reveals his intention to build a house for 
Yahweh. Without hesitation Nathan encourages David to go ahead with his plan. But in 
the night of the same day Nathan receives from Yahweh instructions that contradict the 
answer he had earlier given to David. As an obedient prophet, Nathan goes back to David 
to announce to him the better deal from Yahweh (2 Samuel 7:1-17). The way Nathan 
discharged his prophetic responsibility in this matter was captured in his evaluation by 
Dietrich as follows:  
 
Nathan was not a willing oracle but resisted the tit-for-tat mentality of the king by 
establishing a special covenant between king and God within the context of the 
covenant between YHWH and Israel. He thus prevented any attempt of the 
divinely blessed king to control the deity. On the other hand, he made a promise 
to the king that God would bless the dynasty as long as the king acted in 
accordance with God‟s guidance. Nathan is no doubt devoted to the king and the 




Nathan‟s authority and commitment to his prophetic role are also noted in the incident of 
David‟s affair with Bathsheba. This time he is portrayed as a courageous prophet who 
confronts the king wisely, leading him to confess his sin. He points out the seriousness of 
David‟s sin and faithfully discharges his responsibility in pronouncing God‟s judgement 
against the sinning king. He pronounced a death sentence against the king; or rather, led 
the king to pronounce this death sentence himself.
909
  In this case, like the first one, 
Nathan is presented as an uncompromising prophet of Yahweh, with the authority to 
guide the king and eventually rebuke him when he strays. 
 
The third major incident that involved the intervention of Nathan was the ascension of 
Solomon to the throne. David was getting old and feeble and the succession had not been 
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settled. Adonijah, who was probably the eldest son living, started to behave in a way that 
demonstrated his intention to succeed his father to the throne.  He managed to rally 
around him some of the most influential officials of his father. Nathan, who was one of 
those that Adonijah had left behind, decided to frustrate Adonijah‟s plans. He succeeded 
in inducing David to believe that he had once pledged himself to designate Solomon as a 
successor and he fabricated a coup d’état on the part of Adonijah to furnish a pretext for 
extracting from David the designation of Solomon for the throne.
910
 In this incident the 
prophet is represented less as Yahweh‟s messenger than as an intriguing court politician, 
planning very cleverly and successfully the succession of David by a successor of his 
choice instead of a candidate who ignored him. Dietrich sees him as an opportunistic 
accomplice of the power-hungry Solomon.
911 
 
Ishida found in Nathan a prophet who, being disappointed in David, placed his hopes in 
young Solomon to restore the rule of the dynasty of David with justice and equity over 
the kingdoms of Israel and Judah.
912
 Ishida‟s perception may be correct, but it does not 
help us understand why Nathan preferred Solomon over his brother Adonijah. Was this 
because he felt sidelined by Adonijah or was it an expression of division between the 
tribal groups of Judah, who backed Adonijah, and the city of Jerusalem, who supported 
Solomon?
913
  In any case, Nathan seems here to have had personal reasons to choose his 
camp. His position in this matter could have been vindicated had he intervened later 
during the reign of Solomon to ensure that his concern for justice and equity remained the 
preoccupation of the king. Nathan‟s support to Solomon should have reinforced his 
position of influence over the king, who had good reasons to listen to the prophet who 
brought him to the throne.  Yet this prophet is nowhere reported using his prerogatives 
and influence to advise or admonish King Solomon, as he had done with his father.   
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Nathan‟s silence before the unpopular and exploitative policies of his protégé is difficult 
to explain. Maybe, as time went by, the prophet grew too close to the regime to notice 
and denounce its injustices. It is recorded that two of the chief officers of Solomon, 
Azariah and Zabud, were sons of Nathan, Solomon‟s friend (1 Kings 4:5), and it is 
possible that this was Nathan the prophet.
914
 If this is the case, it could mean that Nathan 
had vested interests in Solomon‟s regime and was too involved to denounce it. Such 
kinds of vested interests in the regime are part of what prevented some Church leaders in 
Rwanda from denouncing social injustices in their time. 
 
It is important to note that the assumption that Nathan failed to promote justice in the 
time of Solomon is based on the silence of biblical traditions on Nathan‟s exact behaviour 
at this time.  It is possible that Nathan spoke and nobody listened to him. A fair 
evaluation of Nathan‟s prophetic role in Solomon‟s time would require more information 
about his exact attitude and contribution toward the indicted policies of Solomon‟s 
regime. The absence of information limits our ability to justly condemn him. His situation 
may be close to that of many Rwandans who, though not being in favour of the Genocide, 
were still not able to prevent or stop it. Being present does not necessarily mean being in 
a position to make a difference. Guilt should be proved, not presumed, as has too often 
been the case in times of social conflicts in Rwanda, with people being judged guilty of 
the crimes committed by those of their social groups. Presuming a whole social group 
guilty has always been, and remains, a serious obstacle to reconciliation in Rwanda. 
 
7.4.1.2 Ahijah’s involvement in the socio-political crisis in Israel 
Ahijah is introduced in the narrative about the time of the troubled end of Solomon‟s 
reign as a Shilonite prophet who acts to implement Yahweh‟s judgement on Solomon. 
Ahijah informs Jeroboam that Yahweh is not satisfied with Solomon, who has become 
idolatrous and has failed to keep God‟s ways and statutes. Ahijah announces a planned 
secession that will result in the separation of ten tribes, leaving the house of David 
reigning only over the king‟s own tribe. The secession, designed to be a means of 
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chastisement for Solomon, is a blessing to Jeroboam, now chosen to inherit what 
Solomon loses. 
 
Ahijah is here introduced as a prophet modelled after the pattern of Samuel and his 
sudden appearance in the account parallels that of Nathan.
915
  In his king-making role, 
however, Ahijah behaves more like Samuel than Nathan, whose choice of Solomon 
appears to follow his own taste while Ahijah, like Samuel, is guided by Yahweh‟s choice. 
Ahijah, like Samuel, acts in secret to take the kingdom away from the current king. But in 
the case of Samuel, the biblical narrative mentions that Samuel was not totally secretive 
about Saul‟s upcoming fall. Both before and after secretly anointing David, he is reported 
to have confronted the king more than once about the shortcomings that caused him to be 
rejected by Yahweh.  The absence on the side of Ahijah of a similar kind of bold 
initiative that generally characterised Yahweh‟s prophets gives a character of conspiracy 




Ahijah is identified as a prophet from Shilo, an ancient northern shrine later supplanted 
by Jerusalem. Jagersma estimates that in the protest of Ahijah there was involved a 
conflict between the old cult of sacral confederacy at Shechem and Gilgal and the new 
cult at Jerusalem.
917
 In Jagersma‟s opinion, the involvement of the prophet Ahijah from 
Shilo could indicate that the religious group in Shilo may have backed the revolt against 
Solomon and this could result from rivalry between Shilo and Jerusalem.
918
 However, 
Ahijah‟s move could have had some socio-political ground, in addition to the expressed 
religious motives. As a prophet from the north, Ahijah is likely to have been sensitive to 
issues of exploitation and oppression, of which his fellow northerners were victims. His 
identification with the exploited people of the north predisposed him to empathise with 
them and, at the same time, leading him to easily notice the injustice of Solomon‟s 
regime. His indictment against Solomon referred to the king‟s apostasy, but the choice of 
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Jeroboam does not seem to focus as much on his better moral and spiritual qualities as on 
his abilities as a charismatic leader. Jeroboam was apparently not meant to be to Solomon 
what David was to Saul. He was never described as a man after Yahweh‟s heart who, like 
David, would succeed where his predecessor had failed. The designation of Jeroboam 
seems to aim more at the vindication of the oppressed people of the north than correcting 
Solomon‟s idolatrous practices. 
 
Ahijah is credited for noticing the weaknesses of the king and distancing himself from an 
oppressive regime. In this he stands in contrast to his colleague, Nathan, whose silence 
under the reign of Solomon may indicate that he was not sensitive enough to notice the 
social injustice of the time, or was not objective and bold enough to denounce a regime 
that, though oppressive to the northern tribes, was favourable to his own tribe. The same 
remark may apply to Iddo. 
 
7.4.1.3 The silence of Iddo the seer and prophet 
The person called by this name and connected with the reign of Solomon is first referred 
to as a seer, serving as a historiographer (2 Chronicles 9:29). The designation „seer” in 
Hebrew “ ” is from the ordinary verb “ ”, meaning “see‟. It appears from 1 Samuel 
9:9 that "seer" “ ” was the older name for those who, after the rise of the more regular 
orders, were called "prophets." It is not appropriate, however, to speak of the "seers" or 
"prophets" of Samuel's time as on the level of mere fortune-tellers. Whatever insight or 
vision they possessed is traced to God's Spirit. Samuel was the “ ” by pre-eminence 
and the name is little used after his time.
919
 Another term used for “seer” is “ ”. 
Individuals who, like Iddo, bear the title “ ” are mentioned in connection with the 
kings and as historiographers (2 Samuel 24:11; 1 Chronicles 21:9; 25:5; 29:29; 2 
Chronicles 9:29; 12:15; 19:2, etc.) and distinction is sometimes made between "prophets" 
and "seers" (2 Kings 17:13; 1 Chronicles 29:29, etc.)
920
. Havernick thinks that "seer" 
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denotes one who does not belong to the regular prophetic order,
921
 but it is not easy to fix 
a precise distinction.  
 
The work of Iddo referred to by the Chronicler comprises his visions (2 Chronicles 9:29), 
his genealogies (2 Chronicles 12:15) and his annals (commentary or midrash) (2 
Chronicles 13:22). Since the chronicler says that the visions of Iddo concerning Jeroboam 
the son of Nebat, comprised the acts of Solomon, this seems to suggest that these visions 
occurred during the reign of Solomon. Therefore Iddo was already a seer in the time of 
Solomon. Moreover, Iddo‟s interest with the affairs of the southern kingdom
922
 may 
suggest that he himself was a southerner. 
 
Iddo‟s ministry seems not to have been limited to seeing visions. The Chronicler calls 
him a prophet (2 Chronicles 12:22). He may have been the prophet who denounced 
Jeroboam (1 Kings 13), who is called by Josephus and Jerome Jadon, or Jaddo. If this is 
the case, this was a prophet who had authority and enjoyed enough recognition to 
confront a king. If then he lived in the time of Solomon, he could have been in a position 
to confront him about his unpopular policies, as he apparently did with Jeroboam. Here 
the courage of a southern man of God in speaking out against the policies of a northerner 
king is in sharp contrast with his lenience before the oppressive policies of a king from 
his region and tribe. Maybe Iddo had some vested interests in Solomon‟s regime that 
affected his objectivity. It is possible, for example, that this was the same Iddo whose son 
Ahinadab was one of Solomon‟s governors appointed to implement his policies in 
Mahanain (1 Kings 4:14). Like Nathan, Iddo may have had no motivation to challenge 
the shortcomings of a regime that were not against his personal interest. Or perhaps none 
of these southern prophets had really paid attention to what was happening. Since they 
were not on the side of the victims of exploitation, to them the situation was just normal. 
Such an insensitive attitude was often noted from God‟s servants in Rwanda, who seemed 
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not to notice injustices inflicted by political leaders from their social groups on the people 
of other groups. It seems that Shemaiah behaved differently. 
 
7.4.1.4 Shemaiah’s boldness makes the difference 
Prophet Shemaiah is introduced in the narrative about the division of the kingdom at the 
heat of the crisis. He is the “man of God” who dissuades Rehoboam after this king in his 
frustration had resolved to use military force to restore the kingdom to himself. Shemaiah 
intervenes and convinces the king and his supporters that civil war was neither in God‟s 
will nor in the interests of the people. By so doing, the prophet spares the nation from 
senseless bloodshed. 
 
The ministry of Shemaiah seems to have been marked by his bold stand before 
Rehoboam. Later traditions of the Chronicler report that this same prophet stood before 
Rehoboam and his officers to speak strongly against their perverted regime announcing 
the impeding invasion of Shishak, the Egyptian Pharaoh (2 Chronicles 12:5-7). This time, 
again, the prophet‟s intervention was successful because the king and the people 
recognized their wrongdoing and, according to the Chronicler, the judgment against them 
was mitigated. What is reported about Shemaiah fits well in the role of a prophet at this 
time.
923
 Shemaiah is portrayed as a man of God who was wise enough to distance himself 
from the corrupt practices in Rehoboam‟s time and bold enough to confront the king 
whenever he erred. By faithfully doing his prophetic ministry, he saves the whole nation 
from impending tragedies. If Shemaiah was a Judean prophet, as is suggested,
924
 he is to 
be credited also for overcoming the bond of his tribal ties with the regime, which could 
have blinded him and rendered him insensitive to its mistakes.  
 
Shemaiah is portrayed as the man of God who speaks the word of God. Through him 
God‟s position on human conflict is made known unambiguously: it is not God‟s will that 
brothers fight one another. Even when they belong to different tribes, they are still 
brothers. This reality is perceived and proclaimed by a man of God who does not allow 
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his/her personal interests, agenda or tribal identity, to interfere with God‟s will and God‟s 
truth. Nathan was that man of God under David, but under Solomon, when he involves 
himself in the court‟s intrigues, he is no longer the prophet sent by God. Ahijah 
discharged his prophetic role in opposing the oppression of, and siding with, the exploited 
northern tribes. Maybe his kinship with them predisposed him to sympathize with their 
condition. The diverse attitude of these prophets of Israel illuminates the attitude of 
God‟s servants in Rwanda.  
 
7.4.2 Attitude of God’s people in social conflicts in Rwanda 
Although Rwanda has never been a theocracy, the influence of the church has been an 
important factor contributing to the making of the history of the nation. From the advent 
of Christianity in Rwanda, the action and inaction of the church influenced the turn of 
events that shaped Rwandan history.  Throughout Rwandan history Christians and church 
leaders have been part and parcel of social conflicts. God‟s people have often been 
criticized for their involvement in politics, or for their involvement for the wrong 
motives. They have also been criticized for doing nothing to prevent or solve crises.  
 
The Catholic Church of the colonial period was best positioned to influence the action of 
the colonial administration.  Unfortunately the considerable authority that the church 
possessed was not used to defend the just cause. Instead of speaking for the voiceless and 
exploited Hutu masses, the Catholic Church opted for siding with the oppressing regimes, 
directly participating in the oppression by promoting discrimination and exclusion. When 
they later shifted their sympathy from the Tutsi to favour the Hutu, it became even more 
apparent that their preoccupation was not social justice. In Israel, Nathan performed 
excellently in his early ministry at David‟s court, especially in the case of Uriah. Later, in 
the time of Solomon, his attitude was as disappointing as that of the Catholic Church in 
Rwanda. As Nathan did under Solomon, the intervention of the church was evident when 
it was about supporting political leaders, but blatantly lacking when it was about 




The weak Protestant churches of the colonial period remained marginalized in the 
Catholic-controlled post-independence regime. Their relative emancipation by the 
Habyarimana regime still kept then in a position of weakness in their preoccupation to 
remain on good terms with the regime.   The same preoccupation to stay on the good side 
of the regime may be behind the attitude of Nathan under Solomon and it may be a 
plausible explanation for the silence of Iddo. But the silence of Protestant leaders in the 
presence of social injustices in Rwanda mainly resulted from giving in to the intimidation 
from political authorities, insensitivity to the plight of the oppressed masses, a poor grasp 
of their prophetic responsibility or the pursuit of personal interests, which would be 
jeopardized if the concerned religious leader was not on good terms with the politician.  
 
A recurrent phenomenon observed is the tendency for religious leaders to note and 
denounce social injustices committed against their kins-people and to remain silent when 
their related groups are the oppressors.   It took a northern prophet, Ahijah, to note and 
oppose the abuses perpetrated by a southern king, Solomon, and endured by northern 
people. Were there no prophets in the south? The Rwandan experience has shown that 
few Tutsi servants of God have ever noted and openly spoken against injustices endured 
by Hutu under Tutsi regimes and vice versa, few Hutu in the church have noted and 
denounced Tutsi oppression by Hutu regimes. Instead, whenever political power moves 
from one social group to the rival group, church leadership tends to change accordingly. 
The result has been that when the Hutu were exploited, Tutsi leaders of the church did not 
do much to speak for them. When Tutsi are oppressed by Hutu political regimes, it takes 
time for the Hutu leadership of the church even to be aware that something bad is 
happening to the Tutsi. If the church is to perform its prophetic role in Rwandan society it 
needs to arise above tribal politics and assert its independence from the state.  
 
7.4.3 Summary  
In Rwanda, as in Israel, the failure of God‟s people to discharge their prophetic role 
resulted in their inability to prevent social crises. The failure can be explained by a 
number of weaknesses that are similar in both contexts. These include a narrow 
understanding of the social responsibility of God‟s servants. In both contexts spiritual 
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leaders allowed for exploitative and oppressive political regimes to go unquestioned, 
maybe thinking that it was not their business to be involved in politics. In many cases 
those who were supposed to speak out were not directly concerned by the oppression 
perpetrated by their tribesmen against the “other” group.  To some, tribal identification 
with those holding political power may have prevented their sensitivity to the suffering 
“outsiders”. It was easier for those who were not feeling the weight of discrimination to 
remain indifferent. To others, it was probably fear or lack of boldness that neutralised 
them. They were not courageous enough to accept the risk of confronting the rulers. 
Others, maybe, had vested interests in the regimes which they willingly protected, 
overlooking their weaknesses and sacrificing social justice at the altar of personal 
interest. It is the ambiguous behaviour of God‟s servants in Rwanda that confused the 
people with respect to their understanding of God‟s attitude to the conflicts. If the 
contemporary church of Rwanda is to make a difference, more “Shemiah-like” 
messengers of God are needed in the country, who, regardless of their tribal identity, will 
make known the God of peace, opposed to conflicts among brothers.  
 
In Rwanda, as in Israel, God‟s people are criticised either for the absence of their voice 
denouncing social injustices or for their direct involvement in politics not in the interests 
of the oppressed. Today, a number of church leaders have decided to be fully involved in 
politics, not as “prophets”, with God‟s message to the politicians, but as politicians.  
Whether this is the best way for God‟s servants to discharge their responsibility to the 
society, I will leave for future debate, as I maintain that the role of the Church of God is 
that of contributing towards finding solutions to social problems, rather than participating 
in creating problems or remaining unconcerned in the face of problems. 
 
This chapter has attempted a survey of some major socio-economic and political issues 
involved in the conflicts in Israel and in Rwanda, as discussed in the previous chapters, 
and has examined the extent to which tribal diversity contributed to the conflicts. Issues 
discussed have been grouped into four categories, following the kind of actors whose 
action or inaction contributed to conflicts in both contexts. In the first group, the political 
leaders resolved to monopolize the privileges of power. They failed to organise equitable 
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regimes that guarantee justice and equal access to resources for all. In the second group, 
the people subjected to the inequitable policies of their leaders reacted by dividing 
themselves into social groups according to their sharing interests or challenges. The third 
group is that of the religious leaders and God‟s servants, who, by failing in their prophetic 
role, failed their respective nations and their people. The fourth group is that of the 
external powers, whose interventions were major contributions to the conflicts. Any 






































CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
8.1. Introduction 
This chapter intends to recapitulate various issues pertaining to tribal conflicts covered in 
the present study. It summarises the findings of this study which has analysed the context 
of tribal conflicts that culminated in the Genocide in Rwanda, in dialogue with the 
context of tribal competition that contributed to the division of the kingdom of Israel, 
narrated in 1 Kings 12:1-24. This dialogue has helped in identifying dynamically 
equivalent issues from both contexts that, on the one hand, guided the interpretation of 
the text and, on the other, helped to answer some questions raised by the contemporary 
context of tribal conflict in Rwanda and elsewhere, especially in Africa.  After a 
summary of findings, the chapter concludes with an attempt to answer the questions 
asked at the beginning of the study. Finally, some areas not sufficiently covered by this 
study are pointed out for further research. 
 
8.2 Summary 
This study involved the use of a biblical text, the passage of 1 Kings 12:1-24, that 
narrates the event of the division of the kingdom of Israel. To bring this text in dialogue 
with the contemporary context of conflict in Rwanda, a contextual approach was required 
in order to bridge the gap between the two worlds, the ancient world that shaped the 
biblical text and the contemporary world that conditions the way a contemporary reader 
understands it. To establish this dialogue, this study followed the inculturation 
interpretive approach. The second chapter of this study described, in detail, this 
contextual approach. 
 
Inculturation hermeneutics is an approach to biblical interpretation inspired by the 
concern of African theologians to promote an African interpretation of the Christian faith. 
This concern resulted in the development of African theology. Inculturation biblical 
hermeneutics developed following the same processes followed by African theology, of 
which it was destined to be the expression in the domain of biblical interpretation.  Three 
phases were identified in the development of inculturation hermeneutics. First was the 
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reactive and apologetic phase, characterized by its reactive and apologetic turn in 





 centuries. This was the phase which produced comparative studies, 
undertaken to legitimise African religion and culture. Next was the proactive phase, when 
emphasis was put on the use of the African context as a resource in biblical interpretation. 
Inculturation and liberation methods were expressions of this concern. Then there was the 
reader-centred phase, when new emphases were directed, on the one hand, toward the 
contribution of ordinary readers and, on the other hand, toward the African context, 
which now becomes the subject of biblical interpretation. It is this last aspect that 
influenced the present study. 
 
Inculturation hermeneutics helped especially in the analysis of the two contexts, the 
contemporary context of conflict in Rwanda and the context of the selected biblical text, 
as well as in the use of the contemporary context as the subject of interpretation.  The 
steps suggested by Ukpong in analysing the context were helpful. The inculturation 
hermeneutics were complemented with aspects of the tri-polar interpretive approach, 
especially the phase of this approach called “appropriation”. In this phase the issues 
deemed dynamically equivalent from the two contexts were brought face to face. As the 
Rwandan context was the subject of interpretation it was analysed first. 
 
The analysis of the Rwandan context was the focus of the third chapter of the present 
work. This chapter undertook to analyse and evaluate the situation of social relations 
during the different regimes that led the country from the pre-colonial period to the 
present. The pre-colonial period, the colonial period, the First Republic, the Second 
Republic and the post-Genocide regime each has its contribution to social conflict in 
Rwanda. 
  
It was noted that the pre-colonial period witnessed no conflict among the different social 
groups existing in the country. But the inequality of privileges among social groups in 
that epoch were the root sources of social disharmonies. Beside the monopoly of power 
that was reserved to one social group, to the exclusion of others, most noted were the two 
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institutions, „ubuhake” and “uburetwa”, that resulted in the subordination of some groups 
to the others, with subsequent uneven distribution of resources.  
 
The cattle clientship ubuhake was the chief institution of pre-colonial Rwanda. This was 
a contract by which a Hutu client entrusted himself to a Tutsi patron, who would grant 
him some privileges in terms of usufruct on cattle and land in exchange for commodities 
and services regularly offered by the Hutu servant. This institution could sometime result 
in a personalized relationship between a Hutu client and a Tutsi patron, involving the 
exchange of certain commodities and services. Most of the time, however, it was rather 
exploitative and generative of hierarchical differences between Tutsi and Hutu. Some saw 





Uburetwa was compulsory and non-paid work imposed on Hutu peasants. Sometimes it 
was extended to poor Tutsi, although even in this case the kind of work requested from 
the Tutsi was relatively lighter than that which was requested from the Hutu. The 
discriminatory nature of this institution, coupled with the abuses that characterized it, 
provides additional argument to those who trace the sources of social conflicts in Rwanda 
back to the pre-colonial period. Social relations in pre-colonial Rwanda were not perfect 
and when the colonial powers arrived the situation worsened. 
  
The first colonisers to arrive in Rwanda were Germans. Despite their short stay, the 
Germans contributed to social conflicts in Rwanda in two main ways, first, through their 
indirect rule strategy, then by providing military support to the then ruling Tutsi regime. 
The indirect rule consisted of maintaining unchanged the traditional administration 
structure and controlling the country through local officials who became the executive 
instruments of the colonial power. This strategy gave more power to the Tutsi ruling 
class, at the expense of the downtrodden mass of mainly Hutu peasants.  
 
                                                 
925




In addition to their political support to the ruling Tutsi, the Germans provided the Tutsi 
regime with military assistance that enabled them to conquer the remaining independent 
Hutu kingdoms. With the military support of the German colonizers, the king was able to 
extend his control to the peripheral regions, especially in the north of the country, where 
some Hutu polities had maintained their autonomy vis-à-vis the central state. The 
Germans did contribute to Rwandans‟ social problems, but their contribution cannot 
compare to that of the Belgians who replaced them 
 
Continuing in the path of the Germans, the Belgian colonial administration further 
reinforced the traditional institutions. Under their regime ubuhake and uburetwa were 
extended to regions that had never known these systems of exploitation. The 
administrative reforms introduced by the Belgians were an additional setback to Hutu 
peasants, whose chance to escape exploitation was further reduced. But the greatest 
contribution of the Belgian administration to Rwandan social conflicts was their 
propagation of the Hamitic Hypothesis, an ideology that preached the superiority of the 
Tutsi over other social groups. The Hamitic theory claimed that the Tutsi descend from a 
superior race different from the other social groups and were endowed with exceptional 
skills and characteristics that qualified them to rule over the other “primitive” groups. 
The theory postulated that the Tutsi were aliens who came to conquer the land already 
occupied by the Hutu and the Twa. These claims repeated over and over the front of both 
Hutu and Tutsi, were internalised by many from both groups and they regularly fuelled 
conflicts that set the two groups against each other throughout the history of Rwanda.  
 
The assertion that the Tutsi were born to lead had its logical corollary that they alone 
should have access to education. Belgian administrators who advocated this supremacist 
ideology made sure that the Tutsi remained the sole recipients of colonial education. In 
government and missionary schools, Tutsi sons were trained to serve as auxiliaries of the 
colonial administration and, from among them, new chiefs would be appointed. Thanks to 
this exclusive right to education the Tutsi elites managed to perpetuate themselves in the 
seats of power. Education provided them with the technical skills and training necessary 




Towards the end of the colonial regime, the Belgians shifted their support from the Tutsi, 
who were campaigning for independence, to the Hutu, who were agitating for socio-
political changes. Throughout the events that marked the period of transition from 
colonialism to independence, the Belgians played a determining role, gradually 
destroying or neutralizing all sources of resistance to the Hutu revolutionary movement, 
while at the same time creating new institutions through which further changes 
favourable to the Hutu could be generated. It was under the supervision and 
encouragement of the Belgians that the Hutu militants took power from the Tutsi before 
accession to independence in 1962.  
 
Independence found the Hutu in a position of strength. They had abolished the monarchy 
and proclaimed the republic. They now controlled power. But the transition had been at 
the expense of the Tutsi community.  Targeted by bands of Hutu who burned their huts 
and looted their property, many Tutsi followed the members of the Tutsi elite, who had 
lost their positions and privileges and gone into exile. The former freedom fighters now 
in power were not particularly magnanimous in their victory. Little effort was made 
toward reconciliation. The exclusion of the Hutu from power in the deposed regime was 
replaced by the exclusion of the Tutsi community from participation in the political 
institutions of republican Rwanda. The situation, already tense, was worsened by 
repeated attempts by Tutsi, now in exile, to fight their way back. These external Tutsi 
attacks were always followed by reprisals on the innocent Tutsi who had stayed in the 
country.  The new regime badly failed to repair the damages of a long history of 
exploitation, oppression and rivalries that had generated mistrust and violent conflicts. 
 
It was this climate of social tension that provided a pretext for the putschists to seize 
power in 1973. The second Hutu republic promised to restore social harmony. Their 
slogan was peace and unity. In practice, however, they created more problems than they 
solved. To the historic Hutu/Tutsi divide, they added a sectional one, opposing the north 
to the south. If this regime can be credited for putting an end to violent attacks on the 
Tutsi, it is noted that the peace it granted them was conditional. They were safe as long as 
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they accepted their exclusion from positions of power and their limited access to 
education. The strategy of keeping the Tutsi away from power was behind the decision to 
oppose the return of those living in exile. 
 
The obstinate opposition to the return of the Tutsi refugees provided the Tutsi with a 
pretext to launch an attack against the regime of the Second Hutu republic. The war, 
started by Tutsi refugees, was used to revive the anti-Tutsi sentiment in the country, 
depicting them as the historic enemies and oppressors of the Hutu. This anti-Tutsi 
campaign received a mixed response, as many of those who were disgruntled with the 
regime preferred to overlook their supposed tribal differences and to unite their efforts to 
oppose the regime through political alliances.  
 
The war lasted longer than each fighting party had expected. Meanwhile, the level of 
mistrust had not ceased to increase, so that when the parties were asked to negotiate, there 
was no serious commitment to reconciliation. It was this mistrust that delayed the 
implementation of the negotiations concluded under pressure. The assassination of the 
Hutu president transformed this mistrust into an almost generalized hatred and fear of the 
Tutsi among the Hutu, who were convinced that the Tutsi were out to exterminate the 
Hutu. This fear and hatred were the main forces that drove many who perpetrated the 
Genocide. 
 
The Genocide brought the relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi to its lowest level 
ever. The hate campaign that accompanied it, the number of people it involved as 
perpetrators and victims, the amount of atrocity it caused, and the physical and 
psychological injury it inflicted; all these made the Genocide an unprecedented tragedy in 
the history of social relations in Rwanda and a serious setback for any efforts at 
reconciliation. The rifts in the Hutu/Tutsi relations were even further widened by acts of 
retaliation against the Hutu during the early post-Genocide period, as well as the tragic 
consequences of the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo on Hutu refugees. Among 
the challenges facing the post-Genocide regime in its reconciliation programme is the 
conviction established in the minds of many from both social groups that members of the 
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“other” group are historical and unredeemable enemies. This perception results in a 
climate of constant mistrust, fear and hatred. These feelings could have been overcome 
by the message of the churches, had they been able to effectively discharge their 
prophetic responsibility.  
 
The fourth chapter showed the weaknesses of the Rwandan churches that prevented them 
from making a significant difference, especially in social crises. In this, the Catholic 
Church, through its European missionaries, contributed to social injustices, first, by their 
promotion of the Hamitic theory and in their discriminatory admission of only Tutsi to 
their school. Later, when they decided to support the Hutu uprising, they did this through 
training a Hutu counter-elite and supporting them in many ways. While the Catholic 
Church contributed to Rwandan conflicts through a biased participation, the Protestant 
churches contributed through their complacence, being in many ways deficient in their 
ability to confront socio-political issues.   
 
Having established that the causes of the Rwandan Genocide are rooted in history, we 
studied the context of the division of the kingdom in Israel. The fifth chapter of this work 
focussed on the literary analysis of the passage of 1 Kings 12:1-24, reporting the event of 
the division of the kingdom of Israel. This passage was located first in its broader context 
of the former prophets narrating the life of the people of Israel in the Promised Land 
under different modes of leadership.  Then the focus of analysis shifted toward the 
immediate literary context of the passage, the narrative reported in the book of Kings 
about Israel under the reign of David‟s house.   
 
The analysis of the division narrative revealed that the division, interpreted as Yahweh‟s 
judgment of Solomon‟s apostasy, resulted from the failed negotiations between 
Rehoboam and the representative of the northern tribes. It was found that the issue at 
stake had all to do with socio-economic and political problems that existed even before 
Rehoboam‟s accession. The monarchical regime that had displaced the charismatic kind 
of leadership was making high demands on the people, whose determination to stop their 
oppression met with the intransigence of their king. It was noted that the revolt that 
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resulted was not directed against King Rehoboam alone, but against the house of David. 
Moreover, the secession that ensued followed tribal lines. The tribal connotations of this 
conflict justified the need for a socio-historical analysis aimed at examining the history of 
social relations in Israel. This was the focal point of the sixth chapter of this study 
 
The discussion of social relations in Israel considered two periods in the history of Israel, 
namely the pre-monarchical period, referred to as the tribal period, and the period of the 
united monarchy. Different hypotheses explaining the emergence of Israel in Canaan 
were surveyed. It appeared from these hypotheses that Israel emerged as a tribal 
confederation in Palestine during the period of transition from the Late Bronze Age to 
Iron Age I. It is contended that the sense of kinship and mutual loyalty which these tribes 
came to share emerged gradually after the settlement, due to such factors as geographical 
proximity, similar lifestyles elicited by the physical features of the mountainous regions, 
shared sanctuaries and the necessity of combined warfare during the pre-monarchical 
period. Yahwism, a new religious movement brought by a group referred to as the 
„Exodus group”, transcended tribal religion and created solidarity among pre-existent 
social units. The basic characteristic of this confederacy included a common concern for 
the Yahwistic cult, shared laws and ideology, a commitment to economic egalitarianism 
and a readiness to organize military opposition against external forces such as the 




In the post-settlement period, Israel was an egalitarian society without centralized 
institutions. As in any segmented society, the organization of power and leadership 
followed lineage systems and kinship units.  Charismatic deliverers called judges were 
nominated as ad hoc leaders to meet the need of the moment and their power ended with 
their specific mission. The judges were generally called individually and seldom sought 
to establish ruling dynasties through which they could eventually confer on their tribes 
some long-term privileged status that could attract jealousies and competitions from other 
tribes. The social structure of this time was not favourable to a scramble for power. 
Ranking privileges, which typify tribes with chiefdoms, were fiercely resisted and the 
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claim of certain families to greater wealth and honour than others ran against the grain of 
the egalitarian levelling mechanisms guarded by the protective family associations.  
Attempts to establish dynastic monarchy were resisted until the time when internal and 
external conditions called for it. 
 
With the institution of the monarchy, Israel progressively changed from an egalitarian to 
a hierarchical society. The centralised regime of the monarchy provided permanent 
leadership and reinforced political integration and cohesion of different tribes. But this 
was accompanied by the emergence of an administrative apparatus with a group of 
specialists in whose hands were concentrated the society‟s resources. From a few people 
in the service of King Saul, the system grew to become a fully fledged administration in 
the time of Solomon, with a good number of administrative officers needing to be 
sustained from the rapidly dwindling surplus of the peasant masses. Leadership positions 
increasingly moved away from the charismatic type, which were intended primarily to 
serve the people, to patrimonial regimes with a hierarchy of local leaders mostly chosen 
from the close relatives of the central figure, who entrusted them with power and socio-
economic privileges. They acted as representatives of the central authority in their 
constituencies. 
 
The king‟s tribesmen surrounding him began to believe that they were the legitimate 
custodians of political power and were not ready to share it, let alone relinquish it to any 
other tribe, without contestation. Had Zibah, Shebah, Mephiboshet or Abner, each in his 
time, had enough military power, the throne of Israel could probably not have moved 
from Benjamin to Judah. It was because of his military power and the support of his 
tribesmen that David conquered the throne and reigned over a dual monarchy of Israel 
and Judah. Under David, the people of Judah attempted to assert pre-eminence over other 
tribes, with this attitude embittering the northern tribes who attempted to mount a number 
of rebellions, easily quelled by David‟s superior military power.  David‟s same power 





Solomon inherited an emerging empire from his father, together with enough prestige to 
command submission from all the tribes. His father David had spent his time expanding 
the emerging empire; Solomon undertook to re-organize and develop it.  This re-
organization was done at the expense of tribal leaders, the elders, who lost their power to 
Solomon‟s men. The immense projects he initiated weighed heavily on the people, who 
were bearing the cost of the opulence of Solomon‟s court and the maintenance of his 
harem. More importantly, the northern tribes came to believe that they were exploited by 
the southerners, who were taxed less and who enjoyed more access to resources and 
power. Solomon‟s administration increased bitterness among the northern tribes, whose 
power and influence had been eclipsed by the rise of David‟s house.  
 
Jeroboam, a mighty man from the north, attempted a rebellion, but Solomon was strong 
enough to prevail. Towards the end of Solomon‟s reign his empire declined, losing most 
of the territories earlier annexed by David. At his death, Solomon left behind a kingdom 
weakened by external conflicts from neighbouring countries fighting to recover their 
sovereignty.  It was with less prestige and less authority that Rehoboam succeeded his 
father. At the very beginning of his reign Rehoboam faced the unhappy northerners, who 
were determined to do away with what they perceived as oppression from David‟s house.  
Rehoboam‟s young courtiers advised him to ignore the people‟s request for relief from 
hard labour. His intransigence provided the northern tribes with a motive to successfully 
rebel against this weak and stubborn king, forming their own kingdom. The secession 
was interpreted as Yahweh‟s judgement on Solomon‟s apostasy, but it was a result of 
socio-economic and political conflicts with roots traceable back to the beginning of the 
monarchy.   
 
The context of conflict in Israel was further examined in the light of the context of 
conflict in Rwanda in Chapter Seven of this study. The issues taken from these different 
contexts that allowed for space for comparative dialogue revolved around four categories 
of contributors to the conflicts, namely, the political leaders, the people, external 




It was noted that, through the practice described as patrimonialism, political leaders in 
Israel and in Rwanda surrounded themselves with people from their own tribes. In so 
doing the central figures hoped to secure loyalty and support from the people they could 
generally trust the most. They granted them strategic positions, making them stakeholders 
whose vested interest in the regimes would motivate them to support and defend them. As 
such influential groups of privileged elites grew stronger, they were able to highjack the 
control of power and silence the voices supporting social justice. The Genocide became 
possible in Rwanda not because the majority of Rwandan necessarily wanted it, but 
because most of those who did not support it were not able to successfully oppose it. 
Similarly, wise people who wanted harmony in Israel witnessed the division of the 
kingdom, but could not stop it. The effects of patrimonialism in both contexts were the 
division of the people into those who had access to power and privileges, which they 
were determined to defend, and those who felt excluded and were united by their shared 
determination to resist and claim their rights.  
 
It emerged from this study that shared interests and common challenges are catalysts of 
social unity, while diverging interests loosen kinship ties. The claim that the unifying 
factor and the stronger bond of relationship of a given society is created by the fact of 
blood relationship
927
 cannot be pushed to the extent of  concluding that social diversity is 
an obstacle to social unity. It was observed that blood relationship in itself is not the sine 
qua non for social unity. The possibility that one people of Israel may have emerged from 
a diversity of tribes may strengthen the argument that tribal diversity is not necessarily an 
obstacle to social unity. The present study argued that blood ties are not the unifying 
factor alone, but one phenomenon around which more shared and vital interests revolve. 
Blood kinship loses its force whenever there is a conflict of interests, even among 
siblings. In Israel, as in Rwanda, there were times in each society when social diversity 
was not much of a problem. Shared goals, or a threat from a common enemy, brought 
together social groups, minimizing their differences. Conflict among them resulted from 
attempts of one group to monopolize privileges to the exclusion of the other group. 
Competition encouraged rivalries, divisions and enmity.  
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Under the pressure of conflicting interests kinship relations became irrelevant and 
obsolete. In both the contexts of Israel and Rwanda, social groups that initially affirmed 
their shared identity ended up treating each other as aliens when they were competing for 
power and associated privileges. Unity for the Hutu and Tutsi of Rwanda will not 
necessarily be reached by proving that the two groups are not (or used not to be) tribes. 
Tribes or no tribes, what they need is to be delivered from whatever issues that 
antagonize them today and to be encouraged to work together for the common interests 
and against one common „enemy‟. The disappearance of Hutu and Tutsi categories may 
not prevent people from grouping into other equally or more harmful categories. 
Mamdani has recorded, for example, the appearance of new categories in the post-
Genocide groupings (or rather dividings), separating Rwandans into returnees, refugees, 
victims, survivors and perpetrators.
928
  These categories that have taken root in Rwanda 
are not empty rhetoric, because there are privileges or prejudices attached to each. 
 
The present study has illustrated that the Rwandan Genocide and the division of the 
kingdom resulted from internal conflicts, to which external powers contributed. External 
intervention in internal conflicts is often justified by the alleged noble motives of the 
intervening parties. The enthusiasm to offer help is often said to be based on friendship, 
compassion for the suffering people, promotion of human rights, social justice, 
democracy and other laudable motives. Strategic interests are rarely formally 
acknowledged, though they remain the sine qua non for any intervention. Friends are 
always available, ready to come in if only this will offer them the occasion to “fish in the 
troubled water”. Sometimes the external intervention determines the outcome of the 
conflict. For this reason, the prevention or resolution of an internal conflict requires 
considering and adequately addressing the external factor involved. 
 
External intervention, as opportunistic as it can be, is most of the time facilitated by 
internal selfishness, from groups of people who prioritise their own interests or the 
interests of a small group, to the detriment of the interests of the whole people.  Foreign 
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powers may have interests in internal conflicts, but they rarely create conflicts from 
scratch. The conflicts in Israel and in Rwanda, as discussed in this work, originated from 
within the respective communities.  In both contexts, the conflicts resulted from the 
failure of social groups to equitably share the privileges and responsibilities that their 
respective nations offered.  In both cases, social groups resorted to exclusion and 
exploitation and oppression to enjoy the monopoly of those privileges. Most of the time, 
the intervening foreign powers were either invited or welcomed and supported by internal 
parties.  
 
In Rwanda, as in Israel, the failure of God‟s servants to discharge their prophetic role 
resulted in their inability to prevent social crises. The failure can be explained by a 
number of weaknesses that are similar in both contexts. These include a narrow 
understanding of the social responsibility of God‟s servants. Many church leaders in 
Rwanda, and apparently some prophets during the united monarchy in Israel, allowed for 
exploitative and oppressive political regimes to go unquestioned, maybe thinking that it 
was not their business to be involved in politics. In many cases, those who were supposed 
to speak out were not directly concerned by the oppression perpetrated by their tribesmen 
against the “other” tribes. It was the Ephraimite Ahijah who prophesied against the 
southern king. Similarly the Tutsi-dominated church of the colonial period seems not to 
have been very sensitive to the exploitation of the Hutu masses. When the Hutu took over 
the leadership of the church, they seem not to have paid much attention to the pain of the 
Tutsi community. 
 
To some religious leaders, their tribal identification with those holding political power 
prevented their identification with the oppressed. It was easier for those who were not 
feeling the weight of discrimination to remain indifferent. To others, it was fear or lack of 
boldness that neutralised them. They were not courageous enough to accept the risk of 
confronting the rulers. Others, maybe, had vested interests in the regimes which they 
willingly protected, overlooking their weaknesses and sacrificing social justice at the altar 
of personal interests. The Israelite prophet Shemiah was singled out as a model for God‟s 
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The Genocide that happened in Rwanda in 1994 was a culmination of a long period of 
conflict between the two main social groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi, who never agreed to 
share equitably the leadership responsibilities of the nation and subsequent privileges. 
Throughout history, the different regimes that governed Rwanda were monopolized by 
one of the two groups. Each time that one of the two was in power, it adopted exclusivist 
ideologies and oppressive strategies that aimed at keeping the rival group in a powerless 
position, to prevent them from becoming strong enough to challenge the regime.  While 
power struggles were maintained at the level of the elite from the rival groups, the 
implied scramble for access to the limited resources brought the conflict to the level of 
the masses, often called upon by their respective kinsfolk in the elite group. Rivalries and 
competitions for power developed into jealousies, mistrust, hatred and fear, sentiments 
that fuelled the Genocide. 
 
In the same way, the division of the kingdom was a reaction to the monopoly of power 
and abuse of it by one tribe at the expense of the other tribes. Dynastic patrimonial 
monarchy, with its hierarchy and exclusion, had failed to unite the people. During the 
period of the united monarchy, the tribe of the king monopolized the power and 
attempted to hold on to it. Under David and his sons, social division fuelled rebellions, 
but it was the oppressive policies implemented especially by Solomon‟s administration 
that exacerbated tensions and triggered the revolt that ended in secession. The details 
discussed in this work concerning these conflicts allow us to answer the questions we 
asked at the beginning, as follows: 
 
8.3.1 What are the root-causes of the conflict that led to the Genocide in Rwanda and 





The decision to annihilate the Tutsi in Rwanda was not taken by the masses of Hutu 
people, although many of them took an active part in its implementation. It was taken by 
powerful extremists among the Hutu elite who saw in this “final solution” a way to 
prevent a rival group from snatching power from them. For many of these Hutu leaders, 
Tutsi rule meant an end to the pre-eminence of the Hutu, which this group had enjoyed 
since independence, and a return to Tutsi oppression, which the Hutu had endured before 
the independence. The Hutu acted out of mistrust, fear and hate, sentiments that were 
rooted in the history of rivalries, exclusion and oppression.  The historic aspect of the 
roots of the Genocide can be summarized in what Mamdani had called the victim 
psychology. Referring to the cycle of violence between Hutu and Tutsi, he states:  
 
Ever since the colonial period, the cycle of violence has been fed by a victim 
psychology on both sides. Every round of perpetrators has justified the use of 
violence as the only effective guarantee against being victimized yet again. For 
the unreconciled victim of yesterday‟s violence, the struggle continues. The 
continuing tragedy of Rwanda is that each round of violence gives us yet another 




The Genocide had its roots in history but it also had immediate causes. For extremist 
Hutu, losing the war implied losing power. It was this perspective of seeing power pass to 
the Tutsi that led them to opt for the “final solution”. The war situation made it easy for 
more extremists to convince the masses that the Tutsi constituted an immediate threat to 
their lives. The threatened people easily heeded the message to kill-first-not-to-be-killed. 
 
The event of the division of the kingdom is obviously different from the event of the 
Genocide. The similarities are found in the causes of the two events. Like the Rwandan 
Genocide, the division of the kingdom had its immediate causes, the obduracy of 
Jeroboam who ignored the plight of the exploited people, and causes rooted in history, 
namely, socio-political conflicts that dated back from the rise of the monarchy.  
 
8.3.2 How does the attitude of the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda compare to that of the 
competing tribes in Israel? 
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Before independence, the Tutsi in Rwanda monopolized power and excluded the Hutu. 
Holding on to power resulted in a violent transition when the Hutu revolted in 1959. 
After the Hutu seized power in 1961 it was their turn to practise monopoly and exclusion. 
Their opposition to the idea of sharing power with the Tutsi in 1994 resulted in the 
Genocide. 
 
The same attitude is observed with the tribes that ruled in Israel. Under King Saul the 
Benjamites enjoyed the privileges of power and ended up believing that they had 
exclusive right to the throne. When David began to rise, the transition could not be 
smooth.  A good number of Benjaminites paid with their lives in their attempt to defend 
the throne against the men of David. The conflicting groups in both situations were 
antagonized by their failure to equitably share power and resources.  
 
8.3.3 How do we evaluate the role and attitude of religious leaders in the two conflicts 
in the light of their responsibility to the people and their prophetic role toward the 
political leaders? 
 
It was noted that the presence of the church did not make the expected impact in times of 
conflict and social injustice in Rwanda. Most of the time, the leaders of the church 
echoed the ideologies promoted by the political leaders. In pre-independent Rwanda, the 
Tutsi leaders of the church seem not to have been dedicated defenders of the plight of the 
oppressed Hutu masses. In independent Rwanda, Hutu leaders did not do much to 
condemn the discrimination against the Tutsi. It appears as if each group of leaders of the 
church were inclined either to overlook, condone, or to support the discriminative 
ideologies and strategies adopted by their tribesmen in the politic. For some, such 
behaviour was caused by ignorance of their responsibility, for others it was fear of being 





Diverse attitudes were noted with Israelite prophets in the time of David and his house. 
Nathan was portrayed as a prophet who started well, providing the advice that the king 
needed and confronting him when it was necessary. But he could not resist the attractive 
charms of power and influence. He involved himself in the intrigues of David‟s court and 
could not help the king he supported to avoid social injustices. It was Ahijah, a 
northerner, who, maybe because of his identification with the oppressed, secretly opposed 
a regime that oppressed his tribesmen and prophesied against it. Shemaiah stands as a 
good example of a servant of God who discharged his prophetic ministry. He dared to 
differ with the king from his tribe, preventing him from harming the northerners, rivals of 
his own tribe. The church of Rwanda needs prophets like Shemaiah.  
 
8.3.4 God is said to have not only allowed the division of the kingdom but even to have 
ordained it as a reaction against the failure of political leaders to keep his 
statutes and judgments ( ). What is the possible socio-political element 
involved in this sin attributed to the leaders of the people? 
 
According to the terms of the covenant that Yahweh made with David (2 Samuel 7:8-16), 
especially the version of it repeated to Solomon (1 Kings 1-9), Solomon was not only 
warned against idolatry but urged to keep Yahweh‟s “instructions and judgments” if he 
was to fully enjoy Yahweh‟s favour. The biblical redactor explained the decline of the 
empire under Solomon as a result of God‟s judgement on Solomon‟s idolatry. In the 
narration of events, however, there is no direct link established between idolatry and the 
secession that followed the failed negotiations at Shechem. Solomon‟s reported 
weaknesses surely included idolatrous practices, caused by his marrying many pagan 
wives and building shrines for their gods. In addition to this costly harem, Birch has 
observed that details of Solomonic policy and activity show a dismantling of covenantal 
practices rooted in the Yahwistic Sinai tradition in favour of institutions and practices 
largely modelled on Canaanite/Phoenician or Egyptian practices.
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funding which was obtained mainly through heavy taxation and forced labour. This kind 
of situation was definitely not conforming to God‟s instructions and judgments and was 
not approved by Yahweh. It is observed that: 
 
What happens under Solomon‟s administrative policies is that the concern for 
equitable distribution of economic resources reflected in the covenant law codes 
was displaced by an economics of privilege that begins to create sharp class 
divisions of wealthy and poor within Israel. The redivision of tribal territories 
signals the beginning of forced shift in land tenure and inheritance that moves 
land out of the realm of continuous family inheritance and initiate the 
accumulation of land by royal retainers and wealthy elite classes associated with 
royal power structures. The eventual outcome of these economic shifts that begin 
under Solomon can be seen particularly in the economic practices condemned by 




If Yahweh judged Solomon, this was not only for his idolatry but also for failing to 
follow his instructions and judgments with respect to his treatment of the people he was 
trusted to care for. Birch observes that, under Solomon, political power had displaced the 
emphasis on justice in the covenant law codes. The weak and the poor no longer had real 
access to the precincts of royal decision-making.
932
 This was the socio-political aspect of 
Solomon‟s sin and it highlights the socio-political responsibility of God‟s servants in 
Rwanda today. The church that is not concerned with social justice cannot claim to be 
fulfilling its mission. 
 
8.3.5 How does God’s involvement in the conflict affect the human character of the 
conflict which had an obvious tribal element? How does this apply to the tribal 
conflict in Rwanda? 
 
The narrator of the event of the division of the kingdom made God‟s participation in the 
events so plain that one may conclude that the fate was already sealed and inevitable, 
since God had ordained it. The report of Solomon‟s idolatry is followed by that of God‟s 
action in raising enemies against the unfaithful king. It is God who sends prophet Ahijah 
to announce judgment. Reporting on the obduracy of Rehoboam that exacerbated the 
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crisis, the redactor is quick to add that the “thing” came from Yahweh. At the end, when 
the secession is complete, the prophet Shemaiah announces that the fait accompli could 
not be challenged because God had ordained it.   
  
Despite this repeated reference to God‟s intervention, however, nowhere is he referred to 
as using his irresistible power to force any of the involved parties to behave in a 
particular way. The enemies raised against Solomon are Hadad and Rezon, both of whom 
had good reason to rise against Solomon. Yahweh did not push them to fight Solomon. 
The foolish answer of Solomon was not dictated by Yahweh but by a clique of the king‟s 
friends wishing to hold on to their privileges. Even the prophets who spoke in favour of 
the rebellion did not compel anybody to do anything in the name of Yahweh. The main 
characters who actively contributed to the division of the kingdom had their own 
agendas. Their preoccupation was not to fulfil God‟s plan. They did what they chose to 
do and were responsible for their own behaviour. The understanding that God planned the 
division does not exonerate any of the intervening parties from their responsibility for 
their acts. God‟s intervention in the conflict did not interfere with the deliberate decisions 
of each of the parties. God did not behave like a supreme power, manipulating the people 
and pushing them to do what otherwise they would not have done. 
 
The image of such a God using his power to control the actions of men and women is 
understood in the complaint of those who lament God‟s absence during the Rwandan 
Genocide. For many, if God is who he is said to be, he was expected to prevent or stop 
the Genocide. But, like the division of the kingdom, the Rwandan Genocide was a purely 
human conflict. It was produced by a succession of historical events in which the parties 
acted deliberately and in which they are fully responsible for their actions. Both the 
division of the kingdom in Israel and the Rwandan Genocide were primarily products of 
human mistakes and wickedness, not the result of God‟s activity or inactivity. If the 
present Rwandan society watches to avoid the same or similar mistakes, God will surely 
not impose any Genocide on us. If we fail to reconcile and promote unity, we shall surely 





8.4. Further research 
This study has shown that the division of the kingdom in Israel and the Genocide in 
Rwanda were the culmination of a long history of tribal conflicts. These conflicts 
revolved around the monopolization of power and the associated privileges and the 
exclusion and exploitation of the dominated social groups.  There are some aspects of 
these conflicts in the two contexts which were not sufficiently covered because of the 
limited scope of this study but which could be a helpful complement to this study. In 
addition to some of the aspects mentioned in the summaries ending the four sections of 
Chapter Seven, I would recommend further research on the following two issues. 
 
Discussions concerning the history of social conflicts in Rwanda have focussed on the 
relations between the two main social groups, the Hutu and the Tutsi. Very little is said 
about the third social group, the Twa. Although this is a minority group that has never 
been the main party in any social conflict, the Twa were always affected by the conflicts. 
It would be interesting to investigate the historical relation between the Twa and the two 
other social groups and its role, place and challenges in building peace and unity in 
Rwanda.   
 
The discussion of the role of the church in social conflicts concentrated on the mainline 
churches that had a significant presence, from the colonisation era to the time of the 
Genocide. After the Genocide more (mainly Pentecostal) denominations increased in 
number and importance and they have been working among the Rwandan people for 
about 15 years now. It would be interesting to study the impact of the broader church 
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